Afghan soldier "accidentally" kills two US soldiers......

[Mills]

Here we go again.........

I for one am done referring to them as "colleagues" or "partners". Last time I checked..........those definitions don't quite fit the current relationship we have with the Afghan forces.

From Fox News.........

"Then on Monday morning, two American soldiers were shot and killed by one of their Afghan colleagues in the east, military officials said, bringing to 12 the number of international troops -- all Americans -- to die at the hands of their local allies this month.
But Afghan officials said Monday's attack in Laghman province was a separate case from the rash of recent insider attacks on international forces, because it appeared to have been an accidental shooting."


Full story here.

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/08/27/afghan-soldier-kills-2-coalition-service-members-nato-says/#ixzz24itezasH

[Grim]

Regardless of whether it relates to the earlier string of attacks, it's still two more American soldiers dead..

RIP Gents

[Streck-Fu]

Are they still overstressed from Ramadaan?

[Inflexible Six]

Are they still overstressed from Ramadaan?


Maybe they think they're building some kind of street cred for the next regime. Twelve Americans this month. I have a feeling it's going to get worse as the drawdown continues. I saw it happen in VN in '71 when U.S. ground combat units were leaving in significant numbers, tensions began to rise, and some of the ARVNs started assessing future probabilities. But the incidents were few, nothing like what we've been seeing from Afghanistan and that's extremely worrisome and I'm wondering if it portends an eventual uprising of some sort among Afghan forces.

[Adam1680]

I hate for all my posts to be like this, but this is another inaccurate news report. There were 2 U.S. soldiers that were killed by an ANA member, that part is true.

Can't go into details and the investigation is ongoing.

[Mills]

Maybe they think they're building some kind of street cred for the next regime. Twelve Americans this month. I have a feeling it's going to get worse as the drawdown continues. I saw it happen in VN in '71 when U.S. ground combat units were leaving in significant numbers, tensions began to rise, and some of the ARVNs started assessing future probabilities. But the incidents were few, nothing like what we've been seeing from Afghanistan and that's extremely worrisome and I'm wondering if it portends an eventual uprising of some sort among Afghan forces.

It is nothing more than strategically timing their increased attacks as we draw down forces in order to give off the perception that we were "pushed out" of Afghanistan versus actually leaving. They are using mass media and public opinion to their advantage and creating fear and distrust within the ranks of both, the US military and Afghan military.

This is going to get much worse before it gets better.

The Politicians are hell bent on making this the 51st state and for some reason, we are operationally stuck between a rock and a hard place whilst being forced to create "white space" and report false successes in order to make this look like some sort of great victory.

Thats my .02

Maybe im just a pessimist..........

Or maybe im just a realist..........

[Unapologetic Soldier]

It's shity when you have the need to watch those who should be watching yours. Not to say watching the ANSF as a cautionary is anything new but it adds to the many complications we have to deal with already. I’m currently on a SFAT team and work with these guys daily, we’re taken measures to protect our self’s but I have a feeling it’s going to start having an adverse affect on our relationship with them. There starting to ask question "You dont' trust us, I thought we where shoulder by shoulder"

If you do your dammed if you don’t you'll gana have lead heading your way, FUBAR.

[Inflexible Six]

It's shity when you have the need to watch those who should be watching yours. Not to say watching the ANSF as a cautionary is anything new but it adds to the many complications we have to deal with already. I’m currently on a SFAT team and work with these guys daily, we’re taken measures to protect our self’s but I have a feeling it’s going to start having an adverse affect on our relationship with them. There starting to ask question "You dont' trust us, I thought we where shoulder by shoulder"

If you do your dammed if you don’t you'll gana have lead heading your way, FUBAR.


It's got to have some adverse effects, even with guys who are solid; but if there's any inconsistency in different ANA units with regard to their level of dependability and trustworthyness--and I'm guessing there is--it'll be bad in the less dependable ones, and like poison in the ones tainted by corruption. It's enough just dealing with the enemy situation without having to worry about the guy behind you on the trail. Good luck and stay safe.

[echoes]

Here we go again.........

I for one am done referring to them as "colleagues" or "partners". Last time I checked..........those definitions don't quite fit the current relationship we have with the Afghan forces.

From Fox News.........

"Then on Monday morning, two American soldiers were shot and killed by one of their Afghan colleagues in the east, military officials said, bringing to 12 the number of international troops -- all Americans -- to die at the hands of their local allies this month.
But Afghan officials said Monday's attack in Laghman province was a separate case from the rash of recent insider attacks on international forces, because it appeared to have been an accidental shooting."


Full story here.

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/08/27/afghan-soldier-kills-2-coalition-service-members-nato-says/#ixzz24itezasH

Rest-in-Peace brave soldiers. :( May justice be swift!

Holly

[Dozer523]

Rest-in-Peace brave soldiers. :( May justice be swift!
HollyI'm pretty sure it was.... According to the article.


"He didn't do this intentionally. But then the commander of the unit started shouting at him, `What did you do? You killed two NATO soldiers!' And so he threw down his weapon and started to run," Hatefi added. The U.S. troops had already called in air support to help with the insurgent attack and the aircraft fired on the escaping Afghan soldier from above, killing him, Hatefi said

[Inflexible Six]

Maybe im just a pessimist..........

Or maybe im just a realist..........


You have a lot of company in the pessimist/realist club.

[Gypsy]

RIP.

When are we going to start calling a spade a spade?

[Basenshukai]

Maybe they think they're building some kind of street cred for the next regime. Twelve Americans this month. I have a feeling it's going to get worse as the drawdown continues. I saw it happen in VN in '71 when U.S. ground combat units were leaving in significant numbers, tensions began to rise, and some of the ARVNs started assessing future probabilities. But the incidents were few, nothing like what we've been seeing from Afghanistan and that's extremely worrisome and I'm wondering if it portends an eventual uprising of some sort among Afghan forces.

I predicted to my men over three weeks ago that this very thing would continue to increase. If one thinks about it, it is a great strategy on their part. This will do for the Taliban what the IED did for AQ - and others - in Iraq, and they know it.

[Mills]

I predicted to my men over three weeks ago that this very thing would continue to increase. If one thinks about it, it is a great strategy on their part. This will do for the Taliban what the IED did for AQ - and others - in Iraq, and they know it.

Great strategy.

Too bad there is no way to actually defeat it.

Except leave, which isn't going to happen any time soon.

[Unapologetic Soldier]

RIP.

When are we going to start calling a spade a spade?

I hope sooner than later, things are FUBAR now, but there are diffenent levels of FUBAR.

[MtnGoat]

As far as the whole " colleagues" or " Partners" phrases are concerned, since 2001, Afghans working with Americans and Americans with Afghans, any SF guy should know this can happen. I doubt these words but we can not deny them either. It is so easy for news people OR a military person to say, " I am done with calling them as this or that". It is not so easy and it does not really matter what you call them. Let's say if we do not call them partners, it fails the whole US mission in Afghanistan. Hell didn't you join SF to work with others? A Guerilla Force a partner force? Everything we do, especially these days, are about these partner forces but on the other side, we all know deep inside that it is all "chinese glue" or sometimes, "Insha Ullah". our SF teams do mission with Afghan commandos and Afghan special Forces every night and this makes every body feel good but when you deal with regular ANA, they are a bunch of morons, jackasses, Taliban, on drugs, and you name it. So it becomes complicated situation as you know and denying them will dash all our efforts to the ground though we feel the level of trust.

Dealing with Afghani forces is like dealing with all kinds of snakes. Afghans have a saying in pashto, " If you play with snakes, you may die of snake bites". Some people say, " If you are dealing with Camels, you better have big doors". It is unfortunate but it is the reality. We SF are living with snakes in their snake pits, most of us. That's where a lit of our VSPs are TB controlled zones.

One thing based on my experience, you can trust the ANA but trusting Afghanistan police especially the ALP is the mistake one should never make. Second, pashtunwali is greatly affected by bad guys and they have twisted it to their advantage. Never trust Pashtunwali these days unless you are 100 percent sure. For example, You can not kill even your enemy in Pashtunwali when you invite him/her, but yet SF guys got killed in Helmand when they were invited. Pashtunwali is crap these days. Pashtunwalin used to be in Mujahidin time NOT now. it is very rare. It is still there but very rare. Remember to be invited isn't left to ones house or compound.

