[The Reaper]

This might be worth looking at....

TR

Effective Use of FID: Expands SF Influence

by Captain Stephen C. Flanagan

During the past six years of combat rotations to Iraq, United States Army Special Forces have refined their lines of operation, or LOOs, to meet the ever-evolving challenges presented on the battlefield of counterinsurgency, or COIN.

The LOOs directed by combined joint special-operations task forces, or CJSOTFs, in Iraq and Afghanistan have varied greatly over time and have included: targeting enemy networks, conducting tribal engagements, conducting information and psychological operations, conducting combined lethal operations and developing networks of influence. However, one LOO that has remained the constant emphasis for the 10th SF Group in shaping the battlefield in Operation Iraqi Freedom is the conduct of foreign internal defense, or FID.

Joint Publication 1-02 defines FID as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.” The 10th SF Group has prioritized FID, emphasizing military training and combat-advising, to improve the capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces, or ISF, and ultimately to protect Iraqi society from insurgency. During OIF V and VI, SF Operational Detachment-Alpha 0324 learned that effective FID not only led to improved employment of ISF but also enabled the ODA to develop strong networks of influence and effectively accomplish the desired effects along their assigned LOOs.

Based in Kirkuk during OIF V, ODA 0324 spent the first half of its deployment conducting FID training with 84 Kurdish soldiers of the 4th Iraqi Army Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance Company.

In July 2007, the ODA conducted training in the military decision-making process, or MDMP, reassessing how to more effectively shape the operational environment.

The ODA found that multiple friendly elements redundantly focused on insurgents in the Kirkuk City area, collected intelligence from the same sources and partnered with the same Iraqi elements.

Meanwhile, the detachment’s intelligence preparation of the battlefield indicated that the greatest threat had shifted to an area outside of Kirkuk City: Diyala Province was teeming with violence between al-Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI, and Jaysh al-Mehdi, or JAM.1 Intelligence indicated the Hamrin Mountains, running along the Salah ad-Din/Kirkuk provincial boundary, provided an unimpeded supply route into Diyala for AQI.2 The key AQI node at the northern end of that supply line was the Zaab Triangle, formed by the towns of Bayji, Hawijah and Sharqat, with Zaab Village at its center.

There were virtually no coalition forces, or CF, and few ISF forces in the triangle because it was on the seam between three CF brigades and four provinces: Ninewah, Kirkuk, Irbil and Salah ad-Din. AQI firmly controlled most of the Zaab Triangle. The Hamrin Mountains essentially formed an AQI “supply snake” into Diyala Province, with the Zaab Triangle at its head. The ODA’s MDMP concluded that the best way to attack the snake was to cut off its head. >Top <blockedhttp://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/Page1.htm>

In August 2007, therefore, ODA 0324 constructed a combat outpost in the heart of the Zaab Triangle, co-located with the largely AQI-corrupted 18th Strategic Infrastructure Battalion, or SIB. The ODA established close ties with the commander of the 18th SIB, mitigated his corruption, and initiated intensive FID training with his best platoons. The ODA advised NCOs from the 4th Iraqi Army ISR Company who were training platoons of the 18th SIB Scout and Quick Reaction Force, or QRF. This was a noteworthy accomplishment, persuading the Shiite Kurdish soldiers of the 4th IA to train with and later conduct missions alongside the Sunni soldiers of the 18th SIB. The FID training promoted a healthy competition between the Iraqi units to be the best ISF direct-action force in the area, demonstrating a vast expansion of the ODA’s influence.

The QRF platoon leader soon introduced the ODA commander to a retired major general of the Iraqi police. The general commanded the loyalties of the dominant tribe in the area. The timing of the meeting was crucial. AQI had recently killed a tribal member because it believed he had cooperated with U.S. forces. AQI had established the Islamic State of Iraq, or ISI, implementing strict, radical Sunni Sharia law, and it maintained dominance in the general area.

AQI regularly distributed ISI newsletters full of propaganda against the government of Iraq, or GOI, and the U.S. government, and it corrupted local leaders of the ISF and government. AQI conducted grisly executions for minor infractions of the Sharia law, including beheadings in the center of towns. Through those coercive tactics, AQI gained the ability to collect local taxes and command control of the area. However, with the execution of the tribesman and the arrival of ODA 0324 to the area, that was all about to change.

The ODA developed a close relationship with the general and the area tribal leaders, who previously had been wary of CF, ISF and the GOI. The ODA fostered the development of a tribal sahawa, or “awakening,” against AQI, in the form of a network of concerned local citizens. The sahawa organization slowly began providing the ODA with atmospherics and intelligence. With that intelligence, the ODA began combat-advising its counterparts in the 4th IA, ISR and 18th SIB to conduct direct-action raids against AQI facilitators and weapons caches.

As the ODA and FID partners degraded AQI control of the area, the sahawa grew in its strength, willingness and ability to provide intelligence. Local ISF also began cooperating more with the ODA and even asserting itself to enforce the GOI rule of law. The regional police chief began coming to sahawa meetings and cooperating fully with the ODA. The commander of the 18th SIB also grew less corrupt and began to employ his line companies in ODA-advised clearing operations against AQI.

On Sept. 17, 2007, the ODA and the 18th SIB Scout Platoon were en route to recover a cache when the combined force was caught in a two-sided ambush in a tight alley in the AQI stronghold of Hugna. All the FID training paid off — the SIB Scouts responded professionally.

The combined element returned fire, pushed beyond the kill zone and quickly began clearing back through that portion of the village. The ODA synchronized maneuver of the combined assault force, the Humvee-based support-by-fire elements, close air support from the 2-6 Cavalry, and a company-sized QRF provided by the 18th SIB and the 5-82 Field Artillery Battalion.

The action resulted in no friendly casualties, 14 detained AQI operatives and one enemy killed. The dead man, Baha Turki Abd Shabib, had been on the ODA’s high-value target, or HVT, list. He was the AQI leader of the Hugna area and had been linked to the deaths of more than 60 innocent Iraqis, including the notorious beheading of an Iraqi soldier. Shabib had been responsible for manufacturing IEDs and directing numerous IED attacks against CF and ISF.3 The operation was an ISF victory and resulted in the degradation of AQI in the Hugna area.

Also in September 2007, the ODA received a tip from a sahawa contact about a regional AQI leader in Old Zaab Village. The ODA and the 18th SIB QRF Platoon conducted a daylight time-sensitive raid and arrested Sattam Hamid Khalif, the area AQI leader, former Baath Party leader and 3/25 BCT HVT, who had been the primary target of nearly a dozen CF-led raids since 2003.4 The celebration in the streets over his capture lasted for the next several days.

Sattam’s capture was a huge psychological blow to area AQI. In just three months, the ODA had trained the formerly stagnant 18th SIB and advised them as they performed 32 successful direct-action operations, captured or killed 43 AQI operatives and recovered seven caches. These operations demoralized the AQI in the Zaab Triangle and asserted the ODA-advised ISF as the authority of the area. >Top <blockedhttp://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/Page1.htm>