Yemen

[pulque]

http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0420/p06s02-wome.html

Insurgents rattle an edgy Yemen
Many worry the fight between government forces and Islamic militants may spread through the country.
By James Brandon | Contributor to The Christian Science Monitor

Most Yemenis agree that the revolt stands little chance of success against the full might of the government, pointing out that the minority Zaidi sect makes up only a fifth of Yemen's population.

But unlike last summer, when the rebels made their doomed final stand in an isolated mountain stronghold, this time they are choosing to fight in cities and towns.

In addition, al-Houthi's views have increasingly gained traction far beyond the Zaidi sect.

Many Yemenis are angry that Yemen's fledgling democracy has failed to bring prosperity or accountability to their impoverished nation, while members of the government are seen as entrenching themselves in power to make fortunes through corruption.

Maybe someone more versed in foreign policy can explain why these insurgent groups fight if they have no chance to suceed. If their cause is so great, why dont they just bide their time until they can win? Also, if the average Yemeni is upset about corruption in the democracy, is that more likely to make him turn to an Islamist/extremist cause? Should (or is) the GWOT concerned with these kinds of insurgencies along side of the typical global terrorist ala Sageman?

[Airbornelawyer]

Reliable information is hard to come by, but that statement that Zaydis account for "only a fifth of Yemen's population" seems inaccurate. Zaydis account for a greater percentage than that, and in what was formerly North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic) they are likely the majority. Attached is a CIA map with an estimated ethnic-religious breakdown as well as a nice little oblique topographical map.

Also, Zaydis are notionally Shi'ite. They are a separate branch of "Fiver" Shi'ites. The main Shi'ites are "Twelver" Shi'ites, while other sects such as the Ismailis are "Sevener" Shi'ites (Alawis of Syria and Druze of Lebanon are offshoots of Sevener Shi'ites). All this is based on which of the successor imams to Muhammad they consider the last true imam.

And Zaydis might have a little more confidence than is currently justified because they ruled Yemen for about one thousand and thirty years. What is now Yemen was a cluster of small states in ancient times, including one claimed to be the Biblical Sheba (as in "Queen of"). Yemen earned its gold in the trade for frankincense and myrrh. In the sixth century, a leader of one of the local states converted to Judaism and began killing local Christians. The King of Axum (in what is now Ethiopia), aided by the Byzantine Empire, attacked and defeated the Jewish state. Christians ruled for just 40 years, until the Persians conquered the region. The Persians and their subjects converted to Islam shortly thereafter, with Yemen becoming a backwater of the Arab-Muslim empire.

Imam Yahya ibn al-Husayn founded a Zaydi state in 890 AD. It was independent until 1539 when it became a province of the Ottoman Empire (but still under Zaydi local rule). The Zaydis rebelled against the Ottomans in 1595 and once again won their independence (in 1635, so they were fairly tenacious). In 1872, the Ottomans retook Yemen but their control collapsed during World War One and under Imam Yahya Muhammad Hamid ad-Din the Zaydis declared the Republic of Yemen in 1918. He ruled until 1948, leading Yemen into the Arab League and UN, and his son Imam Ahmad ruled until 1962 when he died. Imam Ahmad's son was soon deposed by rebels assisted by Egypt, and the Yemen Arab Republic was declared. The war there in the 1960s pitted nationalists supported by Egypt against royalists supported by Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

Meanwhile, what is known as South Yemen had become the British protectorate of Aden in the 1800s. A Communist insurgency and terrorist campaign forced a British withdrawal and the People's Republic of South Yemen was declared in 1967 (and renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1970). The two Yemens alternatively fought and haggled until 1990, when they officially unified. Then their infighting became civil unrest and, in 1994, a civil war, won by the north.

Besides fighting among themselves, Yemenis also have complicated relations with their neighbors. Hundreds of thousands of Yemenis emigrated to Saudi Arabia in the 20th century to work in the oil industry and related jobs. Among these was Sheikh Muhammad bin Laden, founder of the family business dynasty. After Yemen sided with Iraq after the latter invaded Kuwait, Saudi Arabia expelled hundreds of thousands of Yemenis. Saudi Arabia and Yemen also had a long-running border dispute, which was settled in 2000. Yemen also had a dispute with Eritrea over a small group of islands in the Red Sea. And of course, Yemen's tribal hinterlands served as a hiding place and recruiting ground for terrorists including those responsible for the attack on the USS Cole.

Maybe someone more versed in foreign policy can explain why these insurgent groups fight if they have no chance to succeed.

Presumably, they fight because they don't think "they have no chance to succeed." They defeated the Ottomans at the height of Ottoman power. Other Yemenis defeated the British.

Their leader Badreddin al-Houthi fights in part because the government killed his son, Hussein al-Houthi, last September. The son was the founder of al-Shabab al-Mu'min ("the Believing Youth" or "Youthful Believers" or "Faithful Youth") in 1997 and launched the current uprising last summer. His father took over as "spiritual leader" after Yemeni troops killed Hussein, while actual operations are led by Abdullah Ayedh al-Rizami (or Razami), Yusuf Madani and Abdul Malak al-Houthi.