Honestly, there is nothing IMHO you can tell locals about this insider killings and the person who is gonna do it does not care about the pashtunwali anyways. One thing I strongly recommend to tell clearly to the village elders,"hey listen, We know you think we are from a different religion and some may think we are infidels. We are not infidels and we have a holly book as well, bible. With that said, I know pashtuns and Afghans in general. we know about pashtunwali as well. We respect your honor and religion and we expect the same thing from you. If you are nice and respect us, you will find us very nice and respectful BUT if you are not nice and respectful towards us, we WILL show you the ugly side of us and trust me , You are not gonna like it". The reason I am saying this because a lot of Afghans take advantage and sometime they think Americans are stupid. It always worked out for us to show then respect. All afghans, Young, old, males, females, dogs, their animals and livestock. I can name 6-7 team leaders who something like this and made a big difference. History shows that Afghans love and respect power and strength. Do not get me wrong, there has to be mutual respect as well. so start with respect and if that does not work, end with power/ugly side.

One last thing, in many incidents where coalition forces got killed, there has been personal issues as well. When I was teaching at the ANASF school house, every one loved and respected me and most of my ODA..why? Because w were nice and respectful to them and were honest and genuine with them. Also sometime, I got mad, pissed, that I would swear, they know cuz words and know I was mad. But this was disrespectful in their eyes. It was okay with them because they understood what we did for them everyday. Try in your daily dealings with Afghans, both military and locals not to use swear words. As stupid as that sounds, mini about phrases and cuss words get lost in translation. Terps love using American phrases that they've learned from TV shows or movies. But try translating them from English into any language and it's lost. So the next time you think of getting mad at your ALP or ANASF for taking too long with ammo on loading or unloading. Try not doing a rookie move that I did and tell your turn to translate: " tell these mother fuckers to get their sorry asses loading up this AMMO before I with both of your head and shit down their throat or sckull fuck there are balls out. I'm I'm pissed and tired of this...." Now translate that, especially the mother part. Every has respect for their mothers, what would you think but the person that said this to you.

Unfortunately, we have a lot of new kids in the special force who think they are "bad Asses" but in reality they are "Jack asses". There is a difference. In reality when these jack asses talk to Afghan forces like this, they make problems. In other words, Afghan jack asses vs American Jack asses. The only difference is the US soldiers are more rational than the Afghan ones and the result is... Well we see all the need reports.

Seasoned SF with number of trips are not always the best to give advice. We have many friends killed over there and can be pissed at the works and every Afghan. Some just want our like the DA world. Not looking at what we are doing or trying to do. You will always very the chance to shit someone in the face. Look at your 50m target, not that 200m.

[MtnGoat]

Okay thus may take this off subject, but if ADMINS want to move it elsewhere please do. Now looking at VSP mission set along the lines of UW. Question for all of us out there doing these VSP.

What are we setting up as far as a Guerrilla force, Auxiliary and Underground within unconventional warfare (UW)? WHICH ONE? OR ONES?

[Adam1680]

VSPs are a FID mission, not UW.. Although the terrain will be a lot more restrictive when the conventional forces leave. The rumor is that there will be no more VSO when that happens..

[MtnGoat]

VSPs are a FID mission, not UW.. Although the terrain will be a lot more restrictive when the conventional forces leave. The rumor is that there will be no more VSO when that happens..

Ok.. Really.. Lets keep thinking that way as SF. Everything we do should be conducted as we are working UW. If you are a 18A as your profile list. You know that we are looking at FID as a cross pollution of UW. Just like a JCET, a FID mission, but why are we doing them? Train our solders for UW with a partnered force. NOT looking at VSP mission as a UW mindset under minds our abilities to conduct UW IMO. This is why I ask this question. SF not thinking in a UW mindset as we should be.

[Adam1680]

I get what you're trying to say.. But that doesn't change doctrinal terms of our mission sets. Just because you're conducting FID does not mean you don't set up contingencies and other supporting networks, nor does it mean you become complacent about your environment. I don't think calling a FID mission a FID mission means we're not in the proper mindset.

[BKKMAN]

Ok.. Really.. Lets keep thinking that way as SF. Everything we do should be conducted as we are working UW. If you are a 18A as your profile list. You know that we are looking at FID as a cross pollution of UW. Just like a JCET, a FID mission, but why are we doing them? Train our solders for UW with a partnered force. NOT looking at VSP mission as a UW mindset under minds our abilities to conduct UW IMO. This is why I ask this question. SF not thinking in a UW mindset as we should be.

There is a great article by COL Witty (among several great articles by various authors) in the following publication, IW - A SOF Perspective, available on CALL:

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/call/docs/11-34/


"In this school’s view , while the tactics, techniques and procedures associated with working with the components of resistance movements and insurgencies, i.e., guerrilla forces, undergrounds and auxiliaries, greatly enable SF to perform a wide array of other special operations, such as SR, DA, CT and FID, the use of irregular forces during the conduct of operations does not make them UW. [B]"The broad traditionalist school categorizes operations by what they aim to achieve rather than the type of force that conducts them.>> (p. 40)

I think the highlighted portion is important in that we should be looking at defining UW and FID by identifying the desired endstate (overthrow of a government/occupying power vs. strengthening a host nation's military/government), rather than trying to fit the various methods we are using now (VSO) or in the future, into a preconceived notion of UW (or FID).

COL Witty also does an outstanding job of tracing the origins of our (SF's) definition of UW and how that has changed over the years (anyone remember circa 2000 when UW was an umbrella term and everything we did as a regiment was just a subset thereof?...good times...).

[blue02hd]

VSPs are a FID mission, not UW.. Although the terrain will be a lot more restrictive when the conventional forces leave. The rumor is that there will be no more VSO when that happens..

Adam,

If you've seen one VSP you've seen ONE VSP. FID is the easy cookie cutter doctrinal label, but many of the VSO sites have had to operate in areas where the local villagers are not and do not support the GIRoA. In those circumstances the official labels can easily get blurred.

VSO is not dependent on conventional unit support (although it makes it much easier). VSO is about connecting with the locals, and influencing them to defend their own villages against those who would harm us as well. If VSO "will be no more" when conventional forces leave then every single active duty QP on this board needs to look for another line of work.

If we can't do it, who will?

YMMV

[D9 (RIP)]

I agree - every VSO site is its own animal. AFG is too full of generalizations made from Bagram and pushed down from there.

Bottom line with VSO: too many carrots, not enough sticks.

The generalized emasculation of American combat power in AFG over the past few years has yielded predictable results.

To paraphrase a wise man: progress is a bus in Afghanistan, and factions get off when it reaches their stop.

So it is with VSO - however much our high-minded ideas of individual liberty and progress are behind it, for them it's only a system to be played in service of far baser motives (like killing the guy you accuse of grazing his sheep on your land last year).

[Adam1680]

Adam,

If you've seen one VSP you've seen ONE VSP. FID is the easy cookie cutter doctrinal label, but many of the VSO sites have had to operate in areas where the local villagers are not and do not support the GIRoA. In those circumstances the official labels can easily get blurred.

VSO is not dependent on conventional unit support (although it makes it much easier). VSO is about connecting with the locals, and influencing them to defend their own villages against those who would harm us as well. If VSO "will be no more" when conventional forces leave then every single active duty QP on this board needs to look for another line of work.

If we can't do it, who will?

YMMV

Concur with all. Obviously this is not the foreign army in formation, in uniform, training from 9a-5pm with a long lunch break, FID (which seems to be the picture people envision when the term is used). Of course most of the villages we go to do not support a national government, Afghanistan has never had one, and it really doesn't fit the model.

That being said, we're not training a resistance force to overthrow a State or occupying force in a non-permissive environment. We're most definitely conducting stability operations to free and protect society from lawlessness and insurgency with the permission of the "Afghan National Government". I don't think there's wriggle room in that respect of the definitions. The fact that the people don't support GIRoA has nothing to do with whether VSO/ VSPs are a FID or UW mission.

