Stirring stick and a bottle of soju: The next Korean War (or the one after that)

[Roguish Lawyer]

Thanks very much for your insight, TR.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Originally posted by Roguish Lawyer
5. I'd like to see some open source order of battle information.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...rea-crisis.htm

http://www.scramble.nl/kp.htm

http://www.csun.edu/~btk29323/keithr~1.htm

[Roguish Lawyer]

The DPRK, with over 8,800 AA guns, combined with SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5, and handheld SA-7 and SA-16 surface-to-air missiles, has constructed one of the world's most dense air defense networks. In the mid- 1980s, the former Soviet Union supplied SA-3/GOA surface-to-air missiles to the DPRK. The SA-3 provides short-range defense against low- flying aircraft. In 1987, the former Soviet Union provided SA-5/GAMMON surface-to-air missiles that gave Pyongyang a long-range, highaltitude, surface-to-air missile capability. The SA-2 GUIDELINE system provides medium-range, medium-altitude point defense for cities and military airfields, as well as a barrier defense along the DMZ.

Seems like those F-22s would come in handy . . .

[Airbornelawyer]

Originally posted by Solid
Would it be feasible for US air power to successfully destroy a majority of firebases, missile emplacements, and airfields in range of the DMZ and the SK civilian populations?

Echoing TR, no.

Numbers: The army has some 3500 pieces of towed artillery, 4400 SP guns, 2600 MRLs, 11000 AA guns and SAMs. Add in an unknown number of SCUD and SCUD variant TELs (maybe 50, with 500+ missiles). Plus, of course, Kim Jong-il has No dong.

Locations: Extremely mountainous terrain. TR noted the hardened targets and tunnel complexes, for which North Korea is famous.

Historical perspective (this deals more with interdiction than destruction of forward targets, and technology is better today, but still worth noting):

• From a CGSC study: "Notwithstanding the heavy damage inflicted by UN airpower, the overall air interdiction campaign in Korea had only partial success. The destruction did not succeed in significantly restricting the flow of the enemy's supplies to the frontlines, or in achieving interdiction of the battlefield.... Throughout the campaign, the enemy seemed to have ample strength to launch an attack if he wished. His frequent and heavy artillery barrages were evidence that he did not suffer from a shortage of ammunition."
• GEN Mark Clark's assessment: "...as in Italy, where we learned the same bitter lesson in the same kind of rugged country, our airpower could not keep a steady stream of enemy suppliers and reinforcements from reaching the battleline. Air could not isolate the front."
• Assessment of US Navy historians: "It must be grudgingly admitted that one of the key reasons why isolation of the battlefield could not be achieved in Korea was the surprising tenacity, determination, and ingenuity displayed by the Communists to keep their rail and highway networks in operation. In spite of incessant daylight attacks and nighttime harassment, despite the necessity of working at night, of using old equipment, of having long, exposed, and vulnerable supply lines, the Chinese were able to maintain and even increase the flow of supplies to the battlefront.... At no time during the course of the war did either the UN's surface or air interdiction efforts succeed in stopping the flow of enemy supplies from Manchuria to the front to a decisive degree. ... By every index, in fact, the Communists were able to steadily increase their flow of supplies to the frontlines. ... the enemy was never kept from supplying his needed requirements. At no time—except locally and temporarily—did the enemy limit his combat effort because of supply considerations."
• VADM J. J. Clark: "The interdiction program was a failure. It did not interdict."

Close air support took a second priority to interdiction, but the USAF still flew 250,000 ground attack sorties. The Navy flew 167,552 sorties and the Marines 107,000 (all combat missions, not just CAS). South Koreans, Australians and and South Africans also flew. Most CAS missions were direct support to ground troops.

Originally posted by Valhal
Would China commit troops if that happened?
Or sit back and watch.

I'm not a China expert either, but in analyzing all potential China war scenarios in the near and short term, I concluded that a Chinese war against North Korea is a distinct possibility. The scenario I envisaged was increasing instability in the North leading to mass waves of refugees (estimates of the current number of Korean refugees on the Chinese side of the border range from 50,000 to 300,000). The PLA decides to established a buffer zone on the south side of the river, leading to confrontations with DPRK troops. The increasingly erratic Kim orders a counterattack, and the PLA responds.

[DanUCSB]

Originally posted by Airbornelawyer
Plus, of course, Kim Jong-il has No dong.

Is it technically a hijack if I'm keeled over laughing?

[Valhal]

It is sad and amazing that regimes like kim long dong can exist in this day and age.

[Valhal]

Oops I meant kim small dong

Just a few thoughts...

