U.S. Is Reining In Special Forces in Afghanistan

[Richard]

And so it goes...

Richard

U.S. Is Reining In Special Forces in Afghanistan
Richard Oppel Jr. and Rod Nordland, NYT, 15 Mar 2010

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top American commander in Afghanistan, has brought most American Special Operations forces under his direct control for the first time, out of concern over continued civilian casualties and disorganization among units in the field.

“What happens is, sometimes at cross-purposes, you got one hand doing one thing and one hand doing the other, both trying to do the right thing but working without a good outcome,” General McChrystal said in an interview.

Critics, including Afghan officials, human rights workers and some field commanders of conventional American forces, say that Special Operations forces have been responsible for a large number of the civilian casualties in Afghanistan and operate by their own rules.

Maj. Gen. Zahir Azimi, the chief spokesman for the Afghan Ministry of Defense, said that General McChrystal had told Afghan officials he was taking the action because of concern that some American units were not following his orders to make limiting civilian casualties a paramount objective.

“These special forces were not accountable to anyone in the country, but General McChrystal and we carried the burden of the guilt for the mistakes they committed,” he said. “Whenever there was some problem with the special forces we didn’t know who to go to, it was muddled and unclear who was in charge.”

General McChrystal has made reducing civilian casualties a cornerstone of his new counterinsurgency strategy, and his campaign has had some success: last year, civilian deaths attributed to the United States military were cut by 28 percent, although there were 596 civilian deaths attributed to coalition forces, according to United Nations figures. Afghan and United Nations officials blame Special Operations troops for most of those deaths.

“In most of the cases of civilian casualties, special forces are involved,” said Mohammed Iqbal Safi, head of the defense committee in the Afghan Parliament, who participated in joint United States-Afghan investigations of civilian casualties last year. “We’re always finding out they are not obeying the rules that other forces have to in Afghanistan.”

“These forces often operate with little or no accountability and exacerbate the anger and resentment felt by communities,” the Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan wrote in its report on protection of civilians for 2009.

Rear Adm. Gregory J. Smith, General McChrystal’s deputy chief of staff for communications, cautioned against putting undue blame on Special Operations forces. Since night raids are dangerous, and most missions take place at night, most of them are carried out by the more highly trained special groups. In January, General McChrystal issued restrictions on night raids.

Admiral Smith said that General McChrystal had issued the new directive on Special Operations forces within “the last two or three weeks.” While it is being circulated for comment within the military and has not been formally announced, General McChrystal has already put it into practical effect, he said.

Only detainee operations and “very small numbers of U.S. S.O.F.,” or Special Operations forces, are exempted from the directive, Admiral Smith said. That is believed to include elite groups like the Army’s Delta Force and the Navy’s Seals.

Previously, Special Operations forces in Afghanistan often had separate chains of command to their own headquarters elsewhere. That remained true even after General McChrystal was appointed last year and consolidated the NATO and American military commands under his own control.

Three recent high profile cases of civilian casualties illustrate the concern over Special Operations forces.

On Feb. 21 in Oruzgan Province, a small Special Operations forces unit heard that a group of Taliban were heading their way and called for air support. Attack helicopters killed 27 civilians in three trucks, mistaking them for the Taliban.

Military video appeared to show the victims were civilians, and no weapons were recovered from them. “What I saw on that video would not have led me to pull the trigger,” one NATO official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity in line with his department’s rules. “It was one of the worst things I’ve seen in a while.”

General McChrystal promptly apologized for the Oruzgan episode, both directly to Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai, and in a videotaped statement released to local television stations.

On Feb. 12 in a village near Gardez, in Paktia Province, Afghan police special forces paired with American Special Operations forces raided a house late at night looking for two Taliban suspects, and instead killed a local police chief and a district prosecutor when they came out, armed with Kalashnikov rifles, to investigate. Three women who came to their aid, according to interviews with family members and friends, were also killed; one was a pregnant mother of 10, the other a pregnant mother of 6.

A press release from the International Security Assistance Force, as NATO’s force here is known, said at first that the three women had been discovered bound and gagged, apparently killed execution style. NATO officials now say their bodies were wrapped in traditional manner before burial. Admiral Smith said Afghan forces fired the shots in the compound.

“The regret is that two innocent males died,” Admiral Smith said. “The women, I’m not sure anyone will ever know how they died.” He added, however, “I don’t know that there are any forensics that show bullet penetrations of the women or blood from the women.” He said they showed signs of puncture and slashing wounds from a knife, and appeared to have died several hours before the arrival of the assault force. In respect for Afghan customs, autopsies are not carried out on civilian victims, he said.

Interviews with relatives and family friends give a starkly different account and described an American cover-up. They say a large number of people had gathered for a party in honor of the birth of a grandson of the owner of the house, Hajji Sharaf Udin. After most had gone to sleep, the police commander, Mr. Udin’s son, Mohammed Daoud, went out to investigate the arrival of armed men and was shot fatally.

