Yemen

[pulque]

http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0420/p06s02-wome.html

Insurgents rattle an edgy Yemen
Many worry the fight between government forces and Islamic militants may spread through the country.
By James Brandon | Contributor to The Christian Science Monitor

Most Yemenis agree that the revolt stands little chance of success against the full might of the government, pointing out that the minority Zaidi sect makes up only a fifth of Yemen's population.

But unlike last summer, when the rebels made their doomed final stand in an isolated mountain stronghold, this time they are choosing to fight in cities and towns.

In addition, al-Houthi's views have increasingly gained traction far beyond the Zaidi sect.

Many Yemenis are angry that Yemen's fledgling democracy has failed to bring prosperity or accountability to their impoverished nation, while members of the government are seen as entrenching themselves in power to make fortunes through corruption.

Maybe someone more versed in foreign policy can explain why these insurgent groups fight if they have no chance to suceed. If their cause is so great, why dont they just bide their time until they can win? Also, if the average Yemeni is upset about corruption in the democracy, is that more likely to make him turn to an Islamist/extremist cause? Should (or is) the GWOT concerned with these kinds of insurgencies along side of the typical global terrorist ala Sageman?

[Airbornelawyer]

Reliable information is hard to come by, but that statement that Zaydis account for "only a fifth of Yemen's population" seems inaccurate. Zaydis account for a greater percentage than that, and in what was formerly North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic) they are likely the majority. Attached is a CIA map with an estimated ethnic-religious breakdown as well as a nice little oblique topographical map.

Also, Zaydis are notionally Shi'ite. They are a separate branch of "Fiver" Shi'ites. The main Shi'ites are "Twelver" Shi'ites, while other sects such as the Ismailis are "Sevener" Shi'ites (Alawis of Syria and Druze of Lebanon are offshoots of Sevener Shi'ites). All this is based on which of the successor imams to Muhammad they consider the last true imam.

And Zaydis might have a little more confidence than is currently justified because they ruled Yemen for about one thousand and thirty years. What is now Yemen was a cluster of small states in ancient times, including one claimed to be the Biblical Sheba (as in "Queen of"). Yemen earned its gold in the trade for frankincense and myrrh. In the sixth century, a leader of one of the local states converted to Judaism and began killing local Christians. The King of Axum (in what is now Ethiopia), aided by the Byzantine Empire, attacked and defeated the Jewish state. Christians ruled for just 40 years, until the Persians conquered the region. The Persians and their subjects converted to Islam shortly thereafter, with Yemen becoming a backwater of the Arab-Muslim empire.

Imam Yahya ibn al-Husayn founded a Zaydi state in 890 AD. It was independent until 1539 when it became a province of the Ottoman Empire (but still under Zaydi local rule). The Zaydis rebelled against the Ottomans in 1595 and once again won their independence (in 1635, so they were fairly tenacious). In 1872, the Ottomans retook Yemen but their control collapsed during World War One and under Imam Yahya Muhammad Hamid ad-Din the Zaydis declared the Republic of Yemen in 1918. He ruled until 1948, leading Yemen into the Arab League and UN, and his son Imam Ahmad ruled until 1962 when he died. Imam Ahmad's son was soon deposed by rebels assisted by Egypt, and the Yemen Arab Republic was declared. The war there in the 1960s pitted nationalists supported by Egypt against royalists supported by Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

Meanwhile, what is known as South Yemen had become the British protectorate of Aden in the 1800s. A Communist insurgency and terrorist campaign forced a British withdrawal and the People's Republic of South Yemen was declared in 1967 (and renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1970). The two Yemens alternatively fought and haggled until 1990, when they officially unified. Then their infighting became civil unrest and, in 1994, a civil war, won by the north.

Besides fighting among themselves, Yemenis also have complicated relations with their neighbors. Hundreds of thousands of Yemenis emigrated to Saudi Arabia in the 20th century to work in the oil industry and related jobs. Among these was Sheikh Muhammad bin Laden, founder of the family business dynasty. After Yemen sided with Iraq after the latter invaded Kuwait, Saudi Arabia expelled hundreds of thousands of Yemenis. Saudi Arabia and Yemen also had a long-running border dispute, which was settled in 2000. Yemen also had a dispute with Eritrea over a small group of islands in the Red Sea. And of course, Yemen's tribal hinterlands served as a hiding place and recruiting ground for terrorists including those responsible for the attack on the USS Cole.

Maybe someone more versed in foreign policy can explain why these insurgent groups fight if they have no chance to succeed.

