McCain

[NousDefionsDoc]

I think he's going to run as a Dem or Hillary's VP.

[rubberneck]

I think he's going to run as a Dem or Hillary's VP.


He you read or heard something lately that would cause you to come to that conclusion or are you just making an educated guess based off his prior history? Personally, while I respect the man for his service I have begun to believe that he thinks he is bigger than his party and really seems to enjoy his maverick super star role. IMHO joing the Dems wouldn't get him anything more than he probably have during the next election cycle.

[CPTAUSRET]

I think he's going to run as a Dem or Hillary's VP.

H. Ross Perot, Jimmy Carter, and John McCain...What do they all have in common?

Terry

[NousDefionsDoc]

Navy?

[CPTAUSRET]

Navy?


Real close, Sneaky.

Annapolis grads.

Terry

[NousDefionsDoc]

And I didn't even look it up. LOL

There are little things. Look at what happened when Arnold called for a move to the left.

Who will the GOP run? No way in hell McCain gets it over Rudy if Rudy runs.

I think he knows there will be a visceral reaction to Hillary and who else have they got?

I think he knew what he was doing when he pushed Hillary into the SOWF speech and will "open" more doors for her on the military side, probably hoping she will fail.

Going after the SECDEF is a calculated risk for a Republican, no risk for a Dem.

I think McCain might still be a little pissed that President Bush got it in 2000.

[rubberneck]

Who will the GOP run? No way in hell McCain gets it over Rudy if Rudy runs.



I can't see Rudy getting the nod. I don't think the GOP will ever nominate a Pro-abortion pro-gay marriage candidate.

[NousDefionsDoc]

I can't see Rudy getting the nod. I don't think the GOP will ever nominate a Pro-abortion pro-gay marriage candidate.

Then who?

[rubberneck]

Then who?

That's a good question. '08 is a long way off so it is hard to guess. Gov Romney of Mass would be a good choice expect he is a Mormon and there are some out there on the right that don't hold mormons in high regard. Bill Frist is positioning himself but Senators don't make good Presidential candidates. Gov Pitaki is a soup sandwich who probably won't even win election. McCain has pissed to many on the right off and so has Chuck Hagel. Little Bush has the name and the creds but after 12 years of Dad and big brother there might be a fatigue factor. Rick Santorum has expressed interest but is too far to the right to interest independents. George Allen has a face made for radio. My guess is that it will be a Rep Governor that not to many have on their radar right now.

[Polar Bear]

Then who?

US Representative John Boehner

[Polar Bear]

or US Senator George Voinovich.

[Airbornelawyer]

Umm... http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showpost.php?p=46269&postcount=127 ;)

[Achilles]

I can't see Rudy getting the nod. I don't think the GOP will ever nominate a Pro-abortion pro-gay marriage candidate.

If Rudy gets the nod, what Dem could beat him? I don't think any Dems would stand a snowball's chance in Hell against him. He would get the vast majority of independant votes, and all the conservatives would vote against the liberal candidate (if not for Rudy). To me, he seems like a really good backup candidate in case the GOP has a hard time finding someone that could further their agenda AND be a popular candidate.

Rudy just seems like a nearly fail-safe candidate that is 90% with the GOP agenda. Good enough for me.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Umm... http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showpost.php?p=46269&postcount=127 ;)


I don't know Allen.
Ridge? Come on
Rudy is as socially liberal as Arnold. But he is known. They will use Kerok against him big time.
Pataki is unknown outside of NY, everybody thinks Rudy is both Mayor and Governor
They will not elect another Bush, especially back to back
Coiln Powell is a possibility, although I think there is still enough racism to prevent it
Tommy Thompson? COME ON!
Don't know Bill Owens

I do think this, whoever it is has to be nationally known if Hillary runs. Name recognition is a bigger deal than people think.

Frist could move over to the left just a tad and be GTG with Republicans.

[Roguish Lawyer]

You're just starting trouble again. ;)

McCain will not run as a Dem, as VP or Pres. He'd never win the Dem primary, and I don't think he'd win the GOP primary either. Too conservative and too liberal.

I see no strong GOP candidates for 2008 so far. Let's see who can raise some money!

[brewmonkey]

The liberal blogs are calling for McCain on the GOP ticket versus Kerry (again.. :rolleyes: ) on the demonrat's. While I would not want McCain on any ticket I think it would be funny to hear Kerry spout off about his 4 months in Vietnam. :D

[The Reaper]

Then who?

Condi Rice.

TR

[Sigi]

Condi Rice.

TR
http://www.rice2008.com/

I like Condi. 2008 is three years+ away. Never to early to pick a frontrunner.

[Airbornelawyer]

I don't know Allen.
Ridge? Come on
Rudy is as socially liberal as Arnold. But he is known. They will use Kerok against him big time.
Pataki is unknown outside of NY, everybody thinks Rudy is both Mayor and Governor
They will not elect another Bush, especially back to back
Coiln Powell is a possibility, although I think there is still enough racism to prevent it
Tommy Thompson? COME ON!
Don't know Bill Owens

I do think this, whoever it is has to be nationally known if Hillary runs. Name recognition is a bigger deal than people think.

Frist could move over to the left just a tad and be GTG with Republicans.
In 1996, in the wake of Dole's defeat, the field for 2000 was completely open. Can you remember the names of who was talked about then? Was George W. Bush one of them?

Until they for various reasons announced they would not seek the nomination, the leading names at the end of 1996 were Kemp and Gingrich. Other also-rans from 1996 were mentioned, including Buchanan, Lamar!, Forbes, Gramm and Keyes. Senators Lugar and Specter also were mentioned, as well as Dole's wife Liddy, Gen. Powell and former VP Quayle.

Of these, Quayle, Liddy Dole, Keyes and Forbes ran, joined by social conservative Gary Bauer. All faded quickly in the shadow of two people not even mentioned in 1996, Bush and McCain.

Relatedly, how many of you were familiar with Dean, Edwards, Graham, Kucinich or even Kerry in 2000? And who would have pictured Wes Clark in a Dem convention race? The presumptive 2004 candidate in 2000 was, of course, Gore, with Hillary, Bill Bradley, Lieberman, Gephardt, Daschle, Biden and Dodd also mentioned. Of these, only Lieberman and Gephardt actually ran.

The name recognition that matters will come in 2006-7, as potential candidates gear up for a run.

Owens' biggest minus is speaking ability. His biggest pluses are a positive reputation among conservatives, executive experience and a record of tax-cutting and school reform. He needs national level experience in foreign and/or defense policy. When he leaves the governor's mansion, look for what he does next.

Allen's biggest minus is an Edwards-esque schoolboy charm that borders on unseriousness. He has national experience as a US Senator and executive experience as governor of the 12th largest state in the Union. He also has a family connection to the NFL which will help in ramping up name recognition.

It is a bit early to predict these things, but a primary race between Guiliani and McCain seems most likely. Both not only already have strong name recognition, but generally strong positives as well (Hillary's disadvantage, by contrast, is that everybody knows her, but a lot of people really dislike her).

[Roguish Lawyer]

Name recognition is nice, assuming it is positive recognition (Hitler has high name recognition ;)).

Money is the key. Which GOP primary candidate raised the most money early in the 2000 race?

AL, want to test the correlation? I believe you will find it to be quite significant.

[Polar Bear]

or US Senator George Voinovich.

This is the guy...In 1998 I was shooting a commercial for his senate race and the question came up in jest but his answer was very clear I will run someday…he ain’t getting any younger it had better be soon

[The Reaper]

Putting up liberal Republican candidates like Giuliani and McCain could cause enough conservatives to stay home to overcome Hillary's big negatives.

I would see little reason to bother with those choices. Damned if I do, damned if I don't.

None of them believe in the Constitution as it was written.

TR

[Doc]

Condi Rice.

TR

I did a quick web search on books about Condi;


Read these book reviews about Condoleezza Rice.

Condi Rice is a brilliant powerful woman in the Bush administration. Condi Rice is an accomplished pianist. A talented musician. Leftists despise her. The mainstream media try to minimize her accomplishments. 'White' and 'black' conservatives love her because she exemplifies the values they love!
Amazing! 'white' conservatives love Condi Rice.

The only people sliming/trashing her are liberals! (Who is the racist?)
Value-challenged leftists loath her because she is a perfect example of the values leftists can't accept! Leftists can't stand to look at her, because every time they see her they are forced to confront their biggest lie: that Bush is a racist.

What really annoys leftists is the fact that Ms Rice is a deeply religious person.

This site thinks that Condoleezza Rice should be the first woman president.

Condoleezza Rice speaks Russian, French, Spanish.

She graduated college at age 19. Could read music before she could read words.




Wow!

[NousDefionsDoc]

In 1996, in the wake of Dole's defeat, the field for 2000 was completely open. Can you remember the names of who was talked about then? Was George W. Bush one of them?

1. He almost lost.
2. Al Gore ain't no Hillary Clinton

;)

My prediction is up there in B&W and up there it stays. Time will tell.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Rice would be a terrible candidate. She cannot win. She has never run for public office before, and that is a HUGE problem for a presidential candidate. Campaigning is hard, and you need practice.

It's not that different from taking someone with all of the raw material needed to be a great SF solider and putting him on an ODA on a really tough mission without putting him through the Q Course, etc. first.

[Razor]

Poor analogy. The Q Course teaches the basic skills required for the job on an ODA. What skills does campaigning teach that will be essential to be the POTUS?

[Roguish Lawyer]

Poor analogy. The Q Course teaches the basic skills required for the job on an ODA. What skills does campaigning teach that will be essential to be the POTUS?

The analogy may have been badly put, but the mission is winning the election. She lacks basic campaign skills and I do not believe she is capable of winning. Not even close.

[jatx]

A campaign instills extreme discipline and time management skills in the candidate. It teaches a politician how to truly go on the offensive, something that is very rarely called for in a legislator. It teaches them how to rapidly get their bearings with respect to issues they might not have really cared much about previously. It teaches them how to sit effectively at the top of a dynamic organization with lots of moving parts. Remember, a presidential campaign is analogous to a Russell 2000-size company that starts up, reaches full rev and shuts down in under 24 months. That is no joke - they are vast organizations and are getting increasingly sophisticated with every passing cycle. All of these experiences serve our elected presidents well, and I do like the Q course analogy FWIW.

