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Old 08-13-2005, 16:03   #4
Solid
Guerrilla Chief
 
Join Date: Feb 2004
Location: NC
Posts: 995
I was just waiting for him to announce in astonishment:
"Mein fuhrer, I can valk!!"

Based on lessons learned from history, it seems that in any occupation (or however else you phrase it so that it is not so politically charged a term) experiencing active insurgency, two capabilities must be preserved at all times: the capability to perform large-scale counter-offensives and offensives, and the capability to police the entirety of the nation.

At different times during the occupation, one or the other will have primacy. For the most part, I feel that the situation in Iraq still merits the primacy of large-scale combat capabilities. Only when a significant period of time has passed in which these capabilities have not been used can the policing capabilities come to the fore.

I feel that the Iraqi insurgents, either through necessity or strategy, have attempted to ensure that both capabilities must co-exist in Iraq. They achieve this by concentrating their efforts in certain areas while leaving others relatively peaceful (Basra at the start of the war, for example). The media then makes it seem like the situation all over Iraq is dire, which has political ramifications. This maximises the manpower drain for the U.S., and makes the situation look worse than it is.

That said, however, I think that the situation is still bad. When the insurgency still possesses the capability to cause meaningful harm to on-duty soldiers, it suggests to me at least that the coalition force must maintain a counter-offensive capability in country. Thus, personnel levels within the country should not drop too far. This does not, however, prevent personnel being allocated to provide training to police forces or actively aid police operations.

I think the real mistake of this administration was in the 'Mission Accomplished' proclaimation. For me, by highlighting the BIG WAR as the real mission, the administration implied that Iraq would be won through a short BIG WAR and then police operations that could stretch out in time. This, in my eyes, is certainly not true- when heavily armed soldiers, many mounted in vehicles, are being killed, it is not a police operation- it is BIG WAR fighting just on a different scale.

In short, I think the administration didn't pay enough attention in concieving the 'win the peace' portion of operations are an integral part to 'winning the war'.

That, however, is just my opinion. I might also add that the above is a chain of thought provoked largely by the Kissinger article, and therefore virgin to rigorous intellectual critique.

I'd be very interested in people's response to my thinking.

Thank you,

Solid

Last edited by Solid; 08-13-2005 at 16:05.
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