[magician]

Originally Posted by Roguish Lawyer

What sayeth the magic birthday boy with respect to these assessments?

well....big bite to chew on...but here goes.

The South, per se, is relatively quieter, because the majority of the population there believe that their time to rule is nigh. The Shia support the current roadmap to representative government because historically, they have been suppressed and oppressed by the Sunni minority, and they can do math.

That said, it is perilous to ascribe uniform behavior and beliefs to any population, as the larger your sample, the more that schisms and exceptions emerge. And indeed this is the case with the Shia, with Sadr and his "army" merely one example.

It is also important to remember that Iraq is more than just Shia, Sunni, and Kurd, with a small Christian minority keeping its head down. Tribal affiliations are also important, and it is tribal affiliations which often serve as faultlines within the larger religious groupings.

And then, you have the wildcards represented by the Jihadis, and the criminals, or those who have resorted to criminal activities, due to the extreme economic disruption and dislocation of the occupation.

Trying to analyze Iraq is like trying to be systematic about a kaleidescope.

I would also advise reading what my esteemed brother and colleague The Reaper wrote very carefully:

The Sunni Triangle, which contains a fraction of the population of Iraq, is the main hotbed of unrest, and a small percentage of the people there support the terrorists. An even smaller percentage are actually terrorists.

I would like to gently point out that it is not so important that a "small percentage of the people there support the terrorists," as historically, a virulent underground does not require a huge infrastructure or broad apparatus as much as it requires well-placed sympathizers and co-conspirators. We all know that one mole in the right place can cripple entire governments, and anecdotes from Iraq are replete with tales of endemic insurgent penetrations of Iraqi police, military, and national guard forces.

More significantly, it is that the majority of the population tolerates the presence of what they term "resistance fighters," perhaps through misguided Islamic allegiance, or traditions of hospitality, or because of intimidation and fear to act.

It is not necessary for the majority of the population to support the Jihadis. It is enough if the majority of the population simply tolerates their presence, and does not act to expel them from their villages and neighborhoods and cities.

I would also point out that it is better for our enemy, in fact, in strategic terms, if the Jihadis are numerically small in number. Their target profile is accordingly lessened, and their vulnerability to penetration diminished. Given the destructive potency of modern weapons of war, and the emergence of the IED in all its permutations as the insurgent weapon of choice, it is simply not necessary for many Jihadis to wage war on US forces, and the nascent Iraqi security forces. It is enough if small cells with evolved expertise do so. In fact, their security is improved.

I personally would like to thank the Jihadis for congregating in places like Fallujah. They are easier to kill.

Until we are somehow able to find a prescription for broadening the security umbrella, and consolidating simple peace and order over stable swaths of territory and population concentrations, we are chasing a chimera in Iraq. Until the equation can be somehow changed, and Abdullah Average Iraqi is motivated to inform on insurgents laying low in the house next door, we will forever be reacting to insurgent strikes, rather than effectively targeting insurgent units, and their internal lines of communication. We will remain on the defensive, and the initiative will remain with the bad guys.

I have been receiving reports from pals elsewhere in Iraq, and it is apparent to me that the assault on Fallujah, vital and necessary as it was, may have merely precipitated the wider distribution of insurgents throughout broader parts of the country. Truly draconian population control measures are required in Iraq, with Soviet-style internal passports and ubiquitous checkpoints and roving patrols. These measures are inimical to a flourishing economy, which fundamentally is the one thing that can save Iraq.

Then, we need the equivalent of neighborhood block security committees, and we have to start running agents and hiring informants everywhere. And this will require an Iraqi infrastructure of security institutions which no longer exists.

Unfortunately, the cure for Iraq may be inimical to the spirit of democratic institutions. In a place that has no tradition of democracy, but does have some experience with fascism, and the features of a police state, an Iraq that is kept from the clutches of the Mullahs in Iran, or is somehow contiguously saved from the chaos of civil war, may come to resemble its old self under Saddam more than we would like to admit.

I would like to write more, but I am getting chased out of the office. Maybe tomorrow. And besides, I am hungry.