Three (3) GO's

[BMT (RIP)]

http://today.reuters.com/news/newsar...ELD.xml&rpc=22

The only one I have any knowledgr of is Eaton. My book he is a Clinton promoted ass hole.

BMT

[bubba]

Isn't Eaton the one who whined when his son was "bullied" in Ranger School a couple years ago. What a Puss!

[BMT (RIP)]

YEP!! Same ass hole.

BMT

[Airbornelawyer]

The article says MG Eaton was "in charge of training the Iraqi military from 2003-2004".

One of LTG Newbold's criticisms of Rumsfeld is the poor job of getting the training of the Iraqi military off the ground in 2003-2004.



By the way, I have no idea if it is significant, but LTG Newbold retired from his position as Director for Operations (J3) on the Joint Staff. Newbold's four predecessors - GEN Howell M. Estes III USAF, GEN Peter Pace, USMC, ADM Vern Clark, USN and VADM Scott A. Fry - and his successor - GEN Norton A. Schwartz, USAF - all went on to follow-on assignments. Estes became CINCNORAD, Pace is CJCS, Clark became CNO, Fry became COMSIXTHFLT and Schwartz commands TRANSCOM.

[NousDefionsDoc]

I don't think I care much for those fellows.

AL, the breadth of your knowledge (or google skills) never ceases to amaze me.

[504PIR]

From what I have seen in the news I believe Gen. Zinni has politcal aspirations much like Westly Clark.

And MG Eaton ....IMHO is another "political"general, definitly not a warrior but another "wuss".

[The Reaper]

I know GEN Zinni, knew him when he was the CINCCENT and have a lot of respect for him.

At the same time, I think that he is wrong on Mideast policy and has been since he retired.

I do not think that he has political aspirations ala Wes Clark, whom, I have also dealt with. Of course, compared to Wes Clark, Hillary has no political aspirations, so maybe that was a bad comparison.

TR

[Razor]

Well, I'm rather disappointed. Then-COL Eaton was my Bde commander in 3ID, and seemed to be a good senior officer.

[Roguish Lawyer]

I read Newbold's piece in Time at the doctor's office yesterday. I found it conclusory and stupid.

[Airbornelawyer]

Originally Posted by The Reaper

I know GEN Zinni, knew him when he was the CINCCENT and have a lot of respect for him.

At the same time, I think that he is wrong on Mideast policy and has been since he retired.

I do not think that he has political aspirations ala Wes Clark, whom, I have also dealt with. Of course, compared to Wes Clark, Hillary has no political aspirations, so maybe that was a bad comparison.

TR

From what I here, GEN Zinni's political aspirations are not like Clark's. GEN Clark wanted to be President, or at least seriously considered as veep material. GEN Zinni seems to be jockeying for the Colin Powell role - SECSTATE or SECDEF - in a Democratic Administration.

[CoLawman]

http://www.hughhewitt.com/

Generals Pace and McInerney
by Hugh Hewitt
April 12, 2006 03:42 PM PST

Retired Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force Thomas McInerney was my guest today, and his belief in the ability of the American military to destroy the Iranian nuclear program is complete. Radioblogger will have the transcript up later.

I also asked the General about the criticisms of SecDef Rumsfeld and the war from retired Generals Batiste, Newbold, Eaton and Zinni. McInerney was not complimentary of some of these criticisms, and his comments echoed those made by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Peter Pace made today:

In the last couple of days there have been several articles, opinion pieces, editorials about the responsibility of senior U.S. military officers to speak up, to tell the truth as we know it, and that is a sacred obligation of all of us who are fortunate to represent all the members of the armed forces and to have the opportunity to participate at this level.
Let me just give you Pete Pace's rendition of how the process worked building up to Iraq. First of all, once it became apparent that we may have to take military action, the Secretary of Defense asked Tom Franks, who was the commander of Central Command, to begin doing some planning, which he did. Over the next two years, 50 or 60 times, Tom Franks either came to Washington or by video teleconference, sat down with the Secretary of Defense, sat down with the Joint Chiefs and went over what he was thinking, how he was planning. And as a result of those iterative opportunities and all the questions that were asked, not once was Tom told, "No, don't do that. No, don't do this. No, you can't have this. No, you can't have that." What happened was, in a very open roundtable discussion, questions about what might go right, what might go wrong, what would you need, how would you handle it, and that happened with the Joint Chiefs and it happened with the Secretary.

