View Full Version : Tooth-to-Tail (T3R)
Tooth-to-Tail (T3R), the ratio of non-combat troops to combat troops, has been an issue of contention for military and civilian leadership since at least WWI. Doing my best to avoid the tall grass, the trend of T3R has been a reduction in combat troops and an increase in life-support, logistics, and HQ personnel. In WWI the T3R for an Infantry Division was 78.4% Combat troops, 14.4% Logistics, and 7.2% HQ/Administration. The Army’s new Stryker Brigades have a T3R of 52% Combat, 30% Logistics, and 18% HQ/Admin. Even more striking are the numbers for Army Forces in Iraq (2005): 40% Combat, 36% Logistics, 24% HQ. If you add civilian contractors to the mix, the share of combat troops drops to only 28%.
My own observations seem to support these numbers and force me to view them in a negative, even destructive, light. MASSIVE FOB’s are equipped with pools, restaurants, and other facilities that seem out of place in a “combat” environment. The support personnel that I saw on these FOB’s seemed (mostly) to be supporting only themselves.
While I understand that the world of SOF does not operate off of the same T3R as the RA folks, I’d be interested to hear everyones thoughts!
(A well done Combat Studies Institute “Occasional Paper” on the subject: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/mcgrath_op23.pdf)
One thing to remember in all this is the job sets everyone is looking at.
Not a lot of variation in "jobs" in a circa 1917 Infantry Regiment.
Not a lot of mechanical or electrical stuff either. One vet could handle a lot of horses and mules.
Everything that can break will break - and you need somebody to fix it.
Thanks, Pete.
I did consider the appearance of new technologies and the need for personnel who know how to fix them after Joe breaks them. I'm sure this accounts for at least some of the shift in T3R. But what about HQ? The Army's Expeditionary Forces during WWI had what the referenced report calls an "austere" share of only 1.7%. In Iraq, Army HQ personnel have a 17% share.
What strikes me is that technology should be making C2 easier (especially if you have the support personnel to keep all the wheels turning) and allow HQ's to SHRINK. Not to mention that, although I wasn't around in 1917, it seems that today's Army as a whole is more professional (read easier to control) than the Doughboys.
I think the only reason I may be able to get away with saying that is because, last I heard, there was only one WWI Vet still out there!
I don't have any quotable numbers handy, but seem to remember that during the SEA engagement (1956-1975) the ratio of REMF's to Combat troops was some where around 4 to 1. That's 4 REMF's to 1 Combat troop.
The reason I remember it is because of all the discourse about drugs and PTSD during that time period.
As I had both a line platoon (HC 31) outside the wire for 5 months and was XO of a Div HQ company (HC 500) for 4 months, I was exposed to the gambit of problems.
The REMF's far out numbered those in combat,, and also had a much higher UCMJ rate.
I personally believe the problems stemmed from the 24/7 office schedule and way to much free time at the EM club...
Todays SWA and yesterdays SEA had a preponderance of support off shore and far from the madding crowd. It takes a lot REMF's to keep the Navy's Tin Cans floating and the Air Forces delivery truck drivers flying.
One FOG's observations...
:munchin
The REMF's far out numbered those in combat,, and also had a much higher UCMJ rate.
I personally believe the problems stemmed from the 24/7 office schedule and way to much free time at the EM club...
Not to stray to far off course here, but I recently read something (I think in connection with Seb Junger/Restrepo/War) about the incidents of PTSD/Suicide being much higher among support troops vs. combat troops in OEF/OIF.
Thanks for the input, JJ.
My own observations seem to support these numbers and force me to view them in a negative, even destructive, light.
(A well done Combat Studies Institute “Occasional Paper” on the subject: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/mcgrath_op23.pdf)
Before 9/11 when I had to build and staff an Ops organization, this was my bread and butter. I spent a lot of time at the pentagon, doing verbal combat with the who's-who to the point of almost, but not quite, being kicked out. That's what the boss hired me to do.
You can probably pick up the numbers from existing manuals. I used to have a few I kept handy to toss off the top of my head. Don't have them any more.