Presumably, they fight because they don't think "they have no chance to succeed." They defeated the Ottomans at the height of Ottoman power. Other Yemenis defeated the British.

Their leader Badreddin al-Houthi fights in part because the government killed his son, Hussein al-Houthi, last September. The son was the founder of al-Shabab al-Mu'min ("the Believing Youth" or "Youthful Believers" or "Faithful Youth") in 1997 and launched the current uprising last summer. His father took over as "spiritual leader" after Yemeni troops killed Hussein, while actual operations are led by Abdullah Ayedh al-Rizami (or Razami), Yusuf Madani and Abdul Malak al-Houthi.

Also, Yemeni politics, especially in recent decades, seems full of deal-making. Maybe they figure they don't need to win power, only concessions.

[pulque]

Thanks.

Maybe someone more versed in warfare can explain if the GWOT is concerned with these kinds of insurgencies along side of the typical global terrorist ala Sageman?



there is no bunny.

[pulque]

I am supposed to be working but instead I am reading about the tenacious Z's.

Also, its occurring to me now that the "embryonic democracy" refered to in the CSM article, is, well, not.

[Airbornelawyer]

"Embryonic democracy" is one of those phrases people use without necessarily thinking it through. Essentially it means "not a democracy" but with the idea that it will be. Perhaps it rests on the progress myth that things inevitably get better and that democracy is part of the natural progression of history. Democracy is something that needs to be nurtured and defended and reinvigorated.

"Embryonic democracy" seems to be used alot when a country pays attention to the form of democracy but not necessarily to the substance. The country has a free election (or at least what diplomats call "generally free and fair") but the institutions of democracy are weak. Iraq is an "embryonic democracy" too, as is Ukraine, but lumping Iraq and Ukraine and Yemen together in one category like "embryonic democracy" requires ignoring lots of fundamental differences. Turkey and Pakistan have been embryonic democracies for decades, which basically means they have some democratic institutions and some undemocratic ones, and occasionally power shifts from one to the other. Germany was an embryonic democracy until 1933. Even under the Empire there was competitive politics, rising capitalism giving more people a vested interest what the state did with their wealth, and social debates; and many of its subordinate states like Bavaria were even more liberal (in the 19th century sense). But that embryonic democracy died rather quickly after the Nazis achieved power.

Yemen does have one advantage, though, which is that no one really cares about Yemen. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Yemens were caught up in regional and global rivalries. The Soviets supported anti-British Communist insurgents in what became South Yemen, and then the Communist regime there after the British left. The USSR got access to naval facilities on the island of Socotra, and hoped to create a network of client states that would give it control over the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Somalia's socialist regime was a Soviet client too, but when Ethiopia's Communists took power, the Soviets found an even more ideologically pure ally. Initially, through Cuba, the Soviets tried to bring together all three - South Yemen, Somalia and Ethiopia - but Somalia balked and instead invaded Ethiopia. The Soviets and Cubans sided with Ethiopia, and Somalia decided to become the US' new bestest buddy. Then Communism collapsed in the USSR, the Cold War ended and no one cared about their client states anymore.

In North Yemen, regional rivalries played a bigger role than superpower ones. In the 1960s the big rivalry was between the Arab socialists - primarily Nasser's Egypt, Ba'athist Iraq and Syria, and Algeria - and the conservative pro-Western monarchies - Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and non-Arab Iran. This had a superpower proxy component too, of course, as the socialist regimes all became Soviet clients of varying loyalty. After the Zaydi monarchy was overthrown, the Egyptians tried to use North Yemen as a weapon against Saudi Arabia. Their role in the civil war there was particularly brutal, involving the use of chemical weapons against royalist forces. But by the 1970s Nasser was gone and oil wealth gave the Gulf monarchies a lot of power to buy off the Egyptians, Syrians and Iraqis. And they could paper over their own differences by jointly hating Israel.

When North and South Yemen unified it took me by surprise. Apparently their ostensible ideological differences amounted to nothing. But it was hardly a triumph of democracy. The Yemen Socialist Party continued to control most of what had been the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the republicans continued to control much of what had been the Yemen Arab Republic, with smaller royalist, Islamist and other parties. Power remained heavily tribally-based, so the parties remained regional parties. These various interest groups are heavily competitive, which leads to vigorous politics, but insofar as the people at the bottom still have little or no say, even competitive elections among these groups isn't really democracy.

Yemen's most recent Freedom House survey is here, although their "Freedom in the World 2005" survey ought to be coming out within the next few weeks.

