CIA Must Return To Its Roots To Become Effective Once Again

[Richard]

Some interesting points; don't agree with all of his POV through a polarized lens, though.

FWIW--Mr Faddis is a retired CIA Ops Officer and criminal defense attorney.
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/7/562/322

Richard's $.02

CIA Must Return To Its Roots To Become Effective Once Again
Charles Faddis

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.o...OnceAgain.aspx

In 1942, as the United States went to war with brutal and fanatical foes, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the creation of the first civilian intelligence collection organization in U.S. history.

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), under the brilliant direction of its first and only leader, Gen. William “Wild Bill” Donovan, performed legendary service throughout World War II from the jungles of Burma to the mountains of Norway and into the heart of the Third Reich, itself.

At the advent of the Cold War, the OSS became the Central Intelligence Agency — and the CIA morphed into a large, lumbering bureaucracy.

Almost seven decades after the birth of this civilian intelligence agency, we need to go back to the beginning — to a lean, flexible, imaginative organization trained and equipped to confront our nation’s enemies. We need a new OSS.

The office in 1942 was an organization built in the image of Donovan, himself, and staffed by what he called his “glorious amateurs.” Occasional failure was accepted as the cost of doing business. Inactivity was not. Donovan told his agents that if they fell, “they should fall forward.”

Within the OSS were Army paratroopers and regular military officers. There were also former communists, actors, professional athletes, bankers, lawyers and socialites. Probably the single most effective OSS operative was a one-legged woman named Virginia Hall, who operated inside occupied France disguised as a peasant despite continuous, ruthless efforts by the Gestapo to hunt her down.

The OSS adopted a simple operational methodology: it did whatever it took to acquire the intelligence the nation desperately needed. Across the world it penetrated embassies, recruited foreign diplomats and stole secrets to intercept the official communications of hostile nations. The intelligence acquired was important, but it was not enough, and so the OSS also sent operatives deep into occupied territory under a variety of non-official covers to steal secrets, conduct sabotage and make contact with resistance groups. The dividends paid were enormous, but so were the costs. OSS agents caught by the Germans were lucky if they were killed quickly.

Donovan knew what price his people would pay for acquiring the intelligence the nation needed. The men and women of the OSS understood exactly what sacrifices they would have to make.

After a hiatus following the end of the war, the OSS was reborn in 1947 as the Central Intelligence Agency. We were now in a global confrontation with the Soviet Union. We needed intelligence officers overseas, and we needed them in large numbers. The Red Army’s plans for an invasion of Western Europe were of intense concern, so were Soviet efforts to undermine the government of Italy, to form new relationships with African nations and to sell arms to India.

Most CIA agents were sent to nations that were generally supportive of our efforts. Cover was not a concern in most cases. The West Germans and Thais did not spend huge amounts of time trying to identify and expel U.S. intelligence officers. We moved — as the OSS had — with the understanding that the CIA would do whatever it took to acquire the intelligence the nation needed. That meant deploying large numbers of officers under official cover to focus on countering the actions of Soviet personnel who were also operating under official cover.

This long, almost ritualized confrontation — a significant element of the Cold War — dragged on for decades. It was a tough, shadowy war, but one in which the rules became well known and were generally religiously observed. Spies might be caught. They were rarely killed. A bad day meant some period of questioning by the other side and then deportation as persona non grata. We did not target Russians for lethal action. They did not target us.

By the mid to late 1980s, this war was coming to an end. The Soviet Empire was beginning its slow-motion disintegration. New dragons — terrorism, drug smuggling and nuclear proliferation — were coming to the fore. These emerging targets did not lend themselves to attack using the methodologies of the Cold War.

Officers under official cover were not well placed to recruit operatives who could penetrate organizations such as Hezbullah. Personnel trained and equipped to work diplomatic targets were not conditioned psychologically or physically to deal with the dangers inherent in operating against armed groups which were prepared to use murder and torture as tools of the trade.

It was time for radical change. Just as the OSS had reinvented itself into the CIA of the 1950s, it was now necessary for the CIA of the Cold War to transform into something capable of handling emerging threats. The moment had come for our premier human intelligence agency to shift form once again.

It did not happen.