But, consider...
At some time during WWI, a unit could put a certain amount of firepower "down range". Later, in our history, a unit half that size could put that amount of firepower down range, and in our current situation, a unit 1/4 the size of the WWI unit could put that much down range.
Now, the question is..... if a soldier can put 4 times as much hurt on an enemy, do you want him to have the ammunition necessary to do so? (I asked that question of many conference rooms of pure civilians, and watched their eyes glaze over). The answer is obviously "Yes".
That being the case, would you like the trucks to carry it to the troops? If so, would you like the number of fork lifts, conex containers, etc., to get that ammo on the trucks?
A study that doesn't look at increased capability is fatally flawed.
Now, when we move 50k and strike, rather than station our support near the trenches, we need our support, not in the occasional convoy, but just behind the battle formation. Our first lift requirement has increased.
A column moving along at 2 mph, shooting the occasional pheasant with musket and ball is much more supportable.
However, you lose the war.
Plato,
I appreciate having someone so experienced on the topic offering their thoughts.
I don't think anyone could argue against having enough ammo. :D
I meant to mention this as a "devil's advocate" comment: Increased capability shouldn't always (especially in the current conflicts??) be about how much ammo you need for that Apache, or that Bradley, Stryker, MLRS etc. The guys walking around on the ground are stretched pretty thin and 5.56 is pretty small. What I see in the T3R numbers is a movement further and further away from human capability when, at least in today's battles, we may need to focus more on getting bodies outside the wire and less on toys.
1stindoor
01-26-2011, 12:38
It's true the ammo is small and light relatively speaking, but that little radio can call in a whole world of hurt in minutes...just remember though Predator is not your friend....nothing ruins a good war story like an eye-witness.
I think the only reason I may be able to get away with saying that is because, last I heard, there was only one WWI Vet still out there!
That would be Frank W. Buckles, and if he is still alive, he turns 110 on Feb., 1st (next week).
From last year, a memorial was in the news.
http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.7975/pub_detail.asp
November 22, 2010
Stolen Cross, Stolen Honor: Mojave Desert Site Was Only Memorial to World War I Veterans
Maj. General James E. Livingston, USMC (ret) Medal of Honor Recipient, Major General Paul Vallely, USA (Ret.), Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter, USN (ret).
Frank Woodruff Buckles was born in Missouri 109 years ago. He is a national hero and the last living American veteran of World War I. But as we observed this Veterans Day - a day conceived as a celebration of the end of that bloody war - there was no national monument to honor Mr. Buckles and 5 million other Americans who served our nation in uniform then. The sole National Monument to World War I has been destroyed by vandals, and the Obama administration refuses to allow its replacement, even by private citizens, even at private expense.
In 1934, John Bembrey, along with several fellow veterans, erected a simple cross on a granite outcrop in the Mojave Desert. Their intention was to commemorate the sacrifice made by their comrades in the Great War, and for the next 65 years, this modest memorial was quietly maintained by volunteers. In 2000, the Mojave Desert Cross was designated by the U.S. Congress as the only official National Monument to World War I.
One thing we learned on the TAACOM Staff was that greater modern combat capability equates to an exponentially (not a simple) greater demand for support of that capability.
Bottom line, under normal (our term, as if there ever was such a thing) combat conditions, we used to plan for a minimal logistical requirement of a 'critical priority push' to support our capabilities IAW the acronym 35mm:
Class 3 (POL)
Class 5 (Armaments)
Medical (Class 8)
Maintenance (Class 9)
Beyond that, it was what we can provide when/if available.
It appears to me that, in spite of the distances and difficulties associated with establishing and maintaining an adequate LOC to a theatre like A'stan, we still retain both a capacity and a desire to provide maximum support to our forces far beyond our actual in-theatre combat requirements.
It is also reasonable to consider that even if our in-theatre requirements to support our own forces have diminished, our need to provide similar support for our allies (NATO and host nation) may have actually increased and the demand for providing both a tail and HQ/LNO elements to coordinate/supervise/provide that tail have also increased - especially when the need to 'out-source' so many of our current logistical requirements is the new norm.
