Does The United States Still Need a USSOCOM?

**The Reaper** · 12-13-2009, 20:44

Excellent questions.

I find myself agreeing very strongly with most of his comments.

Recommended reading for all SF and SOF. In fact, it would be tremendously beneficial for our leadership to read it as well.

TR

Quote:

Posted by SWJ Editors on December 13, 2009 10:25 AM

Does The United States Still Need a U.S. Special Operations Command?
How Effective Has USSOCOM Been in Fighting the Long War?
by Yasotay

The establishment of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987 with the passage of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1987 was designed to fix the problems with Special Operations that were brought to light after the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt at Desert One in 1980. Congress did what the military establishment would not. This legislation provided unity of command and control for Special Operations Forces and elevated Special Operations to a near peer with the Services giving it “service-like” responsibilities as well as a little used Combatant Command authority.

However, in 2009, perhaps it is time for Congress to review their handiwork. Of course many outside the military establishment are enamored with the myth and romanticism of Special Operations. There are so many “groupies” among staffers and in academia that it is hard to see Special Operations for what it really is and what it has become. And within the military, Special Operations has been “hijacked” by a group of hyper-conventional Ranger types and other supporting elements that Special Operations and most important, its heart and soul – Special Forces - has lost its way. There are so many in and out of the military who claim ties to Special Operations that it is unlikely that there will ever be a critical look at USSOCOM and what it has become.

There is no doubt that Special Operations Forces, including from across the spectrum: the hyper-conventional Special Mission Units including the Rangers and Special Operations Aviation, as well the SEALs, the Air Commandos, the MARSOC Marines and the intellectual, indirect approach experts in Special Forces such as Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations, have made tremendous contributions to the United States’ fight against terrorists and insurgents. However, it is important to note that they have done this working for the Combatant Commanders (formerly regional Commander in Chiefs) and Ambassadors and not under USSOCOM.

So let’s take a broad look at USSOCOM and specifically focus on its headquarters and what it has done for our nation since 9-11 and what it has become. Congress might want to delve into some of these issues and ask some hard questions.

(Continued at link below)

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...tates-still-n/

**The Reaper** · 12-13-2009, 21:37

Quote:

Originally Posted by Brush Okie

He has some very valid points, however I am not sure getting rid of JSOC is the answer. I will be the first to admit many folks here forgot more about SOF than I will ever know, but returning to CA after a long break I see where things have taken on a more conventional feel.

IMHO SOF has lost its way in that it lost sight of the PRINCIPALS of why they were established. For instance why is a conventional general in charge of an unconventional war? Instead of SOF being under a seperate command or suborting its self to a conventional unit like CA does, JSOC should be running the war and conventional units should be reporting to them.

If we were in a cold war type conflict with large armies and manouver units fighting each other the current command structure makes sense, but in the war on terror it is just ass backwards IMHO.

I did not take it that he said that we should get rid of JSOC.

He said that JSOC should be out from underneath SOCOM as a separate command. I agree, they do not really answer to SOCOM, so why have the pretense?

OTOH, JSOC is not the right unit to try and run an FID or COIN effort. They do not need conventional units under them, they have already absorbed far too many assets already, at the expense of SF.

Just my .02, YMMV.

TR

**Ambush Master** · 12-13-2009, 21:51

I think this quote says it ALL!!!

"And within the military, Special Operations has been “hijacked” by a group of hyper-conventional Ranger types and other supporting elements that Special Operations and most important, its heart and soul – Special Forces - has lost its way."

Warrior-Mentor · 12-13-2009, 21:52

Quote:

Originally Posted by Ambush Master

I think this quote says it ALL!!!

"And within the military, Special Operations has been “hijacked” by a group of hyper-conventional Ranger types and other supporting elements that Special Operations and most important, its heart and soul – Special Forces - has lost its way."

Just like islam has been hijacked?