When I spoke of the conventional forces, my point was the freedom of maneuver in the AO will significantly decrease. When coalition forces leave, the white space will most likely be filled by insurgent forces in most places due to the fact we will not be able to build successful ALP in most places faster than conventional forces retrograde. The rumor here is that when the conventional forces leave, SOF will suck up into the major hubs to train larger Afghan forces and oversee regional security. The "higher" plan sounds like it will no longer be teams at VSPs due to logistical and security issues (although I'm sure we will all argue that's what we do and how we expect to live..)

[MtnGoat]

"In this school’s view , while the tactics, techniques and procedures associated with working with the components of resistance movements and insurgencies, i.e., guerrilla forces, undergrounds and auxiliaries, greatly enable SF to perform a wide array of other special operations, such as SR, DA, CT and FID, the use of irregular forces during the conduct of operations does not make them UW. [B]"The broad traditionalist school categorizes operations by what they aim to achieve rather than the type of force that conducts them.>> (p. 40)

I think the highlighted portion is important in that we should be looking at defining UW and FID by identifying the desired endstate (overthrow of a government/occupying power vs. strengthening a host nation's military/government), rather than trying to fit the various methods we are using now (VSO) or in the future, into a preconceived notion of UW (or FID).
.

Great statement in my mind. He highlights the major issues with people within the Regiment. People looking at us doing FID, COIN our whatever. Heck highers are taking about making new doctoral term for ones of our great buzz word.... COMBAT FID. Yeap COMBAT FID!

Unconventional warfare (UW) is the opposite of conventional warfare. Where conventional warfare is used to reduce an opponent's military capability, unconventional warfare is an attempt to achieve military victory through acquiescence, capitulation, or clandestine support for one side of an existing conflict.

The United States Department of Defense defines UW as a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Organization varies by culture and type of conflict.

The latest approved definition by the US Special Operations Command is as follows: Unconventional Warfare consists of activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.

I got that we have doctoral definitions, but I also thought that SF out of the Box thinkers. My point asking the question is now adays no one on the ODA level (IMO) look at "things" we do at a UW view. I for one don't look at VSP as FID or a part of our COIN mission. I look at how us a USSF ODA can conduct activities to enable a resistance movement (GIRoA) to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or [shadow] government (Talabin) operating through or with an underground (local leaders), auxiliary (local) and guerrilla force i(ALP) in a denied area (VSP).

I read that Unconventional Warfare (UW) targets civilian population psychologically to win hearts and minds, seeking to render the military proficiency of the enemy irrelevant. Limited conventional warfare tactics can be used unconventionally to demonstrate might and power, rather than to substantially reduce the enemy's ability to fight.

Thanks for the read!!

[Razor]

We're most definitely conducting stability operations to free and protect society from lawlessness and insurgency with the permission of the "Afghan National Government". I don't think there's wriggle room in that respect of the definitions. The fact that the people don't support GIRoA has nothing to do with whether VSO/ VSPs are a FID or UW mission.

Sounds a bit like Montagnard CIDG efforts.

[Astronomy]

Razor: Sounds a bit like Montagnard CIDG efforts.

Exactly. SF has done this before. US Army SF CIDG & USMC CAP = VSO. It's COIN...not FID. CF & SF folks should re-read some of the Vietnam SF studies and histories. Mobile Guerrilla Forces anyone?

Of course, in 2002, I couldn't find a single fucking leg who had read anything other than out-dated country studies and recent Time Magazine/National Geographic articles about Afghanistan. During Operation ANACONDA, nobody in 10th Mountain's G-2 or command element had ever even heard of Lester Grau's tomes (The Bear Went Over the Mountain, The Other Side of the Mountain, etc.)...despite getting engaged on the exact same terrain by some of the exact same opponents using the exact same TTPs.

We had that place sewn up in a bag by late 2002. We should have never ensconced a central government or formed an ANA/ANP. We should have continued to administer the entire landscape as a tribal reservation system...ensuring that the Comanches (Northern Alliance) dominated the more numerical but militarily lesser tribes of Apaches, Navajo, Mexicans, etc. (i.e, Pashto). We could have established a modern Commancheria.

Lawyers, guns, and money for proven allies (our hired G-Force)...and screw everyone else. Back our favorites up with air power, SOF/OGA, and ISR. Ensure that Kabul belonged permanently to Masoud's folks...and look the other way when the Afghans did what was necessary. The only CF required should have been to help secure Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Bamian, Jalalabad, and Bagram...perhaps MeZ. Play tribe against tribe...ruthlessly.

Instead, we got locked into Big-CF & DoS "strategery"...Nation Building & positional warfare with 2/3 of the force tied down defending bases and LOCs. Just like the US military did in SEA...and just like the Soviets did before us in the 'Stan. Eventually evolving into sending some poor Joes out to the middle of fucking nowhere to defend Duffer's Drift...at some soon-to-be-abandoned-anyway COP...and calling it "COIN". Yeah, buddy...you're doing effective COIN. Oops...we decided to GTFO...and draw down. So from now on we'll just kill our way to a Mexican standoff and call it CT. "More drone strikes for all my Afghan Brothers at the bar! Hey Karzai...here's the keys to the shiny car...have a nice country. It's been Real. It's been Nice. But it ain't been Real Nice. See ya later..."

We let the "By, With, and Through" (and the time to implement it) slip through our fingers from 2002-2009, then belatedly wasted blood and treasure propping up Karzai with a ready-mix, half-baked, tin-soldier central army. "Here...have a province...it's your's. So sorry... we're on an announced and impending departure timeline; you ANA/ANP get the whole ball of wax...ready or not."

IMHO, we also missed the boat early on with the Hazara. In 2002, they were ripe for the picking to be our future Montagnards (or at least comprise our Afghan version of Nung Mobile Strike Forces).

There should simply be a geographic region called Afghanistan...not a country. Real Politik.



I haven't been to Afghanistan since the '02 time frame. Obviously some newer acronyms have evolved in the last two or three years...
Somebody clue me in on the following (or any other new ones):

VSO? (Village Stability Ops?)
ALP? (Afghan Local Police?)
VSP? (Village Security Program?)


Oh well, what the fuck do I know? I'm sure it's now a vastly different war than the one I experienced a decade ago in Afghanistan (or the one I later saw in Iraq). On the other hand, having watched the political gymnastics that have affected it's prosecution, I'm reasonably certain that there is a valid comparison to events in Vietnam. At NSC, Theater, Pentagon, & DoS echelons, it's simply a case of Same Circus, Different Clowns.

Rant over. Out.

[BKKMAN]

I haven't been to Afghanistan '02 time frame. Obviously some newer acronyms have evolved in the last two or three years...
Somebody clue me in on the following (or any other new ones):

VSO? (Village Stability Ops?)
ALP? (Afghan Local Police?)
VSP? (Village Security Program?)




VSP = Village Stability Platform [This is the ODA/MSOT/SEAL Platoon + enablers down at the village level]

[Adam1680]

I think the comparison to Vietnam is spot on.. A lot of lessons we're re-learning, even things from the Soviet era war with Afghanistan (I recently read a paper summarizing the lessons learned from the Soviet withdrawl). A good discussion here. I don't think doctrine is law, but I do think it's there for communicating intent. If you tell another unit you're securing an area, they know you plan to occupy the area after clearance. So, in my opinion, when you say, I'm conducting Unconventional Warfare, it means the endstate is overthrowing a State/ occuping force.

For anything other than communicating mission and understanding intent, you apply the same general principles. It doesn't really matter what you call it.

For some of you "experienced" guys, you're absolutely right, we are conducting COIN, but the new doctrine doesn't list that as one of the core tasks of ARSOF.

The tasks are: UW, FID, Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Counterterrorism, PSYOP, Civil Affairs, Counter proliferation of WMD.

There's a new manual coming out that changes the tasks around again that I have at home. I can't remember if they put COIN back in there.

