CENTCOM Infighting, Fallon vs. Petraeus

[The Reaper]

Looks like the admiral in charge of CENTCOM and the general in charge of Iraq are having some friction.

Who would have thunk it?

I hope that the troops do not pay the price for this dysfunctional leadership.

TR

http://prairiepundit.blogspot.com/20...istration.html

Sunday, September 09, 2007

Vigorous debate in Bush administration over Iraq strategy

Washington Post

For two hours, President Bush listened to contrasting visions of the U.S. future in Iraq. Gen. David H. Petraeus dominated the conversation by video link from Baghdad, making the case to keep as many troops as long as possible to cement any security progress. Adm. William J. Fallon, his superior, argued instead for accepting more risks in Iraq, officials said, in order to have enough forces available to confront other potential threats in the region.

The polite discussion in the White House Situation Room a week ago masked a sharper clash over the U.S. venture in Iraq, one that has been building since Fallon, chief of the U.S. Central Command, which oversees Middle East operations, sent a rear admiral to Baghdad this summer to gather information. Soon afterward, officials said, Fallon began developing plans to redefine the U.S. mission and radically draw down troops.

One of those plans, according to a Centcom officer, involved slashing U.S. combat forces in Iraq by three-quarters by 2010. In an interview, Fallon disputed that description but declined to offer details. Nonetheless, his efforts offended Petraeus's team, which saw them as unwelcome intrusion on their own long-term planning. The profoundly different views of the U.S. role in Iraq only exacerbated the schism between the two men.

"Bad relations?" said a senior civilian official with a laugh. "That's the understatement of the century. . . . If you think Armageddon was a riot, that's one way of looking at it."

For Bush, the eight months since announcing his "new way forward" in Iraq have been about not just organizing a major force deployment but also managing a remarkable conflict within his administration, mounting a rear-guard action against Congress and navigating a dysfunctional relationship with an Iraqi leadership that has proved incapable of delivering what he needs.

...

Amid the uncertainty, the overriding imperative for Bush these past eight months has been to buy time -- time for the surge to work, time for the Iraqis to get their act together, time to produce progress. In Washington's efforts to come to grips with the war it unleashed, the story of these months is one of trying to control the uncontrollable. And now as a result of a casual idea by Petraeus that hardened into an unwelcome deadline, the administration finds itself at a pivotal moment.

"All the outreach and consultations did not reset as much time on the Washington clock as we had hoped," said Peter D. Feaver, who was a National Security Council strategic adviser until July. "Rather than buying us more time, the D.C. clock seemed to accelerate after the president's speech."

...

There is much more to this piece. There has always been a sense of unreality about the anti war case in Washington. It grossly exaggerates difficulties and setbacks. This seems to be for the purpose of accelerating a defeat for domestic political considerations and ignoring the strategic victory they would hand our enemies. There is never any allocation of responsibility for the way the Clinton Democrat troops cuts have limited our ability to fight this war. With half the troops we had in Vietnam and less than a tenth of the casualties the opponents of this war are demanding that we quit while we are winning.

I didn't hear either side of the debate between Adm. Fallon and Gen. Petraeus, but I have seen enough arguments supporting the counterinsurgency doctrine to know where that side stands. Historically too, it is clear that when you have an enemy fighting an insurgency and using a raiding strategy, you defeat it with a high force to space ratio. Reducing force puts you back into a whack a mole position having to repurchase real estate with blood. It makes for a bloodier longer war. We have already seen how the small foot print strategy worked in Iraq. We need a better explanation of why we should go back to that strategy.

A consensus seems to be forming around the need to keep troops in Iraq for at least a couple of more years and a debate is forming on how many and what mission. It would be a huge mistake to change from a counterinsurgency strategy to a small footprint FOB strategy, before we finish pacifying the country. Troops reductions before that time would be a major mistake.

We are about half way through the time period it normally takes to defeat an insurgency. We are winning, and it would be a huge mistake to throw it away at this point.

[82ndtrooper]

I would like to make and intelligent comment but the article pretty much say's it all.

an Admiral in charge of CENTCOM, and a General in charge of Iraq disagreeing about strategy. Yeah, Who'd a thunk it ?

[nmap]

Originally Posted by The Reaper

"All the outreach and consultations did not reset as much time on the Washington clock as we had hoped," said Peter D. Feaver, who was a National Security Council strategic adviser until July. "Rather than buying us more time, the D.C. clock seemed to accelerate after the president's speech."

I suspect the problem is one of salesmanship – or, perhaps, marketing.

The war has few defenders, and fewer proponents. A great many are willing to point out problems, not many mention successes – and almost no one discusses the consequences of troop withdrawal. For that matter, there is little said of the benefits of continuation of the conflict. References to a war on terror, the clash of civilizations, and generational warfare are unlikely to inspire a public that focuses more on the travails of Paris Hilton than on more weighty issues.

It seems likely that the President will be able to maintain a significant presence for the remainder of his term; the opposition does not really want to solve the problem (IMHO), but rather wants to use an unpopular war in furtherance of political gamesmanship. The President’s low ratings in the polls hint that he may be unable to rally meaningful support; and Senator McCain’s languishing campaign suggests that support of the war is not politically viable. If a new President and Congress pursue withdrawal, the unpleasant results are likely to be blamed on the current President.

