[Ambush Master]

EYEWITNESS STATEMENT BY MSG VERLIN R. G., XXX-XX-XXXX, OF EVENTS OF
22 JANUARY 1971



On 22 Jan 71 at approx 0900 hours, I was informed that a LOH was down in the Tbai AO, and as the reaction force team leader, I was to prepare for a Brightlight team insertion on the downed helicopter. At that time, both indigenous Brightlight teams were being utilized on another mission. One team was on security of the DZ during an airborne training operation, the second team on standby for a PW capture team that had already been inserted into our AO. I advised the S3 of this situation and was given permission to form an emergency Brightlight team from combat experienced US Cadre and RT students. This I did by asking CPT S., and the RT students, for volunteers. CPT S., SGT Bennett, SSG H., SGT Celano, SGT Opperman, immediately volunteered when told of the situation and were ready within three minutes after volunteering. SFC M., SSG Lovelace, and myself were from the Cadre. I assigned SFC M. to lead one team and one chopper, and I took charge of the other team. The CO gave us a check over and all the information that was available, then gave us the lift off sign. We arrived at the downed LOH site within approximately four minutes. SFC M. made his insertion into an LZ that was within thirty-five meters of the downed LOH. SFC M. and his team inserted into the LZ by ladder with no difficulty. My chopper approached the LZ and lowered down toward the LZ. The chopper pilot was taking entirely too much time in descending. I immediately gave him the signal to drop down thirty five feet and to move over to his left approximately five meters. He started his descent and then turned his chopper 180 degrees. His descent was very slow. SSG Lovelace and I then kicked our ladders overboard. The pilot was descending slowly as we went over the side and down the ladders to the end rungs. SSG Lovelace and SGT Celano were on the left ladder while SGT Opperman and I were on the right ladder. The pilot lowered us to within approximately 10 feet off the ground, right above a small tree. At this time I gave the signal to SSG Lovelace for he and I to jump because we were taking too much time hovering over the LZ and the pilot was not lowering the chopper down. Also we had only four men on the ground at the time. At approximately the same instant I prepared to jump, three AK 47s opened up from the ground on us. One AK was shooting at us hanging on the ladders, while one was shooting at the chopper, and one was shooting at the tail rotor. The pilot was shot and the chopper started upward and to the right. I immediately jumped from the ladder, as we were about thirty to thirty five feet in the air at that time. SSG Lovelace and the others did not jump. Just as I was departing the ladder one AK round hit one of the ladder rungs that I was on, and another creased the left side of my chest. On hitting the ground, a very hard pain hit me in my left side. I knew I had been hurt but how bad I didn't know. I was interested only in getting to the other four men on the ground. After crawling over to the other four men already on the ground, I let SFC M. know that I had been hurt and that he was to take over the radio because it was difficult for me to speak. I could still hear the turbine whine of the chopper engine that had crashed. I also heard automatic fire, then it stopped.
I told M. to get the men together and get going toward the downed chopper that I had come in on. This he did and he had only gone approximately twenty to twenty five meters when he came up on the downed LOH chopper and four large bunkers. Bennett spotted two pilots from the LOH and proceeded to check to see if they were alive or dead. Both were dead. M. told him to drag the bodies back to the LZ and tie them together for an extraction along with the M-60 machinegun from the LOH. We then proceeded over the top of the bunkers after looking around for the third LOH member. But we did not see him, as he had burned up in the LOH. At that time the LOH ammo started exploding, preventing a search. We backed off quickly and proceeded toward the downed Huey chopper. During this search I had checked my emergency radio and found it was inoperative. It had been damaged in my fall. I then used the PRC-25 while M. was supervising the removal of the bodies from the LOH. It was then that we were given approximately direction to the huey. Actually we were only about twenty meters away but the jungle floor was very dense with undergrowth. We then proceeded to the downed Huey and found a medic being lowered into the crash site. I told M. to form security around the Huey and start to work on the wounded. This was done and the wounded were evacuated out and then we started on the dead. At this time a B-40 rocket hit among us and it contained CS. We started to move away from the area when another B-40 rocket hit among us and wounded three of us, of which CPT S. was hit the most seriously. M. and I received minor wounds. Prior to this all, the dead and weapons had been assembled and ready to be evaced out when the rockets came in. At this time we started to move out of the immediate area and back to the LZ to extract the two bodies from the LOH and get CPT S. out. We made it back to the LZ and called for the Dustoff. It came in and M. asked me to go out too, because I was having difficulty in breathing and moving. He also stated that the link up forces were just outside our perimeter. Cpt S. and I were extracted to the 93rd Medical Evacuation Hospital at Long Binh. In closing my statement I would like to say that all the men that were with me performed their job under the most difficult situation like hard core Special Forces men should. They strictly volunteered for the mission, well knowing their chances. Some lost their lives in trying to save others. Lets hope that these men are not forgotten so soon. I know we won't forget them.


VERLIN R. G.
MSG, XXX-XX-XXXX
Det SGM, Det B-53