Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations (Conference Report)

[Richard]

Interesting.

Winning "Hearts and Minds" in Afghanistan -- Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations
Wilton Park Conference 11-14 Mar 2010 in partnership with the Feinstein International Center, Tufts University with support from the Australian Government, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

• Current Stabilisation Strategies Are Based on Entrenched and Often Questionable Assumptions. Research findings presented at the conference questioned many of the assumptions underpinning COIN stabilisation strategies, including that: key drivers of insecurity are poverty, unemployment and/or radical Islam; economic development and ‘modernisation’ are stabilising; aid projects ‘win hearts and minds’ and help legitimise the government; extending the reach of the central government leads to stabilisation and development projects are an effective means to extend this reach; and the international community and the Afghan government have shared objectives when it comes to promoting development, good governance and the rule of law.
  
  
• The Implementation of COIN Doctrine has not Adequately Addressed Political Issues. The research findings from Afghanistan highlight that many of the fundamental conflict drivers there are inherently political in nature, such as ethnic grievances and inter- and intra-tribal disputes. Indeed, many Afghans believe the main cause of insecurity to be their government, which is perceived to be massively corrupt, predatory and unjust. A COIN strategy premised on using aid to win the population over to such a negatively perceived government faces an uphill struggle, especially in a competitive environment where the Taliban are perceived by many to be more effective in addressing the people’s highest priority needs of security and access to justice. Without getting the ‘politics right’ both military and aid efforts are unlikely to achieve their desired effects.
  
  
• Effectively Designed and Delivered Development Aid Does Seem to Have Some Stabilisation Benefits at a Tactical Level, but Not at a Strategic Level. Researchers and practitioners described ways in which aid had been used effectively to legitimise interactions between international forces and local communities (i.e., ‘to get a foot in the door’), which had proven useful in terms of developing relationships, and gathering atmospherics and intelligence. But these were relatively short-term transactional relationships, and there was little evidence of more strategic level effects of populations being won over to the government as a result of development aid. While there is ample evidence of development programmes having clear development benefits, for example the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and the Basic Package of Health Services, there was little evidence of even successful development outcomes having major stabilisation benefits. Several critical questions remain, however. These include: whether aid in itself is unable to stabilise, or whether the current modalities for delivering aid to promote stabilisation are inappropriate; and, while development aid may not be effective at addressing the main causes of insurgency in the most insecure regions, whether aid could be effective at helping to consolidate stability in more secure areas.
  
  
• Less is Often More – Too Much Aid Can be Destabilising. There was considerable consensus that Afghanistan cannot effectively absorb the large increases in aid spending earmarked for the insecure regions of the country. Too much aid money spent quickly with little oversight can be delegitimising and destabilising in many ways, including by: fuelling corruption; creating destabilising winner-loser dynamics in ethnically and tribally divided societies; supporting a lucrative war/aid economy that benefits insurgents, corrupt government officials and other malign actors; and creating perverse incentives among key actors to maintain the status quo of insecurity and bad governance. Having to spend large sums of aid money quickly also reduces the opportunities for prioritisingthe critically important processes of effective development, and instead focuses attention primarily on generating products. Historical evidence also suggests that the Afghan state’s rentier economy has politically destabilising consequences, as it reduces the government’s need to derive legitimacy from, or be accountable to, the citizens of Afghanistan.
  
  
• Aid Seems to be Losing Rather Than Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan. At a time when more aid money is being spent in Afghanistan than ever before, popular perceptions of aid are overwhelmingly negative. Despite the considerable work that has been done, including the expansion of basic social services, major investments in roads and other infrastructure, and a communications revolution, negative perceptions persist that little has been done, the wrong things have been done, what was done is poor quality, the benefits of aid are spread inequitably, and that much money is lost through corruption and waste. Research findings suggest policymakers should be cautious in assuming that aid projects help create positive perceptions of the deliverers of aid, or that they help legitimise the government.
  
  
• Strengthening provincial and district governance systems and fostering effective and transparent Afghan leadership which connects to Kabul is key. Local governance is not a replacement for Kabul's leadership, but constitutes a key component in a social contract between the centre and periphery. In practice this means encouraging a more responsive and transparent state, promoting more merit-based appointment mechanisms, building social capacity along the lines of NSP, and addressing abuses of power that look inequitable to the population. Fostering quality Afghan leadership is also critical to a sustainable exit strategy.

https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluen...ageId=34085577

And so it goes...

Richard

[mark46th]

Once again, we are trying to impose an American/European culture on a centuries old established culture that is entirely unwilling to accept it. The Afghanis know we won't be there in a few years to enforce it. If we really wanted to impose our way of life on the Afghan people, we should inter-marry with the locals to build clan alliances, pay the locals for their loyalty, set up compounds, stock them with arms and ammo, and become warlords. We do this about every 50 square miles and make it a life long committment. At that point, we can get their children into our own schools, disguising them as medrassahs, providing them with a curriculum to change their culture slowly from within. In about 4 or 5 generations we may be able to turn things around...

We aren't going to change their culture with current policy. If the U.S. seriously wants to change Afghanistan, it will have to adapt to that culture.

[The Reaper]

Dead, balls on accurate.

Just had someone read the famous passage from the Gettysburg Address at the commander's update this morning, and I said, we cannot fix what is wrong with this country. They need an Abraham Lincoln.

Then I thought, we could use another one right about now as well. The current Illinois railsplitter does not seem to be doing a very job of governance either.

TR

[mark46th]

Reaper- I have said the same thing about Mexico. It will take a Messiah to change the cesspool below our border...