Copy Machines, a Security Risk?

[nmap]

The linked video, created by CBS on April 19th, 2010, is 5 min, 14 seconds in length and discusses the hard drive embedded in copiers. These hard drives make a digital copy of every document copied on the machine.

LINK

So - if one makes a copy of a pay check, a tax return, or any sensitive document, the machine may retain that information indefinitely. When the machine is sold or transfered, the new owner can then access that information.

What could possibly go wrong?

[FILO]

Essentially non-issue with most current MFD vendors now offering either standard or as an option image overwrite, on demand or immediate, and encryption. You just have to make sure these features are enabled. The industry security certification is: Common Criteria Certification. Some vendors will secure a CCC for a particular feature or component like the hard-drive and only one vendor, Xerox, secures end-to-end CCC on all features and components. Also if you don't have image overwrite on your current devices, pretty much all vendors will either give you or sell you the hard drive at the end of lease.

[Irishsquid]

That's pretty spot-on. I still don't trust the image-overwrite...it's possible to recover information after MANY overwrite passes...even "bit-level," overwrite (wiping).

That said...I still use 'em when I have to, for lack of a better option.

[Slantwire]

Originally Posted by FILO

Also if you don't have image overwrite on your current devices, pretty much all vendors will either give you or sell you the hard drive at the end of lease.

Why worry about hard drives? Lots of offices use those "work center" units now. All nicely networked so everyone in the office can print, or receive emailed PDFs of whatever they scanned. The unit even has a web-page server so one can use a browser to view job status and toner levels. What could possibly go wrong?

[alelks]

Originally Posted by Irishsquid

That's pretty spot-on. I still don't trust the image-overwrite...it's possible to recover information after MANY overwrite passes...even "bit-level," overwrite (wiping).

That said...I still use 'em when I have to, for lack of a better option.

I know of no one who can retrieve any info after multiple overwrites even with the most sophisticated technology (including the this piece of equipment CLICK ME. )

It's ALMOST impossible with just 1 overwrite with today's newer hard drives because they are so much more precise in how they record their data unlike older hard drives.

[Irishsquid]

Admittedly, I have no evidence to back it up, so it's all hearsay. Liaisons from certain Agencies have made the claim that they can recover data after wiping, even with a 24-pass, bit-level overwrite. Could just be bragging and hyperbole...I'll never know. IF what they say is true, however, I have to assume SOMEONE else, somewhere, has the same capability.

[dr. mabuse]

*

[FILO]

Originally Posted by Pinhead

Why worry? Lots of offices use those "work center" units now. All nicely networked so everyone in the office can print, or receive emailed PDFs of whatever they scanned. The unit even has a web-page server so one can use a browser to view job status and toner levels. What could possibly go wrong?

I believe you're referring to the Xerox WorkCentre line and yes they are designed as a complete MFD which includes network scan-to-email. Their web browser is far more capable and is designed for more then for just viewing job status and toner levels. Worry, why worry since there is no technology with complete security, unless of course you choose not to use it than it's completely secure since there is nothing to be compromised. However, that's why Common Criteria Certification is the benchmark within that industry since it established the security requirements for minimum certification and had those companies that used the equipment known about the security issues or had the vendor companies sold equipment with CCC than there wouldn't have been a story. Ulitmately it always falls back to buyer beware!

[nukem]

There simply is no way to build or design a perfectly secure system, your best bet is to restrict physical access and refrain from making any hardwired connections to outside networks.

as far as disposal I believe if you read into the requirements for secret and top secret data they tend to be more than adequate for magnetic and optical drives but I do not believe that there are any stipulations for flash memory chips which could be an issue on a lot of platforms.

If a device uses for instance a ARM micro controller with flash memory that memory can be dumped in 32 bit hex format using the correct chip clamp and a JTAG too USB converter. The dump then can be de-compiled if the technician has access to a compiler for that particular chip set. The hard part is making sense of the data since all qualitative data is lost in the transition, all functions are given generic names ect.

Text documents are extremely easy to decode. Even a modern day off the shelf PC can easily crack those encryption's since text documents do not use all of the 256 character bytes. Brute force decoding can pin down most simple encryption's in less than a second by looking for the newline or end of text characters. even extremely advanced encryption can be broken in hours or days due to the raw speed of today's processor's with an experienced programmer at the key board. (the world record pi calculation was down with networked PC's in a couple of months/ no super computer required)

If you need to properly dispose of secret or TS data your best bet is to smash/cut/shred into the smallest pieces possible and then preferably burn it. there is no other 100% safe way of destroying data.