Life at the TAACOM may have been purgatory for us combat arms types who swore we would personally hang any loggie toad who ever prevented any combat soldier from getting the adequate levels of critical supplies needed for conducting combat operations, but it also gave us an education in just how complicated it is to adequately equip, deploy, and support those who volunteer to man the "tip of the bayonet" in a modern military force like ours.
And so it goes...
Richard :munchin
silentreader
01-26-2011, 14:34
As a future part of that tail, let me add this to the point QPs and others have already made: In WWI, combat was simple. You knew exactly where your enemy was and how to engage him. It was also futile and suicidal. In today's asymmetrical environment, more guns in the fight does not necessarily equal a better result. Intel, Civil Affairs, Psyops and plenty of other folks have an important role to play in shaping the battlefield without necessarily bringing a gun into the fight (maybe.) The other thing to remember is that almost all support troops are combat-capable in a pinch.
In WWI, combat was simple. You knew exactly where your enemy was and how to engage him.
I know the point you're making, this is not a stab at your thought, but nothing about WWI trench warfare was simple. I'd take a thousand days down range today, (2.739726 years) than any single day in France.
Plato,
I appreciate having someone so experienced on the topic offering their thoughts.
I don't think anyone could argue against having enough ammo. :D
I meant to mention this as a "devil's advocate" comment: Increased capability shouldn't always (especially in the current conflicts??) be about how much ammo you need for that Apache, or that Bradley, Stryker, MLRS etc. The guys walking around on the ground are stretched pretty thin and 5.56 is pretty small. What I see in the T3R numbers is a movement further and further away from human capability when, at least in today's battles, we may need to focus more on getting bodies outside the wire and less on toys.
We may need to get more ability outside the wire, wherever the emination of the capability. Accurate fire support, eyes in the sky, good intel, mobility enhancers, there are a lot of deliverables that we owe our troops other than just ammo.
Consider one man with a laser and a missile on it's way, and the number of people necessary to make that happen.
Understand Devil's Advocate approach :)
The paper you cited tosses a lot of numbers about, gets lost while the author seems to realize that he can't help but run in circles, but doesn't get to anything useful in supporting a level of tooth/tail, or a way of deciding adequate tooth/tail. A good analysis needs input from many more fields, and a lot more from the strategic line of thinking.
All great stuff to add to that mostly empty shell propped up on my shoulders!
So far the comments have orbited around the logistics side of the equation. Any thoughts on the expansion of command elements?
As Plato pointed out, the paper that original set me on this topic doesn't do much to offer any concrete solutions, and I admit that this is probably a bit of a moving target. :D
Thanks to all for taking the time to weigh in and help me digest the subject.
I know the point you're making, this is not a stab at your thought, but nothing about WWI trench warfare was simple. I'd take a thousand days down range today, (2.739726 years) than any single day in France.
France EVER or just during the War? :)
So far the comments have orbited around the logistics side of the equation. Any thoughts on the expansion of command elements?
Thanks to all for taking the time to weigh in and help me digest the subject.
Command elements are interesting. You can draw them wherever you like on a big field army chart, but use pencil.
Skinny down a function at Brigade, and you'll see an increase at Battalion, Division, or both. Group functions from Brigade and pass them up for "efficiency", and the Division Commander will assign those functions in direct support to the Brigades.
The Pentagon has "great thinkers". They envision theoretical things that might "bite us".
We, on the other hand, have NCOs and XO's. Pentagon don't have a chance. :D
They fix whatever doesn't work that caused something that literally bit us until we bled. :(
silentreader
01-26-2011, 18:11
I know the point you're making, this is not a stab at your thought, but nothing about WWI trench warfare was simple. I'd take a thousand days down range today, (2.739726 years) than any single day in France.
Lord knows I agree with this. The courage it would take to respond to that order to charge, in the face of overwhelming machine gun and artillery fire, over 1,000+yards of no-man's land is beyond belief. The most amazing thing, to me, about WW1 is that it only spawned two rebellions (Russian and Arab).