[Inflexible Six]

delete

[MtnGoat]

. Out in these prehistoric villes, no running water, no electricity, food cooked on a fire on a dirt floor in a house made of thatch, trails packed hard from a thousand years of barefoot passings, water pulled up on a rope from a well...I just knew there was know way in hell those generals back in Danang or Nha Trang or Saigon would ever really get the picture.

Are you talking about VN or are sitting in AFG.. :D because when you send up request or whatevers they ask why you want this or need it. After pointing out the why is in my justification sir. I really love the whole FLOUR or DYNCORP can get that for you or that's I the supply system. People during in Chicgo filled rooms with AFN have no clue what is going, even fill they were out at a firebase 2 years ago. It's not priceless it's CLUELESS.

Fun how times never change peoples thinking.

[MtnGoat]

you're absolutely right, we are conducting COIN, but the new doctrine doesn't list that as one of the core tasks of ARSOF.

So are you saying because SWC & USASOC hasn't put it onto a ARSOF titled & number field manual SF let alone ARSOF can't do it? No I know you're not say that or this..it's like saying a SFODA can't occupy a area after clearance or conduct offensive of operations.

What is COIN? Are SFODAs conducting it? Should we? Who has historically had the lead on COIN doctrine?

when you say, I'm conducting Unconventional Warfare, it means the endstate is overthrowing a State/ occuping force.

So if we (USSOCOM/ SOCCENT/ CJSOTF-A) are not trying to overthrow a occupying force (The Taliban)' then what have we ( USSOF) been trying to do at all these firebases, VSP, COPs, ETC for the last 11 years? YES it Maybe semantics and/or play with doctrinal terms. But if a SFODA commanders or even the whole ODA doesn't look at doing things UW, IMO we will be screwed wethat balloon goes up.

I will say thing, we don't try to develop Guerrilla Forces we develop Underground (local leaders), Auxiliary (Local support). Because a USSF kicks ass at making people pick up arms to fight fire a cause. Development of that Human Factor or Factors in the Underground and Auxiliary is what most of us don't know or understand. Historically in case studies this had been our and "others" failing point. So since 2010 that is what my SFODA had been working to improve in our UW skillsets. Training LBGs in BRM, SUT, First Aid we are T triple T in those task lists. Afghanistan had been our Best training ground and SFODAs are not using their time right IMHO. Going out on a patrol 85% of the time you will go Kinetic and get to shoot someone in the face.

[BKKMAN]

I think the comparison to Vietnam is spot on.. A lot of lessons we're re-learning, even things from the Soviet era war with Afghanistan (I recently read a paper summarizing the lessons learned from the Soviet withdrawl). A good discussion here. I don't think doctrine is law, but I do think it's there for communicating intent. If you tell another unit you're securing an area, they know you plan to occupy the area after clearance. So, in my opinion, when you say, I'm conducting Unconventional Warfare, it means the endstate is overthrowing a State/ occuping force.

For anything other than communicating mission and understanding intent, you apply the same general principles. It doesn't really matter what you call it.

For some of you "experienced" guys, you're absolutely right, we are conducting COIN, but the new doctrine doesn't list that as one of the core tasks of ARSOF.

The tasks are: UW, FID, Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Counterterrorism, PSYOP, Civil Affairs, Counter proliferation of WMD.

There's a new manual coming out that changes the tasks around again that I have at home. I can't remember if they put COIN back in there.

FM 3-18 Special Forces Operations (March 2012)

"The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) organizes, trains, and equips Special Forces to perform its nine principal tasks of UW, FID, security force assistance (SFA), COIN, DA, SR, CT, CP, and IO. Through the conduct of these nine principal tasks, Special Forces operations support the accomplishment of USASOC’s specified SOF eleven core activities of UW, FID, SFA, COIN, DA, SR, CT, CP, IO, CAO, and MISO. " (p 2-1)

[Astronomy]

MtnGoat: But if a SFODA commanders or even the whole ODA doesn't look at doing things UW, IMO we will be screwed wethat balloon goes up.

You hit the nail on the head. It's our very reason for existence as a force.

During the late 90's, Group Commandeer COL G. Lambert stood in front of the bulk of 10th SFG and emphatically stated that UW was ancient history, a dead mission, and that SF would never, ever do UW again. Imagine his chagrin when OEF kicked off...the very model of UW we existed to execute...and he was the USASFC(A) Commander.

Yes, you can use SF for humanitarian aid missions. You can use tankers as Infantry (less their tanks). You can even train cannon-cockers to do vehicular checkpoints. But Artillerymen are supposed to deliver fire, Tankers need to maneuver tanks, and Special Forces are supposed to be UW experts. "Core Values" as they say in the business world and the halls of the Pentagon.

By the time our latest evolution of doctrinal FMs are fielded...they are about 10 years out of date, ignore what we are actually doing in the real world, and are full of self-limiting verbiage.

CSAR, Peace Keeping, Winter/Mountain Warfare, Mobility Ops, and CQB DA were never our "doctrinal" bread and butter missions, but we have spent years successfully doing all of them (and numerous other specialty requirements).

With every passing decade, some Group, somewhere, assumes new skill sets to meet previously unforeseen mission requirements. We remold ourselves to do what needs to be done every time we face new circumstances. But at the core, everything we do can be said to fall under the UW umbrella...and we are THE standing UW Force for the United States of America. Ignore that tenet and you doom the organization to irrelevance (and eventual dismemberment).

SF fell into the COIN realm during SEA because UW skills were a natural counterbalance to defeating both a local insurgency and cross border invasion by a conventional force. The best antidote to a sniper is a better counter-sniper.

I have always said that given money, time, and mission emphasis, a good ODA could be trained to competently crew a Space Shuttle. Seriously.

But Mission #1 is UW. We ignore that at our peril.



To nudge this thread back into its original lane...IMHO, the solutions to Green on Blue in Afghanistan are to:

1. Realize that our end state is simply one of reducing Coalition casualties and that we don't really give a rat's ass about the future of Afghanistan. The current Administration has effectively promulgated this course of action by both word and deed. Accept this reality and deal with it.

2. Pull almost all Coalition support from the ANA/ANP; let them wither on the vine.

3. Re-form much smaller (but competent) indigenous formations out of ethnically/tribally pure bodies of troops using:

a) universal biometric ID of allied Afghan fighters

b) deep vetting of all Afghan fighters (we know how to do this for smaller forces)

c) leveraged Pashtunwalli (where it still works)

d) leveraged tribal self-interest (US aid to only the tribes that deserve it)

e) ethnic non-local bodyguard & security forces at US locations. Vetted mercenary inner-security forces & PSDs recruited from other tribes. Your survival is the key to their survival.

f) a greatly relaxed FP SOP/ROE that includes having all Coalition forces operate 24/7 with chambered, condition red weapons and head on a swivel. In other words, everyone get like SF...right now.

4. Implement US monopolization of the Drug Trade by backing a single controlling faction (with the US becoming the single point of purchase for annual crops). The GDP of Afghanistan depends upon this trafficking. It has always been the jugular vein of the country. We already control the foreign aid. Cartels tend to police their own territory quite nicely. Screwing with the primary customer is generally frowned upon in all for-profit societies and a good way for local Muslims to get themselves and their families killed.

5. Adopt WWII Wermacht TTPs regarding Counter-Partisan Warfare. Morally repugnant as those may seem to be, they worked. Make the cost of enemy individual or small unit actions too great for the family, village, or tribe to bear. Deliver exacting retribution exponentially out of proportion to the offending attack.

You shoot a US cadre member on the compound and your body is desecrated, your home demolished, your well poisoned, your livestock slaughtered, your winter produce storage burned, your crops mined, your elders & family are held as hostages...and (if need be) your entire village or urban block is wiped off the map. We seek out your origins and visit punishment on that wellspring, being sure to let the inhabitants know exactly why disaster has visited them. Simple MISO TTPs (PSYOP). Deliberate application of remorseless violence on a discriminatory basis...you only need to do it occasionally.

No Carrots and the Stick gets replaced with a Chainsaw. Retribution against blood relations at a 100:1 ratio of sorrow. After a few such events, peer pressure keeps a young would-be Jihadi at home tending the goats. They still hate us...but legitimate fear keeps most violence in check. It's a simple cost-benefit equation. Afghans understand Power.

