[MtnGoat]

As we transition toward an Afghan-led counterinsurgency strategy that relies on a limited conventional forces footprint, aided by Special Forces and the CIA. Counterterrorism strategy relies on U.S. Special Operations Forces and others to conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. I say U.S. Military needs to develop a better plan to train, equip, and advise Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police forces from the top down counterinsurgency program. Why Top Down. Because to me most policemen and soldiers are uneducated and their leaders are what need to know on how to plan, forecast and execute training and operations.

How do we assist local communities improve security, governance, and development – including through village-level community forces. The bottom-up approach to counterinsurgency. The selling points of the Afghan Local Police program, which so many try to say has undermined Taliban control in Helmand, Kandahar, and Oruzgan, by helping villagers protect their communities and better connecting them to district and provincial government. I love the way Karzai didn’t want the Local Power but the Central Government Power that the USG sold him one.

While we have been conducting direct action operations against high value targets with little effects on the overall scheme. Most within Military feels a ANA lead strategy entails some risks for both sides. It relies on ANA and ANP doing the bulk of counterinsurgency, but with U.S. assistance and oversight. How can we provide “enablers” for the Afghan Forces. Yes enablers such as intelligence, civil affairs, and military information support operations.

Then there is the Pakistan option. Pakistan and the United States have failed IMHO to target the insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan, especially in Baluchistan Province. Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps forces have conducted operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas to the north, and the United States has conducted numerous drone strikes in Baluchistan Province. But relatively little has been done in Baluchistan. The United States and Pakistan must target Taliban leaders in Baluchistan within Chamman, Wana and Quetta. The most obvious way is to conduct joint US-PAK clandestine raids to capture Taliban leaders in Baluchistan; large-scale military force would be unnecessary and counterproductive, especially after current events. Most Taliban are in or near cities like Quetta and Karachi.

Special Forces need to push their Afghan Partners to do more within in their areas. ANA leadership needs to plan and execute kinetic and non-kinetic missions not USSF. SF needs to understand that they are the ones to teach ANA, ANP and ALP to kick in those doors and shoot people in the face. SF NCOs must understand that language capability is essential in order to support ANA to follow the key counterinsurgency injunction to live with the population, and requirements will grow a relationship those ANA and locals. Not falling back on the interpreters ODA find to support their operations. More SF guys with local language ability makes, but such guys that have been enrolled in Command Language Programs for Dari and Pashto. Must also require time to develop their ability to communicate in either of them on substantive matters, basic Combat terms would be great for all SF NCOs to know. Yes we all want more money, but the value you’re getting to know just how to say the basics in an language goes hundred miles when you say it and not your interpreters.

I also think the SF Interpreters that have come to the U.S. via a SF sponsor and want to go back to Interpret should be slotted to go back to USSF teams and not to Conventional Forces.