When a second son, Mohammed Zahir, went out to talk to the Americans because he spoke some English, he too was shot and killed. The three women — Mr. Udin’s 19-year-old granddaughter, Gulalai; his 37-year-old daughter, Saleha, the mother of 10 children; and his daughter-in-law, Shirin, the mother of six — were all gunned down when they tried to help the victims, these witnesses claimed.

All the survivors interviewed insisted that Americans, who they said were not in uniform, conducted the raid and the killings, and entered the compound before Afghan forces. Among the witnesses was Sayid Mohammed Mal, vice chancellor of Gardez University, whose son’s fiancée, Gulalai, was killed. “They were killed by the Americans,” he said. “If the government doesn’t listen to us, I have 50 family members, I’ll bring them all to Gardez roundabout and we’ll pour petrol on ourselves and burn ourselves to death.”

On Dec. 26 in Kunar Province, a night raid was launched on what authorities thought was a Taliban training facility, they later discovered that they had killed all nine religious students in a residential school. Admiral Smith said United States Special Operations forces were nearby at the time, but not directly involved in the attack, which was carried out by an Afghan unit.

Admiral Smith confirmed that all three events, which took place outside of any larger battle, involved Special Operations forces. But he said that General McChrystal’s unified command initiative was not in response to those events.

He depicted General McChrystal’s new policy as a natural outgrowth of the general’s plans all along to unify his command; when he first took charge, he brought together under his control what had been separate NATO and American command structures in Afghanistan.

The NATO official said that the unified command initiative would be obeyed, though it was not universally popular. “They may not like it, they may not want to follow it, but they are going to follow it,” the official said.

Aides to General McChrystal say he has been deeply troubled by the continuing episodes of civilian casualties, including the three major ones still under investigation. “You won’t believe how focused on these issues this command is, almost more than anything else,” the NATO official said.

Mr. Safi, the Parliament member, expressed concern that with the continued exemption of some Special Operations units from the directive, the problem of civilian casualties would continue. “If they are excluded, naturally it means the same thing will happen,” he said. “If there are individuals who do not obey McChrystal, then what are they doing in this country?”

General McChrystal addressed that concern in the interview. “There are no operators in this country that I am not absolutely comfortable do exactly what I want them to do,” he said. “So I don’t have any complaints about that, particularly after the latest change.”

Tension between Special Operations and conventional commanders has often surfaced in the American military, but General McChrystal himself has a great deal of credibility in the black operations world.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/wo...er=rss&emc=rss

[Richard]

MOO - it goes with the territory - for those of us a bit longer in the tooth who remember - at least they aren't counting individual bullets out - bullets back in...yet.

And so it goes...

Richard's $.02

[Utah Bob]

Originally Posted by Richard

MOO - it goes with the territory - for those of us a bit longer in the tooth who remember - at least they aren't counting individual bullets out - bullets back in...yet.

And so it goes...

Richard's $.02

Yeah. Not yet...

Holy Deja Vu Batman.

[Marina]

It looks like McChrystal is reigning in the boys in blue.

At Afghan outpost, Marines gone rogue or leading the fight against counterinsurgency?

Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post
Sunday, March 14, 2010

<snip>

The Marine approach -- creative, aggressive and, at times, unorthodox -- has won many admirers within the military. The Marine emphasis on patrolling by foot and interacting with the population, which has helped to turn former insurgent strongholds along the Helmand River valley into reasonably stable communities with thriving bazaars and functioning schools, is hailed as a model of how U.S. forces should implement counterinsurgency strategy.

But the Marines' methods, and their insistence that they be given a degree of autonomy not afforded to U.S. Army units, also have riled many up the chain of command in Kabul and Washington, prompting some to refer to their area of operations in the south as "Marineistan." They regard the expansion in Delaram and beyond as contrary to the population-centric approach embraced by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, and they are seeking to impose more control over the Marines.

The U.S. ambassador in Kabul, Karl W. Eikenberry, recently noted that the international security force in Afghanistan feels as if it comprises 42 nations instead of 41 because the Marines act so independently from other U.S. forces.

"We have better operational coherence with virtually all of our NATO allies than we have with the U.S. Marine Corps," said a senior Obama administration official involved in Afghanistan policy. "

. . .

Marines support Marines

Until earlier this month, McChrystal lacked operational control over the Marines, which would have allowed him to move them to other parts of the country. That power rested with a three-star Marine general at the U.S. Central Command. He and other senior Marine commanders insisted that Marines in Afghanistan have a contiguous area of operations -- effectively precluding them from being split up and sent to Kandahar -- because they think it is essential the Marines are supported by Marine helicopters and logistics units, which are based in Helmand, instead of relying on the Army.

Concern about the arrangement reached the White House. In early March, Gen. David H. Petraeus, who heads the Central Command, issued an order giving McChrystal operational control of Marine forces in Afghanistan, according to senior defense officials. But the new authority vested in McChrystal -- the product of extensive negotiations among military lawyers -- still requires Central Command approval for any plan to disaggregate infantry units from air and logistics support, which will limit his ability to move them, the defense officials said.