6. Replace the current Karzai regime with one that is hungrier for power. There are candidates. (Of course we did that one in South Vietnam and I'm not really sure we got what we wanted out of Diem's death during the coup).

7. Utilize formations of ethnically homogeneous external tribes to conduct decisive mobile warfare and offensive ops against selected local insurgents. We could have developed a multi-battalion Hazara Foreign Legion or Tajik Striker Forces years ago.

8. Cut off all funding, military assistance, and international aid projects (by militarily forbidding delivery or execution) to areas where Green on Blue is a recurring problem. Hurt local leaders in the purse by cutting off their sources of graft. Boot NGOs out using force. Cease construction projects (and the associated pipelines for kickback and skimming). Explain the reason. If you want locals to do something positive with regard to security, put the squeeze on their funding stream until they squeal. They will generally self police trouble makers and pre-vet potential military candidates. You'll still be infiltrated, just by fewer suicidal flamers.

9. Reduce the target rich environment by withdrawing most Coalition CF and associated Footprint. By throwing the ANA/ANP training effort under the bus, we reduce the daily training/basing interaction and associated opportunity for such attacks. Remaining CF are to be tasked primarily with supporting SOF (if we even maintain a residual US force) and are securely based in isolation from Afghan CF.

Our CF planners continue to play a mindless doctrinal numbers game. Explain to me again why the Afghans require 350K security forces? Police/Soldier to Populace ratios are an interesting point of departure for theoretical COIN discussion. And that's about it.

10. Our enemies haven't been capable of fielding multi-battalion formations since early 2002. Our forces need to be able to destroy (at most) 2 battalions of enemy infantry on short notice anywhere in the country. That's all the ANA needs to be able to do. They don't need 350K welfare paycheck security meat puppets. They need 2-3 brigades of highly mobile and aggressively professional pipe-hitters. Well vetted, trained, armed, supported, and paid. Naturally, they should be SF led, advised, and supported. That goal is well within the capability of US Special Forces. Mutual US/Afghan trust, respect, and esprit de corps forged under fire. Well trained and reliable Afghans who don't backshoot their American Brothers In Arms.



Of course...we will never do even 10% of the above over the next two years. In point of fact, we missed the boat for implementing most of this years ago. That window of opportunity has already shut. We see ourselves as "Good Guys". We won't do what is required at this late date. On the other hand, we will never actually win. There is no further US political or public will for a victory in Afghanistan. The next POTUS will order us out regardless of Party affiliation.

[Astronomy]

Continued from above post:

Up Thread I referred to "Comancheria" with regards to tribal control of territory. That North American landscape comprised Comanche territory from the Southern Great Plains of Kansas & Colorado down to the Texas Gulf Coast and deep into Northern Mexico. All of Texas, Oklahoma, Arizona, and portions of Utah, Colorado, Kansas, and New Mexico. Comanche & allied Kiowa bands dominated that terrain against all comers for several centuries...successively defeating adjacent tribes (Sioux, Cheyenne, Apache, etc) and European invaders (Spaniards, Mexicans, French, and Anglos).

They were lightly armed, fought their enemies face to face, and probably never fielded more than 7000 warriors at any given time across the entire expanse of their jurisdiction. They had no heavy weaponry, but were extremely self-sufficient and mobile within their vast territory, that depth used as sanctuary just as present day Taliban use Pakistan or the Hindu Kush valleys. Their normal war and raiding formations were battalion sized or smaller. Typically, Company or Platoon+ units covered vast distances to execute pre-planned seasonal raids against positional soft targets. Otherwise, ambushes and night attacks were their norm. Their enemies feared them. The integrity of their nomadic territorial range was ensured by that fear. Sound familiar?

A similarly sized American field army defeated them during their last decade of tribal existence by employing similar tactics (but in an asymmetrical fashion). The Americans expanded the "fighting season" and attacked Comanche food supply, horse herds, winter encampments, water sources, unsecured family/tribal home bases, and their very alliances with other tribes. The Army used other Indians against them. For two hundred years, the Europeans & Americans only rarely carried the fight to that tribe. They played Defense...and attempted to 'secure" and "pacify" territory against a completely mobile enemy who only played Offense. When they finally adopted continuous offensive pressure against Comanche logistical centers of gravity, the most powerful indigenous force extant in North america was obliterated. Done at not much financial cost nor at a great expenditure of American Soldier's lives.

Unfortunately, the most recent Afghan Surge we got was the only one we are ever going to see. And we ain't going into Pakistan in a big way. Our time for implementing ceaseless offensive pressure is passing. As in Iraq, it's all draw-down and casualty avoidance as Job #1 from here on out. Except for our ODAs out in the hinterlands. For them, the war will continue until the bitter end. With an increasing emphasis on training ANA, albeit at ever more centralized locations. And an increasing use of this latest enemy TTP (Green on Blue).

[hoot72]

5. Adopt WWII Wermacht TTPs regarding Counter-Partisan Warfare. Morally repugnant as those may seem to be, they worked. Make the cost of enemy individual or small unit actions too great for the family, village, or tribe to bear. Deliver exacting retribution exponentially out of proportion to the offending attack.

You shoot a US cadre member on the compound and your body is desecrated, your home demolished, your well poisoned, your livestock slaughtered, your winter produce storage burned, your crops mined, your elders & family are held as hostages...and (if need be) your entire village or urban block is wiped off the map. We seek out your origins and visit punishment on that wellspring, being sure to let the inhabitants know exactly why disaster has visited them. Simple MISO TTPs (PSYOP). Deliberate application of remorseless violence on a discriminatory basis...you only need to do it occasionally.

No Carrots and the Stick gets replaced with a Chainsaw. Retribution against blood relations at a 100:1 ratio of sorrow. After a few such events, peer pressure keeps a young would-be Jihadi at home tending the goats. They still hate us...but legitimate fear keeps most violence in check. It's a simple cost-benefit equation. Afghans understand Power.


Think the russians tried something like this and failed miserably because it essentially united everyone who wasn't already supporting the muj to do so.

Don't you think this is extreme and will just make things in general a lot worse than it already is by alienating the afghan society as a whole? At the end of the day, whatever support you do have will disappear. They (afghan society) don't necc. see this as a good guys v bad guys scenario but rather a war between christians v islam and this suggestion you make in point 5 will guarrantee almost all Afghan's realize it truely is a war against the crusaders.

Afghans understand power but I don't think your suggestion makes rational sense though I can see where you are coming from.

But they also have pride. A hell of a lot of pride and this method of an eye for an eye will just cause those who haven't already started supporting the radicals to start doing so.

Just my 20 cents on the matter.

[Astronomy]

hoot72: All good points with some validity. Allow me to expand....

Think the russians tried something like this and failed miserably because it essentially united everyone who wasn't already supporting the muj to do so.

The Russians failed because they 1) lost stomach and withdrew (as will we), 2) developed a mediocre ANA analogue to "secure" the provinces (as have we), 3) failed to physically neutralize the sanctuary zone in Pakistan, 4) came to the fight with essentially 1950's battlefield tech (especially ISR and IO), and 5) failed to diplomatically/strategically neutralize Western military support to the insurgency. They actually developed very successful TTPs and Operational Art towards the end (to include Brigade sized incursions into Waziristan and successful SOF warfare), but by then, it was too late. They declared victory and went home. Their slaughter of random Afghans was conducted more out of frenzy than purpose.


Don't you think this is extreme and will just make things in general a lot worse than it already is by alienating the afghan society as a whole? At the end of the day, whatever support you do have will disappear. They (afghan society) don't necc. see this as a good guys v bad guys scenario but rather a war between christians v islam and this suggestion you make in point 5 will guarrantee almost all Afghan's realize it truely is a war against the crusaders.

Actually, in my experience, Afghans are fairly religiously tolerant (as Muslims go). This probably from a sense of never having been totally conquered or ever having had someone else's culture or religion shoved down their throat. Their incentive to fight is much more of a traditional tribal instinct to kill outsiders and invaders than it is a result of religious dogma. I speak of Afghans...not foreign fighters. My paradigm for applying Point #5 is one of accepting that Afghan society is already alienated from our worldview. It always has been. It's not going to get better. Nation Building is a failed course of action.

