U.S. Special Operations - Personal Opinions

[The Reaper]

Great read, from our friends at SWJ.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs...48-collins.pdf

TR

[JGarcia]

Talk about a "Lifetime" of service. Heck of a guy.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Thanks for posting that.

[jatx]

Good stuff, thanks for the post!

[Guy]

Experienced SOF officers and NCOs the world over are eager to furnish you a wide range of options on every subject that concerns your command, but find no convenient way to do so.

Or, they are stifiled by "risk-adversed" leadership, beuracratic incompetence & hurdles, power point presentation so numerous...that it kills motivation, etc.

However, "it is...what it is." We'll still keep at it and win thru adaptation, improvision and the will to overcome!

Stay safe.

[dennisw]

Experienced SOF officers and NCOs the world over are eager to furnish you a wide range of options on every subject that concerns your command, but find no convenient way to do so.

Interesting and extremely frustrating observation. It appears that this problem has been going on since SF was created, which means it will probably go on forever. It's an obvious no brainer to get the SF officers and NCO's involved, but then I think about what Basenshukai said below about the lack of input from instructors in shaping the Q course. If it's hard to be elicit opinions and feedback from the folks inside the community, then it makes sense that those outside the community will probably not make a similar effort.

Basenshukai said
What they need is an "instructor conferrence" in SWC and use that information to make changes. Then, they should go back to the those instructors and discuss the changes to be implemented. It's all about trusting that the cadre know what they are doing and know what they are talking about.

http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/...ad.php?t=20983

One wonders if it's our iconoclastic culture where there seems to be no margin of error causing the decision makers to be deathly afraid of making a mistake . Where there is no margin of error, there's very little motivation to take a chance or break new ground. They either don't make a decision so no one can point a finger, or they determine to do it all themselves instead of eliciting help.

Therefore the only time the proverbial red headed stepson gets a chance to do his thing is inside a scenario that is basically a no win situation like the beginning of the War in Afghanistan. "This a F***** up situation, so let's give it to the Special Forces. That way when they screw it up, we can blame them." However, instead of focusing on the threshold issue of where the success came from, the powers that be miss the obvious. Instead they throw money in the special ops pit, and it becomes a race between competing members in the community to stake a claim on the windfall budget. It becomes the squeaky wheel syndrome which is a drag if your tag line is the quiet professionals. The end result, is the one group that hit the homerun, watches the other players get the huge contracts.

The alternative is the start broadcasting your successes, which diminishes the beauty of the beast itself. What is the future impact of changing the culture?

In the final chapter of the Masters of Chaos, a well known General envisioned SF being the eyes spread througout the World identifying potential problems before they erupt into crisis'. Then the SEALS, Rangers, Cag would go in and execute a direct action missions. I mentioned this to my son to get his response. He said, "Dad, those missions must be earned."

I guess the answer is to soldier on with integrity, and hope a visionary emerges among the powers that be. Someone who can connect the dots without fear.

[Infantry44]

Army Special Forces....in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines currently concentrate on foreign internal defense, whereas Delta Force, Rangers, most SEAL teams, and the Special Ops Aviation Regiment consistently emphasize direct action.

Army Special Forces are best reserved for unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense missions...

Army Special Forces troops are well trained and equipped...I wonder why any commander would waste area oriented, foreign language qualified, high cost, low density UW and FID specialists on direct action missions except in emergencies.

I highlighted the above statements made by the author b/c, seeing that he is working out of Camp Mackall, folks should consider drilling those ideas into the student body training there. I cannot tell you how many times I've heard my peers express their lack of interest in the FID and/or UW mission, while simultaneously foaming at the mouth over DA, DA, & DA.

[The Reaper]

Originally Posted by dennisw

Instead they throw money in the special ops pit, and it becomes a race between competing members in the community to stake a claim on the windfall budget. It becomes the squeaky wheel syndrome which is a drag if your tag line is the quiet professionals. The end result, is the one group that hit the homerun, watches the other players get the huge contracts.