The organization, which had begun life as the free-wheeling, rule-breaking, and eclectic mix of “amateurs” in 1942 had calcified into another, large, ponderous federal bureaucracy. The OSS decided what intelligence needed to be acquired and then did whatever it could to get it. Its methodology was driven by the requirement.

The CIA that had emerged decades later now worked the problem backward. It began by stating its methodology, as if it were a given, and then looked to see what intelligence it could acquire via these mechanisms. Officers who had spent their entire careers working abroad under official cover and in confrontation with other generally civilized adversaries had no intention of moving into the business of penetrating hostile, lethal, ruthless drug cartels and terrorist organizations.

The predictable happened. We began to experience catastrophic failures. In Lebanon, we lost the Marine barracks and the embassy. The CIA provided no warning. Hostages were taken and held with impunity. Time passed. The failures became more frequent and more damaging. We lost two embassies in East Africa. The USS Cole was attacked. Again, the CIA provided no warning.

Then came the 9/11 attacks. Shortly thereafter, a war was launched against Iraq based on catastrophically wrong intelligence assessments.

It has been seven years since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and Osama Bin Laden remains at large.

Within the CIA, nothing fundamentally has changed. New bureaucratic entities have cropped up. More lines have been drawn on wiring diagrams. More requirements for coordination have been put in place. Meetings and PowerPoint presentations have multiplied. None of this compensates for a failure to collect the necessary human intelligence in the first place.

The issue is not sloth. Nor is it a lack of dedication. The CIA continues to attract large numbers of resolute, patriotic Americans.

The organization has degenerated into a stiff, risk-averse bureaucracy due to abysmal senior leadership and a lack of political support.

Donovan told his people to fall forward if they fell. He tolerated failure when inevitable, because he knew in a risky business things often went awry. Today’s CIA lives by the unofficial mantra.

“Big ops. Big problems. Little ops. Little problems. No ops. No problems.” Donovan would roll in his grave every time it is uttered.

Since 9/11, everything we have done in the interest of so-called “intelligence reform” has carried us in exactly the wrong direction as far as human intelligence is concerned. Yet more layers of supervision and bureaucracy have been stacked on top of an already inflexible apparatus. The CIA is becoming less capable of doing the nation’s business, as if caught in some self-perpetuating death spiral.

It’s not that on Sept. 10, 2001, we wern’t conducting enough meetings or preparing enough long-term strategic plans. The problem was that we weren’t running the necessary sources inside al-Qaida to tell us the intentions of that organization. Human intelligence is not collected by staffs, offices or other bureaucratic creations. It is acquired by small number of highly creative individuals, freed of restraints and limitations, and turned loose to do the impossible.

At the end of World War II, Kermit Roosevelt wrote the official history of the OSS in an attempt to record for future generations the lessons learned. On the first page of the manuscript, he wrote: “Secret intelligence, sabotage and subversion could not be run along standard military or bureaucratic lines. In the handling of agents the human element was primary, and it was discovered many times over that a few individuals who combined understanding of this factor with imagination in operations and objectivity in evaluating results could produce far better intelligence than could larger staffs which attempted to work on a more regular, more bureaucratic or more military basis.”

We don’t need to add more layers of supervision, oversight and coordination to the process of collecting human intelligence. We need a new OSS.

[Hostile0311]

Sir,
Very interesting post. I must say, it sounds like a case of "too many chiefs & not enough Indians" or better yet "not enough Indians in the crucial places." I'm very interested to see how the gentlemen on this site view this fellows particular outlook. I've read a few articles on the OSS, Wild Bill Donovan and the Jedburgh teams in the past. Fascinating stuff. Simple, straightforward and to the point with great results. I guess the anacronym K.I.S.S. proves successful in some cases. However, this day in age is a lot different than WWII Germany in that we were essentially dealing with one problem country and a few fringe countries back then. The mid-east, Africa and a growing population of muslims all over Europe are a horse of a different color and will prove to be a diffcult task (but not insurmountable) for the Agency indeed.

[2charlie]

Originally Posted by Richard

[COLOR="Orange"]Probably the single most effective OSS operative was a one-legged woman named Virginia Hall, who operated inside occupied France disguised as a peasant despite continuous, ruthless efforts by the Gestapo to hunt her down.