We don't require a central government, central security forces, or even stabilization within the entire geographic area of Afghanistan. We don't even require the support of the majority populace...just a few of them. We simply require some secure regional basing, a few reliable tribal allies, and an Afghan understanding that supporting our transnational enemies invites sure destruction at a local and tribal level.

I am proceeding from a theory that we do not require a unified country called Afghanistan, but rather, a region where we hold military suzerainty over several carefully chosen allied tribal regions. The violence is applied by our proxies...and only after careful intelligence collection and analysis steers us to exacting retribution in a very targeted manner. Nothing willy-nilly. Every thing done with a considered purpose. We bomb the smack out of sovereign Pakistani territory today. Think that wins us any friends among the inhabitants of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan? Of course not. Nor do we really care.

Hell, under my concept, the Taliban can even administer Pashtu provinces and tribes. Kabul becomes merely a trade center and meeting point for Grand Shuras and Loya Jirgas. They can re-install the Royal Family if it makes everyone comfortable. No skin off of our noses. Let Afghans rule their own tribal areas. But they know that if our Afghan proxies, our ISR, or our HUMINT detects AQ or other outsiders...or any building military threat to our forces...that we will lay waste to the specific offenders...which will invite their own Afghan enemies to usurp their territory.


Afghans understand power but I don't think your suggestion makes rational sense though I can see where you are coming from.

Well, you are correct if you assume that we are willing to continue the decades long effort that would be required to win popular support on a national level (while grooming a generation or two of youngsters to see it our way). But we aren't going to do that any longer. Were broke, the war isn't accomplishing anything, and it's time to withdraw. Culturally, Afghans are actually a lot more Occidental than Oriental. Battlefield suicide tactics and fighting to the last cartridge are not traditional Afghan methods of warfare. They are a pragmatic people who have raised switching sides (for survival advantage) to an art form. But first they must be convinced of your military superiority and willingness to abide by negotiated agreements.


But they also have pride. A hell of a lot of pride and this method of an eye for an eye will just cause those who haven't already started supporting the radicals to start doing so.

True. But most already do support the other side (if only passively). They fear them more and realize that we will leave. If they thought that we would maintain a multi-decade presence capable of smiting anything that displeases us...they would rally to US allied tribal banners and forgo the black & green banners of Taliban/AQ.

Back towards the beginning of the war, I watched tribal elder & war chief eyes glaze over as our political officers tried to explain liberation, democracy, the benefits of female education, and a allegiance to a centrally governed Afghan nation. They didn't get it, they didn't care, and they didn't actually understand our purpose for being armed in their land.

Since I couldn't actually handle another glass of Chai, I finally jumped in and explained it to them in terms they could understand. I told them: We came half way around the world to exact vengeance for AQ killing 3000 of our men, women, and children. It was simple blood feud between us and them.

Snap! Their eyes lit up and they became very animated. They now understood perfectly. They'd be happy to contribute troops for combat patrols 'cause they never liked those shifty Arab sonabitches either. Eye for an eye...it's a readily understood Afghan calculus. So is dog-piling on someone weaker...like the tribe the next valley over. The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Friend and all that....

Your points are valid (and I expected someone to raise something similar). I'm thankfully not in charge and am simply ruminating from my retiree podium. My thoughts aren't even all original, as some of what I have described were things we successfully implemented during the first year of the war.

But we've tried it the other way (an endlessly flowing fire hose of corrupting free money, official banana republic status, and our begging them to love us) for 10 years now...without real success. ;)

[MountainMan35]

Think the russians tried something like this and failed miserably because it essentially united everyone who wasn't already supporting the muj to do so.

Don't you think this is extreme and will just make things in general a lot worse than it already is by alienating the afghan society as a whole? At the end of the day, whatever support you do have will disappear. They (afghan society) don't necc. see this as a good guys v bad guys scenario but rather a war between christians v islam and this suggestion you make in point 5 will guarrantee almost all Afghan's realize it truely is a war against the crusaders.

Afghans understand power but I don't think your suggestion makes rational sense though I can see where you are coming from.

But they also have pride. A hell of a lot of pride and this method of an eye for an eye will just cause those who haven't already started supporting the radicals to start doing so.

Just my 20 cents on the matter.

Hoot the actions "Astronomy" suggested are the ones carried out by taliban forces when they find someone sympathizing with the Americans/ANA. If it can work for the taliban it can surely work for us. The biggest question we have to ask ourselves is are we willing to do that kind of dirty work? If we were to go down that road, those missions would have to be black. Imagine what the media would do with a story about American SOF punishing entire villages for sympathizing with the enemy.

[hoot72]

Hoot the actions "Astronomy" suggested are the ones carried out by taliban forces when they find someone sympathizing with the Americans/ANA. If it can work for the taliban it can surely work for us. The biggest question we have to ask ourselves is are we willing to do that kind of dirty work? If we were to go down that road, those missions would have to be black. Imagine what the media would do with a story about American SOF punishing entire villages for sympathizing with the enemy.


I sincerely hope the US military doesn't go down this path. Or common sense and sensibility would have gone out the window. Head first.

[hoot72]

hoot72: All good points with some validity. Allow me to expand....

Think the russians tried something like this and failed miserably because it essentially united everyone who wasn't already supporting the muj to do so.

The Russians failed because they 1) lost stomach and withdrew (as will we), 2) developed a mediocre ANA analogue to "secure" the provinces (as have we), 3) failed to physically neutralize the sanctuary zone in Pakistan, 4) came to the fight with essentially 1950's battlefield tech (especially ISR and IO), and 5) failed to diplomatically/strategically neutralize Western military support to the insurgency. They actually developed very successful TTPs and Operational Art towards the end (to include Brigade sized incursions into Waziristan and successful SOF warfare), but by then, it was too late. They declared victory and went home. Their slaughter of random Afghans was conducted more out of frenzy than purpose.


Don't you think this is extreme and will just make things in general a lot worse than it already is by alienating the afghan society as a whole? At the end of the day, whatever support you do have will disappear. They (afghan society) don't necc. see this as a good guys v bad guys scenario but rather a war between christians v islam and this suggestion you make in point 5 will guarrantee almost all Afghan's realize it truely is a war against the crusaders.

Actually, in my experience, Afghans are fairly religiously tolerant (as Muslims go). This probably from a sense of never having been totally conquered or ever having had someone else's culture or religion shoved down their throat. Their incentive to fight is much more of a traditional tribal instinct to kill outsiders and invaders than it is a result of religious dogma. I speak of Afghans...not foreign fighters. My paradigm for applying Point #5 is one of accepting that Afghan society is already alienated from our worldview. It always has been. It's not going to get better. Nation Building is a failed course of action.

We don't require a central government, central security forces, or even stabilization within the entire geographic area of Afghanistan. We don't even require the support of the majority populace...just a few of them. We simply require some secure regional basing, a few reliable tribal allies, and an Afghan understanding that supporting our transnational enemies invites sure destruction at a local and tribal level.

I am proceeding from a theory that we do not require a unified country called Afghanistan, but rather, a region where we hold military suzerainty over several carefully chosen allied tribal regions. The violence is applied by our proxies...and only after careful intelligence collection and analysis steers us to exacting retribution in a very targeted manner. Nothing willy-nilly. Every thing done with a considered purpose. We bomb the smack out of sovereign Pakistani territory today. Think that wins us any friends among the inhabitants of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan? Of course not. Nor do we really care.

Hell, under my concept, the Taliban can even administer Pashtu provinces and tribes. Kabul becomes merely a trade center and meeting point for Grand Shuras and Loya Jirgas. They can re-install the Royal Family if it makes everyone comfortable. No skin off of our noses. Let Afghans rule their own tribal areas. But they know that if our Afghan proxies, our ISR, or our HUMINT detects AQ or other outsiders...or any building military threat to our forces...that we will lay waste to the specific offenders...which will invite their own Afghan enemies to usurp their territory.


