Who are the Taliban?

[Richard]

Pretty good overview from the BBC -

Richard's $.02

Who are the Taliban?

Recent years have seen the re-emergence of the hardline Islamic Taliban movement as a fighting force in Afghanistan and a major threat to its government.

They are also threatening to destabilise Pakistan, where they control areas in the north-west and are blamed for a wave of suicide bombings and other attacks.

The Taliban emerged in the early 1990s in northern Pakistan following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

A predominantly Pashtun movement, the Taliban came to prominence in Afghanistan in the autumn of 1994.

It is commonly believed that they first appeared in religious seminaries - mostly paid for by money from Saudi Arabia - which preached a hard line form of Sunni Islam.

The Taliban's promise - in Pashtun areas straddling Pakistan and Afghanistan - was to restore peace and security and enforce their own austere version of Sharia, or Islamic law, once in power.

In both countries they introduced or supported Islamic punishments - such as public executions of convicted murderers and adulterers and amputations of those found guilty of theft.

Men were required to grow beards and women had to wear the all-covering burka.

Madrassas

The Taliban showed a similar disdain for television, music and cinema and disapproved of girls aged 10 and over from going to school.

Pakistan has repeatedly denied that it is the architect of the Taliban enterprise.

But there is little doubt that many Afghans who initially joined the movement were educated in madrassas (religious schools) in Pakistan.

Pakistan was also one of only three countries, along with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which recognised the Taliban when they were in power in Afghanistan from the mid-1990s until 2001.

It was also the last country to break diplomatic ties with the Taliban.

The attention of the world was drawn to the Taliban in Afghanistan following the attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001.

The Taliban in Afghanistan was accused of providing a sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda movement who were blamed for the attacks.

Soon after 9/11 the Taliban were driven from power in Afghanistan by a US-led coalition, although their leader Mullah Mohammad Omar was not captured - and neither was Osama Bin Laden.

In recent years the Taliban have re-emerged in Afghanistan and grown far stronger in Pakistan, where observers say there is loose co-ordination between different Taliban factions and militant groups.

The main Pakistani faction is led by Baitullah Mehsud, whose Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is blamed for dozens of suicide bombings and other attacks.

Observers warn against over-stating the existence of one unified insurgency against the Pakistani state, however.

The Taliban in Afghanistan are still believed to be led by Mullah Omar, a village clergyman who lost his right eye fighting the occupying forces of the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

Afghans, weary of the mujahideen's excesses and infighting after the Soviets were driven out, generally welcomed the Taliban when they first appeared on the scene.

Their early popularity was largely due to their success in stamping out corruption, curbing lawlessness and making the roads and the areas under their control safe for commerce to flourish.

From south-western Afghanistan, the Taliban quickly extended their influence.

They captured the province of Herat, bordering Iran, in September 1995.

Exactly one year later, they captured the Afghan capital, Kabul, after overthrowing the regime of President Burhanuddin Rabbani and his defence minister, Ahmed Shah Masood.

By 1998, they were in control of almost 90% of Afghanistan.

They were accused of various human rights and cultural abuses. One example was in 2001, when the Taliban went ahead with the destruction of the famous Bamiyan Buddha statues in central Afghanistan, despite international outrage.

US onslaught

On October 7, 2001, a US-led military coalition invaded Afghanistan and by the first week of December the Taliban regime had collapsed.

Mullah Omar and most of the other senior Taliban leaders, along with Bin Laden and some of his senior al-Qaeda associates, survived the American onslaught.

Mullah Omar and most of his comrades have evaded capture despite one of the largest manhunts in the world and are believed to be guiding the resurgent Taliban.

Since then they have re-grouped in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, but are now under pressure in both countries, from the Pakistani army and Nato respectively.

Despite ever higher numbers of foreign troops, the Taliban have steadily extended their influence, rendering vast tracts of Afghanistan insecure, and violence in the country has returned to levels not seen since 2001.

Their retreat earlier this decade enabled them to limit their human and material losses and return with a vengeance.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1549285.stm

A little more on how they became who they are:

U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan During Soviet Occupation

In 1978 a revolution occurred in Afghanistan which resulted in the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) led by Hafizullah Amin gaining power. The PDPA was socialist and pro-Soviet, whereas the previous government in Afghanistan preferred to strengthen ties to the United States and Iran. The PDPA instituted numerous reforms that did not sit well with Afghanis and armed rebel groups began to form. Eventually these rebel groups called for a “jihad”, or holy war, against the PDPA. This takeover by a pro-Communist regime and the subsequent uprising provided “proof that Soviet foreign policy was ‘expansionist’ in nature.” (1.) U.S. policy toward communism had been “containment” since Truman was president. The U.S. saw importance in Afghanistan in terms of the “domino theory.” Afghanistan presented a perfect situation for the United States to combat the Soviets indirectly, exercising its policy of containment and later “roll back.”