BTW, I despise McCain. During the New Hampshire primary in 2000, I was managing Bush's field operations out of the Manchester headquarters. McCain was forever trying to plant moles in our organization, and once even sent a young volunteer to see what she could steal off of our desks. When we sent her packing, she went to the media, disavowed her McCain connection and made all sorts of outrageous character attacks on our campaign staff. He has clearly forgotten Reagan's admonition about fellow Republicans. Nasty, nasty man.

[Doc]

Interesting points of view. I respect your thoughts.

The majority of the population called bullshit on this last election. I think they will call bullshit on Hillary versus Condi on the next one as well.

Just my thoughts....

Doc, aka JAFM

[vsvo]

As governor, Allen abolished parole here in the commonwealth, fulfilling a campaign promise. The buzz around here is that the current guv, Warner, will run for the Dem ticket in '08, with Allen a possible VP candidate for the GOP, or even running as a candidate himself. Due to term limits, Warner is out of a job in '06, and the Dems are intrigued b/c he won office in a traditional red state. He even convinced the GOP legislature to pass a 1% sales tax increase.

[Sigi]

This is the guy...In 1998 I was shooting a commercial for his senate race and the question came up in jest but his answer was very clear I will run someday…he ain’t getting any younger it had better be soon
Re: US Senator George Voinovich. Just curious, being that I live in Ohio. Why do you like Sen Voinovich?

I am not saying he was a bad Gov. of Ohio, but his economic policies and ability to keep high paying jobs in Ohio leaves a lot to be desired. How this would translate into a national race I am not sure, but it would not be good.

[1026]

Voinovich is a lib, as is DeWine; both are anti-Second Amendment. While ostensibly a Republican state, Ohio is a leftist haven. Ohio's Republican Party is ideologically weak; while there are a few conservatives in the State House, there are none on the national level and Taft is a RINO as well.

[Airbornelawyer]

Voinovich is a lib, as is DeWine; both are anti-Second Amendment. While ostensibly a Republican state, Ohio is a leftist haven. Ohio's Republican Party is ideologically weak; while there are a few conservatives in the State House, there are none on the national level and Taft is a RINO as well.
I am not sure it is correct to call Taft a RINO. The Taft family has led the "establishment" wing of the Republican Party for generations. RINOs are the Bloombergs of the world for whom the party label is a mere convenience, or the Specters, Chafees and Snowes who are more comfortable being adored by the media as the Republicans who don't act like Republicans. The Taft wing would describe themselves as true Republicans, representing a different faction than the movement conservatives of the Goldwater/Reagan/G.W.Bush line, but no less Republican for that.

Bob Taft's cousin Bill (that would be William Howard Taft IV) was one of my law school professors. I've discussed this with him, and while neither he nor I would presume to speak for all "Taft Republicans" (given that I am more of a movement conservative, I certainly couldn't), the consensus is that they would view their strand as a fairly continuous line from Abraham Lincoln to William Howard Taft to George H.W. Bush. Movement conservatives, on the other hand, are a young movement whose origins lie more in the Goldwater era and the Reagan Revolution, and draw strength as much from disaffected Democrats (like Reagan himself) and Socialists (like Irving Kristol), as from traditionally Republican households.

Also, I can't speak to Dewine's or Voinovich's views on the Second Amendment to the US Constitution (or § 1.04 of the Ohio Constitution), but neither is objectively a "liberal." Dewine's lifetime Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) rating is 10, while Voinovich's is 15. Howard Metzenbaum's was 95, and John Glenn's was 84 (Kerry's is 92). As for American Conservative Union (ACU) ratings, Dewine's is 82 and Voinovich's is 79. Metzenbaum's was 0 and Glenn's was 12.

Dewine and Voinovich are moderate-to-conservative establishment Republicans. A liberal Republican in Ohio would be someone like Ralph Regula or Steve LaTourette. John Glenn was a liberal Democrat. Metzenbaum, of course, was no liberal, but a true leftist.

Liberal Republicans are people like Lincoln Chafee (ADA=70, ACU=44) and Arlen Specter (ADA=59, ACU=43). William Cohen, who went from GOP Senator to Clinton's SecDef, had a lifetime ADA rating of 46 and a lifetime ACU rating of 45.

[Airbornelawyer]

As governor, Allen abolished parole here in the commonwealth, fulfilling a campaign promise. The buzz around here is that the current guv, Warner, will run for the Dem ticket in '08, with Allen a possible VP candidate for the GOP, or even running as a candidate himself. Due to term limits, Warner is out of a job in '06, and the Dems are intrigued b/c he won office in a traditional red state. He even convinced the GOP legislature to pass a 1% sales tax increase.
Mark Warner probably won a few GOP votes from people who thought he was related to John Warner.

Also, Warner ran as a fiscal conservative, essentially following in Jim Gilmore's footsteps. He raised the overall sales tax, as well as the cigarette tax, but lowered the sales tax on food, and pushed through a mix of other tax reforms, some of which Democrats would like, and some which appeal to Republicans.

By his rhetoric, he does seem to be positioning himself for Clintonesque triangulation. If he runs and the result is he at least helps draw the Democratic Party back toward the center away from the Dean/Kerry/Kennedy wing, that would be a good thing.

BTW, for those who don't know, the "term limits" for Virginia governors is not how many terms you can serve, but a restriction on consecutive terms. Governors may not run for reelection in the Commonwealth, but a former governor can run again later. I think Mills Godwin, Jr. is the only one to actually win a second term though, serving from 1966-70 and then from 1974-78. Patrick Henry was governor twice (1776-79 and 1784-86), but governors were appointed then.

Also, since Virginia has odd-year elections, Gov. Warner is out of a job in January 2006, after the November 2005 elections. The Virginia primary is not until June 2006, so he has time to decide whether to go for the Democratic nomination to run against Allen. I doubt he will, though. If he wins, he will be a junior senator just beginning his term, so it would be hard to jump on the Democratic '08 ticket. If he loses, he is branded a loser so would be hard to jump on the Democratic '08 ticket. Of course, both he and Allen might be thinking 2012.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Money is the key. Which GOP primary candidate raised the most money early in the 2000 race?

AL, want to test the correlation? I believe you will find it to be quite significant.

http://www.opensecrets.org/pressreleases/july27_99_release.htm

[Airbornelawyer]

http://www.opensecrets.org/pressreleases/july27_99_release.htm
That is the press release covering contributions for the first six months of 1999. It is a snapshot. However, Bush was also the leader in contributions as of the end of the first quarter of 1999, as well, and his fund-raising lead was early and sustained.

As of the 1st quarter of 2003, Kerry led Democratic candidates with $10.2 million raised. Edwards was 2nd with $7.4 million and Gephardt was 3rd with 5.9 million. At $2.9 million, Dean not only trailed Lieberman, he also trailed Lyndon LaRouche.

But Dean soon began his climb. As of the end of June 2003, the period which corresponds to the 1999 press release to which you link, Kerry still led at $16.0 million raised. But while Kerry's fundraising had added less than six million, Dean had brought in over 7, and now stood in third place at $10.2 million raised. Edwards was still in second at $11.9 million.

However, as of the 3rd quarter of 2003, these positions had all changed. Dean surged ahead by $14.8 million that quarter, to $25.3 million for the year-to-date. Dean was now in first place, while Kerry, who raised only $3.9 million, fell to 2nd place with a total of $19.9 million raised. Edwards fell to 3rd and was only narrowly ahead of Gephardt, who was also enjoying a surge. Clark joined the race late in that quarter, managing to pull in $3.5 million in a few weeks.

As 2003 ended, Dean was still surging. He now had a commanding fundraising lead: $41.0 million to Kerry's $25.1 million. Edwards slipped behind Gephardt, %16.2 million to $16.5 million. Clark surged ahead to be almost tied with Lieberman. Furthermore, more than half of Kerry's increase was due to a $2.9 million loan from himself to his campaign.

Things started to turn around again in January 2004. Dean added $6.1 million, reaching $47.1 million total, but Kerry added $7.5 million, reaching $32.6 million. Of course, Kerry managed this by loaning his campaign another $3.5 million of his own money. Clark, however, had the biggest gain, climbing to $22.2 million and pulling into 3rd place.

Then came Iowa and New Hampshire and all the February primaries. Dean had the money and the momentum and all the media hype he could handle, and he imploded. Still, even after withdrawing from the campaign, he had raised more money than Kerry. Kerry finally passed Dean in March 2004.

In the second half of 2003, as the campaign heated up, Dean raised $30.5 million dollars. Kerry raised just 6.0 million, and loaned himself another $2.9 million. Clark came from nothing to raise $13.7 million in less than 3 1/2 months. The other main candidates averaged $5-7 million in this period.

So, contrary to your hypothesis, the man (Dean) who had raised the most money entering primary season lost, as did the man (Clark) with the second biggest momentum going in. Kerry barely kept his campaign afloat. Yet he won the nomination and came within a Qaqaa's throw of winning the presidency.

[Roguish Lawyer]

So, contrary to your hypothesis, the man (Dean) who had raised the most money entering primary season lost, as did the man (Clark) with the second biggest momentum going in. Kerry barely kept his campaign afloat. Yet he won the nomination and came within a Qaqaa's throw of winning the presidency.

I am not saying that money is the only variable, let alone a completely decisive one, but I am saying it is the most important. The numbers you recite are not inconsistent with the hypothesis -- Kerry was in the lead for most of the time, and always was among the leaders.

Money is a precondition to campaigning. It not only funds your campaign operations and media spending, but it draws endorsements and support by establishing your capacity to win.

The link I posted was not selected for a particular time frame, but simply to illustrate that Bush led in primary fund-raising early. He raised so much money and gobbled up so many endorsements early on that he was extremely difficult to beat long before there were any primaries. He was able to use that money to build a grass-roots organization that helped him win.

I would be curious to see a more precise timeline regarding Dean's fundraising, and also the spending by his rivals. My recollection is that he came on very suddenly a month or two before Iowa, and then was attacked by all of the other candidates in the debates and in paid media. I suspect that he was outspent by the others, several of whom had sufficient resources to go after him. I also would be interested to see HOW he spent his money, as you can make bad spending decisions that cost you an election.

[Airbornelawyer]

RL, you do know that the phrase "want to test the correlation?" is like dangling fresh meat in front of a starving (and boringly nerdy) tiger.