There is a world of difference between throwing money at SOF, and throwing it at SF. The major budget item at SOCOM is infil platforms like the CV-22, ASDV, Mark Vs, etc. The 160th sucks in a huge amount of maney as well, but at least they are being used by all of the services in support of SOF. I have not seen too many underwater missions in OIF or OEF thus far. SOCOM is essentially a platformcentric headquarters with a DA/CT focus. The second largest chunk of the budget goes to black units and DA. Follow the money to see where priorities are.

USASOC is the largest component of SOCOM. ARSOF has more people deployed on a daily basis than the other component commands have assigned. Within USASOC, Special Forces is the largest element by a great deal. Yet SF has one of the smallest budgets in SOF, while providing the largest single element and bang for the buck. The cost of one CV-22 would likely exceed the annual budget of all five AC SF Groups combined.

This is not to say that SF has not received any of the additional money form SOCOM, but it has been a small fraction of what has been spent on platforms and special units.

Originally Posted by Infantry44

I highlighted the above statements made by the author b/c, seeing that he is working out of Camp Mackall, folks should consider drilling those ideas into the student body training there. I cannot tell you how many times I've heard my peers express their lack of interest in the FID and/or UW mission, while simultaneously foaming at the mouth over DA, DA, & DA.

You have to be able to do DA, in order to teach your UW or FID counterparts DA. But those who joined SF primarily to kick down doors and shoot people in the face made a bad career decision. Not that we can't do those things, but by, with, and through is what we do, and what we should be doing.

Just my .02, YMMV.

TR

[gagners]

"Experienced SOF officers and NCOs the world over are eager to furnish you a wide range of options on every subject that concerns your command, but find no convenient way to do so. "

I think this is a problem stemming primarily from the conventional side and, while improved education for SOF leaders, mentioned above, will help incrementally, the potential for exponential improvement lies with conventional leaders.

Most conventional leaders probably
1) hadn't worked with SOF before the wars
2) might harbor a little animousity ("I don't need THEIR help to handle my AO")
or
3) might not understand what SOF brings to the table

I took a course recently (for shits and giggles) that outlines a CJSOTF's build, capabilities (generic), etc. I had no idea. I'd wager that most don't. It's not something taught to most of us - since our training hours are "better spent" focusing on our basic branch/functional area. The infantry and armor schools have made a big step towards building better officers with the advent of the Maneuver CCC - getting to see sides of the major maneuver fights that they hadn't previously been exposed to (the same way logisticians are being cross-trained as multi-functionals). This sort of education shouldn't stop there only to be revisited at some senior staff school. So, in my opinion, step 1 is improving conventional leader's understanding about SOF capabilities, abilities, and roles - as a force multiplier, not "us and them" - through education and training events.

Step 2 I think will more or less take care of itself, as young leaders have been working/fighting with SOF forces for the last few years in Iraq and Afghanistan. I know my understanding of SF was greatly expanded during my 1st tour and my friend had a very similar experience recently with MARSOC. As we "grow up" and assume positions of greater responsibility, we'll have a functional understanding of what SOF could bring to the table (albeit a limited view that needs to be bolstered by further education) and be less hestitant to request SOF assistance or listen to their suggestions for "fighting" our AO. This will also lessen the "us vs them" stigma since we've worked with them and conversed with them. It really was an eye-opener.

Anywho, that's my 2 cents. It's a good article. Thanks for the post.

[The Reaper]

SF has been supporting NTC/JRTC rotations for many years, at least 15 that I am aware of, and been in the GWOT since the beginning, so at this point, most battalion commanders and above should have worked with, or at least encountered SF and be familiar with their capabilities and limitations.

TR

[gagners]

Originally Posted by The Reaper

SF has been supporting NTC/JRTC rotations for many years, at least 15 that I am aware of, and been in the GWOT since the beginning, so at this point, most battalion commanders and above should have worked with, or at least encountered SF and be familiar with their capabilities and limitations.

TR

Agreed, but I was referring to a working "ground level" experience with SOF. ie, pulling security for them during various missions or being tutored by a TL and TS in conducting FID - which has been a role taken on by CF with little education in how to do so. It helps to realize that they're just soldiers, like us. Very good, well trained soldiers to be sure, but it helps to know that they're helpful and generally more than willing to share lessons learned and teach, coach, and mentor. When asked.