The Reaper
01-26-2011, 19:08
Lord knows I agree with this. The courage it would take to respond to that order to charge, in the face of overwhelming machine gun and artillery fire, over 1,000+yards of no-man's land is beyond belief. The most amazing thing, to me, about WW1 is that it only spawned two rebellions (Russian and Arab).
You forget the French.
TR
silentreader
01-26-2011, 21:04
You forget the French.
TR
Good point. (http://www.suite101.com/content/france-1917-rebellion-in-the-western-front-a261328)
France EVER or just during the War? :)
I like France, more specifically, I like French girls, wine and women (ages 18 to 80), foods not bad either. My favorite town in France is Nice. I hate Paris - reminds me of Chicago and Philly, which I like, but why does a french town called Paris stirs such emotion, maybe because they are not Chicago or Philly, but I digress......
Any day, sitting in a trench during WWI has got to be a hollow feeling. Command, structure, "lambs to slaughter", ignorance, waste, etc.
What was that big outbrake of illness that hit America after WWI, with convalescing (convelessing) soldiers in tents and hospitals before their return to our own shores.
The incident escapes me? Someone chime is please.
cetheridge
01-26-2011, 22:23
What was that big outbrake of illness that hit America after WWI, with convalescing (convelessing) soldiers in tents and hospitals before their return to our own shores.
The incident escapes me? Someone chime is please.
The Spanish Influenza pandemic of 1918-1919???
http://virus.stanford.edu/uda/
The Influenza Pandemic of 1918
The influenza pandemic of 1918-1919 killed more people than the Great War, known today as World War I (WWI), at somewhere between 20 and 40 million people. It has been cited as the most devastating epidemic in recorded world history. More people died of influenza in a single year than in four-years of the Black Death Bubonic Plague from 1347 to 1351. Known as "Spanish Flu" or "La Grippe" the influenza of 1918-1919 was a global disaster.
In the fall of 1918 the Great War in Europe was winding down and peace was on the horizon. The Americans had joined in the fight, bringing the Allies closer to victory against the Germans. Deep within the trenches these men lived through some of the most brutal conditions of life, which it seemed could not be any worse. Then, in pockets across the globe, something erupted that seemed as benign as the common cold. The influenza of that season, however, was far more than a cold. In the two years that this scourge ravaged the earth, a fifth of the world's population was infected. The flu was most deadly for people ages 20 to 40. This pattern of morbidity was unusual for influenza which is usually a killer of the elderly and young children. It infected 28% of all Americans (Tice). An estimated 675,000 Americans died of influenza during the pandemic, ten times as many as in the world war. Of the U.S. soldiers who died in Europe, half of them fell to the influenza virus and not to the enemy (Deseret News). An estimated 43,000 servicemen mobilized for WWI died of influenza (Crosby). 1918 would go down as unforgettable year of suffering and death and yet of peace. As noted in the Journal of the American Medical Association final edition of 1918:
"The 1918 has gone: a year momentous as the termination of the most cruel war in the annals of the human race; a year which marked, the end at least for a time, of man's destruction of man; unfortunately a year in which developed a most fatal infectious disease causing the death of hundreds of thousands of human beings. Medical science for four and one-half years devoted itself to putting men on the firing line and keeping them there. Now it must turn with its whole might to combating the greatest enemy of all--infectious disease," (12/28/1918).
The effect of the influenza epidemic was so severe that the average life span in the US was depressed by 10 years. The influenza virus had a profound virulence, with a mortality rate at 2.5% compared to the previous influenza epidemics, which were less than 0.1%. The death rate for 15 to 34-year-olds of influenza and pneumonia were 20 times higher in 1918 than in previous years (Taubenberger). People were struck with illness on the street and died rapid deaths. One anectode shared of 1918 was of four women playing bridge together late into the night. Overnight, three of the women died from influenza (Hoagg). Others told stories of people on their way to work suddenly developing the flu and dying within hours (Henig). One physician writes that patients with seemingly ordinary influenza would rapidly "develop the most viscous type of pneumonia that has ever been seen" and later when cyanosis appeared in the patients, "it is simply a struggle for air until they suffocate," (Grist, 1979). Another physician recalls that the influenza patients "died struggling to clear their airways of a blood-tinged froth that sometimes gushed from their nose and mouth," (Starr, 1976). The physicians of the time were helpless against this powerful agent of influenza.
