Not Fade Away - The Myth of American Decline

[Richard]

At the State of the Union on January 26, President Barack Obama argued, "Anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our influence has waned, doesn't know what they're talking about." According to a Foreign Policy report, the president had read and been influenced by the TNR article below, discussing it at length in an off-the-record meeting on the afternoon of the speech.

And so it goes...

Richard

Not Fade Away - The Myth of American Decline
New Republic (Rbt Kagan), 11 Jan 2012

Is the United States in decline, as so many seem to believe these days? Or are Americans in danger of committing pre-emptive superpower suicide out of a misplaced fear of their own declining power? A great deal depends on the answer to these questions. The present world order—characterized by an unprecedented number of democratic nations; a greater global prosperity, even with the current crisis, than the world has ever known; and a long peace among great powers—reflects American principles and preferences, and was built and preserved by American power in all its political, economic, and military dimensions. If American power declines, this world order will decline with it. It will be replaced by some other kind of order, reflecting the desires and the qualities of other world powers. Or perhaps it will simply collapse, as the European world order collapsed in the first half of the twentieth century. The belief, held by many, that even with diminished American power “the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive,” as the political scientist G. John Ikenberry has argued, is a pleasant illusion. American decline, if it is real, will mean a different world for everyone.

But how real is it? Much of the commentary on American decline these days rests on rather loose analysis, on impressions that the United States has lost its way, that it has abandoned the virtues that made it successful in the past, that it lacks the will to address the problems it faces. Americans look at other nations whose economies are now in better shape than their own, and seem to have the dynamism that America once had, and they lament, as in the title of Thomas Friedman’s latest book, that “that used to be us.”

The perception of decline today is certainly understandable, given the dismal economic situation since 2008 and the nation’s large fiscal deficits, which, combined with the continuing growth of the Chinese, Indian, Brazilian, Turkish, and other economies, seem to portend a significant and irreversible shift in global economic power. Some of the pessimism is also due to the belief that the United States has lost favor, and therefore influence, in much of the world, because of its various responses to the attacks of September 11. The detainment facilities at Guantánamo, the use of torture against suspected terrorists, and the widely condemned invasion of Iraq in 2003 have all tarnished the American “brand” and put a dent in America’s “soft power”—its ability to attract others to its point of view. There have been the difficult wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which many argue proved the limits of military power, stretched the United States beyond its capacities, and weakened the nation at its core. Some compare the United States to the British Empire at the end of the nineteenth century, with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars serving as the equivalent of Britain’s difficult and demoralizing Boer War.

With this broad perception of decline as the backdrop, every failure of the United States to get its way in the world tends to reinforce the impression. Arabs and Israelis refuse to make peace, despite American entreaties. Iran and North Korea defy American demands that they cease their nuclear weapons programs. China refuses to let its currency rise. Ferment in the Arab world spins out of America’s control. Every day, it seems, brings more evidence that the time has passed when the United States could lead the world and get others to do its bidding.

Powerful as this sense of decline may be, however, it deserves a more rigorous examination. Measuring changes in a nation’s relative power is a tricky business, but there are some basic indicators: the size and the influence of its economy relative to that of other powers; the magnitude of military power compared with that of potential adversaries; the degree of political influence it wields in the international system—all of which make up what the Chinese call “comprehensive national power.” And there is the matter of time. Judgments based on only a few years’ evidence are problematic. A great power’s decline is the product of fundamental changes in the international distribution of various forms of power that usually occur over longer stretches of time. Great powers rarely decline suddenly. A war may bring them down, but even that is usually a symptom, and a culmination, of a longer process.

The decline of the British Empire, for instance, occurred over several decades. In 1870, the British share of global manufacturing was over 30 percent. In 1900, it was 20 percent. By 1910, it was under 15 percent—well below the rising United States, which had climbed over the same period from more than 20 percent to more than 25 percent; and also less than Germany, which had lagged far behind Britain throughout the nineteenth century but had caught and surpassed it in the first decade of the twentieth century. Over the course of that period, the British navy went from unchallenged master of the seas to sharing control of the oceans with rising naval powers. In 1883, Britain possessed more battleships than all the other powers combined. By 1897, its dominance had been eclipsed. British officials considered their navy “completely outclassed” in the Western hemisphere by the United States, in East Asia by Japan, and even close to home by the combined navies of Russia and France—and that was before the threatening growth of the German navy. These were clear-cut, measurable, steady declines in two of the most important measures of power over the course of a half-century.

SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS for America’s relative decline these days would be more potent if they had not appeared only in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. Just as one swallow does not make a spring, one recession, or even a severe economic crisis, need not mean the beginning of the end of a great power. The United States suffered deep and prolonged economic crises in the 1890s, the 1930s, and the 1970s. In each case, it rebounded in the following decade and actually ended up in a stronger position relative to other powers than before the crisis. The 1910s, the 1940s, and the 1980s were all high points of American global power and influence.

