U.S. Using Cash as a Defensive Weapon

[NousDefionsDoc]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...2004Jul25.html

U.S. Using Cash as a Defensive Weapon

By Doug Struck
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, July 26, 2004; Page A14


TIKRIT, Iraq -- Cash has become the U.S. military's first line of defense in some parts of Iraq, where U.S. soldiers are distributing money to encourage goodwill and to counter their enemies' offers of money to unemployed Iraqis willing to attack Americans, according to officers here.

Even patrol leaders now carry envelopes of cash to spend in their areas. The money comes from brigade commanders, who get as much as $50,000 to $100,000 a month to distribute for local rehabilitation and emergency welfare projects through the Commanders Emergency Response Program.

There are few restrictions on the expenditures, and officers acknowledge they consider the money another weapon. The targets at which it is aimed are the restless legions of unemployed Iraqi men, many of them former soldiers, policemen and low-level members of the Baath Party of the ousted president, Saddam Hussein. They were put out of work when the U.S. administrator, L. Paul Bremer, ordered a de-Baathification of Iraq. U.S. soldiers say those men are vulnerable to entreaties to carry out an attack on the Americans for pay.

"I have met two guys now who say, 'I don't love you and I don't hate you. But somebody's offered me $200 to set up a mortar or a [roadside bomb], and there's a bonus if we kill you,' " said Lt. Col. Randall Potterf, the civil affairs officer for the Army's 1st Infantry Division.

Maj. Gen. John R.S. Batiste, the division commander, said restive central Iraq is full of men who "are young, unemployed, without hope. We are trying to reach out to them. Whenever we get the money, we are trying to apply it to pull over as many of these men as we can to our side."

His local commanders have the go-ahead to dish out tens, hundreds and thousands of dollars with little more paperwork than a signed receipt. Often, the cash is paid in return for a promise to perform a small community project, but it is also given to Iraqis to buy items they say are necessary.

Capt. David Krzycki, 35, a company commander operating on the outskirts of Tikrit, recently plunked down $350 to get local residents to haul rubbish from their street and another $770 to clean out an irrigation ditch.

Lt. Col. Jeffrey A. Sinclair, commander of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment in Tikrit, said he had paid $500 to a driver to get his car repaired, paid "benevolent" money to the family of a victim of violence, paid people to clean streets, bought soccer uniforms for a local team and repaired a local swimming pool, among other expenditures.

Other officers have given money to ice cream vendors, chicken farmers and hardware suppliers to get their businesses going.

"I'm trying to give them something to do rather than take shots at someone," said Sinclair, who said he gets $50,000 every three or four weeks to distribute. "It's not bribery. It's priming the pump. And it works well."

For more than a year, the Commanders Emergency Response Program was funded with $105 million taken from Iraqi reconstruction funds. But the Defense Department has agreed to begin paying for the program and has requested $300 million as part of its fiscal 2005 budget request to Congress. The program is popular with some members of Congress, who see it as bypassing the bureaucracy of the slow-moving Iraq reconstruction program.

"This is economic warfare," said Lt. Col. Courtney Paul, executive officer of the 1st Infantry's engineer brigade headquartered in Tikrit. "The anti-Iraqi forces are paying $50 to take part in an attack. That's one-third of the monthly pay of an Iraqi National Guardsman."

The projects are "never going to get them to love America," said Potterf, the civil affairs officer. "Nobody is going to ever be waving an American flag. But I just want them to be neutral, to stop planting explosives."

[NousDefionsDoc]

Valid tactic or complete and utter Bullshit?

[The Reaper]

Cash is BS.

I can see buying local merchandise, local services, or even weapons, but putting cash in people's hands for little or nothing is probably going to the insurgent's pockets as well.