1979:

A deteriorating economy, "malaise" in the White House, but a Republican Party still in post-Watergate disarray. Serious Republican candidates included two Illinois congressman, the moderate John Anderson and the conservative Philip Crane; two senators, Minority Leader Sen. Howard Baker and former Vice Presidential candidate Sen. Bob Dole; party favorite George H.W. Bush, former Congressman, DCI, Ambassador to China and RNC chairman; and two former governors, Democrat-turned-Republican John Connally of Texas (the man in the car with JFK in Dallas) and Ronald Reagan of California (the guy with the chimp).

As of June 1979, these candidates had raised the following funds:

1. Crane: $2,490,275
2. Connally: $2,219,113
3. Bush: $1,475,331
4. Reagan $1,421,969
5. Baker: $642,398
6. Dole: $245,040
7. Anderson: $201,744

As of September 1979, Gov. Connally had surged into 1st place, Crane had stagnated, and Reagan and Bush were rising:

1. Connally - $4,205,828
2. Crane - $2,905,544
3. Reagan - $2,692,733
4. Bush - $2,418,337
5. Baker - $1,231,764
6. Dole - $506,503
7. Anderson - $287,448

As of December 1979, with primary season ready to begin, Gov. Connally remained in the lead. Reagan had surged into second place. Crane's campaign began to falter.

1. Connally - $8,968,365
2. Reagan - $7,078,129
3. Bush - $4,395,598
4. Crane - $3,229,461
5. Baker - $2,990,071
6. Dole - $777,202
7. Anderson - $503,330

Connally would raise and spend about $12 million during the campaign, netting one delegate to the 1980 Republican National Convention.

Reagan didn't lead in fundraising until he began winning primaries. He and Bush got past the "voodoo economics" thing to work together for 8 years. Crane went back to the House, serving until this year, when he became one of the only incumbents to lose reelection. Baker and Dole went back to their Senate careers, and on Reagan's coattails each got to be Senate Majority Leader. Anderson ran as a third party candidate.

[Roguish Lawyer]

RL, you do know that the phrase "want to test the correlation?" is like dangling fresh meat in front of a starving (and boringly nerdy) tiger.

LOL -- yep!

The hypothesis is based on my own relatively limited experience in the business and on non-quantitative, non-scientific research I did in school long ago. I look forward to your comprehensive analysis.

And to be clear, I only said "significant correlation," not that it is causative in fact.

:munchin

[Airbornelawyer]

1983:

There was no lack of Democrats willing to challenge Pres. Reagan, but former Vice President Mondale was the leader from the outset. Several senators - John Glenn of Ohio, Alan Cranston of California, Ernest Hollings of South Carolina and Gary Hart of Colorado - jumped in the race, as did former Florida governor Reuben Askew.

As of June 1983, Mondale had received almost as much as the other major candidates combined:

1. Mondale - $5,687,837
2. Glenn - $2,651,779
3. Cranston - $1,934,771
4. Askew - $1,346,154
5. Hart - $850,786
6. Hollings - $744,149

But by the end of the third quarter, this lead had narrowed considerably:

1. Mondale - $6,950,620
2. Glenn - $4,251,885
3. Cranston - $3,485,267
4. Hart - $1,543,953
5. Askew - $1,444,156
6. Hollings - $1,186,760

Mondale only garnered an additional $1.26 million or so, less than Glenn's $1.6 million and Cranston's $1.55 million. Askew's campaign stagnated, and Hart and Hollings recorded small gains.

By the end of the year, again as primary season was on the horizon, Mondale remained in the lead, but new factors were at play:

1. Mondale - $9,745,604
2. Glenn - $6,223,053
3. Cranston - $4,074,246
4. Askew - $2,148,585
5. Hart - $1,827,693
6. Hollings - $1,567,117
7. Jackson - $330,840

Glenn remained a potent challenger, and Jesse Jackson's entry had changed the dynamic, if not the outcome. Cranston began to falter, raising little and spending into the red.

The first few months of 1984 also saw change, but I don't have the data I need to track the trends. I do have data through April 1984, but that period saw the end of Glenn's, Cranston's, Askew's and Hollings' campaigns in early to mid-March.

Mondale had a commanding lead at over $20 million, just behind Reagan's $22 million, but I can't tell how much of that came in after he became the presumptive nominee in March. However, Hart also surged, reaching 2nd place with $11.9 million.

Mondale's experience does appear to fit your hypothesis, but still closer to correlation than causation. Unlike 1999, in 1983 it was not seen as that open a field. Despite the challengers, Mondale was the presumptive heir apparent from the beginning to the end. Only the Hart interlude made the campaign interesting.

[vsvo]

He was able to use that money to build a grass-roots organization that helped him win.


That's what I've always wondered. Has anyone ever quantified the impact of the volunteers on the ground? I guess you need professional staff to organize and manage the volunteers. On election night they almost cancelled my night classes b/c half the damn class was out volunteering at phone banks and canvassing neighborhoods knocking on doors. Where is all this big money going, is it mostly to media buys and the expenses of running a national campaign?

[Airbornelawyer]

1987:

Like former VP Mondale, sitting VP Bush was the presumptive heir apparent, but nevertheless faced challengers, mainly from the right. More later.

On the Democrat side, the field was completely open.

Before things got going in earnest, all the talk was of Gary Hart, the strong second in 1984 (31% of delegates at the 1984 Democratic Convention) and Mario Cuomo, the supposed savior of the party. The perennial tease Cuomo never ran, and Hart dropped out in May over a little Monkey Business. So as of June 1987, in an open field, Gov. Michael Dukakis had a clear but not commanding lead over his nearest rival, Sen. Joe Biden.

1. Dukakis - $4,275,804
2. Biden - $3,258,041
3. Gephardt - $2,261,217
4. Hart - $2,192,377
5. Gore - $1,418,928
6. Babbitt - $1,371,947
7. Simon - $926,898

By September 1987, Dukakis had widened his lead, which by that point could probably be described as commanding:

1. Dukakis - $7,740,622
2. Biden - $3,798,405
3. Gephardt - $3,457,918
4. Gore - $2,701,652
5. Hart - $2,231,395
6. Simon - $2,036,692
7. Babbitt - $1,923,762
8. Jackson - $1,043,864

Biden had lost any momentum he had, and Gephardt and Gore were climbing. Jackson's entry into the race was not nearly as momentous as it had been in the previous election cycle.

As of December 1987:
1. Dukakis - $10,641,519
2. Gephardt - $5,891,973
3. Simon - $4,582,548
4. Gore - $3,853,072
5. Biden - $3,718,569
6. Babbitt - $2,439,249
7. Hart - $2,246,813
8. Jackson - $1,989,977

By the end of the year, little had changed but Dukakis' momentum did slow. Dukakis added about $2.9 million, Gephardt about $2.4 million, and Simon almost $2.6 million. The others, including Hart, who reentered the race in December, were far behind. Biden actually lost money as he refunded some contributions.

By the end of January, with the primaries ready to begin, Dukakis' lead had widened (and he had far more cash on hand than any other candidate). Dukakis had pulled in just over $4 million, while Simon, Hart and Gore each garnered about $2 million. Gephardt remained in 2nd but stagnated. The others fell further behind. Biden was out of the race.

As of January 1988:
1. Dukakis - $14,947,376
2. Gephardt - $6,674,484
3. Simon - $6,655,498
4. Gore - $5,880,169
5. Hart - $4,259,931
6. Jackson - $3,313,236
7. Babbitt - $2,913,629

Still, Gephardt narrowly won in Iowa in February, while Dukakis took New Hampshire. Gephardt then took South Dakota. As February turned to March, Gephardt might have thought he was still in it.

Super Tuesday on March 5 killed him. Nineteen states were in contention, and Gephardt took only Missouri. Super Tuesday also killed the hopes of the only other viable challenger to Dukakis, Al Gore. Gore had banked on a Southern Strategy, but Jesse Jackson upset that. Southern and border states in contention on Super Tuesday were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. Gore managed five - Arkansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, Oklahoma and Tennessee - while Jackson took five - Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and Virginia. Dukakis took Florida, Maryland and Texas.

Gore then switched to a northern strategy, and put everything on the April 19 New York primary. Dukakis won and Gore's campaign withered and died, leaving Jesse Jackson as the only serious challenger to Dukakis.

[Airbornelawyer]

As the FEC reported its year-to-date data for June 1987, Bush enjoyed a more commanding lead over his nearest rivals than Dukakis did over his. This stands to reason given that Bush was the sitting Vice President who had already been on two winning national tickets:

1. Bush - $9,456,271
2. Dole - $3,973,567
3. Kemp - $3,469,568
4. Dupont - $2,333,371
5. Haig - $471,701

Sen. Dole was seen as the main challenger, though those of us in the Kemp campaign thought our guy would prove the better field general. I don't recall people giving Pierre "Pete" DuPont's candidacy much credibility, much less Gen. Haig's.

But by the 3rd quarter 1987, a surprising new development had... developed, in the form of Pat Robertson:

1. Bush - $12,728,370
2. Robertson - $11,737,936
3. Dole - $7,957,928
4. Kemp - $6,294,778
5. Dupont - $3,425,017
6. Haig - $962,289

This trend continued at year's end:

1. Bush - $18,744,604
2. Robertson - $16,108,197
3. Dole - $14,088,184
4. Kemp - $9,990,221
5. Dupont - $5,329,836
6. Haig - $1,647,018

As of January 1988, Bush had actually fallen behind.

1. Robertson - $27,743,979
2. Bush - $25,954,601
3. Dole - $20,822,781
4. Kemp - $13,251,068
5. Dupont - $7,294,302
6. Haig - $1,785,901

However, there was a crucial difference. Robertson had surged ahead in fundraising, but had also spent much of it. As of year's end, Bush had almost $4 million cash on hand while Robertson had about $100,000. Dole had about $2 million on hand. By the end of January, with the primaries and caucuses about to start, Robertson had $5.5 million on hand and Dole $4.2 million, but Bush's war chest was up to $9.3 million.

Like Gephardt, Dole failed to capitalize on early Midwest wins (Iowa and South Dakota), while Robertson's surge soon collapsed. Super Tuesday sealed Dole's fate.

