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one-zero · 09-07-2005, 18:19

Communication
* Communications planning is vital to mission accomplishment.

* It is important to practice simplicity -- complicated plans and equipment frequently fail. SOF should procure simple, easy-to-use, reliable commo gear.

* The complexity of new equipment tends to make operators less proficient.

* New equipment should prompt changes in planning, because each piece of equipment has its own strengths and limitations.

* The pace of fielding may make it difficult to achieve unit proficiency.

* The probability of crisis communications make it essential that all A-detachment members be cross-trained in communications. Take into account the time and the resources needed to fully cross-train all members. In the past, all detachment members knew Morse Code; now, only l8Es do.

* SF needs to define the commo training requirements that will be met by SWCS and by the SF groups.

* SF needs simple, multifunction radios. After 30 years, SF still requires multiple radios that increase the rucksack weight.

* Detachments should have multiple encrypting, frequency-hopping capabilities.

* It is difficult to communicate while moving.

* The SF groups lack common communications procedures.

* The requirements of SR vary with the theater, the SF group, the operational plan and the mission. Coordinate theater SR requirements through the SF group in order to guide planning and tactics, techniques and procedures.

* Preparation for SR is accomplished primarily through unit training that is based on a mission analysis.

• Although new equipment allows longer, more frequent commo, short, infrequent commo helps to counter direction-finding equipment.
• Teams should develop tactics, techniques and procedures for minimizing their time on the air.

* New commo equipment allows headquarters to have more direct control of a team, but there is a risk that micro-management will constrain the team's initiative and decision-making ability. SF should develop procedures that will protect the detachment from higher intervention.

* Sensor-to-shooter links require not only speed, but also a close situational awareness -- a common operational picture -- from the detachment through the joint task force to the joint forces air-component commander.

* Except for special-mission units, current forces lack dedicated aircraft and dedicated positions in the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center and in the Airborne Warning and Control System. Having the support of an operator in the air proved crucial to SOG's mission success. An operator overhead furnishes more urgent support than staff personnel located in a distant headquarters would.

* The special-operations liaison element and the special-operations command-and-control element should be sustained.

As a group, the one-zeros agreed on the following points:

* Not everyone is cut out to conduct recon.

* A soldier should not be penalized if he lacks the aptitude for recon.

* Recon must be practiced at every opportunity.

* Resources must be made available to recon teams, and distractors must be minimized.

* The loyalty required for the recon mission must work down the chain as well as up -- senior officers must trust the judgment of the man on the ground.

COPYRIGHT 2000 John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

09-07-2005, 18:19	#2
one-zero Quiet Professional Join Date: Aug 2005 Posts: 293	Article continued Communication * Communications planning is vital to mission accomplishment. * It is important to practice simplicity -- complicated plans and equipment frequently fail. SOF should procure simple, easy-to-use, reliable commo gear. * The complexity of new equipment tends to make operators less proficient. * New equipment should prompt changes in planning, because each piece of equipment has its own strengths and limitations. * The pace of fielding may make it difficult to achieve unit proficiency. * The probability of crisis communications make it essential that all A-detachment members be cross-trained in communications. Take into account the time and the resources needed to fully cross-train all members. In the past, all detachment members knew Morse Code; now, only l8Es do. * SF needs to define the commo training requirements that will be met by SWCS and by the SF groups. * SF needs simple, multifunction radios. After 30 years, SF still requires multiple radios that increase the rucksack weight. * Detachments should have multiple encrypting, frequency-hopping capabilities. * It is difficult to communicate while moving. * The SF groups lack common communications procedures. * The requirements of SR vary with the theater, the SF group, the operational plan and the mission. Coordinate theater SR requirements through the SF group in order to guide planning and tactics, techniques and procedures. * Preparation for SR is accomplished primarily through unit training that is based on a mission analysis. • Although new equipment allows longer, more frequent commo, short, infrequent commo helps to counter direction-finding equipment. • Teams should develop tactics, techniques and procedures for minimizing their time on the air. * New commo equipment allows headquarters to have more direct control of a team, but there is a risk that micro-management will constrain the team's initiative and decision-making ability. SF should develop procedures that will protect the detachment from higher intervention. * Sensor-to-shooter links require not only speed, but also a close situational awareness -- a common operational picture -- from the detachment through the joint task force to the joint forces air-component commander. * Except for special-mission units, current forces lack dedicated aircraft and dedicated positions in the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center and in the Airborne Warning and Control System. Having the support of an operator in the air proved crucial to SOG's mission success. An operator overhead furnishes more urgent support than staff personnel located in a distant headquarters would. * The special-operations liaison element and the special-operations command-and-control element should be sustained. As a group, the one-zeros agreed on the following points: * Not everyone is cut out to conduct recon. * A soldier should not be penalized if he lacks the aptitude for recon. * Recon must be practiced at every opportunity. * Resources must be made available to recon teams, and distractors must be minimized. * The loyalty required for the recon mission must work down the chain as well as up -- senior officers must trust the judgment of the man on the ground. COPYRIGHT 2000 John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School __________________ The secrecy of my job prevents me from knowing just what it is that I do.
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