Bush Said to Give Orders Allowing Raids in Pakistan

[Paslode]

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/wa...pagewanted=all

By ERIC SCHMITT and MARK MAZZETTI
Published: September 10, 2008
WASHINGTON — President Bush secretly approved orders in July that for the first time allow American Special Operations forces to carry out ground assaults inside Pakistan without the prior approval of the Pakistani government, according to senior American officials.

The classified orders signal a watershed for the Bush administration after nearly seven years of trying to work with Pakistan to combat the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and after months of high-level stalemate about how to challenge the militants’ increasingly secure base in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

American officials say that they will notify Pakistan when they conduct limited ground attacks like the Special Operations raid last Wednesday in a Pakistani village near the Afghanistan border, but that they will not ask for its permission.

“The situation in the tribal areas is not tolerable,” said a senior American official who, like others interviewed for this article, spoke on condition of anonymity because of the delicate nature of the missions. “We have to be more assertive. Orders have been issued.”

The new orders reflect concern about safe havens for Al Qaeda and the Taliban inside Pakistan, as well as an American view that Pakistan lacks the will and ability to combat militants. They also illustrate lingering distrust of the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies and a belief that some American operations had been compromised once Pakistanis were advised of the details.

The Central Intelligence Agency has for several years fired missiles at militants inside Pakistan from remotely piloted Predator aircraft. But the new orders for the military’s Special Operations forces relax firm restrictions on conducting raids on the soil of an important ally without its permission.

Pakistan’s top army officer said Wednesday that his forces would not tolerate American incursions like the one that took place last week and that the army would defend the country’s sovereignty “at all costs.”

It is unclear precisely what legal authorities the United States has invoked to conduct even limited ground raids in a friendly country. A second senior American official said that the Pakistani government had privately assented to the general concept of limited ground assaults by Special Operations forces against significant militant targets, but that it did not approve each mission.

The official did not say which members of the government gave their approval.

Any new ground operations in Pakistan raise the prospect of American forces being killed or captured in the restive tribal areas — and a propaganda coup for Al Qaeda. Last week’s raid also presents a major test for Pakistan’s new president, Asif Ali Zardari, who supports more aggressive action by his army against the militants but cannot risk being viewed as an American lap dog, as was his predecessor, Pervez Musharraf.

The new orders were issued after months of debate inside the Bush administration about whether to authorize a ground campaign inside Pakistan. The debate, first reported by The New York Times in late June, at times pitted some officials at the State Department against parts of the Pentagon that advocated aggressive action against Qaeda and Taliban targets inside the tribal areas.

Details about last week’s commando operation have emerged that indicate the mission was more intrusive than had previously been known.

According to two American officials briefed on the raid, it involved more than two dozen members of the Navy Seals who spent several hours on the ground and killed about two dozen suspected Qaeda fighters in what now appeared to have been a planned attack against militants who had been conducting attacks against an American forward operating base across the border in Afghanistan.

Supported by an AC-130 gunship, the Special Operations forces were whisked away by helicopters after completing the mission.

Although the senior American official who provided the most detailed description of the new presidential order would discuss it only on condition of anonymity, his account was corroborated by three other senior American officials from several government agencies, all of whom made clear that they supported the more aggressive approach.

Pakistan’s government has asserted that last week’s raid achieved little except killing civilians and stoking anti-Americanism in the tribal areas.

“Unilateral action by the American forces does not help the war against terror because it only enrages public opinion,” said Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington, during a speech on Friday. “In this particular incident, nothing was gained by the action of the troops.”

As an alternative to American ground operations, some Pakistani officials have made clear that they prefer the C.I.A.’s Predator aircraft, operating from the skies, as a method of killing Qaeda operatives. The C.I.A. for the most part has coordinated with Pakistan’s government before and after it has launched missiles from the drone. On Monday, a Predator strike in North Waziristan killed several Arab Qaeda operatives.

A new American command structure was put in place this year to better coordinate missions by the C.I.A. and members of the Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command, made up of the Army’s Delta Force and the Navy Seals.

The move was intended to address frustration on the ground about different agencies operating under different marching orders. Under the arrangement, a senior C.I.A. official based at Bagram air base in Afghanistan was put in charge of coordinating C.I.A. and military activities in the border region.

Spokesmen for the White House, the Defense Department and the C.I.A. declined to comment on Wednesday about the new orders. Some senior Congressional officials have received briefings on the new authorities. A spokeswoman for Senator Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat who leads the Armed Services Committee, declined to comment.

American commanders in Afghanistan have complained bitterly that militants use sanctuaries in Pakistan to attack American troops in Afghanistan.

“I’m not convinced we’re winning it in Afghanistan,” Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Armed Services Committee on Wednesday. “I am convinced we can.”

Toward that goal, Admiral Mullen said he had ordered a comprehensive military strategy to address the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The commando raid last week and an increasing number of recent missile strikes are part of a more aggressive overall American campaign in the border region aimed at intensifying attacks on Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the waning months of the Bush administration, with less than two months to go before November elections.