Afghans understand power but I don't think your suggestion makes rational sense though I can see where you are coming from.

Well, you are correct if you assume that we are willing to continue the decades long effort that would be required to win popular support on a national level (while grooming a generation or two of youngsters to see it our way). But we aren't going to do that any longer. Were broke, the war isn't accomplishing anything, and it's time to withdraw. Culturally, Afghans are actually a lot more Occidental than Oriental. Battlefield suicide tactics and fighting to the last cartridge are not traditional Afghan methods of warfare. They are a pragmatic people who have raised switching sides (for survival advantage) to an art form. But first they must be convinced of your military superiority and willingness to abide by negotiated agreements.


But they also have pride. A hell of a lot of pride and this method of an eye for an eye will just cause those who haven't already started supporting the radicals to start doing so.

True. But most already do support the other side (if only passively). They fear them more and realize that we will leave. If they thought that we would maintain a multi-decade presence capable of smiting anything that displeases us...they would rally to US allied tribal banners and forgo the black & green banners of Taliban/AQ.

Back towards the beginning of the war, I watched tribal elder & war chief eyes glaze over as our political officers tried to explain liberation, democracy, the benefits of female education, and a allegiance to a centrally governed Afghan nation. They didn't get it, they didn't care, and they didn't actually understand our purpose for being armed in their land.

Since I couldn't actually handle another glass of Chai, I finally jumped in and explained it to them in terms they could understand. I told them: We came half way around the world to exact vengeance for AQ killing 3000 of our men, women, and children. It was simple blood feud between us and them.

Snap! Their eyes lit up and they became very animated. They now understood perfectly. They'd be happy to contribute troops for combat patrols 'cause they never liked those shifty Arab sonabitches either. Eye for an eye...it's a readily understood Afghan calculus. So is dog-piling on someone weaker...like the tribe the next valley over. The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Friend and all that....

Your points are valid (and I expected someone to raise something similar). I'm thankfully not in charge and am simply ruminating from my retiree podium. My thoughts aren't even all original, as some of what I have described were things we successfully implemented during the first year of the war.

But we've tried it the other way (an endlessly flowing fire hose of corrupting free money, official banana republic status, and our begging them to love us) for 10 years now...without real success. ;)

But here lies the question. Do the Afghan's want americans and western forces in Afghanistan and if yes, to what benefit? There is nothing to be gained economically, socially or militarily by fighting a war in Afghanistan. What started as a war of ideologies (democracy vs syariah radicalistion of islamic laws) has as you have correctly stated become a complete and utter expensive affair as far as tax payer dollars, material, assets and manpower go.

What has really been gained in over 10 years of conflict and where do you see the US 10 years from now, if it were to stay in Afghanistan and how would it benefit from it all?

I guess the point I am trying to make is, OBL is dead and the whole reason for the Afghan conflict wasn't to save women and kids from the oppresive and radical nature of the Taliban but it was to destroy and break down the AQ network. I think, the US has successfully done that and maybe some aspects of AQ have shifted base back into Paktistan and certain hot spots in North and East Africa.

Would it not be beneficial in the longterm to, perhaps leave them to their own devices (the afghan government) unless there was something to be gained from an economic point of view, other than just playing tic-tac-toe with the insurgents and spending billions on a war that, has not got an ending.

Just wonder how you see things. Some very interesting points you made above made me re-think a few ideas I had in my head for the past few years.

I actually think the Chinese will have a long term influence on the socio-politics of Afghanistan and Pakistan as they pump more and more development cash into both countries and start increase long term trade options that benefit all parties mutually. I have been out to West China pretty recently and made it across the hindu kush across into North East Pakistan from Kashgar/Kashi and you can see how much of an influence China is starting to have and what China may suddenly have a say on how long the US does decide to stay because they don't want american forces in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Period.

[MountainMan35]

I sincerely hope the US military doesn't go down this path. Or common sense and sensibility would have gone out the window. Head first.

I completely agree with you however you cannot argue against its effectiveness in UW. I don't want to go off on a tangent about what the biggest problem is in afghanistan when winning the war means one village at a time. There are much more experienced people on here then I who have fought two or more wars of this type.

[hoot72]

I completely agree with you however you cannot argue against its effectiveness in UW. I don't want to go off on a tangent about what the biggest problem is in afghanistan when winning the war means one village at a time. There are much more experienced people on here then I who have fought two or more wars of this type.


Have to agree with you.

[MtnGoat]

U.S Halts Training Of Some Afghanistan Forces In Light Of Green-On-Blue Violence

AP reporting.... Thought I would put thus in here instead of posting a new thread...


KABUL, Afghanistan — The U.S. military has halted the training of some Afghan forces while it digs deeper into their background following a surge of attacks by soldiers and police on their international partners, officials said Sunday.

The move only puts about 1,000 Afghan trainees into limbo, a small fraction of the country's security forces. But it shows how these attacks have the potential to derail the U.S.-Afghan handover of security so essential to the international drawdown strategy.

Officials say that the international coalition ultimately hopes to recheck the backgrounds of the entire 350,000-strong Afghan army and police.

The United States and its allies are pushing to have Afghan forces take over security for the country by the end of 2014. This effort has been imperiled by the spike in insider attacks that have killed 45 international service members this year, most of them Americans. There were at least 12 such attacks in August alone, resulting in 15 deaths.


http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mobileweb/2012/09/02/afghanistan-police-training-green-on-blue_n_1850065.html

[Astronomy]

hoot72: What has really been gained in over 10 years of conflict and where do you see the US 10 years from now, if it were to stay in Afghanistan and how would it benefit from it all?

A. Not much other than revenge and attrition warfare success against selected radical Islamic elements, advantageous positioning for future events (The Great Game), and limited western contractual advantage for exploiting mineral rights. You might argue that we created a flypaper environment for attracting foreign fighters. Better a killing ground there than having to deal with one in the West. In Afghanistan, we kicked down the door and cleared it...then tried to rent the house while remodeling it. We should have torched the place and left. ;)

B. I see no significant upside to the US staying there in strength, other than as a counterpoise to future Pakistani, Chinese, and Iranian moves. If we truly feel that it is to our advantage to own the terrain permanently, our natural partners in such an endeavor should be Russia, India, and (ideally) China. This would entail a required evisceration of Pakistan. Figure the odds...

I was temporarily swept up in the "Exportable Western Democratic Spring" notion of 2001...until I got there and realized that the idea wasn't really catching...ever. We conquered Afghanistan quickly, efficiently, and on the cheap. The 9/11 Eye-for-an-Eye retribution point was made. We should have left soon after (by the end of 2002). We could have let the Taliban flow back in...with an understanding that there are some new rules if you wish to avoid future visitation by American military might. The Taliban would have got the message.


hoot72: Would it not be beneficial in the longterm to, perhaps leave them to their own devices (the afghan government) unless there was something to be gained from an economic point of view, other than just playing tic-tac-toe with the insurgents and spending billions on a war that, has not got an ending.


Agree completely.

hoot72: I actually think the Chinese will have a long term influence on the socio-politics of Afghanistan and Pakistan as they pump more and more development cash into both countries and start increase long term trade options that benefit all parties mutually. I have been out to West China pretty recently and made it across the hindu kush across into North East Pakistan from Kashgar/Kashi and you can see how much of an influence China is starting to have and what China may suddenly have a say on how long the US does decide to stay because they don't want american forces in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Period.

Agree.

The Chinese have been playing a masterful game of Trader Empire round the world (SEA/Australia, Africa, & SW Asia) and in much the same fashion as we Yankees did at the end of the 19th Century and on into the early 20th. Let the military empires clash as they will...the Chinese are about business, cash and carry, host nation politics be damned. On the other hand, they have their own disaffected Muslim minorities and could easily find themselves stuck to the same tar baby.

Regarding my earlier musings on going to the dark side (Point #5 Retribution)...we won't. It would serve little purpose this late in a war that will inevitably wind down. It is generally anathema to the American national psyche and something we would entertain only in a struggle for national survival. In such a case, we would show the same (low) moral character as every other nation on Earth.