And before the final orders were given, the Joint Chiefs met in private with General Franks and assured ourselves that the plan was a solid plan and that the resources that he needed were going to be allocated. We then went and told the Secretary of Defense our belief in Tom's plan and in the resources, and I know for a fact, because I was there, that when the Joint Chiefs were called over to the White House, several of the questions that the president asked specifically were about our understanding and belief in the plan, and whether or not the amount -- proper amount of resources had been allocated. He did that both with us, just the Joint Chiefs, and then again when all the combatant commanders were in from around the globe well before a final decision was made.

We had then and have now every opportunity to speak our minds, and if we do not, shame on us because the opportunity is there.

It is elicited from us. You know, we're expected to. And the plan that was executed was developed by military officers, presented by military officers, questioned by civilians as they should, revamped by military officers, and blessed by the senior military leadership.

Then, when we go to Congress, part of our confirmation process is, "Will you, General Pace, if confirmed, give your personal opinion when asked?" And the answer to that question is, "Yes, I will, sir." And I have been for almost five years now asked my personal opinion multiple times by members of the Congress of the United States in testimony, and I have spoken my personal opinion.

Now, I've given my best military advice to the Secretary and to the president, as have the other officers who have the privilege of being Joint Chiefs or being combatant commanders. Our troops deserve and will continue to get our best military thinking.

I wanted to tell you how I believe this system works, and I wanted to tell you how I have observed it working for five years, because the articles that are out there about folks not speaking up are just flat wrong.

Thank you.

[MtnGoat]

I found this thought it fit in here.

Another general joins ranks opposing Rumsfeld
Defense secretary 'carries too much baggage,' Swannack says

Friday, April 14, 2006; Posted: 12:48 a.m. EDT (04:48 GMT)

Today on CNN, retired Army Maj. Gen. Charles Swannack called for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's resignation. "I think we need senior military leaders who understand the principles of war and apply them ruthlessly, and when the time comes, they need to call it like it is," the former commander of the 82nd Airborne Division said.

Swannack joins former Central Command boss Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni, Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, Marine Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold and Army Maj. Gen. John Batiste -- all retired -- in demanding that Rumsfeld step down.

Batiste, like Swannack, joined the fray relatively late, in an interview with CNN's Miles O'Brien on Wednesday. The interview opened with Batiste slamming Iraq's potential for democracy: "Iraqis, frankly, in my experience, do not understand democracy. Nor do they understand their responsibilities for a free society."

The interview continued:

O'BRIEN: So, you're suggesting a wholesale house cleaning [of Defense Dept. leadership]?

BATISTE: I didn't say wholesale. I said new leadership in the Pentagon, a fresh start. You know, it speaks volumes that guys like me are speaking out from retirement about the leadership climate in the Department of Defense.

O'BRIEN: What is going on that is -- what is it about that climate that is leading to difficulties, leading to trouble, leading to -- as you put it -- perhaps unnecessary bloodshed?

BATISTE: I didn't say unnecessary bloodshed. But when decisions are made without taking into account sound military recommendations, sound military decision making, sound planning, then we're bound to make mistakes. When we violate the principles of war with mass and unity of command and unity of effort, we do that at our own peril.

Ahem.

I met Batiste a year ago when he was commander of the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq. We spoke for an hour about the insurgency, the Iraqi Army and the upcoming January election for an interim national assembly.

The difference between Batiste's attitude then and his attitude now is suprising. Last year, he said the insurgency was "not an impressive effort", insisted that Al Qaeda was behind the worst attacks in Iraq and predicted that everday Iraqis would soon turn against insurgents. And the kicker -- he described the chunk of the World Trade Center that he kept in his office to remind himself why we had to invade Iraq.