State Department officials, as well as some within the National Security Council, have expressed concern about any Special Operations missions that could be carried out without the approval of the American ambassador in Islamabad.

The months-long delay in approving ground missions created intense frustration inside the military’s Special Operations community, which believed that the Bush administration was holding back as the Qaeda safe haven inside Pakistan became more secure for militants.

The stepped-up campaign inside Pakistan comes at a time when American-Pakistani relations have been fraying, and when anger is increasing within American intelligence agencies about ties between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, known as the ISI, and militants in the tribal areas.

Analysts at the C.I.A. and other American spy and security agencies believe not only that the bombing of India’s embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, in July by militants was aided by ISI operatives, but also that the highest levels of Pakistan’s security apparatus — including the army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani — had knowledge of the plot.

“It’s very difficult to imagine he was not aware,” a senior American official said of General Kayani.

American intelligence agencies have said that senior Pakistani national security officials favor the use of militant groups to preserve Pakistan’s influence in the region, as a hedge against India and Afghanistan.

In fact, some American intelligence analysts believe that ISI operatives did not mind when their role in the July bombing in Kabul became known. “They didn’t cover their tracks very well,” a senior Defense Department official said, “and I think the embassy bombing was the ISI drawing a line in the sand.”

So much for secrecy and clandestine operations...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sedition_Act_of_1918

[Richard]

IMO--it's about time.

Imagine if we had a WWBD situation in the White House.

Richard's $.02

[GreenSalsa]

I think its a bad idea to do unilateral operations across virtually any border, especially when it winds up in the MSM.

Talking with Pakistani Officers (and Indian Officers) they are very uncomfortable with us violating their national sovereignty. The reason is not because it violates some arcane constitutional clause--it is because it inflames the masses THEY have to deal with when we return to their bases.

The military would rather be part of the process (you know like "by, with, and through") in order to deal with the threat themselves. I think it is better to do a "good" operation rather than a "perfect" operation WITH a partner.

I am very concerned that we might win a battle or two only to loose the war of ideas with these people. I'm not naive and understand most of the very people I am talking about will NEVER accept our way of life--but maybe, just maybe--they might accept a moderates point of view in the short run--one from within the Pakistani government / military.

When we operate without cooperation from the Pakistani government we alienate one of the few, if marginal, friends we have if the area.

[Razor]

Originally Posted by GreenSalsa

The military would rather be part of the process (you know like "by, with, and through") in order to deal with the threat themselves.

I'm thinking the folks going cross-border aren't involved in "by, with, through", and this authorization is the only way they get to play, hence the push by senior service officials (with strong ties to SOF organizations) to get the authorization in the first place.

Kinda like the "need" to create a definition for irregular warfare separate and distinct from unconventional warfare.

[Richard]

Originally Posted by GreenSalsa

I think its a bad idea to do unilateral operations across virtually any border, especially when it winds up in the MSM.

Talking with Pakistani Officers (and Indian Officers) they are very uncomfortable with us violating their national sovereignty. The reason is not because it violates some arcane constitutional clause--it is because it inflames the masses THEY have to deal with when we return to their bases.

The military would rather be part of the process (you know like "by, with, and through") in order to deal with the threat themselves. I think it is better to do a "good" operation rather than a "perfect" operation WITH a partner.

I am very concerned that we might win a battle or two only to loose the war of ideas with these people. I'm not naive and understand most of the very people I am talking about will NEVER accept our way of life--but maybe, just maybe--they might accept a moderates point of view in the short run--one from within the Pakistani government / military.

When we operate without cooperation from the Pakistani government we alienate one of the few, if marginal, friends we have if the area.

OK—some very good points to think about, but I offer the following points to be considered:

(Note-this is all open source material)

I am not yet sure that it was—according to the MSM—a ‘unilateral’ decision and would be surprised if it does turn out to be that way.

In today’s free-wheeling WWW atmosphere, everything winds up in somebody’s MSM and I am sure our planning is such that we took that into consideration. Sometimes we ‘want’ things to be known for much less obvious reasons.

On the seventh anniversary of 9/11, many Americans remain confused about the nature of the current terrorist threat. The ‘public’ has been told for years that Iraq was the central front in the war on terror…yet the CIA says the front is now on the Afghan-Pakistani border…and I agree.

Osama bin Laden and crew are well and operating out of a safe haven just inside Pakistan and I cannot believe the ISI—whose loyalty is doubtful—does not know where and among whom. As a result, Al-Qaeda still trains terrorists headed for Europe, the Mideast and South Asia – as well, I’m sure, as a number who certainly want to come here and strike another blow at the Great Satan (us).

Our top terrorism experts all agree that al-Qaeda remains at the center of the terrorist problem. According to our own intelligence services, it is still as powerful as it was six years ago, still capable of training people from around the world and then sending them off to stage attacks.

Al-Qaeda is in effect a multinational corporation—an ideologically-driven NGO—that operates on a global stage. The CEO is OBL and the headquarters is in Pakistan, with franchises around the world taking general instructions. We know this, the Pakistani’s know this, and the World knows this…which is why extremists continue to come in small groups to train in Pakistan, including many of those involved in recent terror plots in Europe.

