Worse Than a Nightmare (Afghanistan)

[Richard]

Is this the 'pulse' of the people...???

Words recently received from an old friend who has spent over three decades in the region:

I'm presently sitting at the Kabul airport DFAC (not eating, but its where the computers are located, of course) killing off time and waiting for the big bird to take me home tomorrow. I flew in from Khowst province last night. Khowst is a small Afghan province that borders Wazirstan - my location was about 20 clicks from the border (covering infiltration routes) - training some special locals. Also in our area, operating from FOB XXX is an ODA from XX Group - XX Group is also in-country, but didn't run into any of those guys. We'll talk more later about Afghanistan when I get back, but in one word the situation "sucks" - the best we can hope for here is to create a "manageable situation" -- in my view, this will require maintaining a US mil presence here into the next century. This country has never had a stable government, and I doubt the current one has any longevity - once the US mil pulls out, the house of cards will collapse.

...and...

Worse Than a Nightmare
Bob Herbert, NYT, 25 June 2010

President Obama can be applauded for his decisiveness in dispatching the chronically insubordinate Stanley McChrystal, but we are still left with a disaster of a war in Afghanistan that cannot be won and that the country as a whole will not support.

No one in official Washington is leveling with the public about what is really going on. We hear a lot about counterinsurgency, the latest hot cocktail-hour topic among the BlackBerry-thumbing crowd. But there is no evidence at all that counterinsurgency will work in Afghanistan. It’s not working now. And even if we managed to put all the proper pieces together, the fiercest counterinsurgency advocates in the military will tell you that something on the order of 10 to 15 years of hard effort would be required for this strategy to bear significant fruit.

We’ve been in Afghanistan for nearly a decade already. It’s one of the most corrupt places on the planet and the epicenter of global opium production. Our ostensible ally, President Hamid Karzai, is convinced that the U.S. cannot prevail in the war and is in hot pursuit of his own deal with the enemy Taliban. The American public gave up on the war long ago, and it is not at all clear that President Obama’s heart is really in it.

For us to even consider several more years of fighting and dying in Afghanistan — at a cost of heaven knows how many more billions of American taxpayer dollars — is demented.

Those who are so fascinated with counterinsurgency, from its chief advocate, Gen. David Petraeus, all the way down to the cocktail-hour kibitzers inside the Beltway, seem to have lost sight of a fundamental aspect of warfare: You don’t go to war half-stepping. You go to war to crush the enemy. You do this ferociously and as quickly as possible. If you don’t want to do it, if you have qualms about it, or don’t know how to do it, don’t go to war.

The men who stormed the beaches at Normandy weren’t trying to win the hearts and minds of anyone.

In Afghanistan, we are playing a dangerous, half-hearted game in which President Obama tells the America people that this is a war of necessity and that he will do whatever is necessary to succeed. Then, with the very next breath, he soothingly assures us that the withdrawal of U.S. troops will begin on schedule, like a Greyhound leaving the terminal, a year from now.

Both cannot be true.

What is true is that we aren’t even fighting as hard as we can right now. The counterinsurgency crowd doesn’t want to whack the enemy too hard because of an understandable fear that too many civilian casualties will undermine the “hearts and minds” and nation-building components of the strategy. Among the downsides of this battlefield caution is a disturbing unwillingness to give our own combat troops the supportive airstrikes and artillery cover that they feel is needed.

In an article this week, The Times quoted a U.S. Army sergeant in southern Afghanistan who was unhappy with the real-world effects of counterinsurgency. “I wish we had generals who remembered what it was like when they were down in a platoon,” he said. “Either they never have been in real fighting, or they forgot what it’s like.”

In the Rolling Stone article that led to General McChrystal’s ouster, reporter Michael Hastings wrote about the backlash that counterinsurgency restraints had provoked among the general’s own troops. Many feel that “being told to hold their fire” increases their vulnerability. A former Special Forces operator, a veteran of both Iraq and Afghanistan, said of General McChrystal, according to Mr. Hastings, “His rules of engagement put soldiers’ lives in even greater danger. Every real soldier will tell you the same thing.”