From the safety of retirement, and with his buddies watching his back, Batiste has lashed out at Rumsfeld. But Batiste is guilty of lapses in judgement just as gross as Rumsfeld's. The only difference is that Rumsfeld ranks higher, so his lapses have greater consequences. I'm not defending Rummy. But if Batiste were Secretary of Defense instead, I doubt we'd be much better off.

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

These bastards are moral cowards! If they had such strong feelings when this all started they had an obligation to resign/retire. If this points nothing else out, it definitely shows the total ineptitude of the conventional force GOs who do not have a frigging clue about insurgency and the psychological victory that they are handing to the insurgents and the liberal whiners and media in this country. They can now count themselves among the like of Jane F....a and because they failed to stand for what they believed in when they could have done something about it, the very troops that they committed to operations they signed on to are now paying for their bruised egos and moral cowardice with their blood. Rant over.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Originally Posted by Jack Moroney

These bastards are moral cowards! If they had such strong feelings when this all started they had an obligation to resign/retire. If this points nothing else out, it definitely shows the total ineptitude of the conventional force GOs who do not have a frigging clue about insurgency and the psychological victory that they are handing to the insurgents and the liberal whiners and media in this country. They can now count themselves among the like of Jane F....a and because they failed to stand for what they believed in when they could have done something about it, the very troops that they committed to operations they signed on to are now paying for their bruised egos and moral cowardice with their blood. Rant over.

Preach on!

[Airbornelawyer]

MG Swannack retired after commanding the 82nd Airborne.

Who retires after commanding the Eighty-Deuce? For a major general, division command is the pinnacle. There are lots of MGs and only 10 divisions. Colin Powell has noted that the biggest regret of his military career is that he never commanded a division. And the 82nd is the cream of division commands.

For at least the past twenty years, no former CG of the 82nd has failed to advance. The only question was one more or two more stars. And since the division became an airborne division, only 8 of 38 CGs failed to get a third or fourth star (and the CG immediately before it became airborne, Omar Bradley, got a fifth).

At least 15 reached full general: Matthew Ridgway, Williston B. Palmer, Hamilton H. Howze, Dwight E. Beach, Ted Conway, John L. Throckmorton, John R. Deane, Jr., George Blanchard, Frederick J. Kroesen, Roscoe Robinson, Jr., James J. Lindsay, John W. Foss, Carl W. Stiner, Henry H. Shelton and Daniel K. McNeill.

At least 15 reached LTG: James M. Gavin, Clovis E. Byers, Ridgely Gaither (BG, interim CG), Thomas F. Hickey, Francis W. Farrell, T.J. Trapnell, John W. Bowen, Robert H. York, Richard J. Seitz, Thomas H. Tackaberry, James H. Johnson, Jr., William M. Steele, George A. Crocker, Joseph K. Kellogg, Jr., and John E. Vines (still active).

MG Charles D.W. Canham, an interim CG of the 82nd in 1952, retired with only two stars, but in 1960, after further divisional and corps command (Canham, by the way, commanded the 116th Infantry on Omaha Beach). BG Raphael J. Hallada, another interim commander, also went on to other successful commands. The others to retire as MGs were Gerald J. Higgins, Joe S. Lawrie, Guy S. Meloy III, Edward L. Trobaugh, Bobby B. Porter and Swannack.

Swannack's successor, William B. Caldwell IV, was just last month appointed to be Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects, Multi-National Force-Iraq. He will be succeeded as divisional commander by MG David M. Rodriguez.

Swannack commanded the division in wartime (and apparently had to split command for part of it, as Vines retained command of TF 82 in Afghanistan while Swannack commanded divisional elements in Iraq). Swannack did something to piss someone off (my guess is going out of the chain of command to complain to people in the media about vehicle armor), and his career came to a crashing halt.

I don't want to sound judgmental of MG Swannack. I don't really know much about him. Maybe he did, or at least firmly believes he did, sacrifice an otherwise promising future in the interests of his troops, and feels compelled to speak out. Or maybe his ego got the best of him, and he lost the clash of wills with the Pentagon, and now he's harvesting sour grapes. And maybe it is a little of both: there are genuine disagreements of policy, but ego and ambition and politics often turn policy disagreements into political catfights.