I'm not buying it. Special Forces is doing what it should in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Philippines, and so on....our guys know what needs to be done.

Is it getting the prioritization and resources it should?

That's another argument...

He makes very valid points on the C2 issues with USSOCOM and forcing non-SF types to command effectively SF organizations. Apparently the geniuses who thought that up haven't taken the time to read "Not A Good Day to Die" ... And will need to relearn the important lesson that putting Special Forces Officers in command of Aviation Squadrons in combat gets people killed, oh wait...it was the other way around...

Scimitar · 12-14-2009, 01:07

Wow, what a governance eye opener.

I think it was a pre 9/11 SOCOM commander who said some thing like that his job was to command nothing and to influence everything. For the life of me I can't find the article. (Found it, it was General Shelton - I pretty much paraphased him here)

He went on to explain that his job was to build relationships with the service and operational commanders and educate them on SOF capabilities. SOF shouldn't have authority in a theater; they should have so well educated theater, service, and operational commanders that when ever a problem that can better be solved by an SOF capability arises an SOF unit is used.

Education and relationships creates flexibility, legislated governance creates problems and resentment. Is the reason SF hasn't been used to head up the COIN so well because SF failed to build relationships and educate well?

I've paraphrased him here, and it's only my PoV from the private sector...I'd be interested in an educated PoV.

Scimitar

LongTabSigO · 12-18-2009, 10:45

The important thing is that this question is asked and seriously debated.

Yasotay's article is compelling because it takes the question down to the basic problem: what does SOCOM actually DO?

Joking about higher headquarters aside, the weakness in the creation of a "SOCOM" from the beginning is that the Services will ultimately hold sway over who comes to, stays, and never gets to this HQ. As a result, the folks who really need to be there and provide leadership have better options which do not advance the role of SOCOM. That leaves lesser lights who, however well intentioned, nonetheless have steered SOCOM astray.

The (virtually) impossible to implement solution is to create an actual SOF Service. A credible argument was made that it creation could follow along the lines of the creation of the Air Force in 1947. I am not sure that the overhead necessary is justified; it would probably recreate what we have now.

Richard · 12-18-2009, 11:37

I, too, found the article insightful and relevant.

As for USSOCOM (or any Unified Combatant Command with such functional responsibilities) - if they cannot provide C4I and planning, training, and operational support for their subordinate elements - WTF good are they?

Richard's jaded $.02

**Peregrino** · 12-18-2009, 13:26

I mentioned this article to one of the "big" bosses just in passing. He laughed and said "it has gone viral in the HQ". A lot of food for thought, especially considering some of what is coming down the pipe from USSOCOM.

Abu-Shakra · 12-18-2009, 15:29

Has anyone here read "Afghanistan And the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare by Hy Rothstein?? A lot of what is said in this article is reflected in the book.

kgoerz · 12-18-2009, 17:02

Here at MARSOC. They spent more money on converting real Bayonets into Door Handles for the HQ Building. Then they did on the one and only Shoot House they are building for the School. Ya, I would say it's been High jacked.
The only Flat Range they are building is an indoor Range. Completely worthless for CMMS Training. I guess the HQ people can go and shoot their Pistols during lunch in the AC.

**The Reaper** · 12-18-2009, 18:38

Quote:

Originally Posted by kgoerz

Here at MARSOC. They spent more money on converting real Bayonets into Door Handles for the HQ Building. Then they did on the one and only Shoot House they are building for the School. Ya, I would say it's been High jacked.
The only Flat Range they are building is an indoor Range. Completely worthless for CMMS Training. I guess the HQ people can go and shoot their Pistols during lunch in the AC.

SOCOM MFP-11 money at work.

TR

mark46th · 03-29-2010, 20:23

I have stated before and will continue to say that SF should be out of USSOCOM. Putting SF under the command of anyone who has other than SF's goodwill at the forefront does SF no good. I know it is a source of funding but SF is suffering the disrespect that prostitutes suffer - we are a great piece of a$$ until the wife shows up threatening divorce and we get dumped in a back alley. SF needs an independent command like the structure that was in place during the 50's, 60's and early 70's...

