Conventional forces in the unconventional fight.

[Patriot]

Is there a role for conventional forces in an unconventional fight? This is a topic I've been pondering since the end of phase one of OIF. Seems that the learning curve was long, and it took awhile for conventional leaders to change their mindset and they still have a long way to go IMO. Granted, that circumstances forced this upon them and the COIN FM is in it's final phase of being written so hopefully they'll become more proficient soon. I'd like to hear the opinion of those in the SF community. What in their opinion do conventional forces need to do in order to assist in unconventional fight, if anything? I'm not trying to compare apples to oranges here, it is a given the UW is the specialty of SF and that conventional forces will never, nor should they even attempt to achieve the expertise or capabilities of SF. But what role should they play? What tasks could the perform that might assist SF? It would be especially enlightening to hear the perspective of those who are already experts in the UW arena.

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

Originally Posted by Patriot

Is there a role for conventional forces in an unconventional fight? .

Yep, but it is not going to be answered in the space alloted here.

The simple answer is that UW (and its alter-ego FID) is applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict if the conditions are right and can be used as a strategic tool both offensively and defensively. Conventional forces also have roles across the entire spectrum of conflict but there use and roles will vary with the situation. The problem is not do they have a role but how to educate the decision makers to use the right tools at the right time. I do not think you can have a cookie cutter answer to this question because each conflict brings its own set of dynamics which are impacted by the other elements of national power necessary to meet strategic national interests.

[NousDefionsDoc]

UW (and its alter-ego FID)

I like this concept. With your permission Sir.

Patriot,
There is a veritable plethora of examples of the question you ask.

I suggest you begin with Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife by Nagl. Try the COIN sources thread and the other threads in the Insurgencies & Guerrilla Warfare forum here on PS.com. Do your homework then come back to this thread and tell us what you think the role for conventional forces is in UW. You will never learn anything if you are given answers.

The Colonel has already warned you of several pitfalls, so take heed.

I will move this thread to the Insurgencies & Guerrilla Warfare forum, where it belongs.

[Patriot]

Originally Posted by Jack Moroney

Yep, but it is not going to be answered in the space alloted here.

The simple answer is that UW (and its alter-ego FID) is applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict if the conditions are right and can be used as a strategic tool both offensively and defensively. Conventional forces also have roles across the entire spectrum of conflict but there use and roles will vary with the situation. The problem is not do they have a role but how to educate the decision makers to use the right tools at the right time. I do not think you can have a cookie cutter answer to this question because each conflict brings its own set of dynamics which are impacted by the other elements of national power necessary to meet strategic national interests.

I agree, perhaps in the interest of narrowing the discussion we could discuss this topic within the context of OIF?

While I'm reading the suggested material I'd still enjoy reading any comments that SF Operators may have to offer on this topic with OIF being the backdrop.

We're breaking new ground in OIF regarding conventional force/SF combined ops aren't we? I'm not sure, you SF Soldiers would know better than I. If there are any examples you can discuss, again, I'm eager to read your thoughts.

Now, I'm off to google up "Eating Soup With a Knife." Thanks for the tips.

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

Originally Posted by Patriot

IWe're breaking new ground in OIF regarding conventional force/SF combined ops aren't we?

Well actually yes and no. The only new ground we have broken is the mind-set of conventional commanders that SF could contribute to a conventionally led operation/and or could take the lead in conventional operations. Let's get a couple of terms straight here also. Combined operations are operations with US and foreign forces. US forces/SF operations are joint and not combined. You also have joint/combined forces reflecting a combination of different US forces and foreign forces. While it may not seem like a big deal, it is as important as differentiating between SOF and SF. If you can get access to some of our doctrinal manuals you will see that there is nothing new here except that SF was allowed to perform the missions espoused by their doctrine and that this doctrine had been blessed and approved by the appropriate service manuals.

What is happening now, however is that SF is being used more to make up for conventional military short comings and are playing more direct roles in door kicking and direct action missions rather than FID/UW. I am not suggesting that SF is not performing doctrinal missions, what I am suggesting is that the conventional forces all think that they can step in and perform doctrinal SF operations and are beginning to label things as "special operations" when they start to cross outside their lanes. This again is not new, it is just a continuation of failing to use the right folks for the right task. It also has to do with the failure of developing and implementing a sound national security strategy based on properly defined national interests with a concomitant development by the DOD of a personnel and force strategy that looks beyond and manages idiotic political agendas in order to manage the current battlefield and shape the battlespace of tomorrow.