The problem is, we seem to be headed for a recession, and that suggests that we as a nation will turn inward. The voters will demand domestic programs and bailouts of every sort – and the funds needed for the war will attract covetous looks. The fate of the Iraqi people and our former allies will carry little (if any) weight in these calculations. The public does not believe in possible disruption or worse of Saudi Arabia, followed by profound disruptions of the energy market. $6 per gallon gasoline will make the public howl, but they are unwilling to act to forestall the situation. After abandonment of Iraq, we will no doubt see a variety of bumper stickers advocating seizing oil fields by military force. The irony will escape most.

Let me underscore that I am not advocating anything, merely stating my observations and conclusions. It would be interesting to read history’s verdict on the war and the President after we have some perspective – say, in 50 years. I doubt I’ll have the opportunity.

The admiral may be thinking long-range, Congress controls the purse strings, get on the right side of Congress and your branch will benefit to the detriment of other the other branches.

[NousDefionsDoc]

I honestly don't know what to say.

To say "the surge is working" is more than a bit naive and short-sighted in my book.

I keep getting an uneasy feeling about Petraeus. Can't quite put my finger on it....

[Roguish Lawyer]

Originally Posted by NousDefionsDoc

I keep getting an uneasy feeling about Petraeus. Can't quite put my finger on it....

I recall a post by a QP on this board calling him "General Betrayus" . . .

[abc_123]

Doc,

It's a simplistic way of putting it, but basically it either "is" or it "is not".... followed of course by all the qualifiers. The General really only has those two options given the way things are politically at this point. If he doesn't come out and say either of those two statements outright...you can be he'll be asked repeted questions by some member of congress until he does.

[x-factor]

Originally Posted by abc_123

Doc,

It's a simplistic way of putting it, but basically it either "is" or it "is not".... followed of course by all the qualifiers. The General really only has those two options given the way things are politically at this point. If he doesn't come out and say either of those two statements outright...you can be he'll be asked repeted questions by some member of congress until he does.

I'd love to see Petraeus (or any other public official) sit down to testify and say "Sir, I cannot and will not oversimplify my answers. Its my duty to this Congress and this nation to give thorough and accurate testimony and military advice. The American people need to understand that war is not waged in sound bytes."

But you're right, it'll probably never happen.

[Airbornelawyer]

Originally Posted by NousDefionsDoc

I keep getting an uneasy feeling about Petraeus. Can't quite put my finger on it....

Tal Afar

[The Reaper]

Originally Posted by NousDefionsDoc

I honestly don't know what to say.

To say "the surge is working" is more than a bit naive and short-sighted in my book.

I keep getting an uneasy feeling about Petraeus. Can't quite put my finger on it....

He is an ambitious, egotistical ass, IMHO.

Given that, he may get the job done anyway.

TR

[Surgicalcric]

Originally Posted by NousDefionsDoc

...I keep getting an uneasy feeling about Petraeus. Can't quite put my finger on it....

He is a politician.

Crip

[Roguish Lawyer]

Originally Posted by Airbornelawyer

Tal Afar

Please elaborate.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Originally Posted by Roguish Lawyer

I recall a post by a QP on this board calling him "General Betrayus" . . .

http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/...06&postcount=9

[kgoerz]

Originally Posted by The Reaper

He is an ambitious, egotistical ass, IMHO.

Given that, he may get the job done anyway.

TR

Just tell us what you think Sir

How about the disrespect by the people asking the questions today. Every time I see one of these chubby little Geeks go off on a Military person in these hearings. I always think he is just getting revenge. Because these Military type men are the same ones who kicked his ass and took his lunch money when he was a kid.

I liked the one Congressman who said something like "Before we continue to criticize the Iraqi Government" "Remember that our Iraqi counterparts have passed more legislation, put in more work days and enacted more laws then the very people in this room" "lets look at ourselves before we start looking at others" It was one of the Juiner guys who was given time.

[Airbornelawyer]

Originally Posted by Roguish Lawyer

Please elaborate.

When then MG Petraeus was in charge of northern Iraq in 2003, he prevented Kurdish troops allied with the US from coming into the area to assist with security on the Syrian border, mainly on the main route running from Sinjar through Tal Afar to Mosul. This is a mixed area, with Kurdish, Arab and Turkmen populations, so I imagine he thought presence of the armed and organized Kurdish peshmerga might lead to tension. But his choice of an alternative was something which I found troubling. He essentially ceded border security to the Arab tribes, mainly of the Shammar Federation. But the Shammaris exist on both sides of the border and profit heavily by smuggling across it. Shammaris became one of the main backbones of the Baathist insurgency

Tal Afar subsequently, after the 101st had left, became an insurgent hornet's nest. In 2005, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment conducted a major clearing operation in the city. Though problems continue in the city, this operation was pointed to as the testing ground for "clear, hold and retain". At the time, though, I remember thinking that the reliance on the Shammaris was probably a big reason why Tal Afar became a hornet's nest in the first place.

When then-LTG Petraeus was in charge of MNSTC-I, I was concerned that the incentive to more quickly build up the Iraqi Army might lead to the same types of problems - army units with divided, mostly tribal loyalties and a return of Baathist influence.

Now, while trying to remain positive about the results of the surge, especially in Anbar, I have this nagging fear that the Anbar Awakening, neighborhood watch groups, and new Sunni soldiers is just a Band-aid that might allow for a U.S. drawdown at some point, but is only sowing the seeds for future instability. (Sorry for all the metaphor-mixing)

Having just written this, I also found an article from 2004 discussing the same issues with Petraeus' tenure in northern Iraq: http://www.aei.org/publications/pubI...pub_detail.asp