Does The United States Still Need a USSOCOM?

[The Reaper]

Excellent questions.

I find myself agreeing very strongly with most of his comments.

Recommended reading for all SF and SOF. In fact, it would be tremendously beneficial for our leadership to read it as well.

TR

Posted by SWJ Editors on December 13, 2009 10:25 AM

Does The United States Still Need a U.S. Special Operations Command?
How Effective Has USSOCOM Been in Fighting the Long War?
by Yasotay

The establishment of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987 with the passage of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1987 was designed to fix the problems with Special Operations that were brought to light after the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt at Desert One in 1980. Congress did what the military establishment would not. This legislation provided unity of command and control for Special Operations Forces and elevated Special Operations to a near peer with the Services giving it “service-like” responsibilities as well as a little used Combatant Command authority.

However, in 2009, perhaps it is time for Congress to review their handiwork. Of course many outside the military establishment are enamored with the myth and romanticism of Special Operations. There are so many “groupies” among staffers and in academia that it is hard to see Special Operations for what it really is and what it has become. And within the military, Special Operations has been “hijacked” by a group of hyper-conventional Ranger types and other supporting elements that Special Operations and most important, its heart and soul – Special Forces - has lost its way. There are so many in and out of the military who claim ties to Special Operations that it is unlikely that there will ever be a critical look at USSOCOM and what it has become.

There is no doubt that Special Operations Forces, including from across the spectrum: the hyper-conventional Special Mission Units including the Rangers and Special Operations Aviation, as well the SEALs, the Air Commandos, the MARSOC Marines and the intellectual, indirect approach experts in Special Forces such as Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations, have made tremendous contributions to the United States’ fight against terrorists and insurgents. However, it is important to note that they have done this working for the Combatant Commanders (formerly regional Commander in Chiefs) and Ambassadors and not under USSOCOM.

So let’s take a broad look at USSOCOM and specifically focus on its headquarters and what it has done for our nation since 9-11 and what it has become. Congress might want to delve into some of these issues and ask some hard questions.

(Continued at link below)

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/12/does-the-united-states-still-n/

[The Reaper]

He has some very valid points, however I am not sure getting rid of JSOC is the answer. I will be the first to admit many folks here forgot more about SOF than I will ever know, but returning to CA after a long break I see where things have taken on a more conventional feel.

IMHO SOF has lost its way in that it lost sight of the PRINCIPALS of why they were established. For instance why is a conventional general in charge of an unconventional war? Instead of SOF being under a seperate command or suborting its self to a conventional unit like CA does, JSOC should be running the war and conventional units should be reporting to them.

If we were in a cold war type conflict with large armies and manouver units fighting each other the current command structure makes sense, but in the war on terror it is just ass backwards IMHO.

I did not take it that he said that we should get rid of JSOC.

He said that JSOC should be out from underneath SOCOM as a separate command. I agree, they do not really answer to SOCOM, so why have the pretense?

OTOH, JSOC is not the right unit to try and run an FID or COIN effort. They do not need conventional units under them, they have already absorbed far too many assets already, at the expense of SF.

Just my .02, YMMV.

TR

[Ambush Master]

I think this quote says it ALL!!!

"And within the military, Special Operations has been “hijacked” by a group of hyper-conventional Ranger types and other supporting elements that Special Operations and most important, its heart and soul – Special Forces - has lost its way."

[Warrior-Mentor]

I think this quote says it ALL!!!

"And within the military, Special Operations has been “hijacked” by a group of hyper-conventional Ranger types and other supporting elements that Special Operations and most important, its heart and soul – Special Forces - has lost its way."

Just like islam has been hijacked?

I'm not buying it. Special Forces is doing what it should in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Philippines, and so on....our guys know what needs to be done.

Is it getting the prioritization and resources it should?

That's another argument...

He makes very valid points on the C2 issues with USSOCOM and forcing non-SF types to command effectively SF organizations. Apparently the geniuses who thought that up haven't taken the time to read "Not A Good Day to Die" ... And will need to relearn the important lesson that putting Special Forces Officers in command of Aviation Squadrons in combat gets people killed, oh wait...it was the other way around...

[Scimitar]

Wow, what a governance eye opener.

