The Meaning of Marjah--from Stratfor

[craigepo]

On Feb. 13, some 6,000 U.S. Marines, soldiers and Afghan National Army (ANA) troops launched a sustained assault on the town of Marjah in Helmand province. Until this latest offensive, the U.S. and NATO effort in Afghanistan had been constrained by other considerations, most notably Iraq. Western forces viewed the Afghan conflict as a matter of holding the line or pursuing targets of opportunity. But now, armed with larger forces and a new strategy, the war — the real war — has begun. The most recent offensive — dubbed Operation Moshtarak (“Moshtarak” is Dari for “together”) — is the largest joint U.S.-NATO-Afghan operation in history. It also is the first major offensive conducted by the first units deployed as part of the surge of 30,000 troops promised by U.S. President Barack Obama.

The United States originally entered Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks. In those days of fear and fury, American goals could be simply stated: A non-state actor — al Qaeda — had attacked the American homeland and needed to be destroyed. Al Qaeda was based in Afghanistan at the invitation of a near-state actor — the Taliban, which at the time were Afghanistan’s de facto governing force. Since the Taliban were unwilling to hand al Qaeda over, the United States attacked. By the end of the year, al Qaeda had relocated to neighboring Pakistan and the Taliban retreated into the arid, mountainous countryside in their southern heartland and began waging a guerrilla conflict. In time, American attention became split between searching for al Qaeda and clashing with the Taliban over control of Afghanistan.

But from the earliest days following 9/11, the White House was eyeing Iraq, and with the Taliban having largely declined combat in the initial invasion, the path seemed clear. The U.S. military and diplomatic focus was shifted, and as the years wore on, the conflict absorbed more and more U.S. troops, even as other issues — a resurgent Russia and a defiant Iran — began to demand American attention. All of this and more consumed American bandwidth, and the Afghan conflict melted into the background. The United States maintained its Afghan force in what could accurately be described as a holding action as the bulk of its forces operated elsewhere. That has more or less been the state of affairs for eight years.

That has changed with the series of offensive operations that most recently culminated at Marjah.

Why Marjah? The key is the geography of Afghanistan and the nature of the conflict itself. Most of Afghanistan is custom-made for a guerrilla war. Much of the country is mountainous, encouraging local identities and militias, as well as complicating the task of any foreign military force. The country’s aridity discourages dense population centers, making it very easy for irregular combatants to melt into the countryside. Afghanistan lacks navigable rivers or ports, drastically reducing the region’s likelihood of developing commerce. No commerce to tax means fewer resources to fund a meaningful government or military and encourages the smuggling of every good imaginable — and that smuggling provides the perfect funding for guerrillas.

Rooting out insurgents is no simple task. It requires three things:

Massively superior numbers so that occupiers can limit the zones to which the insurgents have easy access.
The support of the locals in order to limit the places that the guerillas can disappear into.
Superior intelligence so that the fight can be consistently taken to the insurgents rather than vice versa.
Without those three things — and American-led forces in Afghanistan lack all three — the insurgents can simply take the fight to the occupiers, retreat to rearm and regroup and return again shortly thereafter.

But the insurgents hardly hold all the cards. Guerrilla forces are by their very nature irregular. Their capacity to organize and strike is quite limited, and while they can turn a region into a hellish morass for an opponent, they have great difficulty holding territory — particularly territory that a regular force chooses to contest. Should they mass into a force that could achieve a major battlefield victory, a regular force — which is by definition better-funded, -trained, -organized and -armed — will almost always smash the irregulars. As such, the default guerrilla tactic is to attrit and harass the occupier into giving up and going home. The guerrillas always decline combat in the face of a superior military force only to come back and fight at a time and place of their choosing. Time is always on the guerrilla’s side if the regular force is not a local one.

But while the guerrillas don’t require basing locations that are as large or as formalized as those required by regular forces, they are still bound by basic economics. They need resources — money, men and weapons — to operate. The larger these locations are, the better economies of scale they can achieve and the more effectively they can fight their war.

Marjah is perhaps the quintessential example of a good location from which to base. It is in a region sympathetic to the Taliban; Helmand province is part of the Taliban’s heartland. Marjah is very close to Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second city, the religious center of the local brand of Islam, the birthplace of the Taliban, and due to the presence of American forces, an excellent target. Helmand alone produces more heroin than any country on the planet, and Marjah is at the center of that trade. By some estimates, this center alone supplies the Taliban with a monthly income of $200,000. And it is defensible: The farmland is crisscrossed with irrigation canals and dotted with mud-brick compounds — and, given time to prepare, a veritable plague of IEDs.