The influenza pandemic circled the globe. Most of humanity felt the effects of this strain of the influenza virus. It spread following the path of its human carriers, along trade routes and shipping lines. Outbreaks swept through North America, Europe, Asia, Africa, Brazil and the South Pacific (Taubenberger). In India the mortality rate was extremely high at around 50 deaths from influenza per 1,000 people (Brown). The Great War, with its mass movements of men in armies and aboard ships, probably aided in its rapid diffusion and attack. The origins of the deadly flu disease were unknown but widely speculated upon. Some of the allies thought of the epidemic as a biological warfare tool of the Germans. Many thought it was a result of the trench warfare, the use of mustard gases and the generated "smoke and fumes" of the war. A national campaign began using the ready rhetoric of war to fight the new enemy of microscopic proportions. A study attempted to reason why the disease had been so devastating in certain localized regions, looking at the climate, the weather and the racial composition of cities. They found humidity to be linked with more severe epidemics as it "fosters the dissemination of the bacteria," (Committee on Atmosphere and Man, 1923). Meanwhile the new sciences of the infectious agents and immunology were racing to come up with a vaccine or therapy to stop the epidemics.
Camp Devens
A collection of letters of a soldier stationed in Camp Funston Soldier
The origins of this influenza variant is not precisely known. It is thought to have originated in China in a rare genetic shift of the influenza virus. The recombination of its surface proteins created a virus novel to almost everyone and a loss of herd immunity. Recently the virus has been reconstructed from the tissue of a dead soldier and is now being genetically characterized. The name of Spanish Flu came from the early affliction and large mortalities in Spain (BMJ,10/19/1918) where it allegedly killed 8 million in May (BMJ, 7/13/1918). However, a first wave of influenza appeared early in the spring of 1918 in Kansas and in military camps throughout the US. Few noticed the epidemic in the midst of the war. Wilson had just given his 14 point address. There was virtually no response or acknowledgment to the epidemics in March and April in the military camps. It was unfortunate that no steps were taken to prepare for the usual recrudescence of the virulent influenza strain in the winter. The lack of action was later criticized when the epidemic could not be ignored in the winter of 1918 (BMJ, 1918). These first epidemics at training camps were a sign of what was coming in greater magnitude in the fall and winter of 1918 to the entire world.
The war brought the virus back into the US for the second wave of the epidemic. It first arrived in Boston in September of 1918 through the port busy with war shipments of machinery and supplies. The war also enabled the virus to spread and diffuse. Men across the nation were mobilizing to join the military and the cause. As they came together, they brought the virus with them and to those they contacted. The virus killed almost 200,00 in October of 1918 alone. In November 11 of 1918 the end of the war enabled a resurgence. As people celebrated Armistice Day with parades and large partiess, a complete disaster from the public health standpoint, a rebirth of the epidemic occurred in some cities. The flu that winter was beyond imagination as millions were infected and thousands died. Just as the war had effected the course of influenza, influenza affected the war. Entire fleets were ill with the disease and men on the front were too sick to fight. The flu was devastating to both sides, killing more men than their own weapons could.
With the military patients coming home from the war with battle wounds and mustard gas burns, hospital facilities and staff were taxed to the limit. This created a shortage of physicians, especially in the civilian sector as many had been lost for service with the military. Since the medical practitioners were away with the troops, only the medical students were left to care for the sick. Third and forth year classes were closed and the students assigned jobs as interns or nurses (Starr,1976). One article noted that "depletion has been carried to such an extent that the practitioners are brought very near the breaking point," (BMJ, 11/2/1918). The shortage was further confounded by the added loss of physicians to the epidemic. In the U.S., the Red Cross had to recruit more volunteers to contribute to the new cause at home of fighting the influenza epidemic. To respond with the fullest utilization of nurses, volunteers and medical supplies, the Red Cross created a National Committee on Influenza. It was involved in both military and civilian sectors to mobilize all forces to fight Spanish influenza (Crosby, 1989). In some areas of the US, the nursing shortage was so acute that the Red Cross had to ask local businesses to allow workers to have the day off if they volunteer in the hospitals at night (Deseret News). Emergency hospitals were created to take in the patients from the US and those arriving sick from overseas.
