British Officer Comments about U.S. Forces

[Bill Harsey]

Hmmm, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1684561,00.html

[Roguish Lawyer]

:munchin

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

Actually it is a pretty good article and critique of the mindset of a lot of the conventional side of our military. Counter-insurgency is not as much a military problem as it is economic, political, informational, and cultural. The military, to be effective, has to be in the supporting and not the leading role. The informational aspect especially has been elevated to a new "art form" with the plethora of technological devices, gadgets, and manipulative abilities to influence and in some cases prepare the battlefield. It is important to note that there is no criticism of the troop but there is a criticism of the mindset of some and especially of the command climate. This conflict, like all conflicts before it, has become politicized and I can only imagine what it must be like in the daily command and staff briefings and continuous modifications to ROEs to "manage" rather than lead the effort. Just my .02.

[Pete]

As with all things in the information age the talk covered a number of areas. Each in it's own right could be a college class.

A number of people love to pick and choose a small nut here and there from what people of importance say to push a point on the axe they try and grind.

Edit - I'm talking about how the story was written.

[QRQ 30]

A pure case of a writer using a Headline which doesn't accurately refletd the content of the article. The Brit and US Tabloids arer great at this. I thought it was a good and accurate article.

[ghuinness]

I hate reading some editors interpretation.

Here is the actual article from Military Review:

http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/NovDec05/aylwin.pdf

[jbour13]

ghuinness,

Thanks for the real article. A lot more balanced and seems to offer an attempt to help.....not hurt. Damn media boneheads get something that they think is good and run it.

At least they are consistent.

Consistency = Predictibility

Makes them easier to ignore. :D

[longrange1947]

The Brit is right and the so called military intellectuals rebutting have their noses out of joint.

My two cents. :munchin

[NousDefionsDoc]

Silly englishman.

I agree with Colonel Sir. There are no doubt some valid comments there. For one, I agree very much with:
The Army took too long to adapt to the changed requirements arising from Phase 4 operations. , although I don't get wrapped around the axle about phases. Same thing happened. We sat around waiting for them to tell us what to do next. Fortunately, we didn't have the insurgent situation the guys in Iraq do.

The funny thing is, call the classics warn of missing the change. Every one of them I have read. Clausewitz is adamant about it. Callwell is all over it.

Fundamentals are fundamentals for a reason.

[QRQ 30]

This is a classic case of people getting their panties in a knot over the Headline without reading the article.

[CPTAUSRET]

This is a classic case of people getting their panties in a knot over the Headline without reading the article.


YUP!

[Peregrino]

Just got this from a friend. Personally I think there's an uncomfortable amount of truth here. :munchin Peregrino

British brigadier attacks America's John Wayne generals
By Thomas Harding, Defence Correspondent
(Filed: 19/04/2006)

A senior British officer has criticised "shoulder-holster" American generals for trying to emulate film stars.

Brig Alan Sharpe, who worked alongside Americans in Baghdad, said there was a "strong streak of Hollywood" with officers trying to portray themselves as Sylvester Stallone or John Wayne.

He wrote the comments in a paper on Britain's influence on US foreign relations and the essay is likely to strain the "special relationship" further, coming after other British officers' criticism of the American approach.

An important part to being a successful American officer was to be able to combine the "real and acted heroics" of Audie Murphy, the "newsreel antics" of Gen Douglas MacArthur and the "movie performances" of Hollywood actors, the brigadier wrote.

While this might look good on television at home, the brigadier suggested that "loud voices, full body armour, wrap-around sunglasses, air strikes and daily broadcasts from shoulder-holster wearing brigadier-generals proudly announcing how many Iraqis have been killed by US forces today" was no "hearts-and-minds winning tool".

Brig Sharpe, 46, who was awarded the OBE and the American Bronze Star for writing the "coalition campaign plan" for Iraq during a tour in Baghdad in 2004, is regarded as a high-flier.

But US officers he is working with as commander of British Forces in the Balkans will not be impressed by references to the early US regime in Iraq as "autocratic" and an "interim dictatorship".

By contrast British servicemen, although under-equipped, were "undemonstrative, phlegmatic and pragmatic", patrolled on foot where possible and were keen to interact with locals.

Arguing that the Army's 500 years of experience gave it a marked edge over the Americans in insurgency operations, Brig Sharpe said the senior British officers in Baghdad should continue with their moderating influence.

Rather than Britain punching above its weight it should "stand in the corner, with a bucket and towel, advising the undisputed heavyweight champion about who and how to fight".

He referred to America as a "hyper power" in the paper, written during a year-long course with other leading military figures from around the world, run by the Royal College of Defence Studies.

Brig Sharpe said the most effective way of passing on British experience was to place capable officers "with a feel for the British way of doing business" into positions of influence alongside American officers where they could "practically influence the decisions, plans and conduct on the ground of US adventures in world policing".

Tony Blair should not try to secure influence by providing "hollowed-out formations with little real capability".

Brig Sharpe gave the "last word" to an anecdote about a "subjugated Iraqi" just before his release from detention.

The Ba'athist was loudly lectured by an American officer, who was accompanied by a quiet British brigadier, on the dangers of returning to his "previously nefarious ways".

As the Iraqi left he said: "Hey, Mr American, next time before you shout so much you should speak to him. He is British - they know how to invade a country."

The Ministry of Defence said the thesis reflected Brig Sharpe's "personal views" but it was the object of the college course to "stimulate debate".