Simply put, regardless of the Taliban’s strategic or tactical goals, Marjah is a critical node in their operations.

The American Strategy
Though operations have approached Marjah in the past, it has not been something NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) ever has tried to hold. The British, Canadian and Danish troops holding the line in the country’s restive south had their hands full enough. Despite Marjah’s importance to the Taliban, ISAF forces were too few to engage the Taliban everywhere (and they remain as such). But American priorities started changing about two years ago. The surge of forces into Iraq changed the position of many a player in the country. Those changes allowed a reshaping of the Iraq conflict that laid the groundwork for the current “stability” and American withdrawal. At the same time, the Taliban began to resurge in a big way. Since then the Bush and then Obama administrations inched toward applying a similar strategy to Afghanistan, a strategy that focuses less on battlefield success and more on altering the parameters of the country itself.

As the Obama administration’s strategy has begun to take shape, it has started thinking about endgames. A decades-long occupation and pacification of Afghanistan is simply not in the cards. A withdrawal is, but only a withdrawal where the security free-for-all that allowed al Qaeda to thrive will not return. And this is where Marjah comes in.

Denying the Taliban control of poppy farming communities like Marjah and the key population centers along the Helmand River Valley — and areas like them around the country — is the first goal of the American strategy. The fewer key population centers the Taliban can count on, the more dispersed — and militarily inefficient — their forces will be. This will hardly destroy the Taliban, but destruction isn’t the goal. The Taliban are not simply a militant Islamist force. At times they are a flag of convenience for businessmen or thugs; they can even be, simply, the least-bad alternative for villagers desperate for basic security and civil services. In many parts of Afghanistan, the Taliban are not only pervasive but also the sole option for governance and civil authority.

So destruction of what is in essence part of the local cultural and political fabric is not an American goal. Instead, the goal is to prevent the Taliban from mounting large-scale operations that could overwhelm any particular location. Remember, the Americans do not wish to pacify Afghanistan; the Americans wish to leave Afghanistan in a form that will not cause the United States severe problems down the road. In effect, achieving the first goal simply aims to shape the ground for a shot at achieving the second.

That second goal is to establish a domestic authority that can stand up to the Taliban in the long run. Most of the surge of forces into Afghanistan is not designed to battle the Taliban now but to secure the population and train the Afghan security forces to battle the Taliban later. To do this, the Taliban must be weak enough in a formal military sense to be unable to launch massive or coordinated attacks. Capturing key population centers along the Helmand River Valley is the first step in a strategy designed to create the breathing room necessary to create a replacement force, preferably a replacement force that provides Afghans with a viable alternative to the Taliban...

***Remainder viewable after jump at link***

"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100...3b487828a6d769

[incarcerated]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8527266.stm

Petraeus: Marjah start of long campaign

17:58 GMT, Sunday, 21 February 2010
The head of US Central Command has said the current offensive around the southern Afghan town of Marjah is the initial operation of a long campaign.

Gen David Petraeus told NBC that the offensive was part of a revised strategy for combating insurgents that would probably last "12 to 18 months".

He said Taliban resistance to Operation Moshtarak, which is in its second week, had been "formidable" but "disjointed"....

'Initial salvo'

Gen Petraeus said the US public should expect further losses, much like there were following the so-called troop surge in Iraq.
"When we go on the offensive… they are going to fight back. And we are seeing that in Marjah. We will see that in other areas. But we are going after them across the spectrum," he told NBC's Meet The Press programme.

"The reality is that it is hard, but we are there for a very important reason."

The general, who oversees the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, said that in Marjah there had been "tough fighting going on without question".

"[The Taliban] are formidable. They are a bit disjointed at this point in time. The way the operation was conducted leaped over some of them."

He said it was important to realise that Operation Moshtarak marked the beginning of what would be a 12 to 18-month campaign, as mapped out by the commander of US and Nato forces in Afghanistan, Gen Stanley McChrystal.

"We have spent the last year getting the inputs right in Afghanistan, getting the structure and organizations necessary for a comprehensive civil-military campaign, putting the best leaders we can find in charge of those," he said.

"Now we are starting to see the first of the output. The Marjah operation is the initial salvo," he added....

