[Richard]

Iran loses clout in Arab world
Scott Peterson, CSM, 29 Nov 2009
Part 2 of 2

The official rhetoric emanating from the regime since the election has remained strident. Khamenei has declared Ahmadinejad's victory a "divine assessment." A host of election complaints and anecdotal evidence of widespread fraud – along with official results that Iran analysts say are virtually impossible to achieve in Iran's mix of ethnic, social, and political constituencies – have not caused the regime to back down. Khamenei, in fact, has decreed the refusal to accept the election results as the "biggest crime."

The opposition remains active and defiant. It has been marking up currency notes with slogans supporting Mir Hossein Mousavi, the moderate challenger who declared the election was stolen, as well as with pictures of a bloodied Neda Soltan, the 19-year-old student shot dead by a Basij gunman. It is also painting opposition graffiti on streets and in classrooms.

ONE TEST OF IRAN'S current standing in the region lies among the mosques and militias of southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah has been watching the turbulence more closely than any of Tehran's allies.

Hezbollah was founded with Iranian help in response to Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It is the only organization outside Iran that adheres strictly to Ayatollah Khomeini's system of velayat-e faqih, leadership by an infallible supreme theologian.

Iran still provides significant funding and weaponry to Hezbollah, and all members must swear allegiance to the Islamic system led today by Khamenei.

Still, as an example of the damage done to Iran's image, Nasrallah, the Hezbollah chief, has noted Iran's "internal problems." Significant, too, the ultraconservative Tehran Friday prayer leader, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, related in a mid-October sermon how Nasrallah told him "that following [the postelection violence] he has received phone calls from all over the world. They expressed displeasure and were asking him questions. They were telling him that all the world's oppressed and liberal-minded people have pinned their hopes on Iran."

One week prior to Iran's June vote, Hezbollah itself suffered a blow in Lebanon's general election. The bloc that it led was expected to gain a majority of seats in parliament, but, in fact, held steady at 45 percent, against the US-backed bloc that won the remainder. Another blow struck the militia's well-honed reputation for incorruptibility when a Lebanese businessman close to Hezbollah was caught in a vast Bernard Madoff-style scheme to rip-off investors.

"I think you can crudely – and I would be very careful to push this too far – map some of the twists and turns that Iran has taken over the last few years, alongside those that Hezbollah has taken, because we've seen some similar dynamics," says Nicholas Noe, the editor in chief of the Beirut-based Mideastwire.com.

He and others believe that just as Iran's credentials have been eroded since the election, so has – to a lesser degree – Hezbollah's self-assigned role as the just leader of the Lebanese Shiites and as a member of the "axis of resistance" that stands up to Israel and the US.

Indeed, Beirut's leftist As-Safir newspaper predicted that "Hezbollah's patriotism will increase more than ever, based on its increased need to broaden its popular base and ... to compensate for the loss of a decisive Iranian ally."

Yet the impact of the damage done to "Brand Iran" – to use Mr. Noe's phrase – may be limited, both in Lebanon and in the larger Arab world. For one thing, only a minority of people in Lebanon, even among Shiites, look to Iran for spiritual guidance. For another, many of Tehran's closest allies – Hezbollah, Shiite parties in Iraq, Hamas – are already well established militarily and politically.

Then, too, as long as Iran keeps sending money and weaponry, the ties will remain strong no matter what happens on Tehran's streets. "We don't really care about the internal political situation in Iran," says Abu Hassan, a unit commander in the military wing of Hezbollah, sipping a cup of sweetened tea in Beirut's southern suburbs. "It doesn't matter to us who is the president, so long as they continue to support us. We don't interfere in their politics."

On the West Bank, the admiration for Iran remains even tighter. Despite official hostility by the Western-backed Palestinian Authority for Tehran's support of Hamas, the view of the election crisis among many is almost a facsimile of the hard-line view in Tehran. "Ahmadinejad wants to build power for himself and his country. And I think it's in his right," says Sheikh Mahmoud Musleh, a Hamas parliament member in Ramallah, who was jailed for two years after his election in 2006.

Leaders like Ahmadinejad should serve as a "model" for Arab nations, says Mr. Musleh, twiddling two rubber bands as if they were worry beads. He blames foreign "interests" for fomenting the unrest. "I can feel how the Western intelligence is seeping through the streets of Iran and disrupting harmony," he says. "It isn't in our interests to side with one side or the other.... Our interest is to have good relations with whoever rules Iran."

That message is even stronger in the warren of the Jalazoun refugee camp on the edge of Ramallah, where graffiti showing machine guns and the Palestinian flag dominates. Men gathered around a television praise Iran. "Any enemy of Israel's is a friend of the Palestinians," says Abu Mohammed. "In any case, not one Arab country is capable of fighting Israel in the way that Iran is able."

WITH ALL THE internal strife in Iran, all this poses a central question for those who rule in Tehran: How much should they continue to focus on exporting the revolution? During the postelection tumult, the demonstrators made clear their wariness over the regime's costly support of resisting the US, Israel, and the West on distant battlefields – especially at a time of torpor in the Iranian economy.

Their slogan: "Neither Gaza, nor Lebanon. May my life be sacrificed for Iran."

Yet there are both political and strategic reasons for the regime to be sending money and guns beyond its own borders. Khamenei, for one, is known to have appreciated the goodwill that came to Iran from the Arab street during the first four years of the Ahmadinejad presidency.

One veteran analyst in Tehran says that while he understands the desire of many disgruntled Iranians to focus internally, the regime also has a strong rationale for continuing to export its influence. "They think we have enemies in the world, and it's better to move away the hot flash points from national borders, and keep our enemies busy further away," he says.

With the Israeli-Palestinian peace process stalling, Iran might also find new receptivity around the region to reenergizing the axis of resistance, which could serve to take the focus off its own election fiasco. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has suggested that "resistance" might be the only way, while Nasrallah was quoted recently as saying: "What we see is absolute American commitment to Israeli interests ... while disregarding the dignity of feeling of the Arab and Muslim people."

Some conservative websites inside and outside the country are, in fact, urging Iran to revivify its bellicosity with Israel and the West. "They are revising this idea of exporting the revolution," says Torfeh at the University of London. "Some people are saying, 'We should rekindle a second stage of exporting Islam to the world, and work on regenerating our appeal.' So, obviously, they are a little concerned about the impact of recent months."

Yet the deeper question is which direction the country should be going in altogether. In Iran, even the meaning of the legacy of Khomeini – often called "imam" by the faithful in Iran – is the subject of sharp debate. Would the father of Iran's revolution have accepted a natural and moderate "evolution," in order for it to remain vibrant and viable, as reformists and many protesters believe?

Or are the hard-line values honed by the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s and a strict spiritual interpretation – beliefs that exclude nonbelievers from government and permit the beating of "enemies," even if they are fellow Iranians – the ones to pursue?

Paradoxically, both sides see a larger rationale for their positions. "Of all these people in prison, most consider themselves followers of the imam [Khomeini]," notes the Tehran analyst. "And all those who are torturing them also consider themselves followers of the imam."

http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/1130/p25s03-wome.html