Afghanistan was perceived as a “buffer” between the Soviet Union and U.S. allies until the fall of the Shah of Iran to a fundamental Islamic group in 1979. Afghanistan had always had ties with the Soviets, but mainly by means of humanitarian assistance. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan combined with an unstable Iran, which could be easily influenced by Soviets from neighboring Afghanistan, were seen by the U.S. as serious threats to the balance of power in the region. The domino theory prevailed in Washington. If Afghanistan were to fall to the communists, a weakened Iran could possibly be next, thus giving the Soviets a firm grasp in Southeast Asia for further expansion into other areas.

The U.S. began contacting the Afghan rebel organizations in 1979 with offers of aid to assist them in overthrowing the PDPA. The Soviets saw the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan as a threat to their security because of a shared border and feared more “capitalist encirclement” if the rebels succeeded in overthrowing the pro-Soviet PDPA with help from the United States.

The U.S. policy was to prevent excessive Soviet influence in Afghanistan that could lead to their establishment of a forward “foothold” that might lead to further aggressive action in the region. (1.) In December of 1979 the Soviet Union sent military units to Afghanistan to assist the PDPA, and a “proxy war” between the U.S. and Soviet Union began. Afghanistan itself held little importance for the U.S., but neighboring Pakistan, Iran, the Persian Gulf and ports of the Indian Ocean were seen as critical, however. Afghanistan became a Cold War battlefield.

U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation (1979-1989) was primarily covert. The Central Intelligence Agency sent operatives into the country to advise and equip the rebels, mainly using Pakistan as a conduit. Several Afghan dissident groups had operated out of Pakistan prior to the Soviet invasion. They were primarily Islamic groups who had formed during the early 1970s, one of which was the “Hizb-I Islami” led by a man named Hekmatyar. A Pakistani source introduced a CIA official to Hekmatyar in 1979. Hekmatyar was described as “more radically Islamic and Anti-American than most Afghans” but headed what the Pakistani government considered one of the most militant and organized rebel groups. (1.) His rebel group received a much larger share of weapons and funds from Pakistan than the other groups.

The Soviet Union sent hundreds of thousands of troops into Afghanistan in an attempt to put a stop to the rebel uprisings and help establish the new socialist regime. The U.S. saw this as communist aggression that could destabilize the balance of power in the region.

Throughout the 1970s pro-Soviet governments had taken over in many third world countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. Afghanistan was seen as simply more Soviet expansion, and many in the U.S. government suspected that the Soviets played a hand in the initial pro-communist takeover, although it has yet to be proven. The Soviets disliked the new Amin’s methods and attempted to advise him as to how to establish, stabilize, and consolidate his government. Amin refused to take the Soviets’ advice and continued to operate the way he saw fit, which contributed to the eventual Soviet invasion and removal of Amin by the Soviets. The Soviets installed Babrak Karmal, an exiled leader of one of Afghanistan’s many tribal factions, as the Prime Minister of Afghanistan.

1980 was an election year in the United States, and Soviet expansion into Afghanistan was high on the list of candidate topics. To oppose the Soviet aggression, President Carter established the “Carter Doctrine” in January 1980, stating:

“An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the U.S. and would be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” (1.)

President Carter approved moderate levels of covert aid to the Afghan rebels and sought to negotiate a settlement for a Soviet withdrawal. Reagan’s policy of “roll back”, or to take back the areas that communists had taken over, appealed to the American public, however, and Carter lost the election.

With the election of Reagan in 1980, U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and the Soviets changed drastically. Reagan took a more hard lined approach to dealing with the Soviets. Reagan approved a six-year economic and military aid package for Pakistan. A large number of weapons were given to Hizb-I Islami and other rebel groups. Reagan’s intent was to tie down the Soviets and make Afghanistan too costly for them to continue the occupation by keeping the rebels well equipped. By doing so, the U.S. would make the Soviet occupation simply too expensive to maintain. This plan eventually worked, but at a tremendous cost in both Soviet and Afghan lives, money, and equipment.

With Reagan in the White House and Congress supporting the idea of Afghan self-determination and rolling back the communists, support for the Afghan rebels grew. During the early 1980s, in order to retain some plausible deniability of U.S. involvement, the U.S. initially purchased foreign Soviet-style weapons to give to the rebel groups. Most of them were AK-47 assault rifles purchased from China through Egypt and then sent to Pakistan, then passed to the rebels.

In 1982 Congress approved almost three billion dollars in aid for the mujahidin rebels. In 1984 several congressmen called for U.S. material aid for the rebels to increase the size and quality of the rebel covert aid program. In 1986, the CIA provided the mujahidin rebels with U.S.-made Stinger missiles to combat Soviet aircraft. This was the first time the CIA had used U.S.-made weapons to support a covert insurgency. By 1987, the U.S. was giving the rebels nearly $700 million in military assistance per year, including Swiss and British antiaircraft missiles.

To be continued...

Throughout the Soviet occupation, one of the largest problems was Afghan refugees. Millions of dislocated Afghans fled to Pakistan in droves. This created many problems along the Pakistan-Afghan border region, as Pakistani tribes clashed with the fleeing Afghan refugees over land and limited resources in the region. Many political and religious differences between the peoples added to the tension. Disease, starvation, poverty, all contributed to the misery. The large numbers of refugees put tremendous economical and political pressure on Pakistan.

