Does America Have a Muslim Problem?

[T-Rock]

Chief among these reasons is the fact that the Reagan administration, through its pursuit of 'escalation dominance' across the spectrum of warfare, rejected mutually assured destruction in favor of a national security strategy that emphasized strategic defense and second strike assets (chiefly through plans to arm Ohio-class boats with Trident D5 missiles throwing MIRV-ed W88 warheads) with first-strike capabilities (chiefly through reduced CEPs).

Sorta brings a nostalgic tear, during the transitional phase in Jaw Juh, while ushering in the era of Ohio's, and watching the 640's slowly laid to rest. The trips to Cocoa beach and Lauderdale were teh awesome

Détente is over.*

The misguided one ruined it... The Siege of Mecca comes to mind...

[NosceHostem]

Originally Posted by Sigaba

Your understanding of the Cold War is inaccurate for several reasons.

Chief among these reasons is the fact that the Reagan administration, through its pursuit of 'escalation dominance' across the spectrum of warfare, rejected mutually assured destruction in favor of a national security strategy that emphasized strategic defense and second strike assets (chiefly through plans to arm Ohio-class boats with Trident D5 missiles throwing MIRV-ed W88 warheads) with first-strike capabilities (chiefly through reduced CEPs).

When matched with AirLand Battle and SEAPLAN 2000 (the Maritime Strategy)--to say nothing of a secret presidential directive that established an acceptable level of loss of life in case of a nuclear war--the Reagan administration's emphasis on escalation dominance underscored the belated point of the White House's previous inhabitant: Détente is over.*

I studied the Cold War under arguably the world's top expert on the subject, John Lewis Gaddis. But, according to this book review in the NY Times, it seems I should have paid closer attention:

Reagan was another saboteur. He strove to shatter the East-West stalemate "by exploiting Soviet weaknesses and asserting Western strengths." Few - even among his supporters - glimpsed Reagan's genuine passion to abolish nuclear arsenals, which he considered immoral. Many American academics decried Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative of 1983 as a warmongering effort to extend the cold war into the heavens. But while conceding the risks (the Soviets feared a first-strike attack), Gaddis praises Reagan's strategy of using the threat to build an antimissile shield that the Soviets could not soon match. "If the U.S.S.R. was crumbling," Gaddis asks, "what could justify . . . continuing to hold Americans hostage to the . . . odious concept of mutual assured destruction? Why not hasten the disintegration?" LINK

Beyond the nuances of Cold War strategy, my point in bringing up M.A.D. was to argue that deterrence may not work with death-loving Islamists the way it did with life-loving Soviets.

[Sigaba]

Originally Posted by NosceHostem

I studied the Cold War under arguably the world's top expert on the subject, John Lewis Gaddis.

FWIW, I would have agreed with this assessment until the mid 1990s. Since then, Professor Gaddis has not quite kept the pace he had set for himself in the 1970s and 1980s. Now, I would rank him behind Melvyn Leffler and Michael J. Hogan among Americanists and well behind "international" diplomatic historians who have the language skills to do multi-archival research. (Gaddis switched from Russian history to American history because he had problems learning Russian.*)

Second, Gaddis's efforts to cross pollinate the fields of history and political science never quite took hold. (Gaddis has always been a little too preoccupied with 'relevance' for my tastes. History is a humanity, not a social science.)

Moreover, Professor Gaddis has changed his views towards history, the historiography of the Cold War, as well the relationship between domestic politics and international affairs in ways that are jarring. So much so that he (at least in my opinion) needs to do a better job at explaining the transition--which he, at least in my experience, treats as seamless. For example, the way Gaddis wrote/spoke about nuclear war changed dramatically during the mid 1990s. Why? Did Gaddis tire of the incredible push back he received from academics and students? (Believe me, it was intense.) Or did his views towards nuclear war change?

This is not to say a scholar should not grow or change from this master's thesis to his dissertation to the time he pens a broad overview of an immensely important topic. But rather, one does need to square the circle if one goes from having a viewpoint a lot like Henry Kissinger's in the 1950s to one a lot like Bush the Younger's in the 2000s.**

Originally Posted by NosceHostem

But, according to this book review in the NY Times, it seems I should have paid closer attention

MOO, Beschloss was absolutely the wrong person to write that review and the New York Times's editorial staff did Beschloss no favors. Sycophancy is a poor substitute for probing analysis and critical engagement. (The review should have fallen to Anders Stephanson.)

Did Professor Gaddis assign his own Strategies of Containment or did he walk you through the historiography of the Cold War and/or American foreign relations since 1945 (specifically "Eisenhower Revisionism")? Either one of these options would have given you a preview of the current trend of crediting Reagan for ending the Cold War. (And Strategies of Containment definitely would have challenged the notion that MAD was a permanent fixture of the Cold War.)

Originally Posted by NosceHostem

Reagan was another saboteur. He strove to shatter the East-West stalemate "by exploiting Soviet weaknesses and asserting Western strengths." Few - even among his supporters - glimpsed Reagan's genuine passion to abolish nuclear arsenals, which he considered immoral. Many American academics decried Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative of 1983 as a warmongering effort to extend the cold war into the heavens. But while conceding the risks (the Soviets feared a first-strike attack), Gaddis praises Reagan's strategy of using the threat to build an antimissile shield that the Soviets could not soon match. "If the U.S.S.R. was crumbling," Gaddis asks, "what could justify . . . continuing to hold Americans hostage to the . . . odious concept of mutual assured destruction? Why not hasten the disintegration?"

Here, I strongly disagree with both Gaddis and Beschloss. IMO, our understanding of the Cold War will remain incomplete as long as diplomatic historians fail to take the military/naval history of the U.S. Soviet rivalry seriously.

Originally Posted by NosceHostem

Beyond the nuances of Cold War strategy, my point in bringing up M.A.D. was to argue that deterrence may not work with death-loving Islamists the way it did with life-loving Soviets.

Were the Soviet's any more life loving or rational than the Islamicists? Could "containment" work today?

/end thread hijack

__________________________________________
* Interview with Robert A. Divine, 22 April 1992.
** It might be argued that Bush the Younger's conduct of GWOT was in line with the type of decision making Gaddis advocated in his master's thesis, “Railroads and Russian Expansion in the Far East, 1890-1905” (1963) due to Bush the Younger's consistent disregard for domestic political opinion. However, given the fact that Bush the Younger frequently defined America's strategic interests in ideological terms, the degree of Gaddis's support for Bush the Younger (as well as Reagan) is surprising. YMMV.

[Sigaba]

Originally Posted by Pete

This thread - along with many others on this board has divided into two camps that will never see eye to eye.

The one camp sees a future problem with a growing Muslim population, it's non-assimilation into our culture and accommodation of it's ways - Sharia - into ours.

The other camp sees no problem - and if there is one it's caused by us. The Muslims are just like the Irish, French, Japanese, Chinese, Scandinavians, etc, etc, etc who came here before and became Americans.

QP Pete--

With respect, by my count there are not two camps in the debates over Muslims and Islam but seven or eight. (FWIW/IMO, a year ago, the count was five or six.)

IMO, five central questions are useful in delineating the differences among these camps.

1. At its heart, what is the nature of Islam?
2. How much influence does Islam have on the everyday lives of Muslims?
3. What is the West's appropriate response to the Muslim world?
4. Are answers to the first three questions fixed or might they change over time?
5. Is American civilization in decline?

My $0.02.