We are sinking more and more deeply into the fetid quagmire of Afghanistan and neither the president nor General Petraeus nor anyone else has the slightest clue about how to get out. The counterinsurgency zealots in the military want more troops sent to Afghanistan, and they want the president to completely scrap his already shaky July 2011 timetable for the beginning of a withdrawal.

We’re like a compulsive gambler plunging ever more deeply into debt in order to wager on a rigged game. There is no victory to be had in Afghanistan, only grief. We’re bulldozing Detroit while at the same time trying to establish model metropolises in Kabul and Kandahar. We’re spending endless billions on this wretched war but can’t extend the unemployment benefits of Americans suffering from the wretched economy here at home.

The difference between this and a nightmare is that when you wake up from a nightmare it’s over. This is all too tragically real.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/26/op...26herbert.html

And so it goes...

Richard's $.02

[bailaviborita]

I just got back and pretty much agree with both commentaries. Although I would add I don't think we should take the gloves off as much as just leave. I don't think what we are doing there is improving American national security interests- in fact, we're probably hurting our interests by continuing to waste money better invested internally.

I think the Afghans can handle what they need to handle, I think we're building American systems that won't last when we leave, and I don't think AQ will come back if we leave...

[busa]

What do you gents think would happen if we left except for SF?

Originally Posted by busa

What do you gents think would happen if we left except for SF?

You'd have a bunch of dead SF guys.

[bailaviborita]

Originally Posted by busa

What do you gents think would happen if we left except for SF?

I think you'd have a lot less power point briefings!

There are a lot of folks who think we can send most of the conventional combat guys home right now, keep some trainers and support folks and enough conventional might to support what the government wants to do, and enough SOF to strike at AQ (not Taliban) targets- and our national security would be just fine...

[olhamada]

Originally Posted by bailaviborita

I just got back and pretty much agree with both commentaries. Although I would add I don't think we should take the gloves off as much as just leave. I don't think what we are doing there is improving American national security interests- in fact, we're probably hurting our interests by continuing to waste money better invested internally.

I think the Afghans can handle what they need to handle, I think we're building American systems that won't last when we leave, and I don't think AQ will come back if we leave...

Amen.

[busa]

Thank you for your insight.

[PRB]

Originally Posted by bailaviborita

I just got back and pretty much agree with both commentaries. Although I would add I don't think we should take the gloves off as much as just leave. I don't think what we are doing there is improving American national security interests- in fact, we're probably hurting our interests by continuing to waste money better invested internally.

I think the Afghans can handle what they need to handle, I think we're building American systems that won't last when we leave, and I don't think AQ will come back if we leave...

I agree...you cannot 'teach' a form of democratic Govt. to a people with no traditions of the same to build upon. It goes against their traditions, history and more importantly experience.
I'd leave with a basic warning to Karzai...."Good luck, we've done what we can, hope it works out....and, btw, if you harbor terrs that target us we will come back and kill everyone because we realize you've decided to side with our enemies"
That they understand.

[kgoerz]

First stop calling it a country. It has no Government and no borders. Is just a region with a bunch of different tribes living with in it's space. Astan will never have stability. Just let the bad guys take over. Then every five years we go in and kill a bunch of them.

[MtnGoat]

The U.S. has been

playing a dangerous, half-hearted game

for many years, if not the whole time.

kgoerz, so true!!

[fng13]

Why won't AQ come back if we leave? Is it that it is too hot and would further draw unwanted attention or is it that the population is against them?

I am not suggesting that they would, I am genuinly interested in this.

[NiteTrain]

Originally Posted by kgoerz

First stop calling it a country. It has no Government and no borders. Is just a region with a bunch of different tribes living with in it's space. Astan will never have stability. Just let the bad guys take over. Then every five years we go in and kill a bunch of them.

The "INTERNATIONAL RESET BUTTON"

[MtnGoat]

As ISAF does it transition in next coming years, just thought I bump this thread. I like to bring up some points to this Nightmare we call Afghanistan.