Still, the fundraising edge was not decisive. As of April 1988, with the nomination effectively wrapped up, these were the fundraising numbers:

1. Bush - $31,273,187
2. Robertson - $28,063,146
3. Dole - $25,752,442
4. Kemp - $15,404,156
5. DuPont - $8,047,834
6. Haig - $1,930,888

[Airbornelawyer]

1991 is an oddity. In the wake of victory in Desert Storm, no Dem wanted to challenge Bush. Cuomo, Gore and Gephardt all took a pass.

The FEC reports as of end of June 1991 show two Democratic candidates, Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas ($507k) and former Virginia Governor Doug Wilder ($119k), neither of which stood out as a serious candidate.

By the end of the third quarter, the field had broadened to include two governors, Slick Willie and Governor Moonbeam, and two senators, Tom Harkin and Bob Kerrey:

1. Tsongas - $792,566
2. Harkin - $715,637
3. Kerrey - $223,720
4. Clinton - $201,653
5. Wilder - $200,990
6. Brown - $48,440

Still not exactly a campaign for the history books. By year's end, though, Clinton's star rose as people forgot about his 1984 convention snoozefest.

1. Clinton - $3,293,862
2. Harkin - $2,169,168
3. Kerrey - $1,905,158
4. Tsongas - $1,306,872
5. Brown - $519,208
6. Wilder - $502,245

By the end of January 1992, Clinton had established himself as the man to beat:

1. Clinton - $5,469,163
2. Harkin - $3,558,959
3. Kerrey - $3,255,799
4. Tsongas - $1,882,820
5. Brown - $944,124
6. Wilder - $703,566

Ironically, in February's primaries and caucuses, he was the man to beat, losing Iowa (Harkin), New Hampshire (Tsongas) and South Dakota (Kerrey). Each of these was a favorite son (or at least favorite next-door neighbor) win, though, and gave none of the three momentum going into March. Still, Harkin took two more (Minnesota and Idaho caucuses), Brown took Colorado and Tsongas took Maryland. Clinton took Georgia, a southern state he was expected to win as easily as Harkin took Iowa.

Clinton then won big on Super Tuesday and a series of subsequent primaries. And the rest is history.

Clinton was not the early money leader and did not rise as the frontrunner until relatively late in the process.

[Airbornelawyer]

Money is a precondition to campaigning. It not only funds your campaign operations and media spending, but it draws endorsements and support by establishing your capacity to win.The problem is that as a logical argument this is little more than a tautology. It says nothing about why a particular candidate raises more money; it does not address the dynamic of money drawing endorsements and endorsements drawing money, etc. It does not help us understand the campaigns of people like Connally, Robertson and Dean, or even Clinton.

Instead, other factors seem to be at play in several of these cases. I don't remember Connally's campaign, and I was a Democrat at the time anyway (albeit a rather naive 12-year old one). Both Robertson and Dean suffered from the burn-out that accompanies being a dynamic fringe candidate, able to bring in gobs of money from true believers but unable to break into the mainstream of even one's own party, much less the country as a whole.

Clinton had at least two advantages: the party's heavy hitters were sitting out the 1992 election and the other leading candidates - Tsongas and Harkin - were seen as too liberal for the national electorate (although ironically Tsongas was actually more moderate than Clinton). Clinton also benefited from Kerrey's inability to mount a strong campaign. And of course Clinton had Carville and the rest of his well-organized political machine (few candidates have been as well served by their campaign advisors - maybe Reagan and Casey, Bush and Atwater, Bush II and Rove). And of course, the Perot effect is practically unquantifiable.

[Airbornelawyer]

As for the 1996 election cycle, money alone does not appear dispositive , at least as the campaigns began.

As of the first half of 1995, the leader among announced GOP candidates was Texas Senator Phil Gramm. Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole was second. Leaving aside fringe candidates, the leaders were:

1. Gramm - $16,806,762
2. Dole - $13,574,181
3. Alexander - $7,575,188
4. Wilson - $3,380,711
5. Lugar - $3,030,339
6. Buchanan - $2,252,549
7. Specter - $1,750,917

By September 1995, Dole had moved into a fundraising tie and Forbes had entered the race:

1. Dole - $19,055,302
2. Gramm - $18,920,741
3. Alexander - $8,657,103
4. Wilson - $5,238,335
5. Buchanan - $4,341,809
6. Lugar - $4,240,782
7. Forbes - $4,025,810
8. Specter - $2,769,934

By the end of 1995, Dole had built up his lead, but it was far from commanding:

1. Dole - $24,616,811
2. Gramm - $20,758,058
3. Forbes - $17,973,909
4. Alexander - $11,516,260
5. Buchanan - $7,222,684
6. Lugar - $5,902,822
7. Wilson - $5,807,944
8. Specter - $3,023,971

In terms of the relationship between money and popularity (whether chicken or egg), Forbes' ascent was illusory. Most of his campaign's money came from himself.

As of January 31, 1996, the trend was the same - a Dole lead, but not commanding:

1. Dole - $31,988,345
2. Gramm - $25,715,538
3. Forbes - $25,440,564
4. Alexander - $12,535,861
5. Buchanan - $10,731,288
6. Lugar - $7,367,800
7. Wilson - $6,362,258
8. Specter - $3,203,441

Gramm's and Alexander's candidacies fell apart in the early primaries and caucuses, while Buchanan and Forbes stuck it out. By the end of April 1996, when Dole had already wrapped it up, Forbes had raised almost as much money as Dole:

1. Dole - $41,964,731
2. Forbes - $40,573,957
3. Gramm - $28,716,894
4. Buchanan - $20,017,250
5. Alexander - $16,877,394

Again, however, a huge chunk of this was Forbes' own money.

[Roguish Lawyer]

That's what I've always wondered. Has anyone ever quantified the impact of the volunteers on the ground? I guess you need professional staff to organize and manage the volunteers. On election night they almost cancelled my night classes b/c half the damn class was out volunteering at phone banks and canvassing neighborhoods knocking on doors. Where is all this big money going, is it mostly to media buys and the expenses of running a national campaign?

I don't know if anyone has attempted to quantify this (it would be difficult, I think), but there is no question that you can have a successful campaign without much fundraising if you have enough volunteers. You see this often in local elections (city council, municipal ballot measures, etc.), but not often at the state or national level. When you have tens of millions of people voting, you need an awful lot of volunteers to generate the same results as paid media.

My old firm ran Clint Eastwood's campaign for mayor of Carmel. The city was so small that we didn't need to raise lots of money. The strategy was for him to go door to door and personally ask every voter for support. Now sure, he had other things going for him, but you can win without money in a local race. The larger the electorate, the more you really need money.

[Roguish Lawyer]

So far, everything is supporting the hypothesis. Connally may be an exception, but not really. The winners all were among the fundraising leaders early on. Usually first, always among the top two or three. I see no one having success without fundraising success. Keep in mind, it is not a matter of being first in fundraising per se, but rather raising enough money to support the organization and paid media you need to win. Not much different from one side having five soldiers armed with the best gear and lots of ammo, while the other side has one soldier with inferior gear and little ammo. You need money to fund the campaign.

Raising money does not just happen in politics. You raise money by calling people and asking them for it. Sure, there are other channels, but major donors generally expect to be called personally by the candidate before they write big checks. Asking people for money is not something everyone can do. Even if you can raise money through other channels, you need to have certain qualities in order to get people to write checks. Dean raised money on the Internet from wacko libs, but he did so because of the way he delivered his message. He got plenty of support from Hollywood too, IIRC.

I don't see people writing big checks to get Condi Rice elected. Maybe I'm wrong, but I just don't. She has no natural constituency and she's too cerebral and boring.

[vsvo]

Thanks RL.

Regarding fundraising, Dean's internet model was quickly implemented, although McCain was using the internet in 2000. I gave a nominal amount online to a former boss who ran unsuccessfully for a Senate seat. Although not registered with his party, I was subsequently bombarded daily with updates and messages, all ending with a request for a contribution. But this is for small change and requires minimal overhead so why not do it. It'll never replace the personal touch required to solicit the big money like you said.

[Airbornelawyer]

So far, everything is supporting the hypothesis. Connally may be an exception, but not really. The winners all were among the fundraising leaders early on. Usually first, always among the top two or three. I see no one having success without fundraising success. Keep in mind, it is not a matter of being first in fundraising per se, but rather raising enough money to support the organization and paid media you need to win. Not much different from one side having five soldiers armed with the best gear and lots of ammo, while the other side has one soldier with inferior gear and little ammo. You need money to fund the campaign.

Raising money does not just happen in politics. You raise money by calling people and asking them for it. Sure, there are other channels, but major donors generally expect to be called personally by the candidate before they write big checks. Asking people for money is not something everyone can do. Even if you can raise money through other channels, you need to have certain qualities in order to get people to write checks. Dean raised money on the Internet from wacko libs, but he did so because of the way he delivered his message. He got plenty of support from Hollywood too, IIRC.

I don't see people writing big checks to get Condi Rice elected. Maybe I'm wrong, but I just don't. She has no natural constituency and she's too cerebral and boring.


No it does not support youyr hypothesis in any meaningful sense. You haven't stated what would be a useful theory of money and politics. Of course having a lot of money helps a campaign, and being able to raise a lot of money helps move the campaign forward, but you haven't added anything new. "Money and politics go hand in hand" isn't exactly a controversial proposition.

If you are looking for a model to predict 2008 candidates, which seems to have been the point of bringing it up, though, the evidence is not there.

As I said, I don't know enough about Connally, but I do know about a few of the others.

Pat Robertson - Robertson showed a great ability to raise money, and unlike Dean, in the Iowa caucuses he showed an ability to mobilize his base to show up as well. But he was never more than a fringe candidate to whom the deep pockets and the broad base of supporters would flock.

Dean - Dean did not become a viable candidate because of his fundraising ability. He became a magnet for funds because of the perception that he was the hot candidate. When that perception fizzled in the Iowa meltdown, so did his fundraising. Meanwhile, Kerry, who had been keeping his campaign afloat with his own money, husbanded his resources and campaigned strategically. When he showed himself to be the winner, the floodgates opened.

Gramm - A popular conservative, Gramm also held a perch on the Senate Budget Committee. He was a hell of a fundraiser, as shown by his early lead in 1995. But with his slow Texas drawl he was not a dynamic public speaker and wasn't seen as a good match to Clinton. He also soon found his position as the conservative candidate for the nomination, heir to the Reagan legacy, challenged by Buchanan from the social conservative side, Steve Forbes from the fiscal conservative side, and Lamar! from all sides. Dole, by contrast, faced little serious challenge in the GOP center. Like Bob Graham in this past election, Pete Wilson had a great resume on paper but showed himself to be a terrible campaigner. Lugar had no national profile and little charisma.

