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As a historian, I'm uncomfortable when anyone offers analysis of a dynamic that is (a) mono-causal in nature, and (b) gleaned from an "aha" moment that centers around an individual's personal life.
Similarly, I am very leery of any plan of action that seeks to fuse the way of the warrior with the way of the businessman. IMO, since the end of the Second World War, civilians have unself-consciously sought to appropriate the mindset of armed service professionals. During the Cold War, this appropriation was part of a broader effort to de-legitimize war as an instrument of policy and to undermine the professionalism of the armed forces. This effort reached its peak when McNamara was SecDef.
After the Cold War, this dynamic seems to be about civilians seeking to buttress their gendered identities. (If you push paper and count beans for a living in a corporate environment, what better way to reclaim your manhood than to recast business plans and sales goals as 'missions', 'strategies,' and 'objectives'?) So when we need to listen to what warriors and soldiers have to say about warfare, we do so with a tin ear and even less comprehension than normal.
Thus, while I'm not in the least bit qualified to assess the sustainability of Mr. Burlingame's analysis of and recommendations for QPs, I worry about the unintended consequence of his argument falling into the dynamic discussed in the previous two paragraphs.
My $0.02.
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