[pulque]

Yemen does have one advantage, though, which is that no one really cares about Yemen.

compared with, say, Kyrgyzstan?

After the Zaydi monarchy was overthrown, the Egyptians tried to use North Yemen as a weapon against Saudi Arabia. Their role in the civil war there was particularly brutal, involving the use of chemical weapons against royalist forces.

Why would a bunch of Zaydi Nationalists from the north ally themselves with Egyptians who have chemical weapons up their bisht?

Apparently their ostensible ideological differences amounted to nothing.

I must defer to your knowledge on that subject

[Airbornelawyer]

compared with, say, Kyrgyzstan?

Actually, I should rephrase that. Yemen is no longer a place for superpower and regional rivalries to play out by proxy, but there are people who do care about Yemen, namely al-Qa'ida. The point was that whatever path to democratization Yemen might otherwise have been on was thwarted by Soviet, Egyptian, Saudi and others' meddling to empower their proxies. The main external powers who are concerned about Yemen today because of al-Qa'ida (primarily the US and Saudi Arabia) don't have a particular dog in the fight. The rivalries that concern Yemenis don't really matter to us, as long as there is a consensus among the main factions against the terrorists. This differs from Iraq, for example, where the major external actors - the US, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Syria - have different agendas and lean toward different sides.

Of course, no one caring about you is a double-edged sword, as without foreign meddling dictators can flourish too. Until 9-11, the West was relatively unconcerned with Central Asia except as it regarded potential oil resources. The Russians played their political games, and the Chinese watched for signs of unrest in their own Central Asian possessions. We care only slightly about Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan today but only because of their proximity to Afghanistan. When was the last time you heard of Turkmenistan in the news? Niyazov's Stalinist personality cult there doesn't get much attention.

Why would a bunch of Zaydi Nationalists from the north ally themselves with Egyptians who have chemical weapons up their bisht?

The Zaydis were the royalists. The Egyptians supported the republicanist side.

I must defer to your knowledge on that subject

No need to defer; if you have a question, ask. If I wasn't clear I will explain. The point was that in the 1960s the Soviets built up a string of client states who advocated various brands of "socialism" and willingly took Soviet arms. Nyerere's "African socialism" in Tanzania (which at various stages was more Maoist than Marxist) and Nasser's Arab socialism were two prominent examples. By the 1970s, however, many of these states had shown a lack of ideological commitment. But a few went beyond the socialist rhetoric and declared themselves true Communists and one-party states. These included the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

South Yemen's Yemeni Socialist Party was modeled on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and was ostensibly the vanguard of the proletariat and all that jazz. As Soviet power declined in the late 1980s, they began to change their tune, and became basically the southern party in unified Yemen rather than an ideological party.

East Germany's SED offers a contrast. After unification, the SED renamed itself the Party of Democratic Socialism and entered German politics as a social democratic party to the left of the Social Democrats. They moderated their ideology (as opposed to the banned Communist Party of Germany) but remain an ideologically-based party. Their power is regionally limited - they have little appeal outside of the former East Germany - but they are not a regional party (unlike, for example, Bavaria's Christian Social Union).

[aricbcool]

Great thread.

[Jimbo]

Originally Posted by pulque

Thanks.

Maybe someone more versed in warfare can explain if the GWOT is concerned with these kinds of insurgencies along side of the typical global terrorist ala Sageman?



there is no bunny.

Yes. Like all other social movements, the global insurgency has various 'scenes'. Yemen and other insurgencies like it are just other scenes.

[Airbornelawyer]

There are dozens of battlefields in this conflict, not just the ones that make the front pages (or even A22) and many of which don't directly involve US military forces.

[lrd]

An interesting tie-in between this thread and our discussion of shipping lanes...

Pirate Attack Off Yemen

[Airbornelawyer]

Originally Posted by lrd

An interesting tie-in between this thread and our discussion of shipping lanes...

Pirate Attack Off Yemen

Where were we discussing shipping lanes? The globalization thread, regarding Chinese naval strategy?

Yemen sits astride one of the major chokepoints on shipping lanes, or SLOCs ("sea lines of communication") as we acronym-loving military types call them. Yemen is on the Arabian side of the Bab el-Mandeb (or Bab al-Mandab, "gate of tears"), one of the world's busiest passages. Soviet and Cuban interest in the 1970s in forming an alliance among the communist regimes in South Yemen and Ethiopia and the socialist regime in Somalia was based on a desire to control this strait.

