Old 04-07-2004, 13:46   #1
Jimbo
Guerrilla
 
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: East Coast
Posts: 438
Good Article in Parameters

Relearning Counterinsurgency

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/P...ring/tomes.htm

Conclusion

Trinquier, Galula, and Kitson are certainly not the only authors providing useful insights into the nature and conduct of counterinsurgencies. They are, however, among the best sources of insight from a generation of soldiers with experience fighting modern wars. A number of common lessons or themes from the above discussion apply to the current situation in Iraq.

All three works discuss the asymmetric relationship between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. This is true not only in terms of the cause, where the insurgent is likely to have the only dynamic one, but extends to the material realm also. Optimizing available counterinsurgency resources is crucial. Education and reeducation of soldiers is one way of sustaining focus and adapting efforts. During and after combat actions, the political nature of the contest must be reinforced. Because transitioning from a combat soldier to a political one is a delicate process, it is important for troop rotations to be aligned with progress in legitimating new political institutions.



Intelligence is the critical enabler. The tactical use of information, which is the responsibility of the operational commander, is the only way to identify the enemy. Background information must be gathered and analyzed at all times, with operational intelligence used to bring forces into contact with the enemy. The operational intelligence effort must remain flexible, adapting to the situation as it develops, and retain the wherewithal to innovate and seize the initiative away from the enemy. Ground commanders must develop and retain a capacity to actively gather information and avoid situations where they are dependent on other organizations for critical operational intelligence. This aids identification and neutralization of causes and concerns before their exploitation for guerrilla mobilization.

Insurgency causes, their mobilization resource, are not static. The movement will manipulate, even create, causes as the war progresses; initial causes often decline in importance as the struggle escalates. Counterinsurgencies must engage in reform, adaptation, or innovation activities to counter the political appeal of evolving causes. Counter-mobilization is a critical, strategic process in the campaign. In Iraq, we are now seeing the shifting of insurgent mobilization appeals from supporting the old regime to defending against foreign occupation to appealing to local tribal elements seeking preservation of paternal social norms. Counterinsurgency efforts must respond accordingly.

Concurrent with the development of a viable intelligence organization is the need to recognize the interdependence of economic, political, psychological, and military factors. The successful counterinsurgency campaign will have an organization which aggregates these factors into one unified command able to adapt and utilize resources efficiently. The efforts of elements within the organization should not be allowed to “cut across each other,” and the commander should be aware of their actions at all times.

Finally, the counterinsurgent must possess the training, capability, and will to fight on cognitive terrain. Toward this end he must develop and deploy psychological operations units, propaganda operations, and social service units that foster the impression that the government is addressing underlying socio-economic problems. Additionally, the insurgent must be exposed as preventing the government from solving these problems.

In discussing success criteria, counterinsurgents need success as early as possible to demonstrate the will, the means, and the ability to defeat the insurgency. Counterinsurgents, moreover, need to avoid negotiations until they are in a position of strength. Potential supporters will flock to the insurgent’s side out of fear of retaliation if the movement considers them disloyal. A negotiated solution to the conflict before the new government possesses a preponderance of power will lead to the undermining of the settlement and the negation of gains.


The above review does not suggest such works can resolve current problems or that concerns can be resolved merely be dusting off and reading counterinsurgency books from the Cold War. However, “studying the past,” to borrow from John Lewis Gaddis, “has a way of introducing humility—a first stage toward gaining detachment—because it suggests the continuity of the problems we confront, and the unoriginality of most of our solutions for them. It is a good way of putting things in perspective, of stepping back to take in a wider view.”
Jimbo is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-19-2004, 20:32   #2
Jimbo
Guerrilla
 
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: East Coast
Posts: 438
Re: Good Article in Parameters

Quote:
Originally posted by Jimbo
Counterinsurgents, moreover, need to avoid negotiations until they are in a position of strength. Potential supporters will flock to the insurgent’s side out of fear of retaliation if the movement considers them disloyal.
This quote tracks with a paper Gordon McCormick wrote for the Insurgency Board last fall.

Given that some Iraqi groups have begun the negotiation process, can we surmise that they percieve themselves to be in the relative position of power?
Jimbo is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-19-2004, 20:49   #3
Footmobile
Guerrilla
 
Footmobile's Avatar
 
Join Date: Feb 2004
Location: North Carolina
Posts: 162
Re: Re: Good Article in Parameters

Quote:
Originally posted by Jimbo
Given that some Iraqi groups have begun the negotiation process, can we surmise that they percieve themselves to be in the relative position of power?
They think they will be able to affect our election in Nov. so they are upping the ante a bit I believe, which may be very true.
Footmobile is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-20-2004, 12:34   #4
CommoGeek
Guerrilla
 
CommoGeek's Avatar
 
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: OCONUS
Posts: 415
The world certainly learned from Vietnam that if they distract us at home enough then they may be able to secure a victory. Will the Iraqi's be able to make that happen? I doubt it but they have to roll the dice sooner or later.
CommoGeek is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-20-2004, 12:57   #5
Solid
Guerrilla Chief
 
Join Date: Feb 2004
Location: NC
Posts: 995
Ass'me-ing that you're talking about the insurgents beginning negotiations, IMO insurgents can be far more dynamic when it comes to negotiations- they can engage and disengage in negotiations without sacrificing large amounts of support, especially in Iraq, where it seems that pro-governmental propoganda isn't disseminating properly throughout the population.
Negotiations may therefore be a ploy to keep the US off of the offensive while the insurgents restructure and reinforce their forces. Either that, or they are in effect biding their time until the US "pull-out", where they will unleash their might. Because they have already struck before at Fallujah etc, having a second strike later on would make it appear as if the insurgency has grown in power.

Just my opinion,

Solid
Solid is offline   Reply With Quote
Reply


Currently Active Users Viewing This Thread: 1 (0 members and 1 guests)
 
Thread Tools
Display Modes

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

BB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is Off
HTML code is Off

Forum Jump

Similar Threads
Thread Thread Starter Forum Replies Last Post
More Kerry Service Info The Reaper The Soapbox 24 08-30-2004 07:19
Good food, Good fun, Good friends Roycroft201 The Gourmet Guerrilla 7 07-05-2004 10:21
Good article here Sdiver Weapons Discussion Area 1 04-18-2004 11:38
SF Officer Article The Reaper Special Forces Qualification Course 2 02-18-2004 19:06
Robin Sage Article The Reaper Special Forces Qualification Course 0 01-26-2004 15:33



All times are GMT -6. The time now is 19:56.



Copyright 2004-2022 by Professional Soldiers ®
Site Designed, Maintained, & Hosted by Hilliker Technologies