I too won’t call Afghanistan a Country either kgoerz, because it isn’t. It is an area made up by may different areas, controlled by different people and tribes. Sadly this is the root of its problems, Ethic divide within Afghanistan. Taliban built on this in the mid 1990’s. The non-pashtuns never have worked for or be under control of the Taliban. Even King Mohammed Zahir Shah said that he ruled under the shadow of power due to the tribe difference. He did at least make a constitution which turned Afghanistan into a modern democratic state by introducing free elections, a Parliament, civil rights, women's rights and education systems. But this tribe ethic divide has made Afghanistan a land that for over 2000 years has never been under external control. This is why the Taliban had been able to take over with outsider influences. The issues today are the way the Taliban has started a divide within its ranks. It runs under its Taliban ideologically but it is divide on about 3 to 4 fronts, the South and East divide with the elements within Pakistan, in the East the control fighting between Haqqani Network (HQN), and the Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), then the ISI involvement.

GIRoA has no money to run itself. With the elite/ ruling class running everything and taking every bit of money poured into the country through foreign governments. Everything that has been set up within Afghanistan has been a failure. DoS and the military had a plan for nation building. The issue between DoS or DoD and other nations is that when Senior military leader failures occur when the civilian leaders and military commanders become disconnected. This happen on so many levels, for each RC and sector, each time a new commander came in to command they never followed the plan set up. The base line plan or changed everything up for there own plan. Not flowing a plan caused many issues within Afghanistan. Then you have the issue with JOBs in Afghanistan. With ISAF and NATO pulling out Afghanistan’s economy will face a sharp shock after international troops withdraw in 2014, removing the one factor that provided investors and businesses with a measure of confidence for Afghanistan economic infrastructure development. But even with a secure economic infrastructure Afghanistan still suffers from massive institutional corruption, which means that much of the tens of billions of foreign investment that have flowed into the country has been squandered by the ruling class. Once 2014 rolls around this ruling class will be flying out by the dozen to Dubai, Middle East, and the EU. I bet next year this will start happening. US and EU should follow the AID development plan that China has, they don’t provide large amounts of “cash” they go in with Chinese Companies and build with locals the aid projects. So they are in control of the cash and then have that nice Civil platform.

Pakistan and its impact on Afghanistan development. This is something that has been an issue since the start of time. Pakistan has never wanted a successful Afghanistan. This has been from the two British control periods to the 1947 creation, to the Soviet period and the backing of the mujahideen through the ISI and PAK Army, then with ISI backing of the Taliban. The Pakistan and its Military/ISI has been stirring up problems within Afghanistan for many years. Pakistan has so many internal problems and does look inward, but with its military controlling class always pointing outwards. Pakistan has two of four providence with a insurgency problem. The Military/ISI “made” the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) inadvertently through the creation of Islamic fundamentalist militants groups to fight in the Indian-administered Kashmir, a territory claimed and disputed by Pakistan. The TTP “pulled” together an alliance of about five militant groups in Pakistan formed in 2007 to unify groups fighting against the Pakistani military in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Pakistani military/ISI “turned” on their insurgent groups in a confrontation in July 2007 between Islamic fundamentalist militants and the Government of Pakistan in an operation against the Lal Masjid ("Red Mosque") and the Jamia Hafsa madrasah complex in Islamabad, Pakistan. Then you have the long running Balochistan conflict which is an ongoing conflict between Baloch nationalists and the Government of Pakistan over Balochistan. Baloch nationalists ideals have changed over the years, but this is a insurgency that Pakistan Military has to deal with.
So has the chickens come home to roost?