Originally posted by Roguish Lawyer
3. What really is the probability of this strike to the south after a devastating US first strike? If we decapitate the leadership, won't there be confusion and chaos?

To be militarily devastating, a US first strike would have to be nuclear. The NK defenses are too many and too fortified to be effectively destroyed. The best bet for decapitating the leadership and preventing a move to the south would be to provoke a coup from within the military leadership. Like the Soviets before them, it seems unlikely that the senior military leadership are capable of actually believing the Party line. Given the choice of killing Kim and taking charge, or fighting a non-conventional war with the US (an interesting separate discussion - is a conventional victory possible for the 'good guys'?), I think they'll opt for the former.

Seems like those F-22s would come in handy . . .

My understanding of the NK Air Defense is that it is capable of bringing down most aircraft through sheer volume of fire (I've heard it described as Baghdad at the outset of the Gulf War 1 air war X 10), but I'm no pilot...

[Roguish Lawyer]

Originally posted by Sean Baker
My understanding of the NK Air Defense is that it is capable of bringing down most aircraft through sheer volume of fire (I've heard it described as Baghdad at the outset of the Gulf War 1 air war X 10), but I'm no pilot...

The F/A-22's stealth and supercruise features make it more difficult to shoot down than the planes we are using now. How much more difficult I don't know.

[lrd]

Originally posted by Roguish Lawyer
The F/A-22's stealth and supercruise features make it more difficult to shoot down than the planes we are using now.

And you are basing this on...?

[DanUCSB]

Originally posted by lrd
And you are basing this on...?

Those features are, largely, the whole reason for the F-22. However, I'm not sure that's the ideal.

That being, the problem with North Korea is not so much that it has state-of-the-art equipment that we need our pinnacle of technology to combat (although they do have some good stuff), but rather that they have so damn much of it, so well dug in. Anyone who has played around in that neck of the woods can tell you that you can't walk ten feet in the woods/hills without running into an underground bunker (and none of this dirt and timber stuff... we're talking about feet-thick concrete). Koreans on both sides of the border dig like hedgehogs, and have been planning out/preparing for the 'big one' for fifty years.

As such, I would say that it is not so much the need for a few F-22s as it is a need for a -lot- of F-15s and F/A-18s (and some A-10s for our boys humping in the hills). Our current technology is a good enough overmatch--I would rather buy, what, 3 or 4 Super Hornets for the price of one F-22? Pyongyang has quite a few air defenses, but the biggest thing to worry about if the balloon goes up is just getting there and pushing the bastards back up past the Imjin before they get too far. Just my opinion... YMMV.

[lrd]

Originally posted by DanUCSB
As such, I would say that it is not so much the need for a few F-22s as it is a need for a -lot- of F-15s and F/A-18s (and some A-10s for our boys humping in the hills). Our current technology is a good enough overmatch--I would rather buy, what, 3 or 4 Super Hornets for the price of one F-22? Pyongyang has quite a few air defenses, but the biggest thing to worry about if the balloon goes up is just getting there and pushing the bastards back up past the Imjin before they get too far. Just my opinion... YMMV.

I agree. I was just wondering what RL had heard about the F-22...or rather, whose version of the story he had heard. I probably should have added a to my previous post.

[Sigi]

This is a great thread. I have been reading about this situation ever since this thread opened and although I have changed my position a little on the potential threat of NK and it's leader, I am still trying to figure out what that wacko could possibly gain by attacking.

What goals would he have?
So he has taken the minds of the people off the poverty by building up his rather large military. Then what?

I still say it is suicide and would probably produce a larger coalition than what we saw in GW 1.

Then again, I could be wrong on the last part. I am just curious what he would be gaining. Yeah he might be a crazed lunatic, but they're not all nut jobs in NK, right?

[Roguish Lawyer]

Originally posted by lrd
I agree. I was just wondering what RL had heard about the F-22...or rather, whose version of the story he had heard. I probably should have added a "rolleyes" to my previous post.

You think I'm making this stuff up?

Try the contractor sites for a start.

In my opinion, should an armed conflict begin in the Koreas, the US will have no choice but to use nuclear weapons, and we haven't really had any choice regarding that in a long time (even under Reagan, I don't think we really had any other viable choice). The North Korean forces are too big, and the threat of Korean nuclear weapons in the case of war must be dealt with immediately (even if he says he won't hit us or Japan if we stay out, how do you believe him?). The movement of US forces south (in my opinion) simply shows an acceptance of reality. And the NKPA need to think about it that way. Come south? Fry. I see no other viable solution, not even giving up on South Korea works. This isn't MAD, because our destruction is not assured. Theirs is.