TR

[Peregrino]

It's worse than BS! One of my brothers is over there right now with CA. You really don't want to hear what he has to say about throwing money especially "no strings attached" cash at the problem. Of course he's something of a moralist - thinks we should be getting long term tangible value for the taxpayer's dollar. We're trying to buy people who have no concept of why we get upset when they won't stay bought. Just ask anybody in 5th Gp. who observed the massive quantities of OGA monies exchanging hands in SWA what they think of the tactic. Makes me really glad I've got a LATAM orientation. At least they'll (sometimes) buy you a beer with the money you give them. FWIW - Peregrino

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

I wonder what genius came up with this program. I think the thing that bothers me the most about this nonsense is the crap, with one notable exception when US dollars were not involved, that we all had to go thru to just get an opfund. Even then, the paperwork required was about as rediculous as giving folks on a 200 mile overland movement 1:50,000 scale maps with which to navigate.
Jack Moroney

[Roguish Lawyer]

How about cash for intel on who the insurgents are and where their weapons are located?

[The Reaper]

Originally posted by Roguish Lawyer
How about cash for intel on who the insurgents are and where their weapons are located?

A good technique, if the info pans out.

I would not pay for bad intel, not because of the cost, but because of the volume of tips and the abuse of the program.

TR

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

Originally posted by Roguish Lawyer
How about cash for intel on who the insurgents are and where their weapons are located?

Agree with TR. Also you have to remember where you are. The loyalty starts with the family and the tribe and what better way to start eliminating your competition by turning in the other tribes folks with whom you have had disagreements in the past. As far as the tactics, techniques and procedures for intell ops, that is way outside the scope of this forum but suffice it to say, money ceases to be a motivator for just about anything once the basic needs for which the money was used are satisfied.

Jack Moroney

[Solid]

I recall reading somewhere that in terms of spending to win indig support, the best thing you could do was give them tangible, lasting, and significant things such as schools, wells, healthcare, etc. At least there the money doesn't disappear instantly, and to get rid of the appearance that the US cares, the insurgents would have to destroy the building/project and thereby actually hurt the community and public support.

True?

Thank you,

Solid

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

If you want to win indig support for anything you need to understand what it is that makes them tick and help them realize those goals that are most meaningful to them within the constraints of common sense and cultural reality. For instance, when we brought in a bunch of displaced folks after a major operation and they needed a place to live we got the local village chief to give them the land and folks pitched in a helped them build their homes. Now we could have used tin for the roof but we made sure they used indigenous material not only so that they were not looking to us the next time they needed a new roof but also not to afford them special status that the other indig did not have available to them. You always have to consider the long term effects of whatever you do, understand the operational environment, anticipate and control psychological effects, ensure long term sustainment to state but a few of what we call the Special Operational Imperatives. What works in one area will not necessarily work in another. You mention healthcare for instance. In a FID or UW environment when you are trying to establish a rapport with the indig your medics just might be the most important player on the team. However, if you are dealing with folks that are steeped in the mysteries of black magic and the medic represents a threat to his power you are going to have to look to other things to win them over first without undermining their beliefs and internal power structure. There is no cookie cutter answer, that is why things like area studies play such an important role in what we do when we start mission planning. Hope that answers your question, this is a whole lot more involved than this paragraph and it will vary with not only the situation but the skills and qualifications of your team members.

Jack Moroney

[Solid]

Colonel,
I absolutely understand and thank you for that paragraph. I should have been more specific in my post- that whatever funding purchases, it has to fit the AO and indigs within it to a Tee to be effective.
I find that I am often not specific or clear enough, I will endevour to be in the future.

Thank you,

Solid

[pulque]

Originally posted by Solid
to get rid of the appearance that the US cares

This reminds me of something portrayed in The Ugly American. There, the Soviet diplomat makes it appear that the rice given to the Sarkahnese came from Russia rather than US.

Tangible and lasting or not, there are nuances of "seeming to care" as contrasted with real area knowledge.

[Solid]

Yet another book that sits on my desk waiting to be read. I agree completely. I'm reminded of the Malay Insurgency, where the British colonial government undertook a huge relocation program. Cultural sensitivity, use of propoganda, and tangible benefits significantly decreased the success of the ethnic chinese insurgency, and increased faith in the British government (which had lost some legitimacy, I believe, during the war).

Solid