Having worked in a TOC before, I'd seen some interaction between the staff and SOF, but it generally amounted to briefing each other on what each were doing so as not to interfere with each other. Little in the way of coordinated effects. But that opinion is skewed by limited personal observation.

[Razor]

Interesting perspective, with many points I liked. One part, however, I question:

"CIA... agents also should conduct most clandestine missions, which would enable SOF to wear “white hats” and maintain credibility in foreign lands where the Agency has long had an unsavory reputation."

I think perhaps he intended to say 'covert' here, as many aspects of UW require a clandestine approach.

[Surgicalcric]

Originally Posted by The Reaper

...You have to be able to do DA, in order to teach your UW or FID counterparts DA. But those who joined SF primarily to kick down doors and shoot people in the face made a bad career decision. Not that we can't do those things, but by, with, and through is what we do, and what we should be doing.

Just my .02, YMMV.

TR

I am fairly sure this has been covered before but I think it bears repeating giving the topic and misuse of SF.

I polled my SFMS class asking what brought them to SF and what type of team they wanted to go to when they graduated. Overwhelmingly the majority wanted to go to a DA team. The majority of the others listed scuba and HALO teams but still wanted to do DA.

When asked about the core SF missions many of the guys out right said they wanted nothing to do with FID/UW. This mentality was especially pervasive with the 18X's in my class. There is a major problem there.

I remember seeing a video when I was a medic at SOPC which highlighted SF, and 555 in particular, working by, with, and thru the NA at the onset of the war. I remember thinking to myself, "this is what makes SF Special." Now a days its all DA vids that you see highlighting what SF does.

An SF soldier must be able to do DA to do FID/UW but at what cost do we focus on it?

Crip

[jbour13]

Speaking from the Intelligence NCO perspective.

DA is sexy to a strap-hangar and has immediate, gratifying affect. Intelligence Architecture needs an overhaul Army wide and the systemic problems in many BOS's could be attributed to all supporting MOS's. We've been trying to ignore the elephant in the room too damn long. I saw a great deal of Intelligence professionals that are awaiting the return of Cold War activities because it was easy to sit back and ponder the enemies next move. Those in the schoolhouse are still teaching archaic methods of Intelligence production and fail in many ways.

I recieved in 2007 at my BNCOC a 15 slide presentation on COIN. That took us roughly 30 minutes to cover and was nothing more than a rehash of Cliff Notes from Fm 3-24. No methodology, no insight as to the phases of Guerilla Warfare, case studies, personalities........nothing. My instructor was a smart fella and offered the opportunity for students to teach. It is BNCOC after all. Myself and 3 other NCO's spoke on COIN, Guerilla Operations and many other subjects that the schoolhouse just chose to ignore. Not even close to perfection, but made us realize that the Army as a whole is DA Centric and has a devout refusal to think of 2nd, 3rd, 15th order effects. Effective targeting is not "We killed him, mission complete"

Point here is that it isn't limited to SF, but a major contributional factor in the roles of today's Soldier. This is not limited to the naive young trooper with 2yrs of service, but those that stalk the halls of the puzzle palace out of touch with reality, calling you on the battlespace looking for an update, micro-managing your op.

Good article and I hope it pisses someone off. Just maybe someone will listen and not want to throw more SF Soldiers at a manageble problem with the current assets available. Good Soldiers are out there and I've met many a Team Sergeant that understands how to fight these wars.
Just the beginning of my rant.....I'll stop there.

[The Reaper]

A squad or an ODA doing DA has roughly 12 guns on target.

An ODA which has trained a battalion, and who goes to the fight with them, brings several hundred guns.

I would not be embarassed to share the glory with the HN soldiers rather than pulling an Alamo or Custer's Last Stand to die with my brothers.

I suspect that the ODA with 10 Silver Stars would have probably all been posthumous had they not had their indig commandos with them.

There are times to go DA, but most times, FID or UW is a better use of Special Forces. Maybe not a better use of SOF though.

TR