Weapon Failures in Astan?!?!?! - Page 3

MtnGoat · 10-12-2009, 08:17

Quote:

Originally Posted by The Reaper

Sounds like a leadership failure to me.
TR

AMEN!!! Failure to get off their Arses and go around to the local village(s). Lead from the front.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Team Sergeant

Personally I think the reporter RICHARD LARDNER is fabricating some of this story.

Agree with you TS… Someone is feeding this story or lies to push some agenda.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Dozer523

Bull shit. When the final investigation comes out they are going to find a total breakdown. No one with a malfunction was taking care of their weapon. No one witht a Soldier claiming a malfunction was inspecting weapons or anything else for that matter. This battle is going to become the red-headed step-child / poster child for COIN. "Whatever you do DON'T do this."

Yeah, watch they are already saying that the camp was DUE to be CLOSED because of the NEW FOCUS to townships and local centers for Conventional Forces. There will be a spin, off this battle for some months to come. Sad that men had to die, but now “they” will be used IMHO for others gains; Political gains that is.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Dozer523

That battle was lost long before any bad guy came out of that village. It was lost when we wern't having tea in that village.

Conventional Leaders at these “outposts” and firebases all are being “controlled” to do their COIN mission. Which is just to sit in their camps walls. If they get in a fire fight most will go back to their base camps for safety and not engage the enemy. Time will tell from this event.

All of this for a new weapon?? I don't think so. I think there is more to these reports.

BryanK · 10-12-2009, 14:12

This is one reason that it would be nice to put 45B's in with the line units as opposed to the rear. At least a detailed pre-inspection could be done before they leave the wire. Hell, it would be better to have 45's outside the wire with them for emergency repairs. We are heading downrange soon, and I discussed this with my higher. They said no way. Would it be any different once we got in country?

Oldschool45B · 10-13-2009, 10:37

We have all seen what happens to a weapon over there when you leave the hooch. just walking around it is dirty before lunch. So if they were constantly clean I am guessing they were also dry as a bone so that the dust did not get inside and show that little grit in the lube so some snuffy didn't get his ass chewed. Dry guns are not happy guns.

Be that as it may they were using the weapons outside what the weapon was designed for. I have not been in a 30 minute mad-minute firefight but it sounds from the article that they were using them in a suppressive fire role, shooting more and aiming less. Maybe conventional forces should have the select fire taken out and be forced to use them as semi-auto only. It worked in Rhodesia when they were running out of ammo to fight the terrorists. Their consumption went down and their hit to shot ration went up..... I mean we can not rely on the NCO's and officers to train these guys properly so what else can we do?

Ya know, after a few SFAUC and BCCS classes I have been thru, and having worked for the same end users down range none of our guys, even the support guys had these issues.

ETA no, it probably won't be any different. The 45B's get stuck on the FOB most of the time in order to work on everyone's weapons. I was lucky in that I got to sneak out a few days at a time and get to the firebases and see what was going on so I could better adjust the parts I was sending out for spares and replacements. Once I started rebuilding the captured weapons for the ASF I got out more with my list of parts and items that were available to the Teams. Did I mention how badly the FOB sucks the life out of you and how much I hated it?

BryanK · 10-13-2009, 11:39

Quote:

Originally Posted by Oldschool45B

...Did I mention how badly the FOB sucks the life out of you and how much I hated it?

Thanks for the info. It sucks that I'll most likely be stuck on the FOB for my first deployment, but it is what it is so long as the guys get my best work. PMCS would've went a long way before these guys rode out. Sounds like a ps magazine quote, but it's true.

SF0 · 10-13-2009, 18:54

An early account of the battle at Camp Keating
By Bill RoggioOctober 11, 2009 9:43 PM

Quote:

At The Best Defense, Tom Ricks published an "earwitness account" of the battle at Camp Keating in Kamdish in Nuristan province. The account comes via General Barry McCaffrey, and is given by an unnamed military officer serving in nearby Laghman province whose position is not identified, and I won't speculate further. The full account is published below, with permission of Mr. Ricks. I'll define the acronyms and other confusing terms in brackets.

Just a few notes:

• The troop commander seemed to be very level-headed during the battle, and adjusted in a professional manner to several serious setbacks, such as losing his command post and ammunition dump. Only at one point did he appear to be rattled, early on when urging the helicopter to get on the scene as soon as possible lest the camp be fully overrun. The Squadron commander let his troop commander manage the battle and got the troop commander whatever resources he could.
• The base was nearly overrun. As mentioned, the US troops temporarily lost control of the command post and ammunition dump, and the troop commander lost contact with some of his troops. The Afghan Army and Afghan security guards' checkpoints were completely overrun and set aflame.
• The US troops fought hard, and lost eight of their brothers. It could have been much worse. The helicopter and air support was the great equalizer against the massed Taliban assault.
• The US troops lost nearly everything they owned during the battle save the clothes on their backs. You can help them out by donating to the American Legion, which has set up a program, called the COP Keating Relief Fund to specifically help these men.

Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat...#ixzz0TrpCiQLd

C0B2A · 10-13-2009, 21:06

Quote:

Originally Posted by The Reaper

The bolt carrier was not designed to take an impact to the top, it does not have rails to keep it running true. When it is hit, it tips slightly higher in the front and lower in the rear. Sometimes, it may ground out completely, and gouge the inside of the receiver. I would keep my eye out for any unusual wear in the receiver or on the bolt, and anticipate a catastrophic failure of the upper at some relatively low round count.

Just my opinion. YMMV.

TR

IIRC, most company's making piston guns have designed a advanced bolt carrier group to solve this issue. I know my LWRC has one.

ES 96 · 10-13-2009, 22:10

Location of the battle cited: plug into Google Earth (good to update the app too if you haven't in a while): 35 25 23 N , 71 19 44E

-for those not familiar with GE: once the image resolves, zoom with your mouse scroll wheel and then hold down a shift key and scroll for vertical relief

~3300' gain to nearby ridge tops.

question to QPs and ADs:
How could have those in charge of siting this FOB, better set it up (ballpark placement, not OPSEC violating particulars) while balancing COIN needs (close contact with locals) and yet be more defensible than this was?

**The Reaper** · 10-14-2009, 09:18

Quote:

Originally Posted by Alpine Matt

question to QPs and ADs:
How could have those in charge of siting this FOB, better set it up (ballpark placement, not OPSEC violating particulars) while balancing COIN needs (close contact with locals) and yet be more defensible than this was?

I don't think we know you well enough to answer that question.

TR

Stevo777 · 10-26-2009, 18:22

This site has so much great info, I haven't really felt the need to speak up till now. As a new PL, what I am looking for is input regarding small unit leadership issues that directly affected the outcome of this battle (and maybe the fact that the battle even occurred), for my own PD. I owe this to my men. I have been spending a large part of my leave doing my homework at places like Stryker.net in preparation. I am reading stuff like Three Cups of Tea and a full report of the Waygal Valley battle, but would appreciate additional (offline) recommendations.

**The Reaper** · 10-26-2009, 20:18

Quote:

Originally Posted by Stevo777

This site has so much great info, I haven't really felt the need to speak up till now. As a new PL, what I am looking for is input regarding small unit leadership issues that directly affected the outcome of this battle (and maybe the fact that the battle even occurred), for my own PD. I owe this to my men. I have been spending a large part of my leave doing my homework at places like Stryker.net in preparation. I am reading stuff like Three Cups of Tea and a full report of the Waygal Valley battle, but would appreciate additional (offline) recommendations.

See the reading list.

Paul Howe's book would be a good place to start.

TR

regular guy · 12-25-2009, 05:54

Quote:

Originally Posted by Team Sergeant

TR already stated the probable cause and I agree. I've also fired tens of thousands of rounds through the M-4 without failure.
Personally I think the reporter RICHARD LARDNER is fabricating some of this story.

Gentlemen,
I am very familiar with the unit that this story is about. I was in their sister BN a while ago. While I should say that there are some very locked on NCO's in that BN, the training cycle that they received and the leadership put them through in the work up for deployment was neither realistic nor practical. To further aggravate the situation, they are an armor (mechanized) unit. They trained from the Bradley. They might have done some integral dismount live fire training, but not enough to successfully teach the primary shooters of the squad (Joe). The problem was the attitude of many of the leaders in that unit and higher. They were rolling with the training and experience from 06-08 OIF NCO's.

TR, TS, and many of the other QP's on here hit the nail on the head. The SAW is a great weapon. So is the M4. The basic discipline of the unit was reflected though in this article. Rates of fire, talking guns were not even relatively mentioned. They were assumed, and I see obviously that it was a blind assumption. I hate armchair quarterbacking more than anyone, and the only reason I spoke up is because I felt I should provide some first hand knowledge of the unit in question. The senior leadership is lazy and half assed. My apologies. The good news is that one of the problem sources no longer has his name placard on the banana belt. A start...

Yes, I don't work there anymore and haven't for a while, but it is hard to watch the news and see friends names. And I have seen a lot of names this year.

My apologies for interruptions to the thread.

TF Kilo · 12-25-2009, 06:04

The first thing I thought, was directly parallel to many of the senior individuals who spoke up in this thread.

Leadership failure.

I never had issues with my assigned weapons... and I don't see what the complaint is, about 5m of maintenance on a system that you are entrusting your life to...

**The Reaper** · 12-25-2009, 09:06

The only reliably unreliable weapon I have ever been issued by the Army (that was not quickly repairable) was a worn out M-60 Machine Gun.

Now that is one I am not sad to see gone.

Otherwise, you keep it clean, you keep it lubed, you use good ammo and mags, and understand the capabilities and limitations and it should work properly.

You violate these rules, especially in a combat zone at your own peril.

TR