Hiroshima 65 Years Later: US Offers No Apology

[Pete S]

Chemical agents such as mustard gas were being considered until Little Boy was confirmed for use.
Japan is just complaining because they had to loose face.
We deserve their thanks.

[The Reaper]

Originally Posted by Sigaba

FWIW, for decades, diplomatic historians have agreed broadly that factors beyond military expediency shaped the decision to use atomic weapons. Not the least of these factors was how having atomic weapons might shape America's relations with the USSR following the war. Moreover, scholars have challenged the long-standing belief that hundreds of thousands of servicemen would have perished had the U.S. invaded the Japanese home islands. For instance, Rufus Miles found that military planners never projected casualty figures close to Truman's oft-cited 500,000. Barton Bernstein found that worst case scenarios had projections of 46,000 casualties. Bernstein and Robert L. Messer believed that Truman used such a large number to assuage lingering ambivalence over his decision.*
__________________________________________________ _______
* J. Samuel Walker, "The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update," Diplomatic History , 14:1 (1990): 97-114, but especially104-106; Walker, "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground," Diplomatic History, 29:2 (2005): 311-344. especially, 325-326 and 328-329.

Given that we lost 50,000 troops taking Okinawa, and the Japanese military lost over 100,000, with another 100,000 Japanese civilians comprising 25% of the island's population dead, I find Bernstein's numbers laughable.

TR

[kgoerz]

Originally Posted by The Reaper

The Japanese are, IMHO, culturally in denial about their military aggression as the primary cause of WW II in the PTO, and the atrocities that their soldiers committed, not just against the US military, but against military and civilians in virtually every country that they invaded. China and the Phillipines spring immediately to mind as examples.

Perhaps if they were to apologize and accept the fact that they started the war in the Pacific (many years before Pearl Harbor) and their crimes against humanity, they would see that the measures we took to end the war, while harsh, were no more than was reasonable at the time.

Burned to death by a nuke or an incendiary is all the same to me. I do not see a nuclear weapon as anything more than a time and space saver. Dead is dead. Would the Japanese be happier if we took the time and resources to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki into rubble like Tokyo, then burned them to the ground conventionally and conducted an amphibious invasion of the island, losing a million American lives and the majority of their civilian population in the process? Look at the civilian casualties from Okinawa (including suicides) as a predictor.

I do not see an apology being necessary. Both sides did what they had to. The Imperial Japanese could have either not attacked the US, or sued for peace at any time they chose, which they did, after the two nuclear weapons were employed. I have no issue with the targeting decision. The intent was to get the Emperor and his military staff to see the futility, suffering and cost to the Japanese people of protracting the lost campaign.

Just my .02, YMMV.

TR

Agree, it seems the Japanese should apologize to their own people for opening up a Can of Whoop Ass on themselves.

[Sigaba]

Originally Posted by ZonieDiver

Sometimes, academics are just that.

<<SNIP>>

To think that there would only be 46,000 casualties in the conquest of the Japanese mainland is preposterous.

Originally Posted by The Reaper

Given that we lost 50,000 troops taking Okinawa, and the Japanese military lost over 100,000, with another 100,000 Japanese civilians comprising 25% of the island's population dead, I find Bernstein's numbers laughable.

TR

ZD and TR--

With respect, I would like to point out that the operative word in my post is "found." This is to say Bernstein's number is based upon research in declassified government documents. FWIW, Bernstein's article is available here. End note #6 has the citation for the specific record of the U.S. Joint War Plans Committee.

IMO, the fact that historians such as Bernstein have challenged successfully long standing views of this subject does not invalidate Truman's decision. YMMV.

[TrapLine]

Originally Posted by ZonieDiver

As one whose father wad slated to be in the invasion, I am glad Pres. Truman had the brass to drop the bombs (of which there were only two).

I feel the same way, ZonieDiver. My grandfather had returned from the ETO and was making his way to the PTO at the time. The decision by Pres. Truman allowed him to return home. My mother was the youngest of five, and the only post WW II child in the family.

[Richard]

So, did Japan fear the Red Army more than the A-bomb? View that fear of Soviets, rather than A-bomb, forced Japan's surrender gains traction among Historians.

Something to consider.

And so it goes...

Richard

Historians Rethink Key Soviet Role In Japan Defeat
AP, 15 Aug 2010

As the United States dropped its atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, 1.6 million Soviet troops launched a surprise attack on the Japanese army occupying eastern Asia. Within days, Emperor Hirohito's million-man army in the region had collapsed.

It was a momentous turn on the Pacific battleground of World War II, yet one that would be largely eclipsed in the history books by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the same week 65 years ago. But in recent years some historians have argued that the Soviet action served as effectively as – or possibly more than – the A-bombs in ending the war.

Now a new history by a professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara, seeks to reinforce that view, arguing that fear of Soviet invasion persuaded the Japanese to opt for surrender to the Americans, who they believed would treat them more generously than the Soviets.

