The article in the OP offers an argument similar to those who opposed CVBs centered around
Nimitz-class CVNs during the 1970s. Now, like then, the argument is vulnerable to the following questions.
- If larger expensive ships are too vulnerable/valuable to risk closing with the enemy, what is the logic of building ships that are less expensive and less capable if they're going to be sent into the same environment?
- Does this choice not entail an abandonment of the concept of power projection?
- Would the accompanying decline in the navy's ability to project power also reduce the fleet's credibility as a conventional deterrent (and ultimately, as a nuclear deterrent)?
FWIW, I agree with LarryW's take that the article in the OP is an example of a
Proceedings article throwing stones without offering a viable solution. In this case, I think the article would have been more thought provoking (rather than provocative) had its writers led with the last part first and further developed their vision of American sea power in the mid twenty first century and then made the case for their preferred platforms. At the very least, this approach would allow readers to understand that the essay does as much to defend American navalism as it does to question its present-day relevance.
My $0.02.