Tooth-to-Tail (T3R)

[nw44451]

Tooth-to-Tail (T3R), the ratio of non-combat troops to combat troops, has been an issue of contention for military and civilian leadership since at least WWI. Doing my best to avoid the tall grass, the trend of T3R has been a reduction in combat troops and an increase in life-support, logistics, and HQ personnel. In WWI the T3R for an Infantry Division was 78.4% Combat troops, 14.4% Logistics, and 7.2% HQ/Administration. The Army’s new Stryker Brigades have a T3R of 52% Combat, 30% Logistics, and 18% HQ/Admin. Even more striking are the numbers for Army Forces in Iraq (2005): 40% Combat, 36% Logistics, 24% HQ. If you add civilian contractors to the mix, the share of combat troops drops to only 28%.

My own observations seem to support these numbers and force me to view them in a negative, even destructive, light. MASSIVE FOB’s are equipped with pools, restaurants, and other facilities that seem out of place in a “combat” environment. The support personnel that I saw on these FOB’s seemed (mostly) to be supporting only themselves.

While I understand that the world of SOF does not operate off of the same T3R as the RA folks, I’d be interested to hear everyones thoughts!

(A well done Combat Studies Institute “Occasional Paper” on the subject: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/cs...grath_op23.pdf)

[Pete]

One thing to remember in all this is the job sets everyone is looking at.

Not a lot of variation in "jobs" in a circa 1917 Infantry Regiment.

Not a lot of mechanical or electrical stuff either. One vet could handle a lot of horses and mules.

Everything that can break will break - and you need somebody to fix it.

[nw44451]

Thanks, Pete.

I did consider the appearance of new technologies and the need for personnel who know how to fix them after Joe breaks them. I'm sure this accounts for at least some of the shift in T3R. But what about HQ? The Army's Expeditionary Forces during WWI had what the referenced report calls an "austere" share of only 1.7%. In Iraq, Army HQ personnel have a 17% share.

What strikes me is that technology should be making C2 easier (especially if you have the support personnel to keep all the wheels turning) and allow HQ's to SHRINK. Not to mention that, although I wasn't around in 1917, it seems that today's Army as a whole is more professional (read easier to control) than the Doughboys.

I think the only reason I may be able to get away with saying that is because, last I heard, there was only one WWI Vet still out there!

[JJ_BPK]

I don't have any quotable numbers handy, but seem to remember that during the SEA engagement (1956-1975) the ratio of REMF's to Combat troops was some where around 4 to 1. That's 4 REMF's to 1 Combat troop.

The reason I remember it is because of all the discourse about drugs and PTSD during that time period.

As I had both a line platoon (HC 31) outside the wire for 5 months and was XO of a Div HQ company (HC 500) for 4 months, I was exposed to the gambit of problems.

The REMF's far out numbered those in combat,, and also had a much higher UCMJ rate.

I personally believe the problems stemmed from the 24/7 office schedule and way to much free time at the EM club...

Todays SWA and yesterdays SEA had a preponderance of support off shore and far from the madding crowd. It takes a lot REMF's to keep the Navy's Tin Cans floating and the Air Forces delivery truck drivers flying.

One FOG's observations...

[nw44451]

Originally Posted by JJ_BPK

The REMF's far out numbered those in combat,, and also had a much higher UCMJ rate.

I personally believe the problems stemmed from the 24/7 office schedule and way to much free time at the EM club...

Not to stray to far off course here, but I recently read something (I think in connection with Seb Junger/Restrepo/War) about the incidents of PTSD/Suicide being much higher among support troops vs. combat troops in OEF/OIF.

Thanks for the input, JJ.

[plato]

Originally Posted by nw44451

My own observations seem to support these numbers and force me to view them in a negative, even destructive, light.
(A well done Combat Studies Institute “Occasional Paper” on the subject: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/cs...grath_op23.pdf)

Before 9/11 when I had to build and staff an Ops organization, this was my bread and butter. I spent a lot of time at the pentagon, doing verbal combat with the who's-who to the point of almost, but not quite, being kicked out. That's what the boss hired me to do.

You can probably pick up the numbers from existing manuals. I used to have a few I kept handy to toss off the top of my head. Don't have them any more.

But, consider...

At some time during WWI, a unit could put a certain amount of firepower "down range". Later, in our history, a unit half that size could put that amount of firepower down range, and in our current situation, a unit 1/4 the size of the WWI unit could put that much down range.

Now, the question is..... if a soldier can put 4 times as much hurt on an enemy, do you want him to have the ammunition necessary to do so? (I asked that question of many conference rooms of pure civilians, and watched their eyes glaze over). The answer is obviously "Yes".

That being the case, would you like the trucks to carry it to the troops? If so, would you like the number of fork lifts, conex containers, etc., to get that ammo on the trucks?

A study that doesn't look at increased capability is fatally flawed.

Now, when we move 50k and strike, rather than station our support near the trenches, we need our support, not in the occasional convoy, but just behind the battle formation. Our first lift requirement has increased.

A column moving along at 2 mph, shooting the occasional pheasant with musket and ball is much more supportable.

However, you lose the war.

[nw44451]

Plato,

I appreciate having someone so experienced on the topic offering their thoughts.

I don't think anyone could argue against having enough ammo.

I meant to mention this as a "devil's advocate" comment: Increased capability shouldn't always (especially in the current conflicts??) be about how much ammo you need for that Apache, or that Bradley, Stryker, MLRS etc. The guys walking around on the ground are stretched pretty thin and 5.56 is pretty small. What I see in the T3R numbers is a movement further and further away from human capability when, at least in today's battles, we may need to focus more on getting bodies outside the wire and less on toys.