Japan's forces in northeast Asia first tangled with the Russians in 1939 when the Japanese army tried to invade Mongolia. Their crushing defeat at the battle of Khalkin Gol induced Tokyo to sign a neutrality pact that kept the U.S.S.R. out of the Pacific war.

Tokyo turned its focus to confronting U.S., British and Dutch forces instead, which led to the Pearl Harbor attack on Dec. 7, 1941.

But following the German surrender on May 8, 1945, and having suffered a string of defeats in the Philippines, Okinawa and Iwo Jima, Japan turned to Moscow to mediate an end to the Pacific war.

However, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had already promised Washington and London that he would attack Japan within three months of Germany's defeat. He thus ignored Tokyo's plea and mobilized more than a million troops along Manchuria's border.

Operation August Storm was launched Aug. 9, 1945, as the Nagasaki bomb was dropped, and would claim the lives of 84,000 Japanese and 12,000 Soviet soldiers in two weeks of fighting. The Soviets ended up just 30 miles from Japan's main northern island, Hokkaido.

"The Soviet entry into the war played a much greater role than the atomic bombs in inducing Japan to surrender because it dashed any hope that Japan could terminate the war through Moscow's mediation," said Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, whose recently published Racing the Enemy examines the conclusion of the Pacific war and is based on recently declassified Soviet archives as well as U.S. and Japanese documents.

"The emperor and the peace party [within the government] hastened to end the war expecting that the Americans would deal with Japan more generously than the Soviets," Hasegawa, a Russian-speaking American scholar, said in an interview.

Despite the death toll from the atomic bombings – 140,000 in Hiroshima and 80,000 in Nagasaki – the Imperial Military Command believed it could hold out against an Allied invasion if it retained control of Manchuria and Korea, which provided Japan with the resources for war, according to Hasegawa and Terry Charman, a historian of World War II at London's Imperial War Museum.

"The Soviet attack changed all that," Charman said. "The leadership in Tokyo realized they had no hope now, and in that sense August Storm did have a greater effect on the Japanese decision to surrender than the dropping of the A-bombs."

In the U.S., the bombings are still widely seen as a decision of last resort against an enemy that appeared determined to fight to the death. President Harry S. Truman and U.S. military leaders believed an invasion of Japan would cost hundreds of thousands of American lives.

The impact of the Soviet invasion comes through in the words of Japan's wartime prime minister, Kantaro Suzuki, urging his Cabinet to surrender.

He is quoted in Hasegawa's book as saying: "If we miss [the chance] today, the Soviet Union will take not only Manchuria, Korea and Sakhalin, but also Hokkaido. We must end the war while we can deal with the United States."

V-J Day, the day Japan ceased fighting, came on Aug. 15 (Aug. 14 in the U.S.), and Japan's formal surrender followed on Sept. 2.

http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcont...1.356350e.html

[grog18b]

Originally Posted by Richard

So, did Japan fear the Red Army more than the A-bomb? View that fear of Soviets, rather than A-bomb, forced Japan's surrender gains traction among Historians.

Something to consider.

And so it goes...

Richard

So... the Soviets owe them an apology too?

IMO-- Japan got off pretty easy for the atrocities they committed, not only to US personnel, but to the Korean and Chinese people. I think Japan has a whole lot more "apologising" to do than we do, when it comes to war.

Do some feel we should use similar weapons on enemies we face today? Perhaps a small demonstration of such weaponry would serve us well before Iran has truely developed nuclear weapons, or would it only cloud the current muddy waters?

I fugure if our enemies are seeking to obtain these weapons, they intend to use them, which means we retaliate, having said that, we go first.

Originally Posted by kgoerz

Agree, it seems the Japanese should apologize to their own people for opening up a Can of Whoop Ass on themselves.

[XJWoody]

Originally Posted by wet dog

Do some feel we should use similar weapons on enemies we face today? Perhaps a small demonstration of such weaponry would serve us well before Iran has truely developed nuclear weapons, or would it only cloud the current muddy waters?

I fugure if our enemies are seeking to obtain these weapons, they intend to use them, which means we retaliate, having said that, we go first.

The weird-beards running things over there (Iran) deserve nothing less. If what they want is their virgins & face time with Allah, I say send it. Switched to Extra Crispy. The finesse part is making it appear like it was an AD/ND

[James Clifton]

My Dad was at PH when they hit it! He told me later his thoughts about Japan!
Jim

[akv]

The bombs were horrible, they were supposed to be just that. Ike took flak for letting the Russians take Berlin. His rationale was to avoid the estimated 100k US casualties, this number according to Beevor was very close to Russian casualties incurred. I hear the notion a blockade or fears of Soviet entry might have worked, but as folks mentioned the cultural hatred in the Pacific and evidence of rising casualties among combatants and civilians the closer US forces got is a cold merciless equation. The Japanese had thousands of planes and troops hoarded in reserve, and had correctly anticipated the exact invasion beaches. IMHO it would have been hell on earth for all involved, particularly Japanese civilians. I think the crime was Tojo and his thugs leading the Japanese into such a war.