The Soviet Union began intense aerial bombardment campaigns throughout Afghanistan to destroy nodes of rebels. This indiscriminate “carpet bombing” killed hundreds of thousands of Afghan civilians, who left villages completely abandoned to escape imminent death. The majority of these Afghanis fled to Pakistan.

The U.S. organization, Agency for International Development (AID), began cross-border humanitarian aid to Afghans so they would not have to flee to Pakistan to survive. By giving funds to Afghans to build hospitals, schools, and growing crops, this also helped to keep bases of support for the rebels inside Afghan borders as well as ease the pressure on Pakistan to support so many displaced refugees. Interestingly, a large percentage of money and materials sent as humanitarian aid for the refugees ended up in the hands of the rebels.

An estimated $6 billion went to fund the Afghan rebels, though approximately only 10% of it actually made it into the hands of the rebels themselves. Much of the funds went into the hands of corrupt Pakistanis. Saudi Arabia also sent large amounts of money and other forms of aid to the Afghan rebels throughout the conflict.

The CIA continued to equip and train rebels, most of which were Islamic radicals who did not favor the United States, yet they shared a common enemy – the Soviets. The U.S. used the rebels as proxies to combat the spread of Communism with little regard to the long-term effects of training and arming such a large number of anti-American radical Islamic groups. Some of the leaders of those groups are still active today, now fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Two of the principal rebel leaders from the Soviet era still active today are Ishmael Khan and Hekmatyar. In 2004 Ishmael Khan was removed as the governor of Herat Province in Western Afghanistan and he fled to Iran to escape arrest. Forces loyal to him still conduct operations in Western Afghanistan. Hekmatyar’s Hizb-I Islami remains active throughout Southern Afghanistan and along the Afghan-Pakistan border region.

The Islamic rebels were taught the basics of Islam and how to conduct guerrilla warfare. They became the “Taliban”, which means student - students of Islam, students of war.

By late 1986 the Soviets were realizing that they could not defeat the rebels in guerilla war. There were no rebel bases to bomb, no relatively easily targeted rebel leaders to assassinate. The Soviets had spent nearly a decade and over six billion rubles in their attempt to reinforce the socialist Afghan government and remove the rebels and had made little progress. In fact, late 1986 to early 1987 were some of the bloodiest months of the occupation in terms of Soviet losses. This was probably largely due to the introduction of more sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons to the rebels.

Soviet Muslims had also been in contact with Afghans across the border and unrest had begun within Soviet borders. The Soviet economy was not doing well, and their efforts to support Cuba as well as Afghanistan were financially draining. In an attempt to cut down the cost of operations in Afghanistan and focus funding on domestic issues, Gorbachev announced a cease-fire and offered amnesty to armed rebels in December of 1986, but the war continued.

In 1988 negotiations began in the UN and between the rebels, PDPA Afghan government, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The U.S. offered to cut aid to the rebels as soon as the Soviets began to withdraw forces from Afghanistan, but only as long as the Soviets stopped funding the PDPA government. Neither the Soviets, nor the Americans trusted the other to hold up their end of the deal and cut support, so the negotiations failed to solve anything.

The U.S. would continue to support the rebels as long as the Soviets were supporting the PDPA. Negotiations between the rebels and PDPA and attempts to form a coalition Afghan government between the different factions there also failed, largely due to mistrust after so many years of brutal war between them.

Eventually an agreement known as the Geneva Accords was reached, which settled the major differences between Pakistan, the U.S., Soviets and Afghanistan. With this agreement the Soviets and U.S. would both stop interfering with the internal affairs of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The accord also set a timetable for the Soviet departure and in May of 1988 the Soviet Union began withdrawing troops from Afghanistan.

The U.S. saw this as a Cold War victory and a victory for the rebel fighters, but the actual war in Afghanistan continued. The rebels were still fighting the PDPA government that it had been fighting before Soviet and U.S. intervention, but they were now better equipped, better trained, and more experienced. None of the rebels were repatriated or demilitarized after the Soviet withdrawal. There were armed rebels all over Afghanistan, with bombs and explosives scattered throughout the countryside.

Once the PDPA were removed from power in 1992, a former rebel leader, Rabbani, took power through a United Nations charter, but several other Islamic rebel groups failed to recognize the government as legitimate. Hekmatyar and Massoud, formerly trained and supported by the CIA, opposed Rabbani and continued to wage war on Kabul. The civil war continued until 1996 when the “Taliban” began gaining recognition, offering peace and security to this war-torn country. The Taliban offered an attractive choice for Afghans, who were still being murdered, tortured, their cities rocketed, and women raped, and with refugees still flowing into Pakistan eight years after the Soviets began their withdrawal. The Taliban took power and was recognized by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. At first Afghans welcomed the Taliban after so many years of war and torture. Little did they know that the Taliban’s true ambition was a strict Islamic state with very few freedoms and that they would soon suffer human rights violations, and atrocities against minority populations.

The Taliban’s support of and refusal to hand over Al Quaeda suspects after the September 11th terror attacks in the United States would bring the U.S. back to Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. Many of the weapons being used against U.S. forces today are remnants of the Soviet occupation, and many of the fighters were once trained and equipped by the CIA.