Afghan Army. Now here is a beast of burden. With GIRoA having no money to run itself and with the elite/ ruling class running everything and taking every bit of money poured into the country will leave the ANA in the hands of Taliban. Under current NATO plans the ANSF are supposed to take over responsibility for security of Afghanistan by the middle of 2013 and all ISAF troops will be withdrawn from combat operations by the end of 2014. Afghanistan’s future will be jeopardized with Taliban returning to control of the country when foreign troops are pulled out. The main issue with ANA is that NATO/ISAF never built an Officer Corps. The Soviet did do something close to this during its time in Afghanistan. Most Officers were tied to their Afghanistan communist parties. Soviet rebuilt the Afghan Army 3 or 4 times. With the Enlisted ranks they will be tied back to their tribal links. This will lead to ANA going back to the same problems the Soviets Army splintered between the government in Kabul and the various warring factions between “warlord” Commanders. Left behind will be military aid in the form of DoS development and DoD training teams to the different ANA commands.

Afghan neighbors don’t want U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Most of the neighbors of Afghanistan don’t want a U.S. military presence within Afghanistan after 2014. Like I said Pakistan has never wanted a successful Afghanistan, Iran pushes aid into the western Afghanistan and the Shi'a areas. All the northern countries are spilt in were they are in support of Afghanistan. India is likely the main supporter of a successful Afghanistan. Even with an America and Afghanistan signing a strategic pact which would allow thousands of United States troops to remain in the country until at least 2024. The Russians have complained that any talks of U.S. Military troop presence in Afghanistan after 2014 violates international understandings. The main one including one made in a joint statement by President Obama and President Dmitri A. Medvedev on supporting a neutral status for Afghanistan. So as Conventional Troops are pulled out and Afghan forces would still need support from US fighter aircraft, helicopters and USSOF elements left behind to support the ANA. So if no neighbors want U.S. around what will change? How will this affect the insurgences of the Taliban and their control or take cover of Afghanistan. Will the Taliban become part of the new Government; remember that 2014 is an election year for Afghanistan too.

Wake up ..wake up your having an NIGHTMARE!!

[perdurabo]

Originally Posted by bailaviborita

I just got back and pretty much agree with both commentaries. Although I would add I don't think we should take the gloves off as much as just leave. I don't think what we are doing there is improving American national security interests- in fact, we're probably hurting our interests by continuing to waste money better invested internally.

I think the Afghans can handle what they need to handle, I think we're building American systems that won't last when we leave, and I don't think AQ will come back if we leave...

Well put. Nobody seems to have a good answer on what to do, so let's just leave. The Al Qaeda presence in AF is either minimal or non-existent depending on who you ask.

Pointlessly trying to form a democratic government in a country used to tribal warlords and Islamic oppression doesn't seem like something that's helping our national interests, in reality. It's certainly a waste of taxpayer money, and more importantly, lives.

Back out and let them deal with their own country. If anything, maybe our interference will have given them a glimpse of life without Taliban rule and they might actually do something about it -- if they even want to in the first place.

[bailaviborita]

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...m-in-naglandia

In 1928 Henry Ford set out to establish a carbon copy of an American town along with an industrialized rubber plantation deep in a Rhode Island-sized piece of Brazilian Amazonia. After upsetting the natives with American ways of doing things and failing to grow sufficient amounts of rubber trees, Ford’s son ended the experiment by capping the losses of “Fordlandia” at $20 million in 1945. Back in 1922, as if to explain this future debacle, the Washington Post had used the term “Fordism” to mean “Ford efforts conceived in disregard or ignorance of Ford limitations.” Today, we could use the term “Petraeusism” to mean “U.S military efforts conceived in disregard or ignorance of U.S. military limitations.” Likewise, we could use the name “Naglandia” to describe Afghanistan, a place where, much like Ford had attempted to do in the Amazon, the U.S. has attempted to establish a “New America,” albeit with the modern and contradictory political correctness that comes with our current obsession with “absolute tolerance” and our culturally-biased interpretation of Galula’s population-centricity in counterinsurgent activities. As if in some kind of twisted Shakespearean comedic tragedy, the U.S. military, traditionally an organization filled with political conservatives and Peace Corps-doubting Thomas’s, has turned itself into an organization that believes there is a Thomas Jefferson inside every Afghan and the solution to jump-starting an economy is to throw money at it. If only our losses could be capped in another seven years at the similar $240 million (inflation-adjusted figure) of Ford’s Amazon experiment.