[incarcerated]

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6234PU20100304

U.S. commander in Afghanistan gets more authority

Pav Jordan
OTTAWA
Thu Mar 4, 2010 5:10pm EST
U.S. General David Petraeus said on Thursday he had expanded the authority of his top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, to give him operational control over virtually all American forces in the country.

Officials in Washington said the move was part of an effort to further streamline the military hierarchy in Afghanistan.

McChrystal commands U.S. and NATO troops there -- except for U.S. Special Operations forces and prison guards who run detention facilities and answer to Petraeus, they said....

Speaking to a defense conference in Ottawa, Petraeus said he had ordered that "all U.S. forces, less a handful, be placed there under General McChrystal's operational, not just tactical, control."

As head of U.S. Central Command, Petraeus oversees wars in Afghanistan as well as Iraq.

He said his order consolidating command under McChrystal was issued within the past week after "considerable discussion ... within the U.S. Department of Defense."

Petraeus did not say which handful of forces would not be covered by the order.

"This is a significant development. It will provide General McChrystal authorities that I never had as the commander in Iraq -- though I wish I had them -- and that his predecessors never had in Afghanistan either," Petraeus said....

[incarcerated]

http://www.stratfor.com

Afghanistan: Kandahar Operation This Summer - U.S. Commander
March 8, 2010 1910 GMT
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said March 8 that an offensive to oust Taliban militants from their strongholds in Kandahar province will begin this summer, AFP reported, citing a statement McChrystal gave to reporters in Kabul. McChrystal said that troop levels will be increased significantly in Kandahar by early summer, but did not announce a specific timeline for the offensive. He also said troops would arrive in the region gradually.

[incarcerated]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...031200441.html

Russia criticizes US, NATO over Afghan drugs

The Associated Press
Friday, March 12, 2010; 2:38 AM
BRUSSELS -- Russia's envoy to NATO is criticizing the alliance's military strategy in Afghanistan - where the emphasis has shifted away from fighting drug trafficking - saying the resulting surge in heroin smuggling is endangering Russia's national security.
Dmitry Rogozin says 30,000 people are dying every year in Russia from drugs imported from Afghanistan. He says this constitutes "an undeclared war against our country."
For years, the U.S. tried to eradicate poppy crops, but that resulted in a boost to the insurgency as impoverished poppy farmers joined the Taliban. Gen. Stanley McChrystal's new policy of trying to win the support of the population means that these farmers are now left alone, enabling them to tend crops that produce 90 percent of the world's heroin.

[greenberetTFS]

Originally Posted by incarcerated

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...031200441.html

Russia criticizes US, NATO over Afghan drugs

The Associated Press
Friday, March 12, 2010; 2:38 AM
BRUSSELS -- Russia's envoy to NATO is criticizing the alliance's military strategy in Afghanistan - where the emphasis has shifted away from fighting drug trafficking - saying the resulting surge in heroin smuggling is endangering Russia's national security.
Dmitry Rogozin says 30,000 people are dying every year in Russia from drugs imported from Afghanistan. He says this constitutes "an undeclared war against our country."
For years, the U.S. tried to eradicate poppy crops, but that resulted in a boost to the insurgency as impoverished poppy farmers joined the Taliban. Gen. Stanley McChrystal's new policy of trying to win the support of the population means that these farmers are now left alone, enabling them to tend crops that produce 90 percent of the world's heroin.

I'm sorry because I just don't get it............. Allowing them to produce crops because we don't want to have them join the Taliban!!!! Is it just me or do others see where this is just wrong?

Big Teddy

[incarcerated]

http://www1.voanews.com/english/news...-87592782.html

Afghan Officials: Four Suicide Blasts Kill 30 in Kandahar City

13 March 2010
Sean Maroney
Kabul
Afghan officials say suicide bombers targeted four different parts of the southern city of Kandahar Saturday evening, killing at least 30 people and wounding 46 others. Authorities say they now have the situation under control.

The head of Kandahar's provincial council Ahmad Wali Karzai tells VOA that officials believe the main objective of the Saturday night attacks in Kandahar city was a prison break.

He says insurgents launched four suicide attacks with the biggest strike occurring in front of the city's main prison. He says another attack occurred outside the police headquarters, while a small explosion occurred close to his house and a fourth attack happened elsewhere in the city....

[Dozer523]

Originally Posted by greenberetTFS

I'm sorry because I just don't get it............. Allowing them to produce crops because we don't want to have them join the Taliban!!!! Is it just me or do others see where this is just wrong?