Author Robert Heinlein's character Lazarus Long encapsulated it best: “He's dead and I'm alive and that's the way I wanted it to be."

In WWII, we (America) carpet bombed/firebombed population centers, conducted unrestricted warfare against civilian shipping, used nuclear weapons, and there wasn't a church, shrine, hospital, or historic sight in Europe, Africa, or Asia that was not instantly targetable. When American columns raced into Germany during May of 1945, the approved TTP for advancing tanks and artillery was that the next German village either displayed white bed sheets and stacked arms...or we blew your goddamn town flat. Simpler times and no instantaneous electronic media back then, but when provoked, we are just as capable today of repeating the procedure. It's just hasn't been needed in Afghanistan.

Anyone notice today's news announcement of ANP training being suspended until re-vetting of all trainees is completed? There's always time to do it again after you don't do it right the first time. :rolleyes: (Edit to Add: Never mind. MtnGoat already posted that info while I was typing this reply).

[Inflexible Six]

Watch for the sullen ones.

[MtnGoat]

You shoot a US cadre member on the compound and your body is desecrated, your home demolished, your well poisoned, your livestock slaughtered, your winter produce storage burned, your crops mined, your elders & family are held as hostages...and (if need be) your entire village or urban block is wiped off the map. We seek out your origins and visit punishment on that wellspring, being sure to let the inhabitants know exactly why disaster has visited them. Simple MISO TTPs (PSYOP). Deliberate application of remorseless violence on a discriminatory basis...you only need to do it occasionally.

6. Replace the current Karzai regime with one that is hungrier for power. There are candidates. (Of course we did that one in South Vietnam and I'm not really sure we got what we wanted out of Diem's death during the coup).

7. Utilize formations of ethnically homogeneous external tribes to conduct decisive mobile warfare and offensive ops against selected local insurgents. We could have developed a multi-battalion Hazara Foreign Legion or Tajik Striker Forces years ago.

8. Cut off all funding, military assistance, and international aid projects (by militarily forbidding delivery or execution) to areas where Green on Blue is a recurring problem. Hurt local leaders in the purse by cutting off their sources of graft. Boot NGOs out using force. Cease construction projects (and the associated pipelines for kickback and skimming). Explain the reason. If you want locals to do something positive with regard to security, put the squeeze on their funding stream until they squeal. They will generally self police trouble makers and pre-vet potential military candidates. You'll still be infiltrated, just by fewer suicidal flamers.

9. Reduce the target rich environment by withdrawing most Coalition CF and associated Footprint. By throwing the ANA/ANP training effort under the bus, we reduce the daily training/basing interaction and associated opportunity for attacks. Remaining CF are to be tasked primarily with supporting SOF (if we even maintain a residual US force) and are securely based in isolation from Afghan CF.

10. Our enemies haven't been capable of fielding multi-battalion formations since early 2002. Our forces need to be able to destroy (at most) 2 battalions of enemy infantry on short notice anywhere in the country. That's all the ANA needs to be able to do. They don't need 350K welfare paycheck security meat puppets. They need 2-3 brigades of highly mobile and aggressively professional pipe-hitters. Well vetted, trained, armed, supported, and paid. Naturally, they should be SF led, advised, and supported. That goal is well within the capability of US Special Forces. Mutual US/Afghan trust, respect, and esprit de corps forged under fire. Well trained and reliable Afghans who don't backshoot their American Brothers In Arms.

You shoot a US cadre member on the compound..... Doing this will never work IMHO.. My time there PashtunWali isn't what it was 5 years ago. Taliban have made physiological and ideological changes in the Pashtun areas. They "control" the people now...so

Point 6... Hell yes replace Karzai regime, but both the Bush and current Admin will never do this. Who do we do it with?? Yes the are names out there, but who is better than the next guy?? This is the hard part, just like Bush Admin had in 2002.

Point 7.. Yes we should have worked more with the Hazara and Tajik's.. they ruled that country before the Taliban, from the Muj times till 1998ish. Outside of the Pashtun areas they were the best Muj fighters. Look back in the 80's in central areas..Hazaras.. Club Maz area and Heret Tajiks.. Heret was more Khan, but Tajik controled. I love the Hazara Foreign Legion.. now that is funny..true but funny.

Point 8.. Yes we, SFODAs should have done this at the village level and District levels cut off all funding, military assistance, and international aid projects to areas where Green on Blue is going on. With this point and the point of shoot a US memeber I always work very close with the village leaders, Khans, Maliks, Mullahs, ETC. I would use their PashtunWali or think and ways against them in the same way they use it against their own vilages. They were or are the land owners, they "rent" the land out to most people in the village or control it in some form. So they have the power over their village and the people they "control". "You Khan are in control of this area, if any roads are IED or a Mine or Bomb is found or strikes one of our trucks we will hold you responsible. He was told months ago about this, he was told, instructed to tell his people that every morning they need to check the roads outside of their coumpounds and fields. If they don't you will be the one responsible for them and the actions will come upon you for their failures. I will say most of the time this worked in the Khans and Maliks that wanted to work for us making this happen. The other were pointed out and not being Pro-US so we now knew what side they were on.

Point 9. Reduce the target rich environment by withdrawing most Coalition CF and associated Footprint. By throwing the ANA/ANP training effort under the bus, we reduce the daily training/basing interaction and associated opportunity for such attacks. IMO this is what we should be doing.. working with ANA Commandos and ANASF ODAs.. ANP and ABP and other units.. throw them under the bus.. If your saying focus our efforts on the units that are making a differents within Afghanistan, then yes we MUST DO this for the next Two year. Focus USSF ODAs on these units and away from this VSP plan that will fall apart once we are gone from those or these areas. We see this trenbd NOW, why keep doing it??

Point 10. IMO we have this going on now with the ANA Commando, yes we need to focus more on them. I see our efforts going there in form of JCETs in years to come. ANASF Green on Blue is more likely the actions of USSF treatment of ANASF NCOs. Yes we have some dumbass SF guys that think telling locals that they X or Y or Z does have any recourse of these actions. Treating people inhumane does make it right if you think they don't understand you. I learned this with crusing the hard way. Better vetting needs to happen, this is happen now at the School houses for both.

I feel overall Green on Blue is more due to pressures to get Tashkill (MTOE) filled by "X" number of locals, not locals that are vetted of qualities. Gee this sounds very familiar :D. Lets sit around and sip green tea and talk about locals to be police that locals have done 85% or more of the background checks on them. Damn that sounds like some Company people I know.


BTW Astronomy nice POST!!

[Pete]

Afghan police recruits' training halted after attacks on Nato

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19454742

A bump to MtnGoat's post # 43. From the BBC.

"The US says it is suspending training for new recruits to the Afghan local police (ALP) while checks are carried out on possible ties to the Taliban.

The move follows a series of incidents in which foreign troops have been killed by Afghan soldiers or policemen..................."

[Adam1680]

Just to clarify that article that's spreading like wildfire.. At least in RC-E, ALP training is not halted. It is true that all the current ALP are going through a re-vetting process, but so far that is having little to no effect on training new ALP and we've even moved to new districts, starting new programs, since the re-vetting began.

I see that the SOJTF PMO is quoted and is the one that told this story, but I think he was mis-quoted or his words spun..

[SF_BHT]

Just to clarify that article that's spreading like wildfire.. At least in RC-E, ALP training is not halted. It is true that all the current ALP are going through a re-vetting process, but so far that is having little to no effect on training new ALP and we've even moved to new districts, starting new programs, since the re-vetting began.

I see that the SOJTF PMO is quoted and is the one that told this story, but I think he was mis-quoted or his words spun..

Best way to get mis-quoted is to talk to the Press. The PMO is a tough job these days since our government thinks we need to discuss everything.

Keep your head down over there guys.....

[bushmaster11]

In RVN we knew there were NVA sympathizers in with the LLDB. But while they were subversive and attempted to influence the VN CIDG, there was nothing like this green-on-blue. The montagnard CIDG on the other hand were incorruptible. I'm not sure what the answer to this existing problem is, I just wanted to stick up for the majority of the CIDG.

J R sends
De Oppresso Liber