I think it was a pre 9/11 SOCOM commander who said some thing like that his job was to command nothing and to influence everything. For the life of me I can't find the article. (Found it, it was General Shelton - I pretty much paraphased him here)

He went on to explain that his job was to build relationships with the service and operational commanders and educate them on SOF capabilities. SOF shouldn't have authority in a theater; they should have so well educated theater, service, and operational commanders that when ever a problem that can better be solved by an SOF capability arises an SOF unit is used.

Education and relationships creates flexibility, legislated governance creates problems and resentment. Is the reason SF hasn't been used to head up the COIN so well because SF failed to build relationships and educate well?

I've paraphrased him here, and it's only my PoV from the private sector...I'd be interested in an educated PoV.

Scimitar

[LongTabSigO]

The important thing is that this question is asked and seriously debated.

Yasotay's article is compelling because it takes the question down to the basic problem: what does SOCOM actually DO?

Joking about higher headquarters aside, the weakness in the creation of a "SOCOM" from the beginning is that the Services will ultimately hold sway over who comes to, stays, and never gets to this HQ. As a result, the folks who really need to be there and provide leadership have better options which do not advance the role of SOCOM. That leaves lesser lights who, however well intentioned, nonetheless have steered SOCOM astray.

The (virtually) impossible to implement solution is to create an actual SOF Service. A credible argument was made that it creation could follow along the lines of the creation of the Air Force in 1947. I am not sure that the overhead necessary is justified; it would probably recreate what we have now.

[Richard]

I, too, found the article insightful and relevant.

As for USSOCOM (or any Unified Combatant Command with such functional responsibilities) - if they cannot provide C4I and planning, training, and operational support for their subordinate elements - WTF good are they? :confused:

Richard's jaded $.02 :munchin

[Peregrino]

I mentioned this article to one of the "big" bosses just in passing. He laughed and said "it has gone viral in the HQ". A lot of food for thought, especially considering some of what is coming down the pipe from USSOCOM.

[Abu-Shakra]

Has anyone here read "Afghanistan And the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare by Hy Rothstein?? A lot of what is said in this article is reflected in the book.

[kgoerz]

Here at MARSOC. They spent more money on converting real Bayonets into Door Handles for the HQ Building. Then they did on the one and only Shoot House they are building for the School. Ya, I would say it's been High jacked.
The only Flat Range they are building is an indoor Range. Completely worthless for CMMS Training. I guess the HQ people can go and shoot their Pistols during lunch in the AC.

[The Reaper]

Here at MARSOC. They spent more money on converting real Bayonets into Door Handles for the HQ Building. Then they did on the one and only Shoot House they are building for the School. Ya, I would say it's been High jacked.
The only Flat Range they are building is an indoor Range. Completely worthless for CMMS Training. I guess the HQ people can go and shoot their Pistols during lunch in the AC.

SOCOM MFP-11 money at work.

TR

[mark46th]

I have stated before and will continue to say that SF should be out of USSOCOM. Putting SF under the command of anyone who has other than SF's goodwill at the forefront does SF no good. I know it is a source of funding but SF is suffering the disrespect that prostitutes suffer - we are a great piece of a$$ until the wife shows up threatening divorce and we get dumped in a back alley. SF needs an independent command like the structure that was in place during the 50's, 60's and early 70's...

This did lead to problems because our command didn't have the influence to protect SF and we eventually became cannon fodder for the regular army after the Desert Eagle fiasco. I guess it is a cycle that we go through. SF becomes sexy and the darlings of the powers that be (Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon) followed by a down cycle (Jimmy Carter) that takes years to overcome.

[glebo]

I, too, found the article insightful and relevant.

As for USSOCOM (or any Unified Combatant Command with such functional responsibilities) - if they cannot provide C4I and planning, training, and operational support for their subordinate elements - WTF good are they? :confused:

Richard's jaded $.02 :munchin

I agree with this 100%.

I wonder if it relates to making the "O's" 18 series??? (which I always thought was wrong) After a young CPT spends his 1.5/2 yrs on an ODA....what do you do with him?? I know he will make his tracks through BN/GP staff jobs, but what then?? You have more higher ranking "O's" that can't go back to teams.....so you make up other billets to put them in....more staff positions of course....ya gotta put them somewhere.

I agree with Richard though....if they don't C&C the tms/co's/bn's/gp's in theater, WTF are they good for??

A "paper" command??

food for thought I suppose....

[Basenshukai]

I agree with this 100%.