[Airbornelawyer]

Those "undemonstrative, phlegmatic and pragmatic" British troops have essentially allowed Iranian-influenced Shi'ite militias to control the police and other government services in al-Basrah.

There can be too heavy a hand, but there can also be too light. And while a lot of Europeans can be discomfitted by American swagger, others respond to it. Arabs, I've noticed, tend to emulate it.

[Pete]

....Arguing that the Army's 500 years of experience gave it a marked edge over the Americans in insurgency operations, Brig Sharpe said the senior British officers in Baghdad should continue with their moderating influence.....

Now granted I'm an American and I do hold with American superiority so my views are a little one sided.

But........

As I recall we whopped 'um good in two (one had a lot of COIN), bailed them out in two, supported them like heck in a third and so.......

I'll stop here before I PO somebody.

Pete

[NousDefionsDoc]

Those "undemonstrative, phlegmatic and pragmatic" British troops have essentially allowed Iranian-influenced Shi'ite militias to control the police and other government services in al-Basrah.

There can be too heavy a hand, but there can also be too light. And while a lot of Europeans can be discomfitted by American swagger, others respond to it. Arabs, I've noticed, tend to emulate it.
+1

[Airbornelawyer]

Arguing that the Army's 500 years of experience gave it a marked edge over the Americans in insurgency operations, ...
The British Army came into existence with the Acts of Union 1707. The English Army before that only goes back to the English Civil Wars (1642-1651). So the Army's experience is 300 to 350 years.

Of course, one may argue that the experience of English feudal militias before the standing army should be counted as part of the Army's heritage, but if so, the United States, having evolved from English colonies and having been part of that militia system from the early 1600s to 1775, can claim that heritage as well.

We have soldiers in Iraq from the Massachusetts Guard's 181st Infantry and 182nd Infantry. Those units trace their heritage to 1636, having been formed for the Pequot War (1637-1638). The Coldstream Guards trace their heritage to 1650.

[SF18C]

Here

Rumsfeld has failed at war, and escalation (http://www.newsday.com/news/columnists/ny-oppin184706216apr18,0,6258173.column)

I will add to the mix by saying this is also a good artilce that gets to the basic point. I thought it was well written as well as well researched!


James P. Pinkerton

Rumsfeld has failed at war, and escalation


April 18, 2006
It's me, Carl von Clausewitz, here to speak about der Krieg - oops, the war - between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the retired generals.

I ordered Herr Pinkerton to take the day off, because I know a lot about war. I wrote the book on the subject. Literally.
If my name doesn't ring a bell, then you probably never served in the armed forces, at least not as an officer - because, I'm proud to say, my writings are enshrined in just about every military academy in the world. But I hope that even you civilians will keep reading, because although I've been dead for 175 years, what I have to say concerns all Americans today.

Perhaps my most famous saying is this: "War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means." That is, war is just another way for a nation to influence another nation. You Americans have been trying to influence Iraq for a long time now, including by fighting two wars. I'm here to assess how you're doing.

I was interested, for example, in the words of one of Rumsfeld's critics, retired Gen. John Batiste, on CNN: "When we violate the principles of war," he said, ignoring "unity of command and unity of effort, we do that at our own peril." That Batiste fellow has obviously given me a close reading; I wrote a lot about unity of command and effort. And I'll also have you know that in 1812 I wrote a book titled "Principles of War."

War has three purposes, I declared. First, "to conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy"; second, "to take possession of his material and other sources of strength"; and third, "to gain public opinion." That's right, almost two centuries ago, I understood that as much as anything, war was about persuasion - persuading the enemy to give up.

So how do I assess Rumsfeld's performance? Has he eliminated the enemy's armed power? Just as important, has he persuaded the foe to stop fighting?

The answer is no, not after three years of fighting. Rumsfeld seems not to have absorbed one of my key dicta: "War does not consist of a single short blow." That is, if you want to win, you have to fight longer and harder than the enemy. Mind you, I'm not squeamish about casualties; I was in the Prussian Army as we fought Napoleon over two decades. That's when I decided really to study war, on the theory that if you're going to fight, it's better to win than to lose.

And war is a waste if you don't win your political objective. If America's goal had been merely to remove Saddam Hussein from power, well, that was accomplished in April 2003. But President George W. Bush wanted much more; he pledged the same year that "the establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution."

And so the big Clausewitzian question: Has the United States committed the resources necessary to achieve that goal? The answer, obviously, is no. America wasn't prepared for either a robust insurgency or an emerging sectarian conflict. That's OK; I'm the guy who coined the phrase "fog of war." Yet, even as the fighting escalated, Rumsfeld failed to escalate in response. He seems strangely willing to be a spectator as the United States falls short of accomplishing its mission, which is to make the Iraqis bend to America's will.

So history's verdict on Rumsfeld will be harsh. But what about these half-dozen generals who are attacking their ex-boss? With the exception of Anthony Zinni, the other five kept their criticism well hidden until recently. And three of them served Rumsfeld in Iraq. So those generals, too, are going to have to do a lot of explaining when they come before the high court of history, up here in Valhalla.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Mr. Pinkerton conveniently ignores Herr Clausewitz' thoughts on war with limited objectives - as do most that only read the jacket cover.

[The Reaper]

The modern cult of Clausewitz is interesting to me. The shallow tactician draws his name when it reinforces his point, and ignores him otherwise.

To me, Jomini is the better guide of the two.

TR