She must have been the fastest, sneakiest one legged woman in history. Seriously though, interesting read.

-2charlie

[Sinister]

Spot on.

[Richard]

A few points to ponder when reading Mr Faddis' opinion based on having spent time around members of both of these organizations:

The OSS--like the CIA--was not always successful in its operations...although Mr Faddis' article would lead one to surmise the OSS was virtually flawless in its efforts.

The OSS--like the CIA--used a great many 'agents' whose reported data was neither accurate nor actionable (relevant, timely)...a problem which has grown with our overall abilities to gather increasing amounts of raw data and the predictable problems associated with effectively processing and disseminating it to those who need it and can act upon it.

The OSS--unlike the CIA--operated in an environment of lesser 'oversight' by government, press, public, etc.

The OSS OGs--unlike the CIAs PMs--were manned primarily by direct-transfer military personnel, many with already developed military and specialized skills, and 'in-country' experience. Additionally, the CIA was virtually 'stripped' of this PM capability in the mid-90s based on (1) cost reduction initiatives, (2) an increased reliance on photint/sigint capabilities, and (3) a kumbaya world-view that such knuckle dragging was an obsolete concept in a post-Soviet world.

The OSS--unlike the CIA--operated in a general global environment of lesser individual or group mobility, C4I, access to $$$, and visibility.

The OSS--like the CIA--did develop an ever-growing bureaucracy as it matured and grew, an issue of common complaint amongst the 'operators.'

The OSS--unlike the CIA--had a more finite 'focus' for its operations than that which our intelligence community faces today.

The OSS--like the CIA--operated in an environment of numerous intelligence gathering agencies with conflicting purposes, compartmentalization, and mutual bureaucratic distrust.

And so on. However, no matter what shape our intelligence community adopts, some things won't change much; it's the nature of the beast.

Richard's $.02

[Team Sergeant]

I don't think the OSS had to deal with EEO, political correctness, or some fat Human Resources Director that went to school at Berkeley or Harvard.

[Richard]

Originally Posted by Team Sergeant

I don't think the OSS had to deal with EEO, political correctness, or some fat Human Resources Director that went to school at Berkeley or Harvard.

And don't forget that the OSS had a 'supportive' Congress and a head who was a respected CMH recipient...both HUGE pluses.

Richard's $.02

[Surf n Turf]

Originally Posted by Team Sergeant

I don't think the OSS had to deal with EEO, political correctness, or some fat Human Resources Director that went to school at Berkeley or Harvard.

Originally Posted by Richard

And don't forget that the OSS had a 'supportive' Congress and a head who was a respected CMH recipient...both HUGE pluses.

Richard's $.02

TS / Richard,
Just thought it might be enlightening to post the backgrounds of the DCI’s to sort them out by effectiveness. Notice a Trend?
I have no comment on Schlesinger, Turner or Webster.
SnT

SIDNEY WILLIAM SOUERS:
Jan. 23-June 10, 1946
Appointed by Truman
Rear admiral, U.S. Naval Reserve
Deputy chief of naval intelligence
Executive secretary, National Security Council

HOYT SANDBERG VANDENBERG:
June 10, 1946-May 1, 1947
Appointed by Truman
General, U.S. Army Air Corps
Vice chief of staff, Air Force
Chief of staff, Air Force.

ROSCOE HENRY HILLENKOETTER:
May 1, 1947-Oct. 7, 1950
Appointed by Truman
Vice admiral, U.S. Navy
Intelligence officer
Staff of Pacific commander, Adm. Chester W. Nimitz
Inspector general of the Navy.

WALTER BEDELL SMITH:
Oct. 7, 1950-Feb. 9, 1953
Appointed by Truman
General, U.S. Army
Chief of staff for Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower
Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Commander, First Army
Undersecretary of state

ALLEN WELSH DULLES:
Feb. 26, 1953-Nov. 29, 1961
Appointed by Eisenhower
U.S. Diplomatic Service, 1916-26
Office of Strategic Services
Deputy director for plans, CIA
Deputy director, CIA

JOHN ALEX MCCONE:
Nov. 29, 1961-April 28, 1965
Appointed by Kennedy
Deputy defense secretary
Undersecretary of the Air Force
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