Forbes, along with Morry Taylor, showed that while millionaires can sometimes buy themselves Senate seats (see Rockefeller, Corzine, Kohl, Edwards; but see Huffington), the presidency is a harder nut to crack.

Mondale - Mondale enjoyed an early advantage in fundraising simply because as the former Vice President, he was the presumptive candidate. G.H.W. Bush enjoyed the same advantage in 1988 as the incumbent veep. Had Quayle run in 1996, he might have been in the same position, but Quayle's position as any sort of GOP heir apparent had been challenged from Burbank to Capitol Hill when he still was veep. Similarly, Gore had little trouble beating Bill Bradley in the money race in 1999-2000, and would have been the presumptive Democratic frontrunner in 2003 had he run (indeed, a big part of Dean's support came from would-be and erstwhile Gore people, while Kerry cultivated the Clintonistas as much as the Kennedy-types).

Hart - Hart was not among the early serious challenges to Mondale's position as frontrunner. Glenn enjoyed that spotlight.

We are sitting on the edge of 2005, looking ahead to 2007. There is no heir apparent in either party. This election is unlike any other since 1928 in that respect.

But party by party, there are precedents:

The Republican field was open after 1976, as Ford had no intention of running again, and liberal Republican Nelson Rockefeller was not highly regarded among the party faithful. In any event, Rockefeller died on January 26, 1979, so he would not be a factor. The party establishment favored Bush, but he had never won even statewide office and was more known as an insider than a campaigner. Even the rising conservative movement was divided, but Reagan enjoyed a high regard. The money may have flowed to Connally, though, for several reasons: one, as Governor of Texas, he had southern appeal; two, he brought a large, then-swing state; and three, as a former Democrat with a dramatic and sympathetic JFK connection, he was seen as having bipartisan appeal. Among the other eventual candidates, Senators Baker and Dole also brought much to the table: experience, political savvy and, in Baker's case, southern appeal.

In the period before the 1988 election, the Democratic Party was in much the same boat as now. Mondale was out of the picture. No one expected Geraldine Ferraro to seek the nomination. The early talk was of Mario Cuomo and Gary Hart, which I suppose would be analogous to talk of Hillary Clinton and Evan Bayh now (the former being the popular party stalwart who could waltz to the nomination and the latter being the guy who supposedly can bring the party back to the center). But Cuomo stayed out, leaving Dukakis as the go-to guy for liberal money interests. Hart, even before setting sail on the Monkey Business, ran into problems. Just as Gramm faced lots of challenge for the mantle of conservative in 1995, Hart was challenged for the reformist center-left label in 1995 by Joe Biden, Dick Gephardt, Al Gore and Bruce Babbitt. Until Jesse Jackson entered the race, Paul Simon was the only challenge to Dukakis on the party's left. But Jackson's entry had another effect, which was to undermine Gore's southern strategy. Despite the money edge, Dukakis was far from assured of victory until Jackson destroyed Gore's Super Tuesday hopes (to be fair, Gore also suffered from being a terrible public speaker).

On the GOP side, of course, Vice President Bush was challenged, mainly from the right, but he had the advantage of incumbency.

Going into 1992, once again, the Democrats found themselves without a presumptive candidate. There was no way Dukakis would run again. Bentsen was a possibility, but for some reason never garnered interest. Instead, by 1990 Cuomo and Jackson were seen as the frontrunners, but neither chose to run. In fact, as noted previously, in the wake of Desert Storm, no one wanted to run against Bush in 1991. Paul Tsongas was the only serious candidate to enter the race during the national victory celebrations. By the fall, he was joined by a few others, but the Democratic Party moneybags remained closed to all the candidates. It wasn't until the winter that money started flowing and Clinton pulled ahead of the pack. But if you had mentioned Clinton's name in December 1988, you would have been laughed at. Clinton's claim to fame then was his interminable Democratic convention address.

The GOP field was also wide open after Bush's defeat. I can't recall to whom the baton was supposed to have passed in 1992 (not Quayle), but by the 1994 midterms, two names stood out - the new Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and the new Majority Leader Bob Dole. With Newt opting out, Dole became the frontrunner. It was his frontrunner status that caused money to flow his way, not his fundraising ability that made him frontrunner.

I actually agree, BTW, that Condi Rice is not a serious possibility at this point. She is simply not a tested politician. Even George H.W. Bush, most of whose jobs were appointed, had run for Congress. But even that works against your hypothesis. We agree that she is not a viable candidate, regardless of campaign coffers, so we don't expect her to raise money. But we proceed from a premise of her viability rooted not in money, but in political experience.

A better test case is Ruby Guiliani. We can identify a long list of problems he will have as a candidate: he is a polarizing figure in some circles over racial and law and order issues; he is not the most dynamic speaker; he is socially liberal and pro-choice; and he has little to no experience in foreign and defense policy. But he is (a) generally popular among Republicans and so-called "9-11 Democrats" and (b) he is wildly popular on the rubber chicken circuit. Barring a constitutional amendment, I can think of no other potential candidate - not McCain, not Powell - who will have his fundraising advantage by 2007.

Read Hugh Hewitt's piece here (http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/010tctvf.asp) for a perspective on Guiliani's appeal at the grass roots. It is similar to the early advantage George W. Bush built in the run-up to the 2000 campaign.

[Roguish Lawyer]

I think you are missing the point. The theory is simple: you cannot be a successful candidate if you lack the capacity to raise lots of money early. I know from experience that this is true. Your data confirm that fundraising is a necessary, but not sufficient, element of a successful campaign.

Talking about candidates who lost despite strong fundraising does not refute the point. Show me someone who won without raising money. I doubt you can find a single instance, and that would probably be a remarkable exception to a strong general rule.

[Roguish Lawyer]

A better test case is Ruby Guiliani. We can identify a long list of problems he will have as a candidate: he is a polarizing figure in some circles over racial and law and order issues; he is not the most dynamic speaker; he is socially liberal and pro-choice; and he has little to no experience in foreign and defense policy. But he is (a) generally popular among Republicans and so-called "9-11 Democrats" and (b) he is wildly popular on the rubber chicken circuit. Barring a constitutional amendment, I can think of no other potential candidate - not McCain, not Powell - who will have his fundraising advantage by 2007.


Giuliani already has demonstrated the capacity to raise money.

http://archive.salon.com/politics2000/feature/2000/01/19/giuliani/

I do not agree that fundraising flows naturally from general popularity or stances on issues or whatever. Those things certainly help, but at the end of the day the candidate has to raise the money.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Fight! Fight!

[Doc]

LMAO!

If you want a good laugh imagine it's the guy on RL's avatar talking.

Classic!

[Polar Bear]

Re: US Senator George Voinovich. Just curious, being that I live in Ohio. Why do you like Sen Voinovich?

I am not saying he was a bad Gov. of Ohio, but his economic policies and ability to keep high paying jobs in Ohio leaves a lot to be desired. How this would translate into a national race I am not sure, but it would not be good.

Don't care for him in the least. He is a cocky little dude and I live in Kentucky.

[Airbornelawyer]

I think you are missing the point. The theory is simple: you cannot be a successful candidate if you lack the capacity to raise lots of money early. I know from experience that this is true. Your data confirm that fundraising is a necessary, but not sufficient, element of a successful campaign.

Talking about candidates who lost despite strong fundraising does not refute the point. Show me someone who won without raising money. I doubt you can find a single instance, and that would probably be a remarkable exception to a strong general rule.
You appear to be missing the point. You have advanced a hypothesis/theory that to the extent it is accurate is merely self-evident. All you do is state the obvious. Candidates with more money generally do better than candidates with less? Knock me over with a feather!

Your theory does not explain why this is so beyond the obvious. More importantly, you have not advanced a theory that can account for candidates who have demonstrated the ability to raise and spend a great deal of money, yet go nowhere. Even more fatally, you have not advanced a theory that can explain whether certain candidates are successful because they raised more money, or whether certain candidates were able to raise more money because they were perceived as successful.

If the former, the large number of candidates who were proven money-raisers but failed candidates creates a problem in drawing any viable inferences. If the former, then the money-raising is only relevant as a side effect of whatever factors were perceived as making the candidate successful (and consequently bankable).

Thus your latter challenge is irrelevant. Why do we care that Kerry received bith more money and more primary support than Kucinich? Or Pat Robertson more than Al Haig? Or George W. Bush more than Alan Keyes?

What is more useful is trying to figure out what separates Reagan from Connally, Bush from Robertson or Dole, Clinton from Tsongas, Dole from Gramm, Kerry from Dean. Money alone cannot be the deciding factor, as the data shows that at various points the ultimate winner had the same or less money as the runner-up.

Going forward, the question isn't whether McCain or Guiliani is a more viable candidate than, say, Tom Ridge or George Allen. Both of the former are highly regarded national figures with strong name recognition and proven attractiveness to voters and check-writers alike. Both of the latter are capable and well-regarded politicians, but have poor national name recognition (or in the case of Ridge, are known for something very narrow like color-coded threat warnings). Political junkies know Ridge from Allen from Owens from Frist from Pataki from Romney, but most apolitical figures don't. They do know McCain and Powell and Schwarzenegger and Guiliani, though.

The question is who among the McCain/Guiliani/Powell-type field is a viable candidate. Another question is whether someone will come up from the second tier like Clinton did in 1991 and make a name for himself or herself. In that case, an Allen or a Rice make actually make a splash.

[Airbornelawyer]

I don't see people writing big checks to get Condi Rice elected. Maybe I'm wrong, but I just don't. She has no natural constituency and she's too cerebral and boring.
I actually agree, BTW, that Condi Rice is not a serious possibility at this point. She is simply not a tested politician. Even George H.W. Bush, most of whose jobs were appointed, had run for Congress. But even that works against your hypothesis. We agree that she is not a viable candidate, regardless of campaign coffers, so we don't expect her to raise money. But we proceed from a premise of her viability rooted not in money, but in political experience. Having made a case against Dr. Rice, I will now endeavor to make a case for her.