I wonder if it relates to making the "O's" 18 series??? (which I always thought was wrong) After a young CPT spends his 1.5/2 yrs on an ODA....what do you do with him?? I know he will make his tracks through BN/GP staff jobs, but what then?? You have more higher ranking "O's" that can't go back to teams.....so you make up other billets to put them in....more staff positions of course....ya gotta put them somewhere.

I agree with Richard though....if they don't C&C the tms/co's/bn's/gp's in theater, WTF are they good for??

A "paper" command??

food for thought I suppose....

I think that the reason for making the officers as 18 series was so that you could keep that officer within the structure of the organization. Imagine having to teach each and every new CO, BN and GRP commander what SF requires, what its true capabilities are and what the priorities for training, operations, equipment and related funding should be? It'd be a freaking nightmare and soon enough, other SOF would eventually eliminate SF from the picture as their "O's" would be hard at work advocating for their respective forces. Unless your experience has been that all, or most, SF officers sucked, I find that not being able to keep the young officers you train and bring into the organization would be a far worse problem than you can imagine. Now, to address the issue of keeping an officer around long enough to truly learn "ropes", then, perhaps it might be worth to bring them in as LTs, and put them in a team as assistants to the SFODA CDR - kind of like what the SEALs do. By the time that LT becomes an SFODA CDR, he would have had - at least - two, maybe three years on a team. When he walks away from the SFODA, he'd have close to five years in there. Then, he becomes an SFODB CDR for a year or two. Heck, look at how long an enlisted guy spends on a team today before he is pulled to SWC, or some other assignment.

[glebo]

No, not all O's I have served with were bad....I just think that moving them out for awhile would have cut down on all the staff positions that had to be created to keep them. I do agree with bringing him in as a LT like we used to, get more "SF" time out of him.

Sending them back to conventional ranks for awhile, could be good or bad. It would spread the capabilities of us to the conventional side who does not truly understand our operations, or....it could go the other way around I suppose.

Look at what we have now, "Purple" commands, most of the people we work for now aren't SF anyway...but claim "SOF"...but are they realy??

Having an SF General is great....but what "weight" do they really have??

Seems like we are always getting the short end of the stick....anyway, just one of my rants...and pet peaves.

I'm just a little guy, never made it past a BN staff job (except where I'm at now, but I'm a civvy). I'm sure there's a bigger picture than my little world....but I like my little world.

[mojaveman]

I'm just a little guy, never made it past a BN staff job (except where I'm at now, but I'm a civvy). I'm sure there's a bigger picture than my little world....but I like my little world.[/QUOTE]

Me too Glebo,

Broadening one's world view can get depressing...

[Utah Bob]

I Now, to address the issue of keeping an officer around long enough to truly learn "ropes", then, perhaps it might be worth to bring them in as LTs, and put them in a team as assistants to the SFODA CDR - kind of like what the SEALs do. By the time that LT becomes an SFODA CDR, he would have had - at least - two, maybe three years on a team. When he walks away from the SFODA, he'd have close to five years in there. Then, he becomes an SFODB CDR for a year or two. Heck, look at how long an enlisted guy spends on a team today before he is pulled to SWC, or some other assignment.

Deja vu from the '60s!:D

Of course the problem is still that you end up with more Os than slots for them and they must either end up in non SF units or put into created, and not necessarily needed, positions.
One difficulty will always be the commissioned career track. Promote or die will prevent officers from becoming experts in one field.
The Peter Principle has always been alive. If a Captain is a fantastic Team Leader he'll eventually end up in a staff job (which he might just suck at).
No such thing as an experienced, old, grizzled captain in the modern American Army.
MOO

[The Reaper]

I seem to see a lot of officer envy/hate going on here occasionally. Not sure why, last time I heard, anyone who wanted to and who met the standards could try to become an officer. Things have changed over the years, mostly for the better, and some of us are quick to bitch without even knowing what the current situation is.

