[bailaviborita]

Originally Posted by NiteTrain

You see, the thing about UW is that you have to have an attainable/winnable end result. One that is tangible in nature and not just ideology that can not be manifested because of improper planning, UNREALISTIC expectations, and lack of follow-through.

Shoot- I'd say that that should be the same for any mission we go on- but you're right- the lack of that in Afghanistan- which I blame 99% on the military- is what is hurting us the most (about 70%?).

Originally Posted by NiteTrain

You can not create an ALP/VSO program, which is community policing on steroids, and not provide constant oversight and follow-through of the program. You train "SELECTED" villagers to take on the task of protectors of their respective villages, but where is the constant oversight. An SFODA split can not train, equip, and oversee a mass produced program like this and still run combat operations to create "white-space" in their AO. That is a man-power issue. What happens when ALP is left unchecked in a village? Do they take over the village? Do they join with the INS because they were with them all along and only wanted training and equipment? Do they start or continue bloody tribal wars now that they have weapons? Or what happens to these ALP forces when we leave. Who takes care of them then? Are the people anymore pro-GIRoA than they have been?

Great point. Since ISAF is planning on massively increasing ALP, one wonders what will happen then. Not enough SOF- so IJC forces step in and do "partnering" and overwatch of the ALP- much like their partnering with ANCOP and ANP. We called it "drive-by partnering". So, it only gets worse...???

Originally Posted by cszakolczai

So would you say that the oversight of the villages needs to be done by someone who is not known to be an overseer?

Also, do you think there is anyway to ensure people stay loyal to GIRoA or has it become embedded in their nature throughout the decades to side with anyone in power?

Not following your first question. Bottom line is that we can't set up a force, help arm and train it, then not provide it with proper oversight. A whole litany of problems can happen: they sell their weapons/equipment, they attack GIRoA forces, they attack Coalition forces, they molest the people, or they simply provide the people with no value.

I adhere to the "propensity" school of thought. Much like in the U.S.- people have a certain worldview and not much will change that worldview. So- the propensity in much of Afghanistan is to "survive". That takes on different forms in different parts of the country- but in many places- if not most- it manifests itself in people only trusting local folks and being very suspicious of and not wanting to invest in outsiders. This includes Tajik police and soldiers if you're not in the Tajik areas. GIRoA will have to prove to the locals that they can provide them with more good than they cause them pain- and GIRoA is as screwed up as a 9 year-old democracy can expect to be in an area that doesn't necessarily appreciate or find useful governance of the self through formal elections and proxies...

So- in short- no way to ensure people "stay" loyal to GIRoA since they aren't loyal already- and there hasn't been much success in "ensuring" anything that we want that involves changing established behavior.