Quote:
Originally Posted by Airbornelawyer
At the time, though, I remember thinking that the reliance on the Shammaris was probably a big reason why Tal Afar became a hornet's nest in the first place.
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I think that was part of it. I spent quite a bit of time detaining Shammar tribe members along that border. Eventually the border police chief (another Shammari) was fired and jailed for his involvement in smuggling.
The larger reason was the severe and rampant infiltration of the Takfiris elements that flooded the Sarai district shortly after the 101st left in early 2004. Through that spring and summer, the Takfiris and AQIZ dug in and garrisoned the whole eastern part of the town. In early September 2004 the coalition made a (IMHO) half-assed attempt at taking the town back. That's when
Scott Taylor was taken captive. After the first Tal Afar offensive in Sept 2004, CF minimized the posture in the town to levels way too low.
We moved up there in mid-to-late April 2005. With 2 ground Cavalry squadrons, 1 Air Cavalry Squadron, 2 AOBs, and 1 Iraqi Army Division for Western Nineveh Province the next 4 months were spent in shaping operations around the town and its outskirts, attempting to tactically isolate the insurgency in Tal Afar from its logistics supply routes from Avghani, Sinjar, and Rabiyah. In September 2005 Operation I'ada Al Haq (Restoring Rights) began as a major offensive operation to clear the Sarai district and surrounding neighborhoods.
Eventually the area was mostly given to the Iraqi Army Division. While still a CF presence in the area, most security and reconnaissance patrols are run by the IA and IPs. I still hear good things from my contacts up there (with the exception of the Yzedi bombing last month). Hopefully it stays that way.