In a manner of speaking, don’t most GO's already become bureaucrats at the 2-Star level and above? How can you practice anything that even resembles EFFECTIVE leadership in that level without knowing how to work your way around the bureaucratic nonsense resident at the 2, 3, and 4 star level of command? I read the executive summary and scanned through the rest and I think it can easily be argued that we ALREADY pursue separate leadership methodologies with respect to Maneuver Commanders and ‘Enterprise’ Commanders. I would ask the following questions to help answer if we do or do not already use the Warfighter/Institutional approach:
Does the USASFC (A) CDR move Soldiers operationally/tactically around the battlefield?
…or do they just focus on the care and feeding of the warfighter that is then farmed out to combatant commanders?
Does the USASOC CDR move Soldiers operationally/tactically around the battlefield?
…or does USASOC provide forces to USSOCOM to fill TSOC requirements?
Do the GCC/TSOC CDRs process promotions, pay issues, assignment orders, and professional development of the Soldier, Sailor, Marine, and Airman?
…or do they move forces around the battlefield while the force provider continues to maintain the training and administrative function inherent in a combat force?
Does the GCC/TSOC provide the training needed to conduct operations or do they post a request for forces that details the minimum training requirement needed to complete any given mission?
*How many active duty Battalion Commanders (in similar year groups) do we have in the SF Regiment right this minute?
…I would take a wild guess and say less than 20.
*How many of them will go on to become the USASFC (A) CDR at some time during their career?
…I would say at best, one or two.
*How many of them will go on to become a TSOC Commander at some time during their career?
…mathematically, considering there are more TSOCs than SF Regiments, I would expect that MORE than one will become a TSOC CDR without ever serving as the Regimental CDR.
*Where will the rest of those BN Commanders go between NOW and retirement?
…is it safe to assume that if they are not commanding troops that they will eventually fill “Enterprise” jobs on the staff at the Regiment, MACOM, TSOC, GCC, and HQDA level?
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Next I would wonder, who are the authors of this paper, and what qualifies them to opine on the state of our senior leaders?
-One of the authors was a company commander in Grenada and later jumped into Panama as a BN S-3 so I would imagine he sees himself as an Operations/Warfighter kind of guy (he also commanded the 25th ID, TF Warrior, and CFC-Afghanistan.)
-One of the authors has made a career out of writing reports for research firms and uses her “research interests” in U.S. military strategy, stability operations, and coalition and alliance operations as the basis for her “expertise” in security and defense matters.
…in other words, she is a professional bbureaucrat; she may not have any time in uniform providing security, but she has plenty of time on a word processer writing about security. Maybe she is an absolute genius in the defense realm and she could teach us all a ton of shit that we should know, but don’t. In the end, “operational” leadership doesn’t seem to be the topic she was brought in to write about.
-The other two authors are research associates for an “inside the beltway” think tank. There doesn’t seem to be much offered as expertise by either of the remaining two authors except the possibility that they are strap-hanging on the article so that they can “get published” in order to chase a doctorate, or gain legitimacy by “co-authoring” a piece written by already established Washington insiders.
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I would also offer that the Center for a New American Security has been described by the Washington Post in the following way:
Quote:
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“It was no accident that former vice president Dick Cheney chose the American Enterprise Institute as the venue for his full-throated defense last month of the Bush administration's national security policies. In the Bush years, AEI wielded significant influence and helped develop major initiatives on national security, including the surge in Iraq.In the era of Obama, however, the Center for a New American Security may emerge as Washington's go-to think tank on military affairs. Founded in 2007, CNAS has already filled key posts in the new administration (such as former CNAS president Michele Flournoy, who is now undersecretary of defense for policy), and its top people include John Nagl, who helped draft the Army's counterinsurgency manual, and David Kilcullen, a former adviser to Gen. David H. Petraeus. Now CNAS has completed a 31-page report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, advising Team Obama on how to best meet its goal to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in its safe haven in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future."
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I am only suggesting by this quote, that this particular "think tank" appeals to the current administration and as such it may tend to "think" a bit more to one side of the political spectrum. You are free to decide for yourself.
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The paper states that the Army’s Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis found that approximately 65 percent of one-star billets, 80 percent of two-star billets, 82 percent of three-star billets and 92 percent of four-star billets are non-operational enterprise management positions. Using these numbers approximately 50 percent of one-star, 70 percent of two-star, 80 percent of three-star and 85 percent of four-star generals have been promoted from the operational career fields.
It would seem that according to known statistics by the US Army that we already put our GO’s into a bit of a bureaucratic bind once they reach the 2-Star level. The paper then goes in a ridiculously odd direction when it suggests that we are somehow mismanaging the force because the preponderance of the Enterprise billets are filled by Operational leaders. This tells me that the authors of this paper somehow believe that USASOC would be better commanded by a career bureaucrat as opposed to an operationally competent commanding officer.
I can understand the idea that a business manager at General Motors can manage an office without knowing how to rebuild a carburetor and we can all understand that you don’t even have to understand simple computer networking to manage the entire nations Affordable Care Act website, but certainly the military is a bit different from a civilian corporation when it comes to the things military leaders are faced with. As leaders move up, they learn how to manage progressively larger elements, and are given progressively larger staffs to execute the process. The Army doesn’t enlist Battalion Commanders; the Army develops Battalion Commanders.
IBM, GM et al hire business managers at whatever level they need a manager.
That’s why some companies go bankrupt.
…GM doesn’t manage transportation; they hire people with the assumption that they will find a way to get to work if they want to have a job.
…IBM isn’t in the business of feeding an Army; you get a paycheck, bring a fucking sandwich.
The military can’t afford to entertain fools by hiring bureaucrats to manage military affairs. Let the government bankrupt itself, but leave the military leadership to military leadership so we can keep order after the bureaucrats crash the rest of the system.
...just my understanding of the paper. Maybe I just dont have a big picture view of whats best for the miitary
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