We tend to dismiss her because (a) "She has no natural constituency" and is "not a tested politician," (b) seems more an intellectual thinker rather than a charismatic leader, and (c) as a black woman already has some hurdles to overcome. Thus we don't think she can raise the money and build the networks needed to win the nomination, much less the general.

1. She would not be the first black woman to run for a major party presidential nomination. She wouldn't even be the second. Those honors belong to Shirley Chisholm and Carol Mosley Braun. Neither of her predecessors were really seen as serious candidates. But for Sharpton, Mosley Braun would have been dismissed as the Democrat's "black candidate"; instead she was just dismissed as a nobody. Dr. Rice would not be running as representative of any sort of ethnic constituency, partly because the GOP is not nearly so defined by such constituencies as the Dems, and partly because her reputation and experience have nothing to do with race or race politics.

2. Her biggest piece of extended public exposure was testimony before the 9-11 Commission, a milieu which did not lend itself to more than the "cerebral and boring." I have seen snippets of her in more informal settings and she is more relaxed and charismatic. Certainly no less charismatic than a number of major party candidates over the years, including some that won (Nixon, G.H.W. Bush) and some that lost but might easily have won (Gore, Kerry). And, as seen by some of the comments here and on similar forums, she does have a certain level of grass roots support. Enough to build a network of thousands of $250-$500 contributors like then-Gov. Bush did early on in his run to the White House?

3. A lack of elected political experience is not necessarily determinative or fatal. And, assuming Senate confirmation, she will be moving into a more public high-profile job, which may affect the perception of her amon voters.

One thing that does jump out from the data provided is how many elected officials - proven vote-getters at state level and in many cases accomplished fundraisers - went nowhere as national candidates. Note for example Connally, Crane, Anderson, Baker, Dole (1979), Askew, Hollings, Cranston, Babbitt, Simon, Kemp, DuPont, Kerrey, Wilder, Brown, Lugar, Specter, Wilson, Braun, Graham and Lieberman.

Conversely, quite a few recent elections have seen candidates running on little or no prior electioneering experience who nevertheless played major roles. These include Jesse Jackson, Pat Robertson, Pat Buchanan, Steve Forbes and Ross Perot. Even George H.W. Bush might be added to that list, since his candidacy in the 1980 primaries was based on his resume of appointed jobs rather than his brief Congressional experience. Of course, a few others - e.g., Al Haig, Gary Bauer, Alan Keyes, Wes Clark and Al Sharpton - have had little impact.

But more interesting than the failures of Forbes and Buchanan is this fact: over the years quite a few persons with little or no prior elected experience have won a major party nomination, and in a few cases they actually won the presidency. These include: Zachary Taylor, won the 1848 election - general officer
Winfield Scott, lost the 1852 election - general officer
John C. Frémont, lost the 1856 election - was the appointed governor of California and served briefly as a Senator (1850-51)
George B. McClellan, lost the 1864 election - general officer
Ulysses S. Grant, won the 1872 election - general officer
Horace Greeley, lost the 1876 election - newspaperman
Winfield Scott Hancock, lost the 1880 election - general officer
Alton B. Parker, lost the 1904 election - state court judge
William Howard Taft, won the 1908 election - Secretary of War, former appointed governor of the Philippines
John W. Davis – lost the 1924 election - he did serve one term in Congress (1911-13), but otherwise had no electoral experience.
Herbert Hoover, won the 1928 election - Secretary of Commerce, headed relief efforts in Belgium after WW1
Wendell Willkie - lost the 1940 election - businessman
Dwight Eisenhower, won the 1952 election - general officerAdd William Jennings Bryan, too. Bryan served two terms in Congress but made his political name outside of elective office. The Buffalo Bills of presidential elections, Bryan was the Democratic nominee in 1896, 1900 and 1908, losing each time.

As I have previously noted, the closest precedent to the 2008 election is the 1928 election, the last election where the field was completely open going in for both major parties. The victor in 1928 was a cerebral cabinet secretary with no prior elected experience. Can history repeat itself?* If, like Coolidge in 1927-8, Bush in 2007-8 made his preference known and threw his support behind someone like Dr. Rice, that would certainly go a long way toward making her a viable candidate and a money magnet.


*probably not, but hey!

[Roguish Lawyer]

You say I am stating the obvious, but that is from the vantage point of a social scientist looking back into history for insights that will predict the future. I am looking at it as a campaign manager evaluating the viability of a potential candidate (which is how this came up, BTW).

The most important question about a potential candidate is whether he can raise money. Your data prove it. There certainly are other important issues, but that's number one on my list.

[Roguish Lawyer]

With regard to Rice, no, I don't base my prediction of financial incapacity solely on lack of political experience. I base it on a simple practical question: who is going to write a big check to get her elected? I don't see a satisfactory answer.

No space to write a long answer on Bberry, but it's easy with those who raised money in the past. See next post.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Big difference between the Doles and Gramms and other guys you name who wad been elected to something somewhere. Dole and Gramm are masters of special interest politics. Lugar, for example, is on the foreign relations committee.

Robertson -- christians.

Bush -- country club republicans.

I don't think Powell can raise money either.

[vsvo]

Post mortem on '04 and where the money went. Check out McAuliffe's quote at the end, talk about sour grapes.

********************

On Nov. 2, GOP Got More Bang For Its Billion, Analysis Shows

By Thomas B. Edsall and James V. Grimaldi
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, December 30, 2004; Page A01

In the most expensive presidential contest in the nation's history, John F. Kerry and his Democratic supporters nearly matched President Bush and the Republicans, who outspent them by just $60 million, $1.14 billion to $1.08 billion.

But despite their fundraising success, Democrats simply did not spend their money as effectively as Bush. That is the conclusion of an extensive examination of campaign fundraising and spending data provided by the Federal Election Commission, the Internal Revenue Service and interviews with officials of the two campaigns and the independent groups allied with them.

In a $2.2 billion election, two relatively small expenditures by Bush and his allies stand out for their impact: the $546,000 ad buy by Swift Boat Veterans for Truth and the Bush campaign's $3.25 million contract with the firm TargetPoint Consulting. The first portrayed Kerry in unrelentingly negative terms, permanently damaging him, while the second produced dramatic innovations in direct mail and voter technology, enabling Bush to identify and target potential voters with pinpoint precision.

Those tactical successes were part of the overall advantage the Bush campaign maintained over Kerry in terms of planning, decision making and strategy. The Kerry campaign, in addition to being outspent at key times, was outorganized and outthought, as Democratic professionals grudgingly admit.

"They were smart. They came into our neighborhoods. They came into Democratic areas with very specific targeted messages to take Democratic voters away from us," Democratic National Committee Chairman Terence R. McAuliffe said. "They were much more sophisticated in their message delivery."

The ultimate test of the two campaigns is in the success of their efforts to increase turnout from 2000. Kerry and his allies increased the Democrat's vote by about 6.8 million votes; Bush increased his by nearly 10.5 million. In the key battleground of Ohio, Bush countered Kerry's gains in the metropolitan precincts by boosting his margin in exurban and rural counties from 57 to 60 percent, eking out a 118,457-vote victory.

A supposed strategic advantage for the Democrats -- massive support from well-endowed independent groups -- turned out to have an inherent flaw: The groups' legally required independence left them with a message out of harmony with the Kerry campaign.

A large part of Bush's advantage derived from being an incumbent who did not face a challenger from his party. He also benefited from the experience and continuity of a campaign hierarchy, based on a corporate model, that had essentially stayed intact since Bush's 1998 reelection race for Texas governor.
Take Office, Plan Campaign

When Bush moved into the Oval Office in 2001, planning for his presidential reelection campaign began almost immediately. Under the direction of Karl Rove, Bush's top White House adviser who served as a kind of chairman of the board, White House political director Kenneth B. Mehlman, the chief executive officer, pollster Matthew Dowd, chief operating officer, and Mark McKinnon, the principal media consultant, the Bush political team developed a strategy for 2004, began investing in innovative techniques to target voters and prepared an early and cost-effective advertising plan. During this period, the Republican National Committee, where much of the planning was based, outspent its Democratic counterpart by $122 million.

In 2001, Dowd said that "we made some of the basic strategic assumptions about what we thought the election would look like."

One fundamental calculation was that 93 percent of the voting-age public was already committed or predisposed toward the Democratic or Republican candidate, leaving 7 percent undecided.

Another calculation was that throughout the Bush presidency, "most voters looked at Bush in very black-and-white terms. They either loved and respected him, or they didn't like him," Dowd said. Those voters were unlikely to change their views before Election Day 2004.

That prompted Republicans to jettison their practice of investing 75 to 90 percent of campaign money on undecided voters. Instead, half the money went into motivating and mobilizing people already inclined to vote for Bush, but who were either unregistered or who often failed to vote -- "soft" Republicans.

"We systematically allocated all the main resources of the campaign to the twin goals of motivation and persuasion. The media, the voter targeting, the mail -- all were based off that strategic decision," Dowd said.

Republican officials said they put $50 million into "ground war" drives to register and turn out millions of new voters in 2001 and 2002, and an additional $125 million after that.

Meanwhile, Kerry, faced with a difficult primary campaign and infighting and turnover among his consultants, did not begin seriously to address the general election until after his Super Tuesday primary election victory in March, eight months before the November vote. By that time, the campaign was hamstrung by legal restrictions on any cooperation between the campaign and the independent 527 organizations running ads and mobilizing voters on Kerry's behalf.
527s' Ineffective Messages

[vsvo]

The 527 groups, named after a section of the tax code and allowed by law to accept unlimited contributions, provided invaluable help in registering and turning out voters. America Coming Together put about $135 million into what became the largest get-out-the-vote program in the nation's history. But the 527s, fueled with money from billionaires such as George Soros, proved ineffective in helping Kerry deliver a consistent and timely message in his advertising.

Of all the money spent on television advertising for the Democratic nominee, Kerry's campaign controlled 62 percent, according to spending totals analyzed by The Washington Post. The rest was spent on ads whose content or placement could not be coordinated with the campaign. The Bush campaign controlled 83 percent of the money spent on its behalf, giving it far more control over when and how it advertised.

At two junctures, when Kerry was either out of funds or under pressure to conserve resources for the close of the campaign, the absence of an overall strategy had damaging consequences: in March 2004, just when the Bush campaign began its first anti-Kerry offensive; and in August 2004, when the Swift Boat Veterans commercials raised questions about Kerry's service in the Vietnam War.

