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NousDefionsDoc · 11-22-2004, 20:16

Russert: But your book did point out some contacts?

Scheuer: Certainly it was available in the open-source material, yes, sir.

This is nonsense. Scheuer would have us believe that although he never saw an Iraq-al Qaeda connection in the classified intelligence as head of the bin Laden unit, he wrote a book in 2002 including numerous examples of that connection based solely on open sources. Is it true that Scheuer did not see classified intelligence about the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship before 2002? That seems highly unlikely.

The Clinton administration cited intelligence on Iraq-al Qaeda to justify its strikes on the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in the Sudan on August 20, 1998. Those officials stand by their decision today. Former Defense Secretary William Cohen told the September 11 Commission that he saw intelligence that the head of the al Shifa plant traveled to Baghdad to meet with the head of Iraq's VX nerve gas program. Such intelligence also led the Clinton Administration to include the Iraq-al Qaeda connection in its first indictment of bin Laden.

Scheuer implies--but does not say directly--that he now believes the open source information is wrong. Would he have written that he was "certain" that Iraq provided WMD assistance to al Qaeda based solely on reports in an Italian newspaper or in other open sources? (I wonder if Scheuer plans to write a new introduction to that book to alert readers that he now considers several important passages to be dead wrong.)

Just for the sake of argument, let's take Scheuer's comments yesterday
at face value. Let's assume that he based the conclusions in his 2002 book solely on open sources and that he has since looked through 19,000 pages of classified material that gives not so much as a hint of an Iraq-al Qaeda connection. If he's right, then the intelligence failure on Iraq is far greater than we have thus far realized.

Consider what we have learned since the beginning of the Iraq war in March 2003. I will include in this list only those facts that are beyond dispute--things we've learned from captured documents authenticated by U.S. intelligence and in debriefings with senior Iraqi intelligence officials.

We know that Iraqi Intelligence officials reported in 1992 that Osama bin Laden was an Iraqi intelligence an "asset" that had "good relations" with the Iraqi intelligence station in Syria. We know that Sudanese government officials met with Uday Hussein at bin Laden's behest in 1994 to discuss cooperation on bin Laden's behalf. We know that deputy Iraqi intelligence director Faruq Hijazi met with bin laden, at least twice. We know that Saddam agreed to air anti-Saudi propaganda on Iraqi national television. We know that the Iraqis considered the numerous "contacts" with bin laden a "relationship"--as revealed in their internal documents. We know that in the mid-1990s an internal Iraqi intelligence memo revealed that Saddam sought "further cooperation" with al Qaeda. And we know that meetings between high-level al Qaeda terrorists and senior Iraqi intelligence officials took place throughout 1998.

Would Scheuer have us believe that there was nothing--"absolutely no connection in terms of a relationship," to use his words--in the 50,000 to 60,000 pages of classified intelligence that he recently reviewed? If so, the intelligence failures on Iraq are far greater than anyone has imagined.

One final point: Scheuer told Russert that he "had nothing to do with Iraq during my professional career until the run-up to the war." That is a jaw-dropping admission. And it might go along way to explaining why, despite the mounting evidence of a significant relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, the CIA for years overlooked or downplayed it.

We now know that the CIA never penetrated the inner circle of either Osama bin Laden or Saddam Hussein. We know this because senior U.S. intelligence officials have admitted it.

And now Scheuer tells us that in all of his analytical work on bin Laden he never looked at Iraq until shortly before the war.

Porter Goss has a big job to do.

Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at The Weekly Standard.

11-22-2004, 20:16	#38
NousDefionsDoc Quiet Professional Join Date: Jan 2004 Location: LA Posts: 1,653	Russert: But your book did point out some contacts? Scheuer: Certainly it was available in the open-source material, yes, sir. This is nonsense. Scheuer would have us believe that although he never saw an Iraq-al Qaeda connection in the classified intelligence as head of the bin Laden unit, he wrote a book in 2002 including numerous examples of that connection based solely on open sources. Is it true that Scheuer did not see classified intelligence about the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship before 2002? That seems highly unlikely. The Clinton administration cited intelligence on Iraq-al Qaeda to justify its strikes on the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in the Sudan on August 20, 1998. Those officials stand by their decision today. Former Defense Secretary William Cohen told the September 11 Commission that he saw intelligence that the head of the al Shifa plant traveled to Baghdad to meet with the head of Iraq's VX nerve gas program. Such intelligence also led the Clinton Administration to include the Iraq-al Qaeda connection in its first indictment of bin Laden. Scheuer implies--but does not say directly--that he now believes the open source information is wrong. Would he have written that he was "certain" that Iraq provided WMD assistance to al Qaeda based solely on reports in an Italian newspaper or in other open sources? (I wonder if Scheuer plans to write a new introduction to that book to alert readers that he now considers several important passages to be dead wrong.) Just for the sake of argument, let's take Scheuer's comments yesterday at face value. Let's assume that he based the conclusions in his 2002 book solely on open sources and that he has since looked through 19,000 pages of classified material that gives not so much as a hint of an Iraq-al Qaeda connection. If he's right, then the intelligence failure on Iraq is far greater than we have thus far realized. Consider what we have learned since the beginning of the Iraq war in March 2003. I will include in this list only those facts that are beyond dispute--things we've learned from captured documents authenticated by U.S. intelligence and in debriefings with senior Iraqi intelligence officials. We know that Iraqi Intelligence officials reported in 1992 that Osama bin Laden was an Iraqi intelligence an "asset" that had "good relations" with the Iraqi intelligence station in Syria. We know that Sudanese government officials met with Uday Hussein at bin Laden's behest in 1994 to discuss cooperation on bin Laden's behalf. We know that deputy Iraqi intelligence director Faruq Hijazi met with bin laden, at least twice. We know that Saddam agreed to air anti-Saudi propaganda on Iraqi national television. We know that the Iraqis considered the numerous "contacts" with bin laden a "relationship"--as revealed in their internal documents. We know that in the mid-1990s an internal Iraqi intelligence memo revealed that Saddam sought "further cooperation" with al Qaeda. And we know that meetings between high-level al Qaeda terrorists and senior Iraqi intelligence officials took place throughout 1998. Would Scheuer have us believe that there was nothing--"absolutely no connection in terms of a relationship," to use his words--in the 50,000 to 60,000 pages of classified intelligence that he recently reviewed? If so, the intelligence failures on Iraq are far greater than anyone has imagined. One final point: Scheuer told Russert that he "had nothing to do with Iraq during my professional career until the run-up to the war." That is a jaw-dropping admission. And it might go along way to explaining why, despite the mounting evidence of a significant relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, the CIA for years overlooked or downplayed it. We now know that the CIA never penetrated the inner circle of either Osama bin Laden or Saddam Hussein. We know this because senior U.S. intelligence officials have admitted it. And now Scheuer tells us that in all of his analytical work on bin Laden he never looked at Iraq until shortly before the war. Porter Goss has a big job to do. Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at The Weekly Standard. __________________ Somewhere a True Believer is training to kill you. He is training with minimal food or water, in austere conditions, training day and night. The only thing clean on him is his weapon and he made his web gear. He doesn't worry about what workout to do - his ruck weighs what it weighs, his runs end when the enemy stops chasing him. This True Believer is not concerned about 'how hard it is;' he knows either he wins or dies. He doesn't go home at 17:00, he is home. He knows only The Cause. Still want to quit?
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