The pandemic affected everyone. With one-quarter of the US and one-fifth of the world infected with the influenza, it was impossible to escape from the illness. Even President Woodrow Wilson suffered from the flu in early 1919 while negotiating the crucial treaty of Versailles to end the World War (Tice). Those who were lucky enough to avoid infection had to deal with the public health ordinances to restrain the spread of the disease. The public health departments distributed gauze masks to be worn in public. Stores could not hold sales, funerals were limited to 15 minutes. Some towns required a signed certificate to enter and railroads would not accept passengers without them. Those who ignored the flu ordinances had to pay steep fines enforced by extra officers (Deseret News). Bodies pilled up as the massive deaths of the epidemic ensued. Besides the lack of health care workers and medical supplies, there was a shortage of coffins, morticians and gravediggers (Knox). The conditions in 1918 were not so far removed from the Black Death in the era of the bubonic plague of the Middle Ages.
I'll figure out where to place this post in the library, too:
Well written book on the 1918 pandemic
The Great Influenza by John M Barry (has an updated afterword on the Avian Flu)
I'd be willing to send it to anyone interested.
Wet Dog - I have about the same acceptable age range for my women. French or not.
Does all this palavering mean y'all think it's the 'tail' or the 'tooth' which is more susceptable to the flu?
Richard :munchin
mark46th
01-27-2011, 10:39
I am of the school where efficient supply/support is the key to successful operations.
"Tell me what you want done, give me what I ask for then get the hell out of the way."
1stindoor
01-27-2011, 12:02
I am of the school where efficient supply/support is the key to successful operations.
"Tell me what you want done, give me what I ask for then get the hell out of the way."
This reminds me of the old joke...
Ranger Option
Forces/Equipment Committed: If the Rangers went in, they would send a Ranger company of 120 men with top-notch issued equipment and weapons.
Mission Preparation: The Ranger Company First Sergeant would conduct a Hair Cut Inspection and equipment layout, while the officers consulted SOPs and held sand table exercises.
Infiltration Technique: Agressive Air Assualt utilizing both Rotary Wing Assets and Static-Line Paracuting. MH-47's would deploy ATV teams to secure the location of the Hijacking on each end of the tarmac.
Actions in the Objective Area: Once they arrived, the Ranger company would establish their Command post, wait for thumbs up from the security elements, conduct a leaders recon, reapply their camouflage, and conduct final preparations for Actions on the OBJ.
Results of Operation: The Rescue/Recovery Operation would be completed within three hours; all of the terrorists and some of the passengers would have been killed, the Rangers would have sustained light casualties and the 747 would be worthless to anyone except a scrap dealer.
Special Forces Option
Forces/Equipment Committed: If Special Forces went in, they would send only a 12 man team, however, due to the exotic nature of their equipment the SF Team would cost the same amount to deploy as the Ranger Company.
Mission Preparation: The SF Team Sergeant would request relaxed grooming standards for the team. All members of the team would spend a grueling afternoon at a quality spa ensuring physical abilities would be honed.
Infiltration Technique: The team would insist on separate travel orders with Max Per Diem, and each would get to the site of the hijacking by his own means. At least one third of the team would insist on jumping in HALO.
Actions in the Objective Area: Once they arrived , the SF Team would cache their military uniforms, establish a Team Room at the best hotel in the area, use their illegal Team Fund to stock the unauthorized Team Room Bar, check out the situation by talking to the locals, and have a Team Meeting to discuss the merits of the terrorists' cause.
