The Loop

[NousDefionsDoc]

Ken Good Article (http://www.strategosintl.com/pdfs/OODA.pdf)

Wanna discuss Looping?

[JGarcia]

I'm game.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Ok, simple or complicated and why?

[NousDefionsDoc]

Next question - Did Boyd's theories cause an RMA?

[JGarcia]

I think that its only complicated when you are new to it. But for it to be as useful as it was intended to be, one should make every effort to master the use of the loop, in all its intricacies. Its like driving a manual transmission the first time. Takes a bit of fumbling at first. But I think once you have developed a feel for it, it becomes second nature. At least thats how I interpret what I have read.

Which brings me to the point that I have never applied it to the real world yet. Still trying to think of ways to integrate the loop with 7-8 and MOUT. Any suggestion for an infantry squad leader?

[JGarcia]

In what ways do you think MTET-C are applicable to OODA? Im only just a national guard infantry squad leader. So bear with me. MTET-C is a variation of the original army METT-TC that some of our trainers with the 91st suggested that we use instead.

Can you explain RMA? If you're asking about what sort of impact Boyd had on modern military thinking and doctrine. I would say that, from what I have read, and that is limited, he appears to have had a huge impact. Marine Corps amphibious warfare doctrine is based on his theories. Gulf War I, Cheney consulted Boyd at length before the initial invasion. He is quoted as saying "I can't let norm do this high diddle up the middle plan." That language the SecDef used was Boyd's.

During a press conference in Gulf War I BG Richard Niel said, "We got inside his decision cycle" when asked for the reason Iraqi troops were surrendering by the thousands.

[Smokin Joe]

Originally posted by NousDefionsDoc
Ok, simple or complicated and why?


Both. :munchin

In all seriousness I think it is both simple and complicated.

Its complicated for the first timer. B/C it is the first time they are understanding (in steps) how their mind works when the fit hits the shan.

Simple for the seasoned individual who has been working with it for awhile b/c they understand the steps the mind is making. In fully understanding what or better yet how there mind is working they are more effective in applying techniques.

Now correct me if I'm wrong: But isn't the OODA Loop designed to help us combat tunnel vision. Which will give us a better tactical advantage in a fight.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Among other things.

RMA - Revolution in Military Affairs. UYou'll have to research that on your own, I'm not writing all that stuff again.

MTET-C - what are the letters?

What do you guys think are the land mines with the Loop?

[The Reaper]

Deception plans, bad assumptions, decentralized execution and an enemy who knows what you are doing, and is using the system against you.

TR

[NousDefionsDoc]

Originally posted by The Reaper
Deception plans, bad assumptions, decentralized execution and an enemy who knows what you are doing, and is using the system against you.

TR
Mmm, sounds eerily familiar.

Not being subjective in evaluating your own orientation would be a big one for me. As well as imposing your orientation on your view of the enemy's.

[JGarcia]

TR-
Can you elaborate as to how you see the deception plans as a landmine? I imagine that you are saying the time and effrots expended to conduct deception operations could be problematic.

Suppose deception were part of your SOP, budgeting your time and resources devoted to deception. I suppose though, that it all boils down to fingerspitzengefuhl, so that deception becomes natural, and the amount used is a quantity that the commander intuitively knows is sufficient. He develops a FEEL for it.

On bad assumptions. I think what you are speaking about is a generalization of a badly conducted analysis/synthesis process in the 'ORIENT' phase. The danger is that one will make bad assumptions with reference to the relationship between himself and his foe. Which is precisely what you want your adversary to do, if I am correct. I dont think I understand this area of his theory very well yet. But bear with me, I am trying to wrap my mind around this. Still have to think about this and read on it some more. But I think I am headed in the right direction.

NDD-
I want to say that I dont think boyd intended for you to concern yourself with the idea of imposing your orientation on your (imagined) view of the adversary's. I think he intended that you conduct your own unique 'ORIENT' phase, generate a hypothesis ('DECIDE') and test it 'ACT'.
Wouldnt this cause you to be the actor and not the reactor, making you the one setting the pace, not your adversary, and forcing him to keep pace with you. The inherant risk is always there.

[JGarcia]

During the ACT phase, when you test your hypothesis, you will get environmental (battlefield) feedback (good or bad), that you incorporate into your observation phase, and then start anew.

Right?

[The Reaper]

I am saying that if you fall for the enemy's deception plan, you are orienting, deciding and acting against a false threat, and if the deception plan was properly integrated, falling into his trap, putting him inside your OODA loop.

Assumptions? Some assumptions must be made in military planning. When I assume away enemy capabilities, or overassume the capabilities of my own, I am pulling the wool over my own eyes.

Let me assume that a small force is capable of conquering the enemy. I will assume that the HN will be grateful and compliant. I assume that the utilities will be functional, or require only minor repairs to restore. I assume that the enemy forces will surrender and will return to lawful employment upon release. I assume that the post-conflict military operations can be conducted with a minimal military force. I assume that the neighboring countries will control their borders with my target nation and control access. After these vastly over-optimistic assumptions, who is inside who's OODA loop?