The "new" ground that is being broken in the aftermath of OIF is that the military has forgotten that they went through all of this before. There are no lessons learned here, just mistakes revisited. I should rephrase that, there are lessons learned and those have to do with equipment failures, leadership shortcomings, myopic strategies, etc. The new part of all this is that it is a "new" crop of players but the boilerplate remains the same. That old hackneyed phrase about those failing to understand history being destined to repeat it plays into this scenario quite well.

[Patriot]

Currently reading the draft of FM 3-24, alot to absorb. Apologize for the confusing use of terms but glad you knew what I meant.

It does seem that the main issues is with the mindset of leadership (conventional). But I recall that conventional forces were under the command of JSTOF-N during the build up and combat phase of OIF and I read the conventional leadership were a real fly in the ointment over that. But that worked out pretty well despite the misgivings of conventional leadership. If we get the guys with the right mindset in the right places, it seems to me that there could be a great synergy produced with the use of conventional/SF applied in the right place at the right time.

Back to my reading before I step on my crank again. I'll be back to comment after I get some more reading done. I find this topic to be very interesting.

[skibum]

Patriot,

You may also want to check out SAS: Secret War in Southeast Asia. The book goes into the operations against Indonesia's Sukharno (sp?) regime in the mid 60's. It's a great read and very interesting, but the applicability to your question is what the SAS did to hand their mission off to conventional (although elite) units such as Ghurhas and Paras.

Conventional forces (and police) were also used during the communist emergency in Malaya a decade earlier.

Different political backgrounds, one being cross-border incursions/aggression from a hostile government, the other an insurgency against an established colonial government already being challenged by impending independance from Britain. Nonetheless, these two campaigns are sure to have useful lessons learned. (The biggest, I think, is the length of the Malayan Emergency - 10 years)

[Patriot]

Thanks for the tip. Still wading through FM 3-24 though, fascinating stuff.

[Bayonet14]

May I add this? And if I am not mistaken this is on a reading list?

[82ndtrooper]

Originally Posted by Jack Moroney

Well actually yes and no. The only new ground we have broken is the mind-set of conventional commanders that SF could contribute to a conventionally led operation/and or could take the lead in conventional operations. Let's get a couple of terms straight here also. Combined operations are operations with US and foreign forces. US forces/SF operations are joint and not combined. You also have joint/combined forces reflecting a combination of different US forces and foreign forces. While it may not seem like a big deal, it is as important as differentiating between SOF and SF. If you can get access to some of our doctrinal manuals you will see that there is nothing new here except that SF was allowed to perform the missions espoused by their doctrine and that this doctrine had been blessed and approved by the appropriate service manuals.

What is happening now, however is that SF is being used more to make up for conventional military short comings and are playing more direct roles in door kicking and direct action missions rather than FID/UW. I am not suggesting that SF is not performing doctrinal missions, what I am suggesting is that the conventional forces all think that they can step in and perform doctrinal SF operations and are beginning to label things as "special operations" when they start to cross outside their lanes. This again is not new, it is just a continuation of failing to use the right folks for the right task. It also has to do with the failure of developing and implementing a sound national security strategy based on properly defined national interests with a concomitant development by the DOD of a personnel and force strategy that looks beyond and manages idiotic political agendas in order to manage the current battlefield and shape the battlespace of tomorrow.

The "new" ground that is being broken in the aftermath of OIF is that the military has forgotten that they went through all of this before. There are no lessons learned here, just mistakes revisited. I should rephrase that, there are lessons learned and those have to do with equipment failures, leadership shortcomings, myopic strategies, etc. The new part of all this is that it is a "new" crop of players but the boilerplate remains the same. That old hackneyed phrase about those failing to understand history being destined to repeat it plays into this scenario quite well.

I suppose this would explain the acronym of CJTSOF or JTCSOF forces in OIF currently operating with the ICTF (Iraqi Counter Terrorist forces) and not just JTSOF operations that would merely include those SOF forces from all the various United States military branches SOF operations forces.