Less than a decade ago, most observers spoke not of America’s decline but of its enduring primacy. In 2002, the historian Paul Kennedy, who in the late 1980s had written a much-discussed book on “the rise and fall of the great powers,” America included, declared that never in history had there been such a great “disparity of power” as between the United States and the rest of the world. Ikenberry agreed that “no other great power” had held “such formidable advantages in military, economic, technological, cultural, or political capabilities.... The preeminence of American power” was “unprecedented.” In 2004, the pundit Fareed Zakaria described the United States as enjoying a “comprehensive uni-polarity” unlike anything seen since Rome. But a mere four years later Zakaria was writing about the “post-American world” and “the rise of the rest,” and Kennedy was discoursing again upon the inevitability of American decline. Did the fundamentals of America’s relative power shift so dramatically in just a few short years?

The answer is no.

(cont'd) http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/...mIwNGQwNDBiZmI

[jatx]

Great article - thanks for posting.

[alright4u]

Far left and extremely liberal slant is always a guarantee with this rag.

[greenberetTFS]

Originally Posted by alright4u

Far left and extremely liberal slant is always a guarantee with this rag.

I concur 100% with Jon,he's right on target I believe regarding this article....

Big Teddy

[Richard]

Originally Posted by alright4u

Far left and extremely liberal slant is always a guarantee with this rag.

Robert Kagan?

Richard

[Doc Diego]

If Washington continues it's Keynesian control, then yes, 16 trillion dollars of debt will sink us.

[alright4u]

Originally Posted by Doc Diego

If Washington continues it's Keynesian control, then yes, 16 trillion dollars of debt will sink us.

Kagan needs to stick to history and stay away from Income Inequality.

[CloseDanger]

There is a point of no return.
If we lose control (again) of the Congress and the Senate, we will have a mitre stone tied around our neck.

[Paslode]

Originally Posted by CloseDanger

There is a point of no return.
If we lose control (again) of the Congress and the Senate, we will have a mitre stone tied around our neck.

Do we really have control of Congress and the Senate?

[akv]

A solid read, we have endured and prospered through much worse. My $.02 we are in a tough recession magnified by the foibles of a weak divisive leader.

I have greater confidence in Republicans taking back congress in 2014 than Romney beating Zero. I do think this younger generation may have to relearn some Hobbesian lessons the hard way, but they will, America has spectacular inherent advantages in resources, geography, military might , technology and opportunity appeal ( smart people from all over still want to come here for the freedoms and opportunity) and will be fine, though she may look different than what we are currently familiar with. This evolution happens to all empires.

[Sigaba]

FWIW, the Institute for Policy Studies, a think tank that describes itself "[a]s Washington’s first progressive multi-issue think tank," offers a profile of Robert Kagan here. That profile paints Kagan as a "neoconservative," and as a "hawk," and a person who is out of place at the left of centerish Brookings Institution.

In regards to the piece presented in the OP and the current president's comments, I think that many are missing the bigger picture. IMO, the president is, in a very abstract way, positioning himself to the right of certain elements in the GOP--specifically Ron Paul--on issues of national security affairs.

By presenting himself as a commander in chief who can use deftly the tools of war, who is determined to maintain the status-quo when it comes to nuclear weapons, and who wants to keep faith with America's veterans, the president is presenting a narrative that is politically viable (if not historically sustainable) in which he and his fellow Democrats, not Republicans, are committed to preserving America's primacy in world affairs. This narrative is clever because it turns on its head the "can do" rhetoric of the McCain/Palin campaign.

On its face, the president's narrative is highly debatable. However, I am increasingly skeptical of the ability of the president's opponents and critiques to offer a cogent reply. As the late "Chick" Hearn, the voice of the L.A. Lakers, often said, "a mad player is a bad player." Right now, too many of the president's opponents are just too mad.

This anger is going to cost the GOP tens of millions of votes in November unless the party's leaders and members work together to harness that emotion into a coherent counter-narrative that will resonate among moderates on both sides of the aisle while also maintaining the party's core values. Otherwise, the GOP ticket will have find itself saddled with the legacy of Robert Taft rather than inspired by the legacies of Eisenhower and Reagan.

(IMO, the way to counter the president's narrative is to change the discussion from "What can/can't America do tomorrow?" to "What should America do given the state of affairs today?" That is, rather than debating tactics--the realm of politicians, make the discussion about grand strategy--which is the province of statesmen.)

My $0.02. YMMV.

[Sulla]

The article fails to mention social and demographic factors such as the increasing reliance on welfare/handouts and a declining birthrate. The government simply buries its head in the sand while writing the checks to future generations and borrowing money from China in order to pay the interest on the money that it has already borrowed from China. We are effectively paying for China's military, who's aim is to replace our dominance in the pacific.

That which is unsustainable will not be sustained.

[dennisw]

Chinese company given huge bridge contract in Bay area.

http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/video/us-b...ylist=14594944

Interesting development here in the sunshine state as reported by ABC News. Almost hard to fathom. A commercial runs for the first 30 seconds.

[afchic]

Victor Hansen had a great article on NRO yesterday http://www.nationalreview.com/articl...r-davis-hanson

He believes that we are not in a Post-America period, but may very well be in a pre-America period, and this century, much like the last century will have the US leading the way.

[BOfH]

Originally Posted by afchic

Victor Hansen had a great article on NRO yesterday http://www.nationalreview.com/articl...r-davis-hanson

He believes that we are not in a Post-America period, but may very well be in a pre-America period, and this century, much like the last century will have the US leading the way.

China has riots; Russia has riots; Europe has riots; the Arab world is one large riot these days. America has a few sputtering Occupy Wall Street street carnivals.

A good read, thanks!