Maybe it is because I served before there was an SF branch, and afterwards, but I cannot see it working anywhere near as well under the old system. Guys came to SF just for a ticket punch and moved on. Good officers were discouraged from going to SF at all. I served with good and bad officers, and it seemed that I found a lot more of the bad ones prior to SF Branch. You could have a SF commander (up to and beyond Group level) in the old days with little or no time in SF. Now, at least you know your CO above the team has multiple SF assignments. The officers being screened for SFAS have at least two years of report cards behind them, and those who are not stellar perfomers in their previous assignments are not selected. Officers do not attend a watered-down version of SFAS or the SFQC. If anything, they are evaluated more harshly, especially in leadership roles. The 18A portion of the SFQC and the team time is definitely a fire hose, as some of our 18As here can verify. O's who cannot hack it are usually sent packing. If you are lucky enough to have a 180A (Warrant O), you get an even better learning experience. If nothing else, at least when the young Captain makes Major and gets a Company, he has some understanding of how bad it sucks out there when someone makes one of those 1:World map waves and asks for the impossible.

There are more billets for O-3s and O-4s after command than you would believe. Hell, there are almost a dozen majors in the Group S-3 shop, and each battalion has a half dozen or more. With Battalion, Group, USASFC, SWCS, USASOC, SOCOM, and tons of other positions, we are usually short on officers. As many officer advisors as can be spared are filling billets downrange. We are not doing to many Club Med or ROTC trips these days.

BTW, I just spoke with a Captain yesterday with 23 years of service, and another one today with 20.

All in all, based on what I see daily, I am satisfied that we are doing the best we can to select, train, employ, and maintain the officers within SF. Not everyone is perfect, but all in all, I think we have a pretty good system.

Just my .02, YMMV.

TR

[Green Light]

+1 on that Reaper.

The officers that we saw in the late 80s were, in most cases, better than those in the early 80s and 70s. Those guys are now 1 and 2 star types. All of them that I served with at the detachment level (save one) were true SF types. Another did plenty of detachment time and gamed the system at least twice as a general's aide (sell your soul, but you'll get promoted). Three of those 5 guys I have the utmost respect for - good decent men who were loyal to their people, listened to their NCOs, and let their guys do their jobs.

Even with SF branch, you could in those days spend too much time on a team. I knew a CPT who spent three years in command, almost all of it deployed. He got stellar report cards and got passed over for MAJ while at the school house in 1994 (plus or minus a year). Heck of a guy who ended up making a ton of money on the outside. But what he wanted to do was be in SF more than anything else. He was one of those officers the NCOs loved to work for.

[greenberetTFS]

First of all,I've no really good understanding of the officers currently in service now....:) But I've gotten to know quite a few of them on this forum and as I've said this before I would have wished to have served with "any of them"................ :D The ones I have served with were equally respected by me and altho there are unfortunately some that weren't............ ;)

Big Teddy :munchin

[Dozer523]

The 18 A is not going away. When it started it was hard.

In the mid-80's when the 18A was being proposed and briefed to the VCSA he specifically stated that the Army was not going create an officer branch to ensure career progression.
When the branch came it was interesting to note the senior officers (MAJ, LTC's) who were "tenured" that made the jump. Seemed to me those branch transfers fell into two very distinct categories: those who as younger officers had served as SF (probably when branches discouraged it); were dedicated to the mission and the branch; wanted to contribute and guide it.
And the others -- guys who as younger officers had served as SF but were dedicated to themselves and saw that getting in on the ground floor of SF might revive a faltering career because there wasn't going to be a lot of competition for those early Battalion Command slots.
I commanded two ODA's under three LTCs. One was an outstanding soldier, who I am going to be eternally grateful and proud to serve with, one was ehhhh. (both made star rank) and one who at the mention of his name I want to spit. He retired as a LTC. And I doubt he is missed.

There was pressure on young Captains to branch transfer, initially. At least at SWC (go figure). But, promotion boards did not realize that ODA Command was exactly like Infantry Company Command and the initial boards were bloodbaths for non (prior) branch qualified Captains. I always suspected the Infantry Colonel on the Board mentioned that A-teams "look a lot like squads with really experienced NCOs".

[Richard]

I kinda thought the article was about issues related to USSOCOM C4I and planning, training, and operational support - not whether or not SF Branch was/is a good thing.

Richard's $.02 :munchin

[glebo]

It was....I think my comments on the "O's" being branched over to 18 derailed it abit. I should have been more specific, I meant to steer it into how it more or less helped to evolve these multi-echelons of command we have and their ability to C4I actual SF ground forces, being everything is going "purple" these days....

I guess that's what ya get when you cant type in "meaning" to your words....or something like that.......I guess I'm just not that articulate.