[1stindoor]

It's true the ammo is small and light relatively speaking, but that little radio can call in a whole world of hurt in minutes...just remember though Predator is not your friend....nothing ruins a good war story like an eye-witness.

Originally Posted by nw44451

I think the only reason I may be able to get away with saying that is because, last I heard, there was only one WWI Vet still out there!

That would be Frank W. Buckles, and if he is still alive, he turns 110 on Feb., 1st (next week).

From last year, a memorial was in the news.

http://www.familysecuritymatters.org...pub_detail.asp

November 22, 2010

Stolen Cross, Stolen Honor: Mojave Desert Site Was Only Memorial to World War I Veterans

Maj. General James E. Livingston, USMC (ret) Medal of Honor Recipient, Major General Paul Vallely, USA (Ret.), Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter, USN (ret).

Frank Woodruff Buckles was born in Missouri 109 years ago. He is a national hero and the last living American veteran of World War I. But as we observed this Veterans Day - a day conceived as a celebration of the end of that bloody war - there was no national monument to honor Mr. Buckles and 5 million other Americans who served our nation in uniform then. The sole National Monument to World War I has been destroyed by vandals, and the Obama administration refuses to allow its replacement, even by private citizens, even at private expense.

In 1934, John Bembrey, along with several fellow veterans, erected a simple cross on a granite outcrop in the Mojave Desert. Their intention was to commemorate the sacrifice made by their comrades in the Great War, and for the next 65 years, this modest memorial was quietly maintained by volunteers. In 2000, the Mojave Desert Cross was designated by the U.S. Congress as the only official National Monument to World War I.

[Richard]

One thing we learned on the TAACOM Staff was that greater modern combat capability equates to an exponentially (not a simple) greater demand for support of that capability.

Bottom line, under normal (our term, as if there ever was such a thing) combat conditions, we used to plan for a minimal logistical requirement of a 'critical priority push' to support our capabilities IAW the acronym 35mm:

• Class 3 (POL)
• Class 5 (Armaments)
• Medical (Class 8)
• Maintenance (Class 9)

Beyond that, it was what we can provide when/if available.

It appears to me that, in spite of the distances and difficulties associated with establishing and maintaining an adequate LOC to a theatre like A'stan, we still retain both a capacity and a desire to provide maximum support to our forces far beyond our actual in-theatre combat requirements.

It is also reasonable to consider that even if our in-theatre requirements to support our own forces have diminished, our need to provide similar support for our allies (NATO and host nation) may have actually increased and the demand for providing both a tail and HQ/LNO elements to coordinate/supervise/provide that tail have also increased - especially when the need to 'out-source' so many of our current logistical requirements is the new norm.

Life at the TAACOM may have been purgatory for us combat arms types who swore we would personally hang any loggie toad who ever prevented any combat soldier from getting the adequate levels of critical supplies needed for conducting combat operations, but it also gave us an education in just how complicated it is to adequately equip, deploy, and support those who volunteer to man the "tip of the bayonet" in a modern military force like ours.

And so it goes...

Richard

[silentreader]

As a future part of that tail, let me add this to the point QPs and others have already made: In WWI, combat was simple. You knew exactly where your enemy was and how to engage him. It was also futile and suicidal. In today's asymmetrical environment, more guns in the fight does not necessarily equal a better result. Intel, Civil Affairs, Psyops and plenty of other folks have an important role to play in shaping the battlefield without necessarily bringing a gun into the fight (maybe.) The other thing to remember is that almost all support troops are combat-capable in a pinch.

Originally Posted by silentreader

In WWI, combat was simple. You knew exactly where your enemy was and how to engage him.

I know the point you're making, this is not a stab at your thought, but nothing about WWI trench warfare was simple. I'd take a thousand days down range today, (2.739726 years) than any single day in France.

[plato]

Originally Posted by nw44451

Plato,

I appreciate having someone so experienced on the topic offering their thoughts.

I don't think anyone could argue against having enough ammo.

I meant to mention this as a "devil's advocate" comment: Increased capability shouldn't always (especially in the current conflicts??) be about how much ammo you need for that Apache, or that Bradley, Stryker, MLRS etc. The guys walking around on the ground are stretched pretty thin and 5.56 is pretty small. What I see in the T3R numbers is a movement further and further away from human capability when, at least in today's battles, we may need to focus more on getting bodies outside the wire and less on toys.

We may need to get more ability outside the wire, wherever the emination of the capability. Accurate fire support, eyes in the sky, good intel, mobility enhancers, there are a lot of deliverables that we owe our troops other than just ammo.
Consider one man with a laser and a missile on it's way, and the number of people necessary to make that happen.

Understand Devil's Advocate approach

The paper you cited tosses a lot of numbers about, gets lost while the author seems to realize that he can't help but run in circles, but doesn't get to anything useful in supporting a level of tooth/tail, or a way of deciding adequate tooth/tail. A good analysis needs input from many more fields, and a lot more from the strategic line of thinking.

[nw44451]

All great stuff to add to that mostly empty shell propped up on my shoulders!

So far the comments have orbited around the logistics side of the equation. Any thoughts on the expansion of command elements?


As Plato pointed out, the paper that original set me on this topic doesn't do much to offer any concrete solutions, and I admit that this is probably a bit of a moving target.

Thanks to all for taking the time to weigh in and help me digest the subject.

[nw44451]

Originally Posted by wet dog

I know the point you're making, this is not a stab at your thought, but nothing about WWI trench warfare was simple. I'd take a thousand days down range today, (2.739726 years) than any single day in France.

France EVER or just during the War?