Behind the Lines

[jatx]

Behind the Lines: The Oral History of Special Operations in World War II by Russell Miller

I received this book for Christmas, and have spent the past couple of months reading it a page or two at a time, not wanting it to end. Miller has combined first-hand interviews and archived materials to weave a narrative stretching from OSS's early days through D-Day, the partisan campaigns in the Balkans, and Det. 101's actions against the Japanese. If, like me, you didn't ask your grandfather nearly enough about their wartime service, you'll enjoy the style. Most of the vignettes are only a page or two long, but have the tone you'll recognize from those rare occasions when our elders got in a story-telling mood.

Some of the stories are very funny, such as that of Gilbert Turck, a Parisian architect dropped back into occupied France by the SOE. Captured by the Germans immediately upon landing, he talked his way out of certain execution by convincing his captors that he had hated the English so much that he bribed an RAF pilot to drop him back in France. They bought it and he went on to make contributions through the end of the war.

Still more of the stories revolve around well-known events, such as the so-called Heavy Water Raid at Vemork and the delaying actions of the Jedburgh teams following D-Day. There is something different about reading about such things in the words of the participants, though.

Looking back, a few things jump out at me. First is the seat-of-the-pants modus operandi of OSS and SOE during much of the war. It was not until fairly late in the war that agents could be described as "well-trained", and many were little more than enthusiastic civilians with the mindset and enthusiasm to live by their wits. This was obviously not the case for the Jedburgh teams, but it did make me think about the importance of talent and will versus technology and training.

Second, the troubles faced by our agents in the Balkans bear a striking resemblance to what I've read about the difficulty of conducting UW and FID in Afghanistan and Iraq. Internecine conflict was rampant, objectives were not always congruent with those of the Allies, and the Gs were surly and recalcitrant at best.

All in all, a great book. I highly recommend it.