WILLIAM FRANCIS RABORN, JR:
April 28, 1965-June 30, 1966
Appointed by Johnson
Vice admiral
Director, U.S. Navy Special Projects Office
Deputy chief of Naval Operations

RICHARD MCGARRAH HELMS:
June 30, 1966-Feb. 2, 1973
Appointed by Johnson
Officer U.S. Naval Reserve
Served with Office of Strategic Services
CIA officer
Deputy director for plans, CIA

JAMES RODNEY SCHLESINGER:
Feb. 3, 1973-July 2, 1973
Appointed by Nixon
Economics professor, University of Virginia
RAND Corp.
Assistant director, Office of Management and Budget
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Defense secretary
Energy secretary

WILLIAM EGAN COLBY:
Sept. 4, 1973-Jan. 30, 1976
Appointed by Nixon
Officer, U.S. Army
Served with Office of Strategic Services
CIA officer
Deputy director for operations, CIA

GEORGE HERBERT WALKER BUSH:
Jan. 30, 1976-Jan. 20, 1977
Appointed by Ford
Navy pilot
Texas congressman
U.N. ambassador
Chairman, Republican National Committee
Ambassador to China
Vice president
President

STANSFIELD TURNER:
March 9, 1977-Jan. 20, 1981
Appointed by Carter
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, systems analysis division, Office Chief of Naval Operations
President, U.S. Naval War College
Commander, U.S. Second Fleet
Commander in chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, NATO

WILLIAM JOSEPH CASEY:
Jan. 28, 1981-Jan. 29, 1987
Appointed by Reagan
Officer, U.S. Naval Reserve
Chief, OSS Europe (1944)
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission
Undersecretary of state for economic affairs
President and chairman, U.S. Export-Import Bank
Member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Manager, Reagan presidential campaign

WILLIAM HEDGCOCK WEBSTER:
May 26, 1987-Aug. 31, 1991
Appointed by Reagan
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy
U.S. attorney
U.S. district judge
U.S. Court of Appeals judge
Director, FBI

ROBERT MICHAEL GATES:
Nov. 6, 1991-Jan. 20, 1993
Appointed by George H.W. Bush
Intelligence analyst, CIA
National Security Council staff
Deputy director of CIA
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs
Assistant to the president and deputy for national security affair


R. JAMES WOOLSEY:
Feb. 5, 1993-Jan. 10, 1995.
Appointed by Clinton
Captain, U.S. Army
Program analyst, Defense Department
National Security Council staff
General counsel, Senate
Undersecretary of the Navy
Ambassador, U.S representative, negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

JOHN MARK DEUTCH:
May 10, 1995-Dec. 15, 1996
Appointed by Clinton
Systems analyst, Defense Department
Undersecretary of energy
Undersecretary of defense
Deputy defense secretary

GEORGE JOHN TENET:
July 11, 1997-July 11, 2004
Appointed by Clinton
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff member
Special assistant to president, senior director for intelligence pgms.
National Security Council
Deputy director of CIA

PORTER JOHNSTON GOSS:
Sept. 24, 2004-May 2006
Appointed by George W. Bus
U.S. Army intelligence officer
Clandestine service officer with the CIA
Florida congressman

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
May 2006 - present
Appointed by Bush
GENERAL – US Airforce
Director, National Security Agency
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence

[civilian]

Originally Posted by Richard

And don't forget that the OSS had a 'supportive' Congress and a head who was a respected CMH recipient...both HUGE pluses.

Richard's $.02

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/elec...base-pakistan/



"Two senior U.S. defense officials told FOX News that no Predator unmanned aerial vehicles are currently or have recently been based on Pakistani territory, despite a statement by Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, at a recent Congressional intelligence hearing."

I think we all had the same hunch that the Dems sitting on the oversight committees were the sources of all those links to the NY Times while W. was leading the good fight. These folks enjoy outting every effective tactic we have to track down our enemies to make their antiwar voters happy. Who's side are they on?

[Roguish Lawyer]

LOL, you think things are bad now? Wait til Obama and Leon Panetta finish what they have in mind . . .

[Trip_Wire (RIP)]

Originally Posted by Roguish Lawyer

LOL, you think things are bad now? Wait til Obama and Leon Panetta finish what they have in mind . . .

I fear that you are correct!