This did lead to problems because our command didn't have the influence to protect SF and we eventually became cannon fodder for the regular army after the Desert Eagle fiasco. I guess it is a cycle that we go through. SF becomes sexy and the darlings of the powers that be (Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon) followed by a down cycle (Jimmy Carter) that takes years to overcome.

glebo · 03-30-2010, 06:27

Quote:

Originally Posted by Richard

I, too, found the article insightful and relevant.

As for USSOCOM (or any Unified Combatant Command with such functional responsibilities) - if they cannot provide C4I and planning, training, and operational support for their subordinate elements - WTF good are they?

Richard's jaded $.02

I agree with this 100%.

I wonder if it relates to making the "O's" 18 series??? (which I always thought was wrong) After a young CPT spends his 1.5/2 yrs on an ODA....what do you do with him?? I know he will make his tracks through BN/GP staff jobs, but what then?? You have more higher ranking "O's" that can't go back to teams.....so you make up other billets to put them in....more staff positions of course....ya gotta put them somewhere.

I agree with Richard though....if they don't C&C the tms/co's/bn's/gp's in theater, WTF are they good for??

A "paper" command??

food for thought I suppose....

Basenshukai · 03-30-2010, 20:53

Quote:

Originally Posted by glebo

I agree with this 100%.

I wonder if it relates to making the "O's" 18 series??? (which I always thought was wrong) After a young CPT spends his 1.5/2 yrs on an ODA....what do you do with him?? I know he will make his tracks through BN/GP staff jobs, but what then?? You have more higher ranking "O's" that can't go back to teams.....so you make up other billets to put them in....more staff positions of course....ya gotta put them somewhere.

I agree with Richard though....if they don't C&C the tms/co's/bn's/gp's in theater, WTF are they good for??

A "paper" command??

food for thought I suppose....

I think that the reason for making the officers as 18 series was so that you could keep that officer within the structure of the organization. Imagine having to teach each and every new CO, BN and GRP commander what SF requires, what its true capabilities are and what the priorities for training, operations, equipment and related funding should be? It'd be a freaking nightmare and soon enough, other SOF would eventually eliminate SF from the picture as their "O's" would be hard at work advocating for their respective forces. Unless your experience has been that all, or most, SF officers sucked, I find that not being able to keep the young officers you train and bring into the organization would be a far worse problem than you can imagine. Now, to address the issue of keeping an officer around long enough to truly learn "ropes", then, perhaps it might be worth to bring them in as LTs, and put them in a team as assistants to the SFODA CDR - kind of like what the SEALs do. By the time that LT becomes an SFODA CDR, he would have had - at least - two, maybe three years on a team. When he walks away from the SFODA, he'd have close to five years in there. Then, he becomes an SFODB CDR for a year or two. Heck, look at how long an enlisted guy spends on a team today before he is pulled to SWC, or some other assignment.

glebo · 03-31-2010, 06:30

No, not all O's I have served with were bad....I just think that moving them out for awhile would have cut down on all the staff positions that had to be created to keep them. I do agree with bringing him in as a LT like we used to, get more "SF" time out of him.

Sending them back to conventional ranks for awhile, could be good or bad. It would spread the capabilities of us to the conventional side who does not truly understand our operations, or....it could go the other way around I suppose.

Look at what we have now, "Purple" commands, most of the people we work for now aren't SF anyway...but claim "SOF"...but are they realy??

Having an SF General is great....but what "weight" do they really have??

Seems like we are always getting the short end of the stick....anyway, just one of my rants...and pet peaves.

I'm just a little guy, never made it past a BN staff job (except where I'm at now, but I'm a civvy). I'm sure there's a bigger picture than my little world....but I like my little world.