Ok, the royal family. As noted, the Foreign Affairs piece mentions a rivarly between Prince Naif and Crown Prince Abdullah. Now alliances in the Kingdom shift as often as the sands (how is that for a tired and easy cliche?), but at essence the main rivalries/factions are threefold: the Sudairis, the Crown Prince and his allies, and the "Free Princes". However, within the Sudairis, for example, there are shifting factions and rivalries as well, and there is another non-Sudairi faction that is often closer to them, that of the Foreign Minister.
Who are these people?
The father of modern Saudi Arabia, King Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, has a very fitting name. He apparently had 43-45 sons (and a number of daughters that don't really matter in Saudi society), 40 or so of whom reached adulthood and 29 of whom are apparently still alive. Those who are living range in age from Muhammad ibn Abd al-Aziz, who if he is still alive is 93 (I can't confirm one way or the other) to the relative whippersnapper Hammud ibn Abd al-Aziz, aged 56.
The most important clique among these brothers and half-brothers are the "Sudairi Seven". "Sudayri" in this context refers to the descendants of 'Abd al-Aziz through one of his of his wives, Hussa bint Ahmad Sudayri. Their seven sons are:
- Fahd, Prime Minister, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques (he eschews the title "King")
- Sultan, Second Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Aviation and Inspector General
- 'Abd ar-Rahman, Deputy Minister of Defense and Aviation and Inspector General
- Naif, Minister of the Interior and Chairman of the Civil Defense Council
- Salman, Governor of Riyadh Region
- Ahmad, Deputy Minister of the Interior
- Turki, a businessman and "philanthropist" with no official government position
Also, a cousin of the Sudairi Seven through their mother is Saad bin Nasir al-Sudayri, the Secretary General of the National Security Council.
The next most important clique is that of the Crown Prince. Abdullah has no full brothers, and maintains his power base through alliances with other half-brothers and through the tribes (especially the northern tribes of his mother's family).
The "Free Princes" today have little power. They were a group that advocated democratic reforms in the early 1960s, while King Sa'ud ruled. When Saud was deposed in 1964, they were allowed to return from exile, but they haven't exerted much influence since. The "leader" of the group, Prince Talal, is the UNESCO Special Envoy for Water. Prince Talal's son Alwaleed bin Talal became prominent when Rudy Guiliani refused his gift to the 9-11 fund.
The Foreign Minister, Saud al-Faisal, is sort of in his own wing. He is the son of King Faisal, and thus a grandson of Abd al-Aziz. His brother Turki was Chief of General Intelligence until August 2001, when he was replaced by someone closer to Crown Prince Abdullah, Prince Nawwaf ibn Abd al-Aziz. Turki has retuned to prominence however, having become Ambassador to the UK in March 2003. Another brother, Khalid, is a regional governor.
Sudairi factions
While generally the Sudairi Seven are close, meeting regularly, they have their own rivalries. Foreign Affairs cites Prince Naif, who as Interior Minister has become prominent in the fight against terrorism inside the Kingdom. And Salman, as Governor of Riyadh, has the most prominent of the regional power bases (and his son is Deputy Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources).
Prince Sultan, having control of the armed forces, also has a powerful base. He is reckoned at being third in power after the King and Crown Prince. Two of Sultan's sons are Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Ambassador to the United States, and Gen. Prince Khalid bin Sultan, Assistant Minister of Defense and commander of Arab forces in Desert Storm. After Desert Storm, given the prominence of his sons, there was fear he had too much power, and there was a period of reshuffling (Khalid was dismissed as commander of the Army), but he has since returned to prominence.
The Power Portfolios
There are some 3000 royal princes, so everyone has some sort of job, but power rests in certain key positions, which I have mentioned in passing above in connection with the name of the Prince. Here are the key positions, by position rather than holder:
- The Royal Court - Fahd's turf
- Ministry of Defense and Aviation; the Saudi Armed Forces - the tanks and planes; also the General Intelligence Directorate is under it, but the Prince who runs it is fairly autonomous
- Ministry of the Interior - controls the police, Frontier Guards, Coast Guard and the mutawiin, or "religious police". Also, the regional governorates report to the Ministry.
- Saudi Arabian National Guard - a tribally-based military force which acts as a check on the Army and a way for the tribal leaders to retain influence. Although the Army has the M-1A2s and Bradleys, the SANG is probably a more capable fighting force.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs - not a power ministry per se, but important in presenting the Saudi face to the world.
A second-tier power portfolio is, oddly, the Ministry of Municipal & Rural Affairs, formerly the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, which among other things controls alot of patronage through various projects. The Minister is Mit'ib ibn Abd al-Aziz, another half-brother of the King.
The Next Generation
Since King Abd al-Aziz al-Saud's death, the succession has been horizontally among his sons. The brothers together choose a Crown Prince. Abdullah has been Crown Prince since Fhad ascended to the throne. But as this generation of sons grows older, and the 100 or so grandsons get restless, there may be problems. Two of those grandsons managed to get killed (one was killed in riots in 1965 and another was executed after he assassinated King Faisal in 1975.
It remains possible that some of these sons whose fathers were Kings might think they have as much of a royal prerogative as someone whose brother was king.
Baer's piece is a bit over the top (albeit not too much), but he posits that Fahd's youngest son Abd al-Aziz ibn Fahd has ambitions of being King. Abd al-Aziz ibn Fahd carries the many outwardly empty titles Minister of State, Cabinet Member and Chief of the Court of Cabinet's Presidency; his power is as a gatekeeper to his father and as a hoarder of oil wealth. His older brother Saud is Deputy Chief of General Intelligence and his oldest brother Muhammad is Governor of the oil-rich Eastern Province.Interior Minister Prince Naif's son Saud, meanwhile, is Deputy Governor of the Eastern Province.
I already mentioned Prince Sultan's sons Bandar and Khalid. Bandar has the biggest profile in the US, but has no claim to the throne as his mother was a house servant (or slave if you ask some people).
The late King Saud's sons Muhammad and Misha'al are both governors, but are not major players.
As mentioned, King Faisal's son Saud is Foreign Minister and his son Turki was Chief of General Intelligence and is now Ambassador in London. His son Khalid is Governor of Asir Region.
None of King Khalid's sons is very prominent, but judging by the "who's in" criteria, they are close to the Crown Prince.
Conclusion
One thing to keep in mind is that despite talk of various rivalries within the royal family, these people have managed their relationships with each other for quite some time. In 1962-63, as King Saud slipped into medical problems, a power-sharing arrangement was worked out for the power portfolios. Fahd became Interior Minister, Abdullah took command of the National Guard, Sultan became Defense Minister and Salman became Governor of Riyadh. Naif took over the Interior Ministry when Fahd became Crown Prince in 1975, but in essence they have held their relative power positions for 40 years.
Although I don't agree with all Baer's conclusions, he does hit on most of the major issues and especially whether this forty-plus year system of checks and balances is on the edge of collapse. He doesn't address the Shi'a problem, though, which has many Saudis deathly concerned about developments to their north in southern Iraq. Perhaps that should be the next topic?
Regards,
Dave