Experts believe the greatest Islamist threat is to Europe, in part because it is easier to travel to Europe and has become harder to hit the U.S. mainland. According to British media, about 400,000 members of the British Pakistani community go to Pakistan each year—and some of them go expressly to hook up with Kashmiri militant groups and eventually with al-Qaeda.

Pakistani jihadis are expanding their territorial base—mindless of the region’s borders—and have proclaimed their desire to acquire nuclear materiel. Doesn’t every one of these groups, but who knows? And can we afford to take such a chance?

IMO, one of the reasons it is so difficult to fight the threat in that region is because the public and the army are reluctant to fight the jihadis and their hate-spewing madrasas…yet are hostile to any allied (US or otherwise) troops on their soil.

All the experts have agreed that the free world needs to rethink the strategy for battling militant jihadis…and I suspect that is what is being done. I also do not like second-guessing such matters (especially on the word of the MSM) and have to assume (such a dangerous word that) that our intelligence was such that we had a VERY GOOD REASON to do what we did.

Victory over a group like al-Qaeda is—IMO—possible, but it does not come easily and, based on UW/CI studies, there are four conditions of a mostly political nature which are generally thought of as being required to defeat them. Two of them concern the state, where the national leadership must:

• Understand and accept the political and public relations challenge involved in battling insurgents.
• Appreciate the vital role of intelligence, invest in it, and require the military to use it effectively.

Another two conditions concern counterterrorist operations, which must:

• Isolate terrorists from the non-terrorist civilian population.
• Control and isolate the territories where terrorists live and fight.

If these guidelines hold true to form, then we need to look at the status of the GWOT and see if we can figure out where we are now in all this. It looks to me as if we’ve accepted the first two conditions and are now working on the other two. I hope.

Richard’s $.02

[Roguish Lawyer]

I would go get these guys even if they're in England or Canada, personally.

[The Reaper]

Originally Posted by Roguish Lawyer

I would go get these guys even if they're in England or Canada, personally.

It violates an imperative, "Ensure the legitimacy of the host nation government."

If anyone needs to be hit, use the agency or contract personnel. The uniformed forces are inappropriate for this activity in a sovereign nation.

The kinetic solution is not always the best one for the long term success.

TR

[Roguish Lawyer]

Originally Posted by The Reaper

It violates an imperative, "Ensure the legitimacy of the host nation government."

If anyone needs to be hit, use the agency or contract personnel. The uniformed forces are inappropriate for this activity in a sovereign nation.

The kinetic solution is not always the best one for the long term success.

TR

I see this as an SOG-type situation, where we really need to do it and do it clandestinely. I don't care if our guys wear uniforms or who their employer technically is. I appreciate Green Salsa's point and understand the need to avoid undermining our friends in Pakistan, but there have to be limits. There are still people who need to pay for what they did seven years ago today, and I want to go get them wherever they are. But obviously I am just a civilian.

[GreenSalsa]

Originally Posted by Razor

I'm thinking the folks going cross-border aren't involved in "by, with, through", and this authorization is the only way they get to play, hence the push by senior service officials (with strong ties to SOF organizations) to get the authorization in the first place.

Kinda like the "need" to create a definition for irregular warfare separate and distinct from unconventional warfare.

Amen brother...amen.

I truly believe that some people "just have to die" but NOT at the expense of losing the war. We just had an open source brief from General "hell of a lot of fun to shoot them" Mattis. He indicated that early on (initial stages of OEF) he went to the Pakistani military to ask for a base, fuel, port, security, and more from the Pakistani government.

The Pakistanis sat him down for 2 1/2 hours and lectured him on all the times the US had let down Pakistan ranging from the Gary Powers / U2 shootdown, till the cows came home. At the conclusion, Mattis acknowledged US shortcomings, reminded them he was not a policy maker, and they moved on and provided the US with MORE than it had requested. On top of it--according to Mattis--the Pakistani government / military knew virtually of all critical events 2 weeks prior to execution and furthermore safeguarded not only our people, their lives, but our national secrets.

I do believe we owe that nation a debt of gratitude. I know there are certain elements inside the government that are probably actively working against us--so is our own State Department--we wouldn't think of a kinetic solution for them--why do we do it to our friends?

[Team Sergeant]

Originally Posted by Paslode

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/wa...pagewanted=all





So much for secrecy and clandestine operations...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sedition_Act_of_1918

Once the first shots are fired there’s little need for secrecy.

When we conduct raids they're "secret" or "top secret" until we strike. You can bet the al qaeda idiots had no warning when the first strike came.

TS

[Razor]

Originally Posted by GreenSalsa

--so is our own State Department--we wouldn't think of a kinetic solution for them--

Even the ones crying about being posted to Iraq? You're no fun.

[Paslode]

Originally Posted by Team Sergeant

Once the first shots are fired there’s little need for secrecy.

When we conduct raids they're "secret" or "top secret" until we strike. You can bet the al qaeda idiots had no warning when the first strike came.

TS

HUA TS!