Lessons from the SOG experiences

[dennisw]

I recently reread John Plaster's book about the SOG experience. I do not believe I read it all the first time, much to my chagrin. Amazing story about amazing people conducting unbelievable missions. There are several issues which have been careening around the interior of my head; one of which I wanted to discuss.

In the latter part of the book the author turns to the discussion of compromised missions and the existence of a mole or moles who provided the enemy with critical mission information. This information ultimately hinders the missions and is directly related to the death and capture of many of the of the members of the recon teams.

As the author points out, the suspicion of the mole's existence was so great among the SOG recon teams, they would not provide the accreted coordinates of their infill locations to the ARVN.

Currently, we have similar conditions in Afghanistan. During my son's recent deployment they conducted a mission where the Taliban had been given the exact information about the mission. Needless to say, they walked into a L shaped ambush where the enemy was dug in, camouflaged and lying in wait.

At what point does leadership stop providing allies with critical mission information? I know this is not an easy question, but it seems to be a problem which continues to plague our troops already tasked with difficult mission responsibilities.