The Democratic media 527s "didn't do what we wanted done," Kerry media adviser Tad Devine said. "We would have run ads about Kerry, we would have had answers to the attacks in kind, saying they were false, disproved by newspapers."

Harold Ickes, who ran the Media Fund, a 527 organization that raised about $59 million in support of Kerry, said the federal election law prohibiting communication with the Kerry campaign created insurmountable obstacles in crafting effective, accurate responses to anti-Kerry ads. Ickes said he regretted not responding to the Swift Boat Veterans' attacks, but at the time he thought they seemed "a matter so personal to Senator Kerry, so much within his knowledge. Who knew what the facts were?"
Early Research Is Like Yeast

The 2002 elections, along with the Kentucky and Mississippi gubernatorial contests the following year, became testing grounds for the Republican effort to mobilize supporters. Designed to get base voters to the polls, it became known as the "72 Hour Project," whose cost Republican officials refused to disclose but is estimated by sources to have been in the $200 million range.

Under Dowd's direction, the RNC began investing in extensive voter research. One of the most striking findings, according to Republican consultants, was the ineffectiveness of traditional phone banks and direct mail that targeted voters in overwhelmingly Republican precincts. The problem: Only 15 percent of all GOP voters lived in precincts that voted Republican by 65 percent or more. Worse, an even smaller percentage of "soft" Republicans, the 2004 target constituency, lived in such precincts.

The RNC decided to cast a wider net for voters. But to work, Dowd's motivation and mobilization strategy needed expensive, high-tech micro targeting to cherry-pick prospective Republicans who lived in majority Democratic neighborhoods.

Republican firms, including TargetPoint Consultants and National Media Inc., delved into commercial databases that pinpointed consumer buying patterns and television-watching habits to unearth such information as Coors beer and bourbon drinkers skewing Republican, brandy and cognac drinkers tilting Democratic; college football TV viewers were more Republican than those who watch professional football; viewers of Fox News were overwhelmingly committed to vote for Bush; homes with telephone caller ID tended to be Republican; people interested in gambling, fashion and theater tended to be Democratic.

Surveys of people on these consumer data lists were then used to determine "anger points" (late-term abortion, trial lawyer fees, estate taxes) that coincided with the Bush agenda for as many as 32 categories of voters, each identifiable by income, magazine subscriptions, favorite television shows and other "flags." Merging this data, in turn, enabled those running direct mail, precinct walking and phone bank programs to target each voter with a tailored message.

"You used to get a tape-recorded voice of Ronald Reagan telling you how important it was to vote. That was our get-out-the-vote effort," said Alex Gage, of TargetPoint. Now, he said, calls can be targeted to specific constituencies so that, for example, a "right to life voter" could get a call warning that "if you don't come out and vote, the number of abortions next year is going to go up. "

Dowd estimated that, in part through the work of TargetPoint and other research, the Bush campaign and the RNC were able to "quadruple the number" of Republican voters who could be targeted through direct mail, phone banks and knocking on doors.


Democrats had access to similar data files. But the Bush campaign and the RNC were able to make far better use of the data because they had the time and money to conduct repeated field tests in the 2002 and 2003 elections, to finance advanced research on meshing databases with polling information, and to clean up and revise databases that almost invariably contained errors and omissions.

"Very few people understand how much work it takes to get this technology to actually produce political results. We are one election cycle behind them in this area," said a Democrat who helped coordinate voter contact in the 2004 campaign.

The Bush campaign's early fundraising success made much of this possible. By March 2004, Bush had $110 million in the bank and virtually no debt. During this period, Kerry was forced to spend all his time and money in the Democratic primaries, a fight that cost him $36 million and that left him $5 million in debt.

"Nobody was giving a thought at all to the general election," said Kerry pollster Mark S. Mellman. Until that March, "it was: How do we survive this week?"
Bush Ads Undermine Kerry

Two days after Super Tuesday, the Bush campaign, anticipating Kerry would have no money to respond, began a $40 million, six-week televised assault designed to crush the Democratic nominee before he could get off the ground. "We had a financial advantage over them for four to six weeks. That's why we did what we did," Dowd said.

With a $177 million ad budget, the Bush campaign and its allies ran more than 101,000 anti-Kerry "attack" or negative ads, more than the combined total of "positive" and "contrast" ads, according to the University of Wisconsin Advertising Project, based on data from Nielsen Monitor-Plus ratings of media buying effectiveness.

Less than 5 percent of Kerry's ads were "attack" or negative, according to the Wisconsin advertising project, and the remaining 95 percent were positive or contrast ads.

During March and April, before the candidate had replenished his war chest to finance TV ads, Kerry strategists were convinced that Kerry needed a barrage of positive biographical ads describing him in a sympathetic light to counter the negative picture drawn by the Bush ads. But when the Democratic 527s began their ad campaign, they aired negative ads reflecting their intensely anti-Bush donor base.

[vsvo]

By the time Kerry had raised enough money to begin his positive ad campaign two months later, the Bush "attack" ads had helped convert the ratio of Kerry's positive to negative ratings in battleground states. Kerry's positive ratings fell from 40 percent to 35 percent, and his negative ratings rose from 24 percent to 36 percent at the start of May, according to the National Annenberg Election Surveys.

The negative Bush barrage was followed in August by the Swift Boat Veterans ads, the first one airing on just four cable channels at a cost of $546,000. The Swift Boat Veterans eventually would raise and spend $28 million, but the first ad was exceptionally cost-effective: most voters learned about it through free coverage in mainstream media and talk radio.

An additional Republican television commercial that significantly affected the race, according to surveys, was a positive spot financed by a second GOP 527 group, Progress for America. It invested $17 million in "Ashley's Story," which featured Ashley Faulkner, 11, whose mother had been killed in the attack on the World Trade Center, describing her meeting with Bush.
GOP Dollar Power

Overall, Kerry, the DNC and the Democratic 527s spent $344 million on ads, while Bush and the GOP counterparts spent about $289 million, much of which was disbursed in the final three months. Arguably, Republicans got more bang for their bucks.

The Bush campaign's early strategy decisions shaped GOP spending. Under the guidance of Rove, Dowd and Mehlman, the Bush campaign had financed early research into ways to communicate to center-right voters through nontraditional media.

The Bush campaign concluded that many of their voters did not trust the networks and the establishment press, and therefore did not trust messages transmitted through them.

Mehlman said that talk radio and cable television "are more credible" to potential Bush voters. Ultimately the Bush campaign invested an unprecedented $20 million in narrowly targeted advertising on cable and in radio, with a heavy emphasis on religious, talk and country and western stations, and such specialty outlets as golf and health club channels.

"They did a lot of stuff really well. They were ahead of us," said one of the Democrats' get-out-the-vote managers who did not want to be identified. "They had a strategy set by the beginning that they were going to live and die by. And we didn't."

In an election with a 2.6 percent margin of victory, the Bush campaign was run to ensure that every dollar went to fulfill core strategies, that resources were allocated to capitalize on Bush's strengths and on Kerry's vulnerabilities, and that the money necessary to finance research, technological advance, television and the ground war was available when needed.

At the July Democratic National Convention in Boston, McAuliffe commented on the disciplined Republican team: "We are up against the dirtiest, meanest, toughest group of people we have ever faced. They have money, they have power, and they ain't going to give it up easily."

Researcher Alice Crites, database editor Sarah Cohen and research database editor Derek Willis contributed to this report.

[Airbornelawyer]

You say I am stating the obvious, but that is from the vantage point of a social scientist looking back into history for insights that will predict the future. I am looking at it as a campaign manager evaluating the viability of a potential candidate (which is how this came up, BTW).

The most important question about a potential candidate is whether he can raise money. Your data prove it. There certainly are other important issues, but that's number one on my list.
You are conflating cause and effect, understandable given the dynamic nature of the process. It's like saying the most important question about a sports team is whether it can score more points than its opponents. You have to look at what the team can do that leads to the points, not the points themselves.
With regard to Rice, no, I don't base my prediction of financial incapacity solely on lack of political experience. I base it on a simple practical question: who is going to write a big check to get her elected? I don't see a satisfactory answer.It isn't the big check. It's lots of little checks.

Steve Forbes wrote himself big checks, to the tune of almost $80 million. But he received only $3.2 million in individual contributions from 5,501 donors. In that election cycle, George W. Bush had 110,169 individual donors. Al Gore had 52,433 and Bill Bradley had 40,448. John McCain had 33,427. Even assuming a large number of Bush's and Gore's contributions came after they had sewn up the nominations, the breadth of Bush's base of support seems more striking than the depth (his average contribution was not dissimilar to that of McCain and Gore, and much less than that of Bradley).

That's why I said the key for Rice (and any other potential candidate) is "a network of thousands of $250-$500 contributors like then-Gov. Bush did early on in his run to the White House."

[Roguish Lawyer]

Very interesting article. Thanks. I used to do a lot of targeting work, but never had the resources to do what they did here. Information is power, but it is expensive too.

[Roguish Lawyer]

You are conflating cause and effect, understandable given the dynamic nature of the process. It's like saying the most important question about a sports team is whether it can score more points than its opponents. You have to look at what the team can do that leads to the points, not the points themselves.

I think we are just talking about different things. I agree that you have to be able to score points (i.e., raise money) to get elected. The first question to ask the candidate is how he is going to raise the money required to fund a campaign budget. Sorry you think this is so obvious, but you would be amazed by the number of candidates who don't understand how important fundraising is.


It isn't the big check. It's lots of little checks.

Steve Forbes wrote himself big checks, to the tune of almost $80 million. But he received only $3.2 million in individual contributions from 5,501 donors. In that election cycle, George W. Bush had 110,169 individual donors. Al Gore had 52,433 and Bill Bradley had 40,448. John McCain had 33,427. Even assuming a large number of Bush's and Gore's contributions came after they had sewn up the nominations, the breadth of Bush's base of support seems more striking than the depth (his average contribution was not dissimilar to that of McCain and Gore, and much less than that of Bradley).

That's why I said the key for Rice (and any other potential candidate) is "a network of thousands of $250-$500 contributors like then-Gov. Bush did early on in his run to the White House."

I don't care where the money comes from as long as it is raised (and raised legally).

$250 is a big check for a "small contributor." That is the kind of check that you generally can get from a relatively successful lawyer or doctor. The question is the same: who will write those checks? If your strategy is to raise money in smaller chunks, you need more chunks to make your budget. So you need more people willing to write the checks.