TR

[NousDefionsDoc]

"NDD-
I want to say that I dont think boyd intended for you to concern yourself with the idea of imposing your orientation on your (imagined) view of the adversary's. I think he intended that you conduct your own unique 'ORIENT' phase, generate a hypothesis ('DECIDE') and test it 'ACT'.
Wouldnt this cause you to be the actor and not the reactor, making you the one setting the pace, not your adversary, and forcing him to keep pace with you. The inherant risk is always there."

rubbish. gross over simplification!:D

I am talking about before the engagement. Very simple example. If you are going to use a distraction device to disrupt his observe and orientation, you assume that your adversary will be distracted by said device. If he uses them as part of his arsenal as well, chances are he will not be distracted as he understands, on observing the device being employed, that it is a distraction. He looks away and at the same time moves. See what I mean?

[NousDefionsDoc]

Originally posted by The Reaper
I am saying that if you fall for the enemy's deception plan, you are orienting, deciding and acting against a false threat, and if the deception plan was properly integrated, falling into his trap, putting him inside your OODA loop.

Assumptions? Some assumptions must be made in military planning. When I assume away enemy capabilities, or overassume the capabilities of my own, I am pulling the wool over my own eyes.

Let me assume that a small force is capable of conquering the enemy. I will assume that the HN will be grateful and compliant. I assume that the utilities will be functional, or require only minor repairs to restore. I assume that the enemy forces will surrender and will return to lawful employment upon release. I assume that the post-conflict military operations can be conducted with a minimal military force. I assume that the neighboring countries will control their borders with my target nation and control access. After these vastly over-optimistic assumptions, who is inside who's OODA loop?

TR

Absolutely. Timely and relevant.

[Solid]

I think it's as complicated as you make it. If you chose not to take the loop seriously, it's simple. I remember seeing it for the first time and saying 'okay, cool', memorising it and being done with it. Bad move. You expand that link and look at it, having become interested in it, and it's fairly complicated. Certainly, when it comes to determining your actions during the different steps and possible reactions of the enemy it can be complicated. Eventually, though, the steps become well integrated into your everyday life and things become simple because they are instinctual.

Solid

[usaf2ltdb]

Useful website- www.d-n-i.net - run by Chuck Spinney. Has the best stuff on OODA you'll find anywhere. Also, any folks close to Quantico can go to MCU and they'll let you dig through the Boyd archives with zero hassle...Can get video of the man giving a brief on the subject made into a DVD.

As to shaping your adversary's observation/orientation, that's very much at the core of Boyd's work. He was a devotee of Sun Tzu. Loved to quote Patton on "hold him by the nose and kick him in the pants." As was mentioned, he inspired the Desert Storm plan, of which half was the USMC pretend landing that fixed the Iraqis in place so the hail mary could loop behind.

Also key to remember that "loop" was a term Boyd hated. He preferred "cycle," which is much better reflected in some of his later (complicated) diagrams. Each portion feeds back and forward to the others. New information can preempt acting while you're making up your mind, causing a different observation, creating a different orientation, leading to a different decision.


(first post after months of lurking. woohoo.)

[Roguish Lawyer]

Welcome, Lieutenant.

[pulque]

Originally posted by NousDefionsDoc
Ok, simple or complicated and why?

"too many mind. no mind." :munchin

[Student2501]

It's simple and complicated. We all do it in every aspect of our lives regardless of if we are aware of it or not. How effective we are at it is something entirely different. The most important part is the observation phase, if you aren't attending to the right stimuli, or are being decieved either by yourself, or your enemy then the rest of the cycle will not be very effective.

The mismatch between reality and what you think is reality will compel you to go through the cycle again until you achieve the desired outcome or until the enemy achieves his.

If you get a chance to read Boyd's Destruction and Creation it really helps to explain more of the theory. Really opens it up more.

usaf2ltb's suggesstion of www.d-n-i.net is right on. Great sight not just for Boyd enthusiasts but for the Military Reform, 3G and 4G warfare, and goings on in the Pentagon as well.

Great Books on Boyd are:

Mind of War by Grant T Hammond:
Great info on Boyd's life, the Military Reform Movement, and Boyd's other theories on War as expressed in his Patterns of Conflict brief.

Boyd by Robert Coram
Boyd's biography. The great part about this is Destruction and Creation is included at the end of the book. IMHO one of the most brilliant things I've ever read.

Also a paper on Boyd's theory as it applies to the Army:
A Critique of The Boyd Theory - Is It Relevant to the Army
Authors: Polk, Robert B.; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES (Haven't read this one yet, but it's on the list.)

Sorry for being long winded but this topic is great.

:D

[LongWire]

Stumbled across this blog site last year while deployed......meant to post this but never remembered to. Great write up as well as being a good blog to follow......

I'm posting the link, since the essay is way too large to post here.

http://pajamasmedia.com/ejectejecteject/2008/01/01/forty-second-boyd-and-the-big-picture-part-1/