Quote:
Originally Posted by The Reaper
I agree.
Colombia, cocaine production, and the Colombian people are sufficiently different that I see few parallels.
Afghanistan is not Colombia, or Iraq. Lessons learned are fine, but cookie cutter applications are a poor substitute for sound analysis and problem solving.
TR
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Here is what NATO is saying on the "Lesson's Learned" front...
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007...lish/art1.html
I cut out some of the article to skip to the "lessons learned part"
Lessons learned
In Colombia, although the process for the consolidation of territorial control is still in its initial phase, we have been able to identify some important lessons. These are not only useful to us in improving our own efforts, but may contribute to other similar efforts in places like Afghanistan.
Friction. The military historian Clausewitz spoke of 'friction in war' to explain the enormous difference between planning war on paper and executing war on the ground. Colombia has also experienced 'friction' in inter-agency coordination, both between civilian and military agencies and between different civilian agencies. In practice, coordination is a continuous process of negotiation between agencies, each one attempting to retain the greatest degree of independence.
Never abandon a region. Once troops reach a zone, they must remain for the duration of the consolidation process
Opportunity dilemma. Finding the right balance between military and social effort remains difficult. Our experience has shown that without minimum security conditions, social efforts are fruitless. For that reason, the first advance is military.
Military criteria must continue to be the genesis of the consolidation. Selecting regions for consolidation must be based on a military strategy that will destabilize enemy plans and positions. So the military must establish the first strategy for consolidation which can be supported later by social activities.
Never abandon a region. Once troops reach a zone, they must remain for the duration of the consolidation process. Otherwise criminal groups will return to take reprisals against the population and generate greater mistrust of the state.
Align efforts with international cooperation. In Colombia, different international cooperation agencies support the consolidation effort. In practice, these agencies don't always act with the same interests. So it is essential to coordinate and align the activities of local (state) agencies with international cooperation agencies. And it is clearly highly important to maintain international political and economic support for the consolidation process.
Break the cycle of mistrust. In regions where terrorist groups have traditionally exercised influence, the arrival of state organizations is often greeted with profound mistrust by the people. This hostile reception in turn generates mistrust on the part of the state, meaning the initial phase of consolidation takes place in a climate of suspicion. The primary task of the consolidation effort is to break this cycle of mistrust - largely by embarking on a series of confidence-building measures.
But the most important and underlying lesson learned in the Colombian case is that security cannot be an end in itself. Security must always be a means for maintaining the governability of the state, producing well-being and fostering social progress. Colombian armed forces can only gain the upper hand against terrorism if we create the necessary conditions to guarantee an effective state presence and social development in our communities.
Those involved in consolidating territorial control in complex threat environments like Colombia or Afghanistan should share experiences and expertise on a regular basis, otherwise ungoverned spaces will continue to breed terrorism and crime.
Juan Manuel Santos is the national Minister of Defence of Colombia, taking up the post in July 2006. He has previously served as the country's Minister for Foreign Trade, as well as working for the United Nations.