I don't see many people writing a check of any amount for Rice. Powell either.

In fact, Powell is a good illustration of my point. Lots of people talk about how they would vote for him and think he is such a great candidate. But I believe they say that only because they don't like anyone else and don't know enough about him to understand who they are voting for. They like him because he is perceived to be moderate, but moderate candidates rarely generate the passion needed to raise money. People write checks to save babies, save the poor harp seals, fight taxation, deport the immigrants taking their jobs, or whatever they are passionate about. They don't write checks for people like Colin Powell based on issues.

Now moderates can raise money, but they have to do it a different way. They have to have connections like Dole or Gramm or Bush Sr., or they have to have charisma and guile like Clinton (yes, I think he is a moderate in today's world -- that's no endorsement). Who is going to step up and help Powell get elected? I see no one, really. And for Rice, it is an even tougher row to hoe.

Part of this, I think, is their focus on foreign policy. I think it is a real political disadvantage. In fact, I'm not sure we will ever see another general officer elected President unless the country's security is truly threatened. I just don't think the military-industrial complex has the ability to make it happen. But that's just me.

[Airbornelawyer]

Now moderates can raise money, but they have to do it a different way. They have to have connections like Dole or Gramm or Bush Sr., or they have to have charisma and guile like Clinton (yes, I think he is a moderate in today's world -- that's no endorsement). Who is going to step up and help Powell get elected? I see no one, really. And for Rice, it is an even tougher row to hoe.Gramm was not a moderate. His lifetime ACU rating is 95.

Dole in the 1996 campaign and G.H.W. Bush in the 1980 campaign raised money not as moderates vs. conservatives, but as representatives of the GOP establishment. Bush in 1988 was the incumbent vice president. Besides his own political skills, Clinton's advantage was the DLC; there is no real GOP equivalent to this to serve as a base of support for moderate Republicans.

Powell will not have the appeal to movement conservatives to follow the path taken by Reagan and George W. Bush. Nor does he have the connections to the GOP establishment that Nixon (a former Vice President), G.H.W. Bush (RNC Chairman) and Dole (Senate Majority Leader) had. In fact, Powell is rather unpopular among both movement conservatives and the GOP establishment for what they see as betrayals of both Bushes in protectingf his own image with the Bob Woodwards of the world. And there is no GOP analog to the DLC to advance moderate Republicans. Purely from an organizational/fund-raising standpoint, then, I think Powell is actually in a tougher position than Rice.

For Rice, assuming she even has 2008 ambitions, everything depends on two factors: (1) how she performs as SecState, as the public face of American diplomacy, and whether she gains the stature of a statesman (stateswoman?); and (2) whether President Bush and Vice President Cheney lend her their support. If Bush pushes her the way Coolidge pushed Hoover, then her chances improve considerably and the checkbooks start opening up.
Part of this, I think, is their focus on foreign policy. I think it is a real political disadvantage. In fact, I'm not sure we will ever see another general officer elected President unless the country's security is truly threatened. I just don't think the military-industrial complex has the ability to make it happen. But that's just me.Do you think the "military-industrial complex" elected Jackson, Taylor, Grant or Eisenhower? Or put Scott, Frémont, McClellan and Hancock on the ballot?

The President of the United States is both head of state and head of government. As such, we tend to get presidents who can both master the political game and appear above the pettiness of partisan politics. General officers have this latter appeal, and many are far more cutthroat politicians (at least for the office politics of the armed forces) than most people imagine. Colin Powell is a consummate political animal, as was Eisenhower.

[Airbornelawyer]

I don't care where the money comes from as long as it is raised (and raised legally).
You should if you are looking for predictive value. The candidates that raise a lot of money tend to fall into four categories:

1. Self-financed candidates: This mostly happens at Senate level or below, but Forbes' candidacy was the most prominent presidential nomination version.

2. Niche candidates: They draw from a specific base of strong support, but lack broad appeal. Many also-ran candidates fall into this category (e.g., Gary Bauer, Dennis Kucinich and Al Sharpton), but since niches are niches, there are few major candidates in this category. Pat Robertson (evangelical Christians) and Jesse Jackson (Blacks) are two who raised enough money and drew enough attention to become players, but who failed to transcend their niches.

3. Establishment candidates. They tend to draw early support from people whose giving is more motivated by party than by the candidate's qualities themselves. They also have access to the party's in-place machinery. This often gives them an advantage that, in many cases (Adlai Stevenson '56, Hubert Humphrey '68, Mondale '84, Bush '88, Dole '96, Gore '00), carries them through to the nomination. But some failed, most notably Bush in 1980 (though Humphrey would likely have lost to RFK had the latter not been assassinated).

Truman was a special case: as the incumbent president he should have been a shoe-in, but the Democratic establishment did not rally behind him and Eugene McCarthy's insurgency forced Truman to bow out. But McCarthy ended up losing to an establishment man, Stevenson.

4. Popular candidates. I can't think of a better descriptive term - "populist" isn't right - but these are the guys to whom the money comes because they look and act like winners, i.e., the money is the effect. They are great on the rubber-chicken circuit and in the face-to-face encounters. They usually have a strong and focussed message that they hammer away on, and are quite practiced at its delivery. They have a strong stump speech that doesn't sound canned.

In Reagan's case, he had years to hone these skills, before and after the 1964 convention. George W. Bush also mastered this approach. Clinton's focus on the message was legendary.

Candidates from 3 & 4 tend to win the nomination, even when they lose the money race (or barely prevail).

[Roguish Lawyer]

Gramm was not a moderate. His lifetime ACU rating is 95.

Agreed. I referenced him because he is hooked in tight with special interests such as financial institutions.


Do you think the "military-industrial complex" elected Jackson, Taylor, Grant or Eisenhower? Or put Scott, Frémont, McClellan and Hancock on the ballot?

The President of the United States is both head of state and head of government. As such, we tend to get presidents who can both master the political game and appear above the pettiness of partisan politics. General officers have this latter appeal, and many are far more cutthroat politicians (at least for the office politics of the armed forces) than most people imagine. Colin Powell is a consummate political animal, as was Eisenhower.

I have no idea. But I'm not so sure that going that far back in history is terribly useful given the technological, regulatory and other changes that have taken place in Presidential politics. I could be wrong on that point, though.

I'm not saying that it would be bad to have a President with a military background, only that I doubt that a military background adequately prepares someone to get elected.

Again, getting elected and governing are two different things.

[Roguish Lawyer]

You should if you are looking for predictive value.

I'm not. You are. And that's why we're talking about totally different things.

[Roguish Lawyer]

The candidates that raise a lot of money tend to fall into four categories:

1. Self-financed candidates: This mostly happens at Senate level or below, but Forbes' candidacy was the most prominent presidential nomination version.

2. Niche candidates: They draw from a specific base of strong support, but lack broad appeal. Many also-ran candidates fall into this category (e.g., Gary Bauer, Dennis Kucinich and Al Sharpton), but since niches are niches, there are few major candidates in this category. Pat Robertson (evangelical Christians) and Jesse Jackson (Blacks) are two who raised enough money and drew enough attention to become players, but who failed to transcend their niches.

3. Establishment candidates. They tend to draw early support from people whose giving is more motivated by party than by the candidate's qualities themselves. They also have access to the party's in-place machinery. This often gives them an advantage that, in many cases (Adlai Stevenson '56, Hubert Humphrey '68, Mondale '84, Bush '88, Dole '96, Gore '00), carries them through to the nomination. But some failed, most notably Bush in 1980 (though Humphrey would likely have lost to RFK had the latter not been assassinated).

Truman was a special case: as the incumbent president he should have been a shoe-in, but the Democratic establishment did not rally behind him and Eugene McCarthy's insurgency forced Truman to bow out. But McCarthy ended up losing to an establishment man, Stevenson.

4. Popular candidates. I can't think of a better descriptive term - "populist" isn't right - but these are the guys to whom the money comes because they look and act like winners, i.e., the money is the effect. They are great on the rubber-chicken circuit and in the face-to-face encounters. They usually have a strong and focussed message that they hammer away on, and are quite practiced at its delivery. They have a strong stump speech that doesn't sound canned.

In Reagan's case, he had years to hone these skills, before and after the 1964 convention. George W. Bush also mastered this approach. Clinton's focus on the message was legendary.

Candidates from 3 & 4 tend to win the nomination, even when they lose the money race (or barely prevail).

Interesting observations.

[Airbornelawyer]

I'm not. You are. And that's why we're talking about totally different things.Yes, I'm talking about something and you're talking about nothing. :D An avatar from Seinfeld is fitting.

Reduced to its essence, your observation is "bank on the candidate that is bankable." That is a tautology.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Yes, I'm talking about something and you're talking about nothing. :D An avatar from Seinfeld is fitting.

LOL -- good one!


Reduced to its essence, your observation is "bank on the candidate that is bankable." That is a tautology.

I don't agree. I believe that fundraising ability is one of many qualities to be judged in a candidate. I very strongly disagree with your suggestion that it flows naturally from the existence of other positive qualities. To be sure, there is some of that, but I read you to be discounting the existence of "ability to raise money" as an independent skill set. I believe very strongly that it is, and you can see that most clearly in less prominent races. It remains a factor at the Presidential level.

Now, if you want to try to figure out what qualities help someone raise money, I guess that is a worthwhile, albeit largely academic, exercise. The start you made a few posts above was interesting, but far from comprehensive.

Have we exhausted this now? You can have the last word if you want, unless you really push my buttons. LOL

[brownapple]

At the July Democratic National Convention in Boston, McAuliffe commented on the disciplined Republican team: "We are up against the dirtiest, meanest, toughest group of people we have ever faced. They have money, they have power, and they ain't going to give it up easily."


As poor a candidate as the Democratic Party nominated, it should have been a blow-out. Rowe's team may have done certain things well, but they certainly were not anywhere close to as dirty, mean or tough as they could have been. McAuliffe got off easy. He was just more incompetent than Rowe.

[Roguish Lawyer]

As poor a candidate as the Democratic Party nominated, it should have been a blow-out. Rowe's team may have done certain things well, but they certainly were not anywhere close to as dirty, mean or tough as they could have been. McAuliffe got off easy. He was just more incompetent than Rowe.

I agree.