Quote:
Originally Posted by Peregrino
Sigaba - Sorry, You're going to have to defend that one. My understanding of the Wesphalian model has plenty of room for a nation state making decisions WRT defending against threats to sovereignty and self-determination - including the use of stereotypes to discriminate against members of a nation/culture whose base philosophy is inimical to the preservation of our own way of life.
As a practical point, respect for "the thrust of American diplomatic history" should not equate to shackling us to a "suicide pact" wherein we adjudge all cultures equally meritorious. Times and threats change; the wise person adapts to meet the new challenges. If that means re-looking previous practices, so be it. I'm confident that route (in today's America) does not lead to National Socialism.
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Peregrino--
My perception of the Westphalian model is much like my understanding of the "original intent' of the founders. That is, affairs of the state are best conducted by disinterested parties. To be clear, I am not arguing that the dividing point of elite and mass is determined by socio-economic factors, political ideology, gender identity, or cultural practices. I am suggesting that those who seek to participate in this discourse should strive towards a sensibility in which passion tempers knowledge but emotions do not overwhelm the ability to think about the consequences of one's choices. In short, I am arguing that in matters of peace and of war, Athena should, at all times, trump Ares.
IRT your observation of American diplomatic history and the present day, I offer the following comments as IMO/MOO/YMMV.
Our own history is filled with examples in which America's interests have led to statesmen picking stability over opportunities to empower populations to achieve the freedoms we espouse--both at home and abroad. IMO "revisionist" diplomatic historians go way overboard in turning these arguments into a broader indictment of American civilization. However, I think they've marshaled enough historical evidence to show that American foreign policy has worked at cross purposes with both our most cherished values and the very interests we sought to protect in the first place.
Similarly, on those occasions when our ideological views have overshadowed our perceptions of self interest, we've also put into place policies that ultimately worked against our long term interests. Two examples from U.S.-Soviet relations illustrate this point. America's participation in the allied intervention in the Russian civil war stemmed in part from President Wilson's hostility towards communism and his belief that Russians weren't civilized enough for democracy. The failed intervention helped Bolsheviks to argue that the capitalist world was permanently committed to preventing any and all aspects of the Marxist political agenda from coming to fruition. In turn, this position emboldened subsequent purges (executions) of those Communists who argued for some form of accommodation with the west and an ensuing climate of political terror that limited the USSR's range of acceptable options until the 1980s.
During the 1980s, Republican rhetoric about Islamic freedom fighters as allies in a global struggle against Communism undermined unintentionally serious discussions among naval strategists about the link between Islamic radicalism and terrorism. Notwithstanding this concern, Mahanian navalists were not going to allow nuance get in the way of any chance to build bigger ships designed for warfare in the open ocean even though there were articulate calls for ships to handle the lower end of the spectrum of conflict.
These two examples are not merely reflections of the hindsight of history. Both choices reflected decisions that were debated contemporaneously. While these debates did not forecast decades' long struggles against vastly different ideologies, they did provide opportunities to develop alternatives that went unexplored.
Consequently, I believe that the United States is better off when it takes an approach to foreign relations that balances a "reasoned" approach to its geostrategic interests and its ideas. To me, a crucial component of this unending quest for balance is that we consistently put forth our best effort to avoid frames of mind that reflect rage ("Kill them all") or despair ("Fortress America") or misguided paternalistic sympathy ("They're simply victims of Western industrialization and colonialism").
In some cases, the approach that I have in mind is going to result in questions that are difficult to understand, much less answer. As TR points out, there are approximately 1.6 billion Muslims in the world. If, as some suggest, only a small percentage (say 10%) of this total accepts uncritically a literal interpretation of the Koran, that's still 160 million people to worry about.
Finally, IRT your evaluation of contemporary America
not being at risk for plunging into darkness in a way similar to Germany, I hope you're right.