Also, Yemeni politics, especially in recent decades, seems full of deal-making. Maybe they figure they don't need to win power, only concessions.

[pulque]

Thanks.

Maybe someone more versed in warfare can explain if the GWOT is concerned with these kinds of insurgencies along side of the typical global terrorist ala Sageman?



there is no bunny.

[pulque]

I am supposed to be working but instead I am reading about the tenacious Z's.

Also, its occurring to me now that the "embryonic democracy" refered to in the CSM article, is, well, not.

[Airbornelawyer]

"Embryonic democracy" is one of those phrases people use without necessarily thinking it through. Essentially it means "not a democracy" but with the idea that it will be. Perhaps it rests on the progress myth that things inevitably get better and that democracy is part of the natural progression of history. Democracy is something that needs to be nurtured and defended and reinvigorated.

"Embryonic democracy" seems to be used alot when a country pays attention to the form of democracy but not necessarily to the substance. The country has a free election (or at least what diplomats call "generally free and fair") but the institutions of democracy are weak. Iraq is an "embryonic democracy" too, as is Ukraine, but lumping Iraq and Ukraine and Yemen together in one category like "embryonic democracy" requires ignoring lots of fundamental differences. Turkey and Pakistan have been embryonic democracies for decades, which basically means they have some democratic institutions and some undemocratic ones, and occasionally power shifts from one to the other. Germany was an embryonic democracy until 1933. Even under the Empire there was competitive politics, rising capitalism giving more people a vested interest what the state did with their wealth, and social debates; and many of its subordinate states like Bavaria were even more liberal (in the 19th century sense). But that embryonic democracy died rather quickly after the Nazis achieved power.

Yemen does have one advantage, though, which is that no one really cares about Yemen. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Yemens were caught up in regional and global rivalries. The Soviets supported anti-British Communist insurgents in what became South Yemen, and then the Communist regime there after the British left. The USSR got access to naval facilities on the island of Socotra, and hoped to create a network of client states that would give it control over the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Somalia's socialist regime was a Soviet client too, but when Ethiopia's Communists took power, the Soviets found an even more ideologically pure ally. Initially, through Cuba, the Soviets tried to bring together all three - South Yemen, Somalia and Ethiopia - but Somalia balked and instead invaded Ethiopia. The Soviets and Cubans sided with Ethiopia, and Somalia decided to become the US' new bestest buddy. Then Communism collapsed in the USSR, the Cold War ended and no one cared about their client states anymore.

In North Yemen, regional rivalries played a bigger role than superpower ones. In the 1960s the big rivalry was between the Arab socialists - primarily Nasser's Egypt, Ba'athist Iraq and Syria, and Algeria - and the conservative pro-Western monarchies - Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and non-Arab Iran. This had a superpower proxy component too, of course, as the socialist regimes all became Soviet clients of varying loyalty. After the Zaydi monarchy was overthrown, the Egyptians tried to use North Yemen as a weapon against Saudi Arabia. Their role in the civil war there was particularly brutal, involving the use of chemical weapons against royalist forces. But by the 1970s Nasser was gone and oil wealth gave the Gulf monarchies a lot of power to buy off the Egyptians, Syrians and Iraqis. And they could paper over their own differences by jointly hating Israel.

When North and South Yemen unified it took me by surprise. Apparently their ostensible ideological differences amounted to nothing. But it was hardly a triumph of democracy. The Yemen Socialist Party continued to control most of what had been the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the republicans continued to control much of what had been the Yemen Arab Republic, with smaller royalist, Islamist and other parties. Power remained heavily tribally-based, so the parties remained regional parties. These various interest groups are heavily competitive, which leads to vigorous politics, but insofar as the people at the bottom still have little or no say, even competitive elections among these groups isn't really democracy.

Yemen's most recent Freedom House survey is here, although their "Freedom in the World 2005" survey ought to be coming out within the next few weeks.

[pulque]

Yemen does have one advantage, though, which is that no one really cares about Yemen.

compared with, say, Kyrgyzstan?

After the Zaydi monarchy was overthrown, the Egyptians tried to use North Yemen as a weapon against Saudi Arabia. Their role in the civil war there was particularly brutal, involving the use of chemical weapons against royalist forces.

Why would a bunch of Zaydi Nationalists from the north ally themselves with Egyptians who have chemical weapons up their bisht?

Apparently their ostensible ideological differences amounted to nothing.

I must defer to your knowledge on that subject

[Jimbo]

Originally Posted by pulque

Thanks.

Maybe someone more versed in warfare can explain if the GWOT is concerned with these kinds of insurgencies along side of the typical global terrorist ala Sageman?



there is no bunny.

Yes. Like all other social movements, the global insurgency has various 'scenes'. Yemen and other insurgencies like it are just other scenes.

[Airbornelawyer]

There are dozens of battlefields in this conflict, not just the ones that make the front pages (or even A22) and many of which don't directly involve US military forces.

[lrd]

An interesting tie-in between this thread and our discussion of shipping lanes...

Pirate Attack Off Yemen