Big Teddy

Teddy, Drug eradication programs have not worked anywhere so why waste the time, effort and good will by wasting the resources?
Afghan farmers are subsistance farmers at the present time. (although in the pre-Soviet days Afghans were net exporters of many crops -- for example more raisins then California.)
Afghans don't grow poppies to eat them, they sell them for cash used to buy stuff to eat. Poppies are easy to grow and harvest but you can't eat them. They are tough on the soil, depleting the ability of the soil to produce poppies in the future. But, they are easy and there is a market. And that market is being used by the enemy.

So how about a strategy that might work.
Hey farmer, want to grow opium? Knock yourself out. But you have to sell it to the government. Meanwhile we have aggies who will help you repair the damage being done to your soil, help you improve your farm (irrigation, fertilizer, rotation strategies) and help you raise crops you can eat and sell for cash. Over time we reduce the price being paid for poppies and food crops return the Afghanistan countryside to a farm based economy that the people are invested in and willing to defend.

"Oh but the US is supporting drug trafficking!"
No we're not. Cuz we collect it all and destroy it.

A big problem in Afghanistan and Iraq is piggy-backing OUR sensibilities onto people who have too much to worry about already. Solutions don't always have to be US-centric.

[greenberetTFS]

Originally Posted by Dozer523

Teddy, Drug eradication programs have not worked anywhere so why waste the time, effort and good will by wasting the resources?
Afghan farmers are subsistance farmers at the present time. (although in the pre-Soviet days Afghans were net exporters of many crops -- for example more raisins then California.)
Afghans don't grow poppies to eat them, they sell them for cash used to buy stuff to eat. Poppies are easy to grow and harvest but you can't eat them. They are tough on the soil, depleting the ability of the soil to produce poppies in the future. But, they are easy and there is a market. And that market is being used by the enemy.

So how about a strategy that might work.
Hey farmer, want to grow opium? Knock yourself out. But you have to sell it to the government. Meanwhile we have aggies who will help you repair the damage being done to your soil, help you improve your farm (irrigation, fertilizer, rotation strategies) and help you raise crops you can eat and sell for cash. Over time we reduce the price being paid for poppies and food crops return the Afghanistan countryside to a farm based economy that the people are invested in and willing to defend.

"Oh but the US is supporting drug trafficking!"
No we're not. Cuz we collect it all and destroy it.

A big problem in Afghanistan and Iraq is piggy-backing OUR sensibilities onto people who have too much to worry about already. Solutions don't always have to be US-centric.

Dozer,that makes an awful lot of sense to me..........

Big Teddy

[Marina]

Originally Posted by Dozer523

So how about a strategy that might work.
Hey farmer, want to grow opium? Knock yourself out. But you have to sell it to the government. Meanwhile we have aggies who will help you repair the damage being done to your soil, help you improve your farm (irrigation, fertilizer, rotation strategies) and help you raise crops you can eat and sell for cash. Over time we reduce the price being paid for poppies and food crops return the Afghanistan countryside to a farm based economy that the people are invested in and willing to defend.

Brilliant! But do you think that is actually what will happen? Will we buy and destroy the output?

Somebody would need to be there to oversee the destruction. Maybe that's why the Pakistanis are so interested in being part of the solution.

Is that cynical?

[Dozer523]

Originally Posted by Marina

Brilliant! But do you think that is actually what will happen? Will we buy and destroy the output?

Somebody would need to be there to oversee the destruction. Maybe that's why the Pakistanis are so interested in being part of the solution.

Is that cynical?

Of course it won't happen.
Could we buy and destroy the output, of course we could and for probably less then the cost of the current eradication program. Who oversees the destruction? Well in my perfect world, the gov picks it up and pays for it then hauls it away for destruction somewhere else. We don't want to destroy it in front of the grower because we want them pouring their hearts and souls into it so they deplete the soil as fast as they can -- heck maybe the aggies could give them some fertilizer to help it along. we want them to be proud that they are good farmers. We also want them to realize legitimate (edible) crops are much less labor intensive. (Which is easier? harvest poppies or wheat?) Besides there is a use for pharma ( cuz I can't spell sutical) opium so we ought to get what we pay for.
Is it cynical? well probably.
A possible solution? I think so.
Practical? Not at all. If we did it the only thing the American people would here is "ISAF, NATO and US encourage drug production in Afghanistan".