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That was my point.
Putin's Russia is sticking its nose in Latin America mainly to tweak the United States, though with a certain geopolitical objective. I doubt Putin really expects anything to come of Argentina's ambitions. But just as we have the Monroe Doctrine, Russia wants the rest of the world to treat Russia's so-called "near abroad" as Russia's turf. Not that the Monroe Doctrine really means much these days, and not that we are blessed with a president least likely to respect that doctrine, but it does allow Russia to accuse us of hypocrisy if we oppose Russian moves in Latin America while involving ourselves in affairs in Ukraine, Georgia and the like. And of all the countries in Latin America where Russia might meddle, Argentina is a "two-fer", since it also tweaks the UK over British support to Ukraine.
Realistically, though, Russia is suffering under the twin threats of the drop in oil prices and sanctions over Ukraine which have had some effect on the oligarchs who support Putin. Especially as a result of the drop in oil revenues, the Russian Armed Forces are having to re-evaluate their own ambitious modernization plans. Russia would be hard-pressed to modernize another country's armed forces unless that country had hard currency to pay, like Chavez's Venezuela at the height of the oil-price boom. Countries like Syria and Iran might also have hard-currency issues, but they also represent more serious geopolitical interests for Russia than Argentina does. India and China remain Russia's biggest customers, although India is also one of the US's biggest customers as well.
Argentina has done almost nothing to modernize its armed forces, especially its air force, since the 1980s, and in many areas is worse off. Manning levels, training and maintenance have all suffered as the military lost its privileged position since 1983. And, indeed, outside of its Exocet-carrying Super Étendard's and certain army, marine and police special operations forces, the Argentine military wasn't particularly potent by Western standards even in 1982. After the initial conquest of the Falklands, most of the SOF were withdrawn and replaced by conscript infantry, who proved rather unmotivated and ineffective against the British Army. Without conscription anymore to maintain even sufficient manning levels, and without the budgets to train and equip professional forces, the Argentine armed forces are far less of a threat now than they perhaps ever were.
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