In August 1973, two Egyptian destroyers and several support vessels set sail for Pakistan and India "for repairs." They stopped off in the South Yemeni port of Aden, and then stuck around for two months, paying port calls in the Sudan, North Yemen and Somalia. On October 6, 1973, they took up station in the middle of the straits, blocking all shipping bound for the Israeli port of Eilat. They stayed on station for several months, even after the IDF defeated the Egyptian invasion forces in the Sinai, and provided leverage for the negotiations that allowed Egypt to maintain control of the west side of the Suez Canal.

The vulnerabilty of the straits to terrorism has been apparent in recent years. On October 6, 2002, the French oil tanker Limburg was attacked by terrorists in the Gulf of Aden who rammed an explosives-laden boat into the tanker (in an attack similar to the attack on the USS Cole). One crewman was killed and about 90,000 barrels of oil were spilled.

An overview of oil transit chokepoints may be found here on the web site of the Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration.

And if you want more than an overview, and a tie-in to the other thread, you can read Globalization and Maritime Power, a book from the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

[lrd]

Originally Posted by Airbornelawyer

Where were we discussing shipping lanes? The globalization thread, regarding Chinese naval strategy?

Yes, as well as: http://professionalsoldiers.com/foru...hlight=law+sea

and the discussion on The Law of the Sea:

http://professionalsoldiers.com/foru...hlight=law+sea

Yemen sits astride one of the major chokepoints on shipping lanes, or SLOCs ("sea lines of communication") as we acronym-loving military types call them. Yemen is on the Arabian side of the Bab el-Mandeb (or Bab al-Mandab, "gate of tears"), one of the world's busiest passages. Soviet and Cuban interest in the 1970s in forming an alliance among the communist regimes in South Yemen and Ethiopia and the socialist regime in Somalia was based on a desire to control this strait.

In August 1973, two Egyptian destroyers and several support vessels set sail for Pakistan and India "for repairs." They stopped off in the South Yemeni port of Aden, and then stuck around for two months, paying port calls in the Sudan, North Yemen and Somalia. On October 6, 1973, they took up station in the middle of the straits, blocking all shipping bound for the Israeli port of Eilat. They stayed on station for several months, even after the IDF defeated the Egyptian invasion forces in the Sinai, and provided leverage for the negotiations that allowed Egypt to maintain control of the west side of the Suez Canal.

The vulnerabilty of the straits to terrorism has been apparent in recent years. On October 6, 2002, the French oil tanker Limburg was attacked by terrorists in the Gulf of Aden who rammed an explosives-laden boat into the tanker (in an attack similar to the attack on the USS Cole). One crewman was killed and about 90,000 barrels of oil were spilled.

An overview of oil transit chokepoints may be found here on the web site of the Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration.

And if you want more than an overview, and a tie-in to the other thread, you can read Globalization and Maritime Power, a book from the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

Thanks for the information and link, AL. If I can figure out how to download it, I'll have something interesting to read on my next trip.

[Airbornelawyer]

Originally Posted by lrd

If I can figure out how to download it, I'll have something interesting to read on my next trip.

I don't see a PDF link, just the HTML one divided into chapters.

Here is a list of all NDU books by date: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/NDUPress_Books_Date.htm

Main NDU publications page: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html

[Airbornelawyer]

The US has pretty good relations with the current government of Yemen, although things could change. The Yemenis generally cooperate in counterterrorism efforts, as well as hunting down their own insurgents, and allow us to go after terrorists within their borders. Abu Ali al-Harithi, an AQ leader in Yemen and planner of the USS Cole attack, found this out the hard way in the fraction of a second before a Hellfire missile fired from a Predator UAV slammed into his vehicle, turning his terror cell into a bunch of little cells scattered all over the roadway.

Our recognition of the region's importance is also shown by our presence in Djibouti, the former French colony on the other side of the Bab el-Mandeb. France has given us use of one of its bases in Djibouti (which despite independence is still home of a French air force base and a Foreign Legion demi-brigade), which serves as the headquarters of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). CJTF-HOA's AO is Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, the Seychelles, Yemen and Ethiopia and the surrounding waters.

There is also a naval task force operating in the region: Combined Task Force 150, currently under the command of Flottillenadmiral Henning Hoops of the German Navy. This is a force of usually 8 but up to 14 ships (frigates and destroyers) conducting maritime interdiction operations in the Red Sea, Horn of Africa region and Arabian Sea. It includes vessels from various countries. Usually about 6 different countries are represented, but participants vary. The main participants are the US, the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain.

And speaking of pirate attacks off Yemen, from back in December: Coalition Maritime Forces Deter Pirate Attack off Yemen.