Results of Operation: The Rescue/Recovery Operation would take a week to complete and by that time all of the terrorists would have been killed, (and would have left signed confessions); all the passengers would be safe, although they would spend the remainder of their lives asking themselves "what just happened"; and several of the female passengers would be pregnant. The 747 would be essentially unharmed, the team would have taken no casualties but would have used up, or "lost" all the "high speed" equipment issued to them while submitting an additional enormous size travel voucher to cover refit/reset operations.
This reminds me of the old joke...
Yep - it was like this circa 1981:
The Chief of Staff of the Army asked his aide, who was both Special Forces and Ranger qualified, which unit he would recommend for the proposed assignment to form an anti-terrorist unit. The aide responded with a parable:
If there was an airplane on the ground which had been seized and held by terrorists, along with its passengers and crew, and you sent in an anti-terrorist unit formed by one of these two organizations, what would you expect to happen?
1. If the Rangers went in, they would jump in a Ranger company of 120 men with standard issue equipment. They would insist on running to the site of the incident, and the airplane with the terrorists would not leave the site once the unit arrived, even if they had to climb on the wings to stop it. The terrorists and most of the passengers would be dead, and the airplane would probably be worthless to anyone except a scrap dealer.
2. If the Special Forces unit deployed, it would consist of 12 men (all SF unites are divisible by 12 for some arcane historical reason) and due to the exotic nature of their equipment, it would cost about the same amount as the Ranger company to deploy. The team would insist on separate travel orders, and each team member would get to the site of the seizure by his own means. At least one-third of the team would insist on "jumping in." The plane with the terrorists would almost certainly not take off. The terrorists would all be dead, and have left signed confessions. All the passengers would be ruined psychologically for the remainder of their lives, and the women would all be pregnant. The airplane would be essentially unharmed. The team would have taken no casualties, but would have used up, lost, or stolen all the equipment issued to them.
OBTW - nobody caught the flu. :p
And so it goes...;)
Richard :munchin
mark46th
01-27-2011, 16:15
Then, they would have their story adapted for television on "The Unit", except they would have been issued condoms so the women would be safe. Kind of...
Dozer523
01-27-2011, 17:11
. . . What strikes me is that technology should be making C2 easier Command and control is dependent upon communication.
Technology doesn't make things easier it makes things quicker.
You want to get the message across in the easiest way possible?
Get right in front of the receiver, pull him close by the lapels, look into his eyes and use simple sentences.:D
1stinthedoor; Richard: I heard the airplane would be missing too.
1stinthedoor; Richard: I heard the airplane would be missing too.
Only if it was near Bermuda or in a Stephen Spielberg script for Richard Dreyfus. ;)
Richard :munchin
Last hard class
01-27-2011, 17:54
1stinthedoor; Richard: I heard the airplane would be missing too.
Burying that in the Mata mile area would be quite the challenge.:D
LHC
The Reaper
01-27-2011, 18:22
Burying that in the Mata mile area would be quite the challenge.:D
LHC
Not for the Brown Brothers.
They probably still have it in their barn.:D
TR
Scimitar
02-23-2011, 10:19
Was just taking a look at this myself,
While I was in DEP my Station Commander asked me to put together a little document that the recruiters could use to overcome the common objection that a mother would give when her son was thinking of enlisting.
"I WILL NOT allow my son to go and get killed in Iraq and no way in hell he's enlisting 11B - Their the ones who die"
I used a few sources but one was the same as the OPs
I couldn't find the whole document, but here's part of the excel document with some interesting tooth to tail stats versus casualty percentages. Not a full statistical representation at all. But interesting stuff all the same.
One interesting point is that ALOT of parents had a poor idea of the risk of being a Combat Soldier due to Hollywood's continual depiction of extremely high casualty rates.
I remember watching Tour of Duty with the old man when I was a kid and thinking "Shit every contact some guys getting killed" in reality you where seeing something like a 1:50 death ratio and 1:20 hospitalized wounded ratio.
Scimitar
I've been watching the news since I've been back and my "gut" instinct is saying...
"You were safer in Iraq." :eek::D
Stay safe.