"At the end of the day, not a lot has changed," said a Marine general, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, as did several other senior officers and officials, to address sensitive command issues. "There's still a caveat that prevents us from being cherry-picked."

[CSB]

Special Forces are traditionally "theater" level forces, since they would -- in the normal course of events -- be expected to span both conventional military areas of responsibilty and international borders.

As a general rule, Special Forces soldiers do not come under the command authority of a commander solely because they happen to be located at a certain lattitude and longitude.

The goals of a theater commander, while in sync with a country commander, may not align 100%.

The lines of authority better be clear, before we have a four star moving A-Teams around like men on a chess board.

[greenberetTFS]

Originally Posted by CSB

Special Forces are traditionally "theater" level forces, since they would -- in the normal course of events -- be expected to span both conventional military areas of responsibilty and international borders.

As a general rule, Special Forces soldiers do not come under the command authority of a commander solely because they happen to be located at a certain lattitude and longitude.

The goals of a theater commander, while in sync with a country commander, may not align 100%.

The lines of authority better be clear, before we have a four star moving A-Teams around like men on a chess board.

Well said CSB,it is sorta frightening isn't it.............

Big Teddy .

[LarryW]

Question: Could the DoD (Gen McChrystal) be actually reducing SF involvement in the area as reported or is the DoD just reacting to MSM? I don't suggest to oversimplify the issues, but I saw a piece on FNC this morning re: DoD hiring contract "hit squads" (link below to USA Today article). The DoD press secretary said basically they're investigating the NYT report. (NYT is all over this stuff.) Is this information or dis-information? I'm not smart enough to know.

(from USA Today) http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2...s-spying_N.htm

[Green Light]

All SOF is not created equal. There are other SOF components that "screw the pooch" for SF. McChrystal is a Ranger and JSOC guy. You'll notice that there was a "very small numbers of U.S. S.O.F." exempted from the directive. Who do you think that is? Not anyone under SF Command I'll wager. They hate it when we're in the villages, sitting cross-legged on the floor, gaining the locals' trust, and winning the war one village at a time.

The SF Regiment has sustained more casualties than any other SOF component. It's not our guys who are going in and shooting up the locals. I've seen some of the other components go in with guns blazing. Our guys are smarter and better than that. Anyone remember Davíd during Just Cause? One of our fellow SOF components wanted to take the place down. The commander of B-790 said heck, let's call'em up and see if they want to surrender. It worked. Our fellow component was pissed - not much fun or glory there. But we did capture Noreiga's #2.

I'm not gonna keep going, I'll just get more pissed. But as a former detachment commander, I'd trust an SF team sergeant to get it done before I'd trust an infantry battalion commander, or a general. Period. Seems Afghanistan was going pretty well before the rest of the army got there.

[TF Kilo]

Originally Posted by Green Light

All SOF is not created equal. There are other SOF components that "screw the pooch" for SF. McChrystal is a Ranger and JSOC guy. You'll notice that there was a "very small numbers of U.S. S.O.F." exempted from the directive. Who do you think that is? Not anyone under SF Command I'll wager. They hate it when we're in the villages, sitting cross-legged on the floor, gaining the locals' trust, and winning the war one village at a time.

The SF Regiment has sustained more casualties than any other SOF component. It's not our guys who are going in and shooting up the locals. I've seen some of the other components go in with guns blazing. Our guys are smarter and better than that. Anyone remember Davíd during Just Cause? One of our fellow SOF components wanted to take the place down. The commander of B-790 said heck, let's call'em up and see if they want to surrender. It worked. Our fellow component was pissed - not much fun or glory there. But we did capture Noreiga's #2.

I'm not gonna keep going, I'll just get more pissed. But as a former detachment commander, I'd trust an SF team sergeant to get it done before I'd trust an infantry battalion commander, or a general. Period. Seems Afghanistan was going pretty well before the rest of the army got there.

Last I checked he got his long tab before he ever wore a scroll brotha...

[Richard]

Last I checked he got his long tab before he ever wore a scroll brotha...

FWIW - that statement is not exactly correct - Stan and I were both ODA CDRs in 1-7th and there was no such thing as a 'long tab' then - his team was in B-710 and mine was next door in B-720 - he spent minimum time there and left as soon as he could for IOAC and looking for company command - he was smart and understood SF, but seemed to be neither committed to it nor comfortable with it - he was obviously more comfortable with the 75th and JSOC lifestyles - Stan was always seen as somebody who was going to make GO - guess they were correct.

OBTW - he wore the 'scroll' before they ever came out with the 'long tab'...but his 'scroll wearing time' did begin after his ODA time.

Richard's $.02

[The Reaper]

And he voted with his feet when he opted not to branch SF, but to remain Infantry.

TR