[Stras]

SOCOM has a purpose, though at times I question it.

I use them quite frequently to put their weight behind an issue I'm fighting for our subordinate commands. At the same time, they are a buffer and serve to deflect a portion of the BS that is coming down the chain. As we all know, there are times when the BS is turned on full power.

Having been in SOCOM repeatedly for conferences and visits during the last 3 years, it is like everyother organization. There are doers and there are spacefillers. The previous statement applies to officers, warrant officers, enlisted and civilian (GS/Contractor) equally.

It is a purple command in that it is a joint unit. That does not mean that everyone assigned there is SOF, there are a large portion from Mother Navy, Mother AF, Mother USMC and Mother Army. Some have a clue and others are simply filling a "joint" billet for their promotion checklist.

JMHO

[bailaviborita]

I know this is an old post- but someone revived it on swj, and there was a link to ps.com on there, so thought I'd post a thought:

SOCOM has definitely done some great things for its subordinates. Today it probably continues to do so- but just like any bureaucracy it has grown into one that stifles change and innovativeness. I'm not sure how to change that- because it is the system SOCOM has to compete in (DoD and the government in general) that causes much of the suffering. But, it would be nice if we could affect change at lower levels instead of requiring the 4-star command to have such control over everyone. Few there that I've worked with have the operators interests at heart IMO.

In terms of 18As- I think it would do the Army and SF a world of good to:

1) bring in senior LTs like before
2) branched-SF officers would have to have a 2-year tour on the conventional side before you could get promoted at each level- so normally you'd spend 50-66% of each rank in SF and the rest in a conventional unit. This would decrease the amount of superfluous staff positions needed to be created for officers (and thus decrease the bureaucracy) and get officers rotated back into the force to both learn "Army"/build relationships and teach others about SF/build rapport.
3) with all that conventional time- maybe SF officers would have better changes at command on the conventional side- which should help SF and the Army in general as well. The small amount of changes for G.O. within SF means lots of good guys getting out at LTC and COL. That hurts SF IMO.

[The Reaper]

I know this is an old post- but someone revived it on swj, and there was a link to ps.com on there, so thought I'd post a thought:

SOCOM has definitely done some great things for its subordinates. Today it probably continues to do so- but just like any bureaucracy it has grown into one that stifles change and innovativeness. I'm not sure how to change that- because it is the system SOCOM has to compete in (DoD and the government in general) that causes much of the suffering. But, it would be nice if we could affect change at lower levels instead of requiring the 4-star command to have such control over everyone. Few there that I've worked with have the operators interests at heart IMO.

In terms of 18As- I think it would do the Army and SF a world of good to:

1) bring in senior LTs like before
2) branched-SF officers would have to have a 2-year tour on the conventional side before you could get promoted at each level- so normally you'd spend 50-66% of each rank in SF and the rest in a conventional unit. This would decrease the amount of superfluous staff positions needed to be created for officers (and thus decrease the bureaucracy) and get officers rotated back into the force to both learn "Army"/build relationships and teach others about SF/build rapport.
3) with all that conventional time- maybe SF officers would have better changes at command on the conventional side- which should help SF and the Army in general as well. The small amount of changes for G.O. within SF means lots of good guys getting out at LTC and COL. That hurts SF IMO.

A new Captain basically is a senior LT.

If they still sent 18As back to basic branches, we would have the shittiest, least career enhancing assignments they could find. The basic branches do not want us back. As far as they are concerned (well, Infantry branch anyway) we sold then out. There would be no commands to be had. 1/3 of your understrength 18A population would be processing mountains of paperwork at the Pentagon, manning a recruiting station in Adak, Alaska, or supervising kennel clean up in East Bumscrew. I had a lot of buddies who lived that life before their was an SF branch. They were looked at as pariahs and their time away from SF was purgatory. Guys would get out after one tour back in the conventional Army. Count on it.

The Army does reward exceptional SF officers with opportunities to lead non-SF units at the GO level. It just doesn't happen very often.

USSOCOM is a necesssary evil. I just don't know how necessary anymore. The HQs is bloated and filled with non-SOF ticket punchers and non-hackers. Their agenda is questionable. And they continue to be a platform-centric HQs where they direct the majority of their budget. JSOC has also grown, but seems to be more relevant and is taking missions away from USSOCOM.

TR