What a way to run the "secret War" in Vietnam...

I am now re-reading a book by Richard H. Shultz, Jr. entitled "The Secret War Against Hanoi". In it I am still finding new facts about MAVSOG that I missed before in the first two times I cracked the spine.

However, two facts are standing out as I type these words. They are:

1) Ambassador William Sullivan had too much power in Laos and was completely inept about COIN/Covert warfare. Some SOG Warriors and the commanders in CCC and CCN often referred to him as "The Field Marshall". This was not for his knowledge of warfare but as a slam towards his very unorthodox charracter in the middle of a war and how he ran the war in Laos. Sullivan gave the CIA there full control of ground and air operations in Laos. SOG was not to enter "his" country unless he personnally invited them.

How bad was he at being "The Field Marshall" you ask? Well, consider this discussion he had with Col. D. Blackburn in the fall of 1965. Blackburn asked that helicopters be used to transfer the teams in and out of Laos. Sullivan's response was an emphatic "No"!. All teams that would be on operations in Laos were to walk across the border only. Blackburn than began to give Sullivan the 411 on helicopters and how they are used to transport troops near to the target. Sullivan's response was: "Well you can take (your men) out by helicopter, but don't put them in that way."

My question at this point is how does an Ambassador get so much power and why does the U.S. military commands have to loose their case because he says so?


2) President Kennedy absolutely loved the Special Forces as all the QP's know here. He wanted to get SOG off an running as soon as possible in Vietnam. He also desired that all planning exacution, and AARP's be conducted at the operational level. They knew what to do and how to do it without the JCS and the Civillian leadership getting in the way. Those operations where to be conducted in Laos, North Vietnam, and Cambodia and they were. However when Johnson became president he was even more upset than Kennedy was when so far only one operation had ben conduted in 1964. He demanded that more operations begin as fast as possible along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Johsnon also had the support in this area of the war with McNamara. Until...

Then later in the war Singlaub (the third commander/Chief of SOG) found out that policy makers in the Pentagon and at the Whitehouse were loosing interest in the "secret war" and began focusing on the more popular conventional part (massive ordnance, technological breakthroughs, throwing divisions and battalions into the battle and getting that ever so popular "Body Count). These were the only ways that the U.S could possibly win this war and save face. Hey what better to judje a war than by counting how many were killed compared to your own losses. This was also true because of General Westmoreland and his successor General Abrahms were both conventinal in their way of thinking. Therefore the war could only be one by this means. Comments by these Generals during their tenure were very negative towards SF and the SEALS. They looked upon them as high strung children who were constantly in need of guidance, pretty boys, and arrogant, thus they needed to be kept under lock and key. There was also another way that made these two even more upset than the latter. That was that SF was taking away excellent combat field NCO's and Officers away from them and this had to be stopped. They tried but it never worked out.

More to come...