[plato]

Originally Posted by nw44451

My own observations seem to support these numbers and force me to view them in a negative, even destructive, light.
(A well done Combat Studies Institute “Occasional Paper” on the subject: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/cs...grath_op23.pdf)

Before 9/11 when I had to build and staff an Ops organization, this was my bread and butter. I spent a lot of time at the pentagon, doing verbal combat with the who's-who to the point of almost, but not quite, being kicked out. That's what the boss hired me to do.

You can probably pick up the numbers from existing manuals. I used to have a few I kept handy to toss off the top of my head. Don't have them any more.

But, consider...

At some time during WWI, a unit could put a certain amount of firepower "down range". Later, in our history, a unit half that size could put that amount of firepower down range, and in our current situation, a unit 1/4 the size of the WWI unit could put that much down range.

Now, the question is..... if a soldier can put 4 times as much hurt on an enemy, do you want him to have the ammunition necessary to do so? (I asked that question of many conference rooms of pure civilians, and watched their eyes glaze over). The answer is obviously "Yes".

That being the case, would you like the trucks to carry it to the troops? If so, would you like the number of fork lifts, conex containers, etc., to get that ammo on the trucks?

A study that doesn't look at increased capability is fatally flawed.

Now, when we move 50k and strike, rather than station our support near the trenches, we need our support, not in the occasional convoy, but just behind the battle formation. Our first lift requirement has increased.

A column moving along at 2 mph, shooting the